0900 Hours, 1 January 1943, Ramree Island, Burma – The OS2U Kingfisher assigned to HMS Albatross glided to a landing off the north coast of Ramree Island and taxied to the small seaplane anchorage where Lieutenant General William Slim stepped off into a lighter that took him to shore. Slim was visiting Ramree Island to meet with the on scene Allied commanders to discuss upcoming operations.
Slim’s immediate concern was the mental state of the 14th Indian Division’s troops. Japanese spearheads were attempting to exploit a seem between the Indian troops pushing down the coast and the East African and Indian troops of the 11th East African Division at Akyab. If successful this would cut the 14th Indian Division off from the rest of XV Corps and operations the previous spring during the Japanese invasion of Burma showed that Allied troops had a tendency to panic when cut off.
What Slim needed the 14th Indian Division’s leaders to understand was that this was part of his plan. He wanted the Japanese to breakthrough to the coast south of Akyab. This would extend their lines and bring them within easy range of guns of the cruiser Georgis Averoff along with any other warships the fleet was willing to detach for shore bombardment. During the training Slim put his men through over the months of the rainy season he stressed that getting cutoff was not a reason to panic because it meant the enemy was overextended. His orders to the 14th Indian Division were to halt their attempts to move down the coast toward Ramree Island and instead dig in and hold in place while any Japanese advances toward the coast were dealt with. Slim was also hoping that if the Japanese thought they had an entire division cutoff and vulnerable then the Japanese troops dug to the south of the 14th Division’s positions might come out of their coconut log bunkers and dugouts and attack. Slim assured Major General Wilfred Lloyd that if this happened, his troops would be supplied by air and sea and his staff was already working with the RAF and the Eastern Fleet to make sure this happened.
Slim also discussed his plans for an amphibious landing with Lieutenant Colonel William Sanguinetti. He wanted No. 5 Commando moved by sea to the Burmese coast south of Ramree Island where they would attack the Japanese troops in the rear areas on the coast near Ramree Island. Recent reconnaissance missions by Riain’s Raiders indicated this sector was held by lightly armed second line formations. Once they began their assault, the 29th Infantry Brigade would attack the Japanese troops dug in on the coast opposite Ramree Island. The plan that was taking shape in Slim’s mind involved allowing the Japanese troops advancing on Akyab to overextend themselves and then defeat them and the troops dug in opposite Ramree Island and push them back across the Arakan Hills. It would not be easy or quick, but for the first time, Slim could envision a successful series of operations that impose a substantial defeat on the Japanese.
During his visit, Slim also inspected the growing Allied position on the northern tip of Ramree Island and was pleased to hear the airfield would be ready for basic fighter operations in another week. The effort begun by the Japanese and then continued by the initial wave of Allied assault troops was now under the expert control of the troops from the 808th Aviation Engineering Battalion’s company now on the island. Plans were already in place to detach Wildcats and Martlets from the carriers to the island as soon as possible. While ultimately RAF Hurricane squadrons would operate from Ramree Island, the Allied experiences on Guadalcanal and Christmas Island clearly demonstrated the rugged Wildcat/Martlet was the best Allied fighter for austere field operations.
Slim’s immediate concern was the mental state of the 14th Indian Division’s troops. Japanese spearheads were attempting to exploit a seem between the Indian troops pushing down the coast and the East African and Indian troops of the 11th East African Division at Akyab. If successful this would cut the 14th Indian Division off from the rest of XV Corps and operations the previous spring during the Japanese invasion of Burma showed that Allied troops had a tendency to panic when cut off.
What Slim needed the 14th Indian Division’s leaders to understand was that this was part of his plan. He wanted the Japanese to breakthrough to the coast south of Akyab. This would extend their lines and bring them within easy range of guns of the cruiser Georgis Averoff along with any other warships the fleet was willing to detach for shore bombardment. During the training Slim put his men through over the months of the rainy season he stressed that getting cutoff was not a reason to panic because it meant the enemy was overextended. His orders to the 14th Indian Division were to halt their attempts to move down the coast toward Ramree Island and instead dig in and hold in place while any Japanese advances toward the coast were dealt with. Slim was also hoping that if the Japanese thought they had an entire division cutoff and vulnerable then the Japanese troops dug to the south of the 14th Division’s positions might come out of their coconut log bunkers and dugouts and attack. Slim assured Major General Wilfred Lloyd that if this happened, his troops would be supplied by air and sea and his staff was already working with the RAF and the Eastern Fleet to make sure this happened.
Slim also discussed his plans for an amphibious landing with Lieutenant Colonel William Sanguinetti. He wanted No. 5 Commando moved by sea to the Burmese coast south of Ramree Island where they would attack the Japanese troops in the rear areas on the coast near Ramree Island. Recent reconnaissance missions by Riain’s Raiders indicated this sector was held by lightly armed second line formations. Once they began their assault, the 29th Infantry Brigade would attack the Japanese troops dug in on the coast opposite Ramree Island. The plan that was taking shape in Slim’s mind involved allowing the Japanese troops advancing on Akyab to overextend themselves and then defeat them and the troops dug in opposite Ramree Island and push them back across the Arakan Hills. It would not be easy or quick, but for the first time, Slim could envision a successful series of operations that impose a substantial defeat on the Japanese.
During his visit, Slim also inspected the growing Allied position on the northern tip of Ramree Island and was pleased to hear the airfield would be ready for basic fighter operations in another week. The effort begun by the Japanese and then continued by the initial wave of Allied assault troops was now under the expert control of the troops from the 808th Aviation Engineering Battalion’s company now on the island. Plans were already in place to detach Wildcats and Martlets from the carriers to the island as soon as possible. While ultimately RAF Hurricane squadrons would operate from Ramree Island, the Allied experiences on Guadalcanal and Christmas Island clearly demonstrated the rugged Wildcat/Martlet was the best Allied fighter for austere field operations.
