Erm, no. That’s a terrible idea. Not AS bad as invading Hawaii, but still a terrible idea.The only major offensive should have been to invade Ceylon.
Erm, no. That’s a terrible idea. Not AS bad as invading Hawaii, but still a terrible idea.The only major offensive should have been to invade Ceylon.
Erm, no. That’s a terrible idea. Not AS bad as invading Hawaii, but still a terrible idea.
Yeah. They could achieve a bridgehead with a landing in 1942; but logistically, it is hard to see how they could sustain it.
The only point I could see might be to try to spur some kind of major uprising in the Raj (which I think is unlikely).
More likely it does more than any number of British promises to get India behind the war effort.Yeah. They could achieve a bridgehead with a landing in 1942; but logistically, it is hard to see how they could sustain it.
The only point I could see might be to try to spur some kind of major uprising in the Raj (which I think is unlikely).
That was a large reason for Operation U-Go in 1944. It was not a success for the IJA.
Erm, no. That’s a terrible idea. Not AS bad as invading Hawaii, but still a terrible idea.
Which goes back to one of my major points, Axis CANNOT win World War 2.Those ships would likely sail for America if it looks like Britain would be lost. Which is very unlikely unless the British completely screw up in so many ways. Also the U.S. would have to be binge drinking lead paint to ever allow a hostile force to be built up in Canada.
Why is it a terrible idea? In the first half of 1942 Ceylon was not strongly held.
Which still doesn't answer the question of what to do about the oncoming Essex swarm. The Japanese cannot do anything about that. Once America starts pushing back against the Japanese in the Pacific what is holding Ceylon or the DEI or holding any other territory going to do to stop America from cutting off the Japanese home islands and eventually crushing them under the increasing weight of material advantage.Why is it a terrible idea? In the first half of 1942 Ceylon was not strongly held. 2 divisions would have sufficed to capture the ports they needed. They didn't need the whole Island. When the Japanese Carrier Fleet entered the Indian Ocean in April 1942 the British Eastern Fleet had to just run away. Once taken the Japanese could shuttle aircraft into their new bases from the Andaman Islands. They'd then control the air, and waters off the Southern tip of India, keeping Allied Shipping out of the Bay of Bengal, and limiting supplies to Assam to the overstrained railroad lines. The massive Assam Famine of 1942-44 would have been made much worse, and the military buildup much harder without the use of ocean shipping. Strangling Assam also disrupts the campaign to support China with supplies, and air power.
Again as I said a submarine blitz on the Suez Convoys in mid 1942 would have disrupted the North African Campaign. A Japanese Submarine Base in Ceylon would have greatly facilitated operations in the Indian Ocean. Japan had a powerful submarine fleet that was misused hunting allied warships, instead of merchant shipping. A Japanese Tonnage War like the U-Boat Campaign would have tied down many more Allied Warships in convoy duty, then they sunk in direct action. WWII was a massive grinding war of economic attrition, anything the Japanese can do to increase the strain on Allied shipping is more helpful to their cause then a few tactical victories.
Why is it a terrible idea?
Which still doesn't answer the question of what to do about the oncoming Essex swarm. The Japanese cannot do anything about that.
Let's see, why is extending your own already overstretched supply lines another 1500 miles a bad idea? By the way, its 1500 miles from Southeast Asia to Ceylon.
I was referring to the Signapore area, though I'll freely admit I rounded a bit.Actually, from the one worthwhile logistical base the Japanese had to work with (Singapore), it was over 1,700 miles to Trincomalee or Batticaloa.
From Japan itself, it's over 4,500 miles.
I was referring to the Signapore area, though I'll freely admit I rounded a bit.
Actually, somewhat stronger than you might think...
Already by the end of March 1942, the garrison of Ceylon consisted of one British, one East African, two Australian, and two Indian brigades along with one brigade of local volunteers. The Australian brigades were from the 6th Division, so...tough customers. On admirable defensive terrain.
So even for just a major foothold, you *are* talking about a multi-division force; to actually take the island, you're basically up to something like the Philippines force. A force you have to supply now, almost 1,700 miles from Singapore, under conditions where the Japanese cannot secure lasting air superiority.
Theoretically this isn't impossible, but politically, it basically was. The IJN actually proposed a Ceylon invasion in connection with the Indian Ocean raid. The Army refused to even discuss it. How you would overcome Army opposition for this is unclear to me.
As I said, and you reiterated the IJA wasn't interested in the operation, so it didn't happen. What I'm suggesting is that on a long list of poor options Ceylon was better then most of the others. Yes it would require a major effort, and would have run risks, but all efforts do.
Which still doesn't answer the question of what to do about the oncoming Essex swarm. The Japanese cannot do anything about that. Once America starts pushing back against the Japanese in the Pacific what is holding Ceylon or the DEI or holding any other territory going to do to stop America from cutting off the Japanese home islands and eventually crushing them under the increasing weight of material advantage.
Sure. But here is the thing: Any ground force Japan sends to Ceylon ultimately has to be written off. You're sending them there to hold out as long as possible. (This had something to dowith IJA skepticism.) Eventually, however, the British will mount a counteroffensive to secure the island, and they're basing right out of India, across a 20 mile strait. The Japanese, by contrast, have to sustain this force over roughly the distance between St John's, Newfoundland and Ireland (h/t to Calbear for that comp). That's how far of a distance we're talking about. It's over double the distance of any other amphibious operation Japan ever mounted.
Questions that occur to me:
1. When were you thinking Japan would mount this op? With Operation C, or at some other point in 1942?
2. Exactly where are the troops for this 2 division operation coming from?