More likely it does more than any number of British promises to get India behind the war effort.
How would invading Ceylon, which most Indians didn't consider part of their country rally them to the British cause?
More likely it does more than any number of British promises to get India behind the war effort.
Are you seriously asking how Japan taking an island right off the coast of India and using it to attack India and British shipping to India is going to get Indians behind the British war effort?How would invading Ceylon, which most Indians didn't consider part of their country rally them to the British cause?
Ok first off we're operating with hindsight knowing Japan is going to lose the war. The IJA wouldn't know the troops they sent would be lost.
Yes it's about 1,500 miles from Singapore, but that's no worse then New Guinea, or anyplace else in the South Pacific.
When does this happen? My guess would be in the wake of Operation C.
Are you seriously asking how Japan taking an island right off the coast of India and using it to attack India and British shipping to India is going to get Indians behind the British war effort?
Actually, apparently that *was* a concern of the IJA staff in their March 4 meeting with the IJN planners. That even if the conclusion of the war was somehow satisfactory, any force sent to Ceylon would be lost long before then...
A little over 1,700 miles, actually...
Compare to:
488 miles from Rabaul to Port Moeresby
655 miles from Rabaul to Guadalcanal
1,200 miles from Truk to Port Moresby
1,300 miles from Truk to Guadalcanal
Rabaul was the logistics base the IJN built up, however, and the one it relied on for the bulk of its operations in New Guinea and the Solomons. And from Truk, they could at least provide some air cover for transport missions to Guadalcanal. That simply won't be an option for supply convoys to Celyon.
Thanks. That helps narrow it down.
I do think it'd help to look at just what the British had on hand in Ceylon in April. The Wiki page for the Easter Raid has a pretty good breakdown :
British Ground
Ceylonese units
Ceylon Defence Force
Ceylon Garrison Artillery (CGA) (equipped with 6 in (150 mm) and 9.2 in (230 mm) guns)
Ceylon Light Infantry (CLI)
Ceylon Planters Rifle Corps (CPRC)
Colombo Town Guard
Commonwealth units
34th Indian Division.
Australian 16th Brigade (of the 6th Australian Division).
Australian 17th Brigade (of the 6th Australian Division).
24th East African Brigade.
British Air
Royal Air Force
No. 222 Group RAF
No. 11 Squadron RAF (Bristol Blenheims) (Colombo Racecourse)
No. 30 Squadron RAF (Hawker Hurricanes) (RAF Ratmalana, Colombo)
No. 258 Squadron RAF (Hawker Hurricanes) (Colombo Racecourse)
No. 261 Squadron RAF (Hawker Hurricanes) (China Bay, Trincomalee)
No. 273 Squadron RAF (Fairey Fulmars) (China Bay)
No. 202 Squadron RAF (PBY Catalina one aircraft)
No. 204 Squadron RAF (PBY Catalinas)
No. 205 Squadron RAF (one PBY Catalina aircraft)
No. 321 Squadron RAF (PBY Catalinas) (Dutch unit under formation at China Bay)
No. 413 Squadron RCAF (PBY Catalinas)
Fleet Air Arm
788 Naval Air Squadron (Fairey Swordfish)
803 Naval Air Squadron (Fairey Fulmars)
806 Naval Air Squadron (Fairey Fulmars)
British Eastern Fleet
Force A (Fast Force)
VAdm James Sommerville
CV Indomitable, Formidable
BB Warspite
CA Cornwall, Dorsetshire [Sunk in Raid]
CL Emerald, Enterprise
DD Napier(RAN), Nestor(RAN), Paladin, Panther, Hotspur, Foxhound
Force B (Slow Force)
VAdm Willis
BB Resolution, Ramillies, Royal Sovereign, Revenge
CV Hermes [Sunk in Raid]
CL Caledon, Dragon, Jacob Van Heemskerck (KM)
DD Griffin, Norman (RAN), Arrow, Vampire (RAN), Decoy, Fortune, Scout, Isaac Sweers (KM)
So that's basically at least two division equivalents to defend a 25,000sq mi island, right at the outset. Fortifications admittedly are limited and sometimes rather obsolete; but supply, at least, will not be a problem for Adm. Layton's forces. The air defense burden is going to be carried by six squadrons of Hurricanes and Fulmars, which were good enough to give a decent account of themselves against a naval air raid, at any rate. 70-80 fighters might not sound like much, but for the purposes at hand they don't need to be, either.
So what can the Japanese bring to Ceylon at the time of the Easter Raid? The answer is: Options are limited. The IJA had remnants of four divisions in Malaya, parts of which had been yanked out for other assignments, and what remained had suffered very heavily in the Malaya campaign. The three IJA divisions in Java were not in much better shape. 33rd and 55th divisions, along with 18th and 56th divisions (or rather, parts of them) were fully committed to the Burma campaign at this point. Any other units are - at that point in time - either too small, or too far away. So it seems that you do need an earlier POD to make available the forces needed for a Ceylon campaign in April. In which case, as others have said, you must give up some other operation - Burma is the most obvious one, and obviously, that has its own price. There is only so much IJA to go around.
It's stimulating to think about Ceylon as a case for what else the Japanese could have done in 1942 while they still had some kind of opportunity to stage offensive operations. Again, it's not utterly *impossible*. But the disadvantages are tremendous, and the IJA was aware of most of them. Likewise, so are the opportunity costs. Consolidating the imperial perimeter in the Solomons and New Guinea will not be possible at the same time, and if they wait until late in 1942, it's pretty arguably too late.
Any invasion of Cleylon would be a Japanese Sealion. Cleylon is even more far than Australia and even the IJA admitted it can’t invade Australia. Allied submarines are a threat. The British units may be lower quality but so what? The home guard was also largely unequipped and low quality and even the Germans can’t invade BritainOk as I said assume the Japanese pull 2 Divisions out of Manchuria, say we convince the IJA the Russians aren't coming till 1945. The British Eastern Fleet needs to run away, or die. They have about a 5% chance of survival in a carrier battle with Nagumo. Swordfish, and Fulmars will die twice as fast a Devastators, and Wildcats. Formidable, and Indomitable have very weak Combat Air Patrols, and AAA isn't much better. Steel Flight Decks won't save them from torpedo attacks, or more then a few bombs. Running is their only chance. The Battleships would be target practice.
The air raid was a disaster for the RAF. 3 Squadrons of Hurricanes are going to die very fast, against Zero fighters. So on the 3rd day the Japanese hit Trincomalee, and land near the city the next day. So we don't have a detailed order of battle, showing what Allied Units are around Trincomalee, lets just say 1 Australian Brigade, and 2 Indian. Do you want to fight for the Port, and Naval Base? The Japanese hope so. They'll move to envelop the area, and after a few days they accept the surrender of the Empire forces. At that point most of the fleet leaves, and the first land based aircraft fly into the captured airfields, from the Andaman Islands.
So now the IJA forms a perimeter to defend the base, and the Naval Air Force starts it's work. The British can't use the Bay of Bengal, Assam starves, Calcutta has food riots, aid to China is slowed, and the rubber crisis gets worse. The Allies hold the Second Washington Conference in June. Because there's no battle of Midway, and with the Indian Ocean Crisis Gymnast/Torch is postponed, and operations to recapture Ceylon receive priority. Churchill agrees to fly to Moscow to break the bad news to Marshal Stalin personally.
Without Midway there is no Operation Watchtower. The Japanese complete the air field on Guadalcanal, and begin to operate aircraft out of it on August 19th. Without the airlift to the Tunisian Airhead the Luftwaffe is better able to support the Stalingrad airlift. The 10th Panzer, and 334th Infantry Divisions are committed to Von Manstein's Panzer Group, attempting to relieve the 6th Army. (They still lose.)
With the South Pacific relatively quiet the Japanese dispatch 2 more divisions to Ceylon to capture the rest of the Island. The coastal areas of Ceylon are secured around the end of August, and the IJN now has about 100 aircraft based on Ceylon, with about 45,000 IJA Troops. On the July 30th the first I Class Submarines start to use the Naval Base at Trincomalee, extending their patrol areas to Cape Town, the Gulf of Aden, and Perth Australia. On September 5th the first German Type 14 Milch Cow U-Boat arrives with 2 Type 9C U-boats, to begin combined operations.
So now you can tell me this is a fantasy. Ceylon is too far away. The Australians are just too tough for the Japanese. There's no way this could end up like Malaya for any number of reasons. The 34th Indian Division was a green unit formed in March 1942, as a garrison unit. I can find no reference for the 24th East African Brigade, can you fill us in on this unit? The Ceylonese units have some issues of political reliability, and training. That leaves the 2 Australian Brigades. The ground defense doesn't seem that formidable. The Japanese might just pull this off. You can say this is just impossible, but then the whole Japanese Campaign in SEA also seemed fantastic at the time.
he British Eastern Fleet needs to run away, or die. They have about a 5% chance of survival in a carrier battle with Nagumo. Swordfish, and Fulmars will die twice as fast a Devastators, and Wildcats. Formidable, and Indomitable have very weak Combat Air Patrols, and AAA isn't much better. Steel Flight Decks won't save them from torpedo attacks, or more then a few bombs. Running is their only chance. The Battleships would be target practice.
Yes the way for Japan to do better is to Attack more places, farther away from Japan/closer to enemy string holds/territory and commit more atrocities to US and British personnel/citizens/Allies.
This sounds like a BRILLIANT idea.......
Any invasion of Cleylon would be a Japanese Sealion. Cleylon is even more far than Australia and even the IJA admitted it can’t invade Australia. Allies submarines are a threat. The British units may be lower quality but so what? The home guard was also largely unequipped and low quality and even the Germans can’t invade Britain
Any assets devoted to Ceylon will be at least a couple of thousand miles away from the probable site of the Kantai Kessen somewhere to the east / south-east of the home islands. And they hardly hold down as diversionary tactics Allied assets in the Indian Ocean. Even holding Ceylon the RN didn't really do much until 1944.
The East African Brigades I know of were the 21st, 25th & 26th which formed 11th (East Africa) Division, and the independent 22nd & 28th brigades. All fought in SE Asia with good records. Check the history of the King's African Rifles.
Because there's no battle of Midway, and with the Indian Ocean Crisis Gymnast/Torch is postponed, and operations to recapture Ceylon receive priority. Churchill agrees to fly to Moscow to break the bad news to Marshal Stalin personally.
Without Midway there is no Operation Watchtower. The Japanese complete the air field on Guadalcanal, and begin to operate aircraft out of it on August 19th. Without the airlift to the Tunisian Airhead the Luftwaffe is better able to support the Stalingrad airlift. The 10th Panzer, and 334th Infantry Divisions are committed to Von Manstein's Panzer Group, attempting to relieve the 6th Army. (They still lose.)
And Somerville *will* run away, as he did in OTL, because he's not stupid. He doesn't have the firepower to go toe to toe with the Kido Butai.
But the thing is, the Kido Butai can't stick around. They don't have the fuel, even if they want to. They were a raiding force, and that's how they were always employed.
So Somerville and the hurricanes can wait until Nagumo has to return back to Singapore. Sure, he'll leave behind some kind of surface units, maybe even Ryujo, to help cover the supply ships. But now the British have a force they can actually face on reasonable terms.
I have more thoughts, but I'll leave it there for the moment.
At this time, does Japan have the extra tankers and fuel to supply the troopships, supply ships and keep Kido Butai in operation for the weeks needed to ensure that Ceylon is securely held? For that matter, can the IJA fly in.and maintain a force of fighters and bombers able to fight off the Eastern Fleet when the IJN withdraws?Your correct about the way the Kido Butai was typically used. However given the task of supporting an invasion tactics would be deferent. They'd need 1, or 2 more tankers to refuel the destroyers, and keep the carrier group in the area for at least a whole week. In the raids on Ceylon the RAF lost 1/3 of their fighters, and almost all their attack aircraft. After several more days of hitting airfields, and air combat over the beachheads there's not going to be many Hurricane's left. After the Carriers leave land based aircraft would fly in from the Andaman & Nicobar Islands. Sommerville coming back with the Indomitable & Formidable would be would be a risk, against Japanese land based bombers. Sending Fulmars, and Swordfish into airspace defended by Zero's is suicidal.
A few more thoughts as I do another driveby....
GYMNAST/TORCH is going to be nearly impossible to cancel - unless you're replacing it with SLEDGEHAMMER - or maybe, in just the right way, with ROUNDUP in early 1943. FDR was adamant that the U.S. had to be in action in the European theater by the end of the year (preferably before the November elections); and Marshall was fully prepared to reopen the whole question of Germany First if there were any more delays or cancellations. A Japanese invasion of Ceylon is not going to be acceptable to either of them as a reason to Do Nothing in the ETO. I just can't see how you can delay it, unless you're "upgrading" it - which is rather unlikely given the enormous difficulties that would have attended SLEDGEHAMMER.
Churchill, of course, was painfully aware of all this by spring of 1942. He knew he could not afford to lose Roosevelt's happy support.
And it is here that Somerville's argument to London that it would be better to sacrifice Ceylon than any other top Allied priorities would almost certainly win the day.
The loss of multiple U.S. fleet carriers at Coral Sea, Midway, or any other major fleet battle in spring of 1942 pretty likely butterflies WATCHTOWER, and I think there's a lot of consensus around here on that. But in a scenario where the U.S. still has at least six carriers, I think the odds improve for WATCHTOWER, even if the Kido Butai is still at large. It might, however, be modestly delayed.
More likely, thanks to the delays posed by the Ceylon operation, Yamamoto likely shifts his big move to bring out the U.S. carrier forces down to the South Pacific, and you get the big battle there instead.
Of course, even a butterflied Solomons Campaign doesn't help Japan all that much, and it might not even lengthen the war. It just means that huge attrition it took there happens in the Marshall and Gilberts (and New Guinea) in 1943 instead. The Solomons had little strategic significance in themselves; what they were was a way to wage an attrition battle against a power (Japan) that could not afford it.
At this time, does Japan have the extra tankers and fuel to supply the troops hips, supply ships and keep Kido Butai in operation for the weeks needed to ensure that Ceylon is securely held? Fir that matter, can the IJA fly in.and maintain a force of fighters and bombers able to fight off the Eastern Fleet when the IJN withdraws?
Unless you intend to keep Kido Butai there indefinitely, Ceylon will be recaptured within weeks of its departure. With two IJA Divisions and support forces sacrificed.
And if course, when the cat is away, the mice do play. What will the USN be doing in the South Pacific while the core of the IJN is tied down thousands of miles away?
aThey don't need to stay for weeks, only about one week longer then the OTL Operation C. Yes they can, the Andaman & Nicobar Islands are about 850 miles from Ceylon. Zero's, Kates, Vals, and of course Betty, and Nell bombers would have no great difficulty with that kind of shuttle distances, they did it all though the war. They'd be moving into captured RAF Air Fields. The bombers can also act as transports, and merchant ships can bring cargo right into the port at Trincomalee. What the USN did while Operation C was on was the Doolittle Raid. The Eastern Fleet would be at great risk approaching Ceylon, with land based torpedo bombers there. How would the Eastern Fleet recapture the Island, without bringing an army with them?
Gymnast/Torch was predicated on Midway.