If I understand you correctly, then, a U.S. that had none of those (handwave it for illo) would have a number of dips on OTL schedule, & in around '72, something like another '29 Crash? (Maybe not that same scale...) And the likes of Arab oil restrictions wouldn't matter much? Or are you counting those in with the "dips"?
Broadly. You're going to get post-war. Post war is going to bleed through until the skilled and semi-skilled (a new category created just for white people!) working class are bought off. Then the buy off will spur a consumer economy. And the predelicion for state spending will *generally* keep growth positive. Insert a war? Instant boom, followed by recession. Cut all the programmes? That's a lot of Lockheed workers not buying Fords.
I'm suggesting:
There's a Kondratieff wave present in all capitalist economies. Seven years is a good bet for post-war Fordism.
Major state intervention disruptions can delay or advance, but not blunt, the wave.
There is an *even greater* wave to do with "is capitalism succeeding or not?" where the recession that suffers these contradictions will be heightened.
* * *
Here's a story:
In the early to mid 1930s the United States builds a few more cruisers faster.
Their economy is more developed earlier, and so more capable of winning a war.
Lo: a major war is concluded by 1943/4.
Major strikes occur in 1944/5. There is a recession. It is bad.
Then the United States goes to war with a former ally. It isn't a major war. Just a proxy war. In China or Greece. This makes the recovery faster.
Then the war ends and there is a recession in 1950.
Ford and GM discover that workers that can afford cars buy cars. This is significantly helped by the cheapening of labour in generalised war Fordism relative to the cost of capital goods. Ford, GM, the United States Government, Lockheed, etc., decided to buy white working class allies by limiting dividend taking, holding share price growth down, cheapening capital, and reducing the rate at which workers are made relatively poorer. The white working class, mispricing the cost of 1952 cars in 1932 dollars, views this as massive wage increases and comes (largely) onside.
But then there's a share crisis / run on credit / insitutions big enough to fail that fail in 1959 because they mispriced commodities whose prices changed because Israel invaded Egypt with UK and French support in 1959.
But this bounces back because Richard Nixon announces that men who aren't communist will walk on the moon, that Laos must be defended, and that Black Protestants deserve to eat and sleep without being rained on.
But the concept of a reduction in the share of total economic output per worker decreasing less rapidly than in the past has made workers bold in general. A religious revival amongst White Students of Compassionate Christianity brought on by a Religious Black Leader transmogrifies when bastardised Islam radicalises small portion of inner urban white students who commit violence. The real story though, despite burning cities, is that black workers are starting to capture union branches in low skill / high volume work places.
This puts the market on notice and the fall of the Republic of Vietnam in 1969 to an internal multiple corps military uprising crashes the Japanese market (a reflection of Japan's export of war items to the RVN). The strike waves and clamp down result in 10 years of industrial unrest until Democratic Racists, led significantly by the "Team 2" group inside the FBI, dedicated to eliminating domestic communism, introduce paternal corporatist institutions focused around high skill / high margin output. The conservative, somewhat Atheist turn, of racist corporate Democrats has the incidental affect of making underground married "swingers," and their allies who "aren't married but seem to swing without women" align towards right-centrist positions of general regulation of capital without corporate company-union cooperation.
Call them "Keynes' cruisers."
* * *
The basic structure of capital is that the underlying value which is respected (calculated input costs that resolve to labour-power eventually), is both mis-priced internally by firms and externally by the market. This is due to time estimation (and human fallibility). The market is just hundreds of thousands of central plans coming together.
Now imagine a fantasy where central planning works.
That's the fantasy of capitalism without crises.[*1]
The problem is that institutions are too big to fail.
Joe gets a loan until pay day instead of killing himself.
Jerry is on 90 day terms when he only deserves 30.
Susan has credit at 4% instead of 7%.
Karol doesn't pay her OSH insurance.
Kamal isn't paying pensions for the post-office.
Brian is buying second derivatives of the aggregate market price. On margin.
A recession often involves someone suddenly realising that that is not the price of eggs, and the real price of eggs being redetermined viciously (often with labour losing most, as labour has sunk costs, and isn't too big to fail.).
* * *
Societies or institutions too big to fail entirely, or too big to fail in an internal market (think about how Marketting always gets away with being shit? Whereas Production is whipped); institutions too big to fail, or be bailed out, have different failure modes. Think of the Soviet Union's failure mode as a cascade of failure to supply on 30 day terms. That's the 1951-55 economic crisis straight up. The trigger was Yugoslav withdrawal from coal/power agreements, for some reason involving repeated attempts to kill a head of state.
yours,
Sam R.
[1]: As I said, I can do this for the Soviet Union as a value-form society. Kornai, J.
Overcentralisation is an example of in period research.