Britain orders the 16 tonner Mk III tank into Serial production - how does this change British AFV development

[Cryhavoc101]

Gagh. That thing is a design atrocity. And I thought the Char B was a bolo?



The only possible use, for those horror shows, (Human factors disasters ^^^) is as a lessons learned exercise for what would need to be British built to move large badly designed clunker tanks around via railroad, tank transporter and ship, but that should already have been learned from moving these clunkers.

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Why not evolve the Vickers Medium? Their improved successors should have been winners.

It is the evolution of having the tank in numbers not the tank itself that is being explored here

Many of the features that you would find on a mid war tank could be found on the 16 tonner

The 16 Tonner was an evolution of the Vickers Medium Mk II!!!

Many of the problems that the BA would have had to learn to deal with would be learned during the 30s and not during war time.

That includes moving them around which would include greater investment in things like road tank transporters which the BA dabbled with in the 30s

And this would help distance the limitations of the British rail tunnels on tank design

 

[formion]

It is the evolution of having the tank in numbers not the tank itself that is being explored here

What he said ^^^

I think the othe rimportant aspect other than numbers, is training. Almost the whole of BEF failed miserably in training before May 1940. Even the Regular divisions spent about half their time digging. Funny thing is that since November 1939 the Dyle plan was approved for implementation, so the Entente knew that the fight will be in Belgium, rather than the franco-belgian border. Yet apparently, nobody cared to issue orders to intensify training and stop digging trenches. Furthermore, the BEF was sent to France with a dearth of weapons: they had to borrow a few hundred french 25mm AT guns to get familiar with AT artillery. Instead of tanks, there were lorries with a "tank" sign on top, for the troops to get familiar with armoured warfare.

If the training issues are solved and the numbers are there (2 armoured divisions + 1-3 armoured brigades) then the butterflies are quite big. How would these extra armoured corps would affect the deployment of Allied troops come May 10th? One thought that is intriguing, is that Georges/Billotte may feel a bit more secure in Belgium. If they deploy less of the reserve in the 1st Army Group in May 11th-12th, how would it affect the response to the Ardennes breakthrough? How the presence of a powerful british arrmoured corps in the continent will affect the german plans?

 

[Cryhavoc101]

What he said ^^^

I think the othe rimportant aspect other than numbers, is training. Almost the whole of BEF failed miserably in training before May 1940. Even the Regular divisions spent about half their time digging. Funny thing is that since November 1939 the Dyle plan was approved for implementation, so the Entente knew that the fight will be in Belgium, rather than the franco-belgian border. Yet apparently, nobody cared to issue orders to intensify training and stop digging trenches. Furthermore, the BEF was sent to France with a dearth of weapons: they had to borrow a few hundred french 25mm AT guns to get familiar with AT artillery. Instead of tanks, there were lorries with a "tank" sign on top, for the troops to get familiar with armoured warfare.

If the training issues are solved and the numbers are there (2 armoured divisions + 1-3 armoured brigades) then the butterflies are quite big. How would these extra armoured corps would affect the deployment of Allied troops come May 10th? One thought that is intriguing, is that Georges/Billotte may feel a bit more secure in Belgium. If they deploy less of the reserve in the 1st Army Group in May 11th-12th, how would it affect the response to the Ardennes breakthrough? How the presence of a powerful british arrmoured corps in the continent will affect the german plans?

The training issue is a result of the '20 wasted years' and where the decision to think about planning to prepare a 32 Division Continental force (6 Regular and 13 TA Divisions doubled to 26) was not taken until early 1938 and limited conscription was not introduced until early 1939 (with only one class of 21/22 year olds having completed their 6 months by Sept 39).

In order to get a decent medium tank we are discussing and the numbers of Armored units you are discussing requires a decision to be made at least 18 months earlier if not longer to stand up a continental force with a much larger pool of Conscripts / trained reserves in time to have such a force 'ready' along with a corresponding increase in the ability of British industry to supply everything from boot laces to Medium Tanks in the numbers required.

The trigger for the OTL decision to raise this continental force was the Munich conference so something needs to happen in 36 or earlier to trigger a loosening of purse strings and an expansion of the Army (even if it was just to stand up the 13 TA Divisions to 100% personnel and full tables of equipment for a 19 Division Force capable of deploying to the Continent).

 

[formion]

The trigger for the OTL decision to raise this continental force was the Munich conference so something needs to happen in 36 or earlier to trigger a loosening of purse strings and an expansion of the Army (even if it was just to stand up the 13 TA Divisions to 100% personnel and full tables of equipment for a 19 Division Force capable of deploying to the Continent).

Do you find it possible, without a POD before Munich, for Britain to be able to deploy one month after the mobilization 5 Regular divisions and by May 1940 (9 months after mobilization) two Armies (18 divisions) in the continent?

It always perplexed me why the majority of Regulars weren't recalled from Gibraltar, Palestine, Egypt and perhaps Malta, replaced by green Territorials who could have been trained in the backwaters. I am under the impression that these garrisons could have yielded the equivalent of 2 divisions of Regulars.

Also, I found fascinating a scheme to invest in the canadian industry in early 1938 (machine tools, factories) so that by late 1939, Canada can ship significant quantities of material. If I remember correctly from various readings, rifles, machine guns and infantry equipment could have been made in time in Canada. Moreover, Ontario had a relatively big automotive industry that could have provided at least a few thousand lorries by fall 1939. Similarly, there was a scandal when 25pdr production was outsourced in Canada. A more effective approach may had resulted in ~100 canadian 25 pdrs(that was the initial order I think) in BEF by early 1940. Otherwise, the 1st Canadian Division could have been 100% equipped with local resources and without the OTL lack of material and ready by April 1940.

While training is definitely a pre-war issue as you state, I think the lack of training in France during the winter 1939-1940 isn't connected so much to the old policy failures. Monty for example actively sought to train his men. Almost everybody else, continued issuing orders for digging even after the Dyle Plan was approved.

 

[riggerrob]

Good point dear for Jon,
OTL Canadian production ramped up pretty quickly once war started. The biggest complaints were about how slowly plans, patterns and tools moved from British factories to Canadian factories. Canadian car factories built as many CMP trucks as all of the A is factories combined. This gave the Canadian Army the best wheels to troops ratio of any WW2 army.


ATL Two years lead time would have given them more time to work out production line hugs.

 

[marathag]

Why was that a "bad mix"? Both were quite adequate until 1941. All the 2 Pdr required was a HE round - which it got in 1944. Indeed, the Australia Army developed its own HE round - a base fused one - which was deemed quite useful against Japanese bunkers.

But it still had a tiny amount of HE, as it wasn't thinwall, or to the extreme what the Russians did with their 45mm, trading MV for HE content, with nowhere close to the same trajectory as AP

The other sin of the 2pdr, as it's just light and small enough to be balanced, to where Free Elevation is possible- where the gunner can balance the breech on his shoulder, for some measure of accuracy while firing on the move.
To get the the British went with internal gun mantlets, that in the future would limit gun size.

Didn't have to be that way, as the US was able to make the Mk2 and Mk3 75mm balanced well enough with external mantlet for a stabilizer to function- when both stabilizer and geared elevation was disengaged, its balanced enough you can move the piece with your little finger.
But the British did not move away from internal mantlets until late in the War.

Anyway, the Mediums would have the old 3pdr at first, til 1936 or so.
In my dreams they would get 18 pdrs at this point, for a true dual purpose gun, finding that the 3" Mortar just isn't great at its job of close support.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Do you find it possible, without a POD before Munich, for Britain to be able to deploy one month after the mobilization 5 Regular divisions and by May 1940 (9 months after mobilization) two Armies (18 divisions) in the continent?

It always perplexed me why the majority of Regulars weren't recalled from Gibraltar, Palestine, Egypt and perhaps Malta, replaced by green Territorials who could have been trained in the backwaters. I am under the impression that these garrisons could have yielded the equivalent of 2 divisions of Regulars.

Also, I found fascinating a scheme to invest in the canadian industry in early 1938 (machine tools, factories) so that by late 1939, Canada can ship significant quantities of material. If I remember correctly from various readings, rifles, machine guns and infantry equipment could have been made in time in Canada. Moreover, Ontario had a relatively big automotive industry that could have provided at least a few thousand lorries by fall 1939. Similarly, there was a scandal when 25pdr production was outsourced in Canada. A more effective approach may had resulted in ~100 canadian 25 pdrs(that was the initial order I think) in BEF by early 1940. Otherwise, the 1st Canadian Division could have been 100% equipped with local resources and without the OTL lack of material and ready by April 1940.

While training is definitely a pre-war issue as you state, I think the lack of training in France during the winter 1939-1940 isn't connected so much to the old policy failures. Monty for example actively sought to train his men. Almost everybody else, continued issuing orders for digging even after the Dyle Plan was approved.

Canada successfully managed to produce Aircraft, Ships, Tanks, Trucks (they made excellent trucks) artillery and small arms during the war as well as leverage equipment from its neighbor - Australia not so much (although it did manage to produce some ships and small arms with a somewhat abortive AFV production and a slightly more successful Aircraft production ) and was reliant on Britain and the USA when Britain could not supply what was needed.

This was the result of decades of Imperial Policy - Dominions provide the materials - Britain makes the goods out of them which the Dominions then buy back

Great for the Empire in peacetime not so good in war time - good job Canada was able to step up as much as it did.

But with an earlier rearmament in Britain they would be in far better shape to provide equipment to the Commonwealth forces than was the case OTL

 

[marathag]

Why not evolve the Vickers Medium? Their improved successors should have been winners

That would be the hope, enough medium tanks built to discover that the tracks and pins were garbage, needing new materials, the worthlessness of the sub turret, and the need for a reliable 3-400hp motor.

 

[marathag]

Great for the Empire in peacetime not so good in war time - good job Canada was able to step up as much as it did.

With the US just south of them, they could not afford to do things as the other Dominions: had they, they would have lost business to those Factories in the 48 States. Requiring local Canadian Content only works so well, provided not left far behind by US developments in manufacturing.
It was good to have GM and Ford locally, they had to keep up.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

That would be the hope, enough medium tanks built to discover that the tracks and pins were garbage, needing new materials, the worthlessness of the sub turret, and the need for a reliable 3-400hp motor.

There were a number of tanks that used sub turrets during the 30's - at one point it was all the rage

I may be wrong but I cannot think of a single design from 39 onwards that was still being made with them (The M3 Grant had a commanders copula turret that had a 50 cal but that is not really what we mean!)

So I doubt very much that the decedents of the Medium MK III would retain any sub turret

 

[McPherson]

Do you find it possible, without a POD before Munich, for Britain to be able to deploy one month after the mobilization 5 Regular divisions and by May 1940 (9 months after mobilization) two Armies (18 divisions) in the continent?

1. Nope.

It always perplexed me why the majority of Regulars weren't recalled from Gibraltar, Palestine, Egypt and perhaps Malta, replaced by green Territorials who could have been trained in the backwaters. I am under the impression that these garrisons could have yielded the equivalent of 2 divisions of Regulars.

2. Lift not there and time. It takes 180 days to train a "green" division. Maybe that same time to build equipment, and weeks to move everybody around.
3. Let us look why troops are not pulled from those empire locations.
1a. Gibraltar. (Frisky Spanish.)
1b. Palestine. (nationalist uprisings against colonial foreign rule.)
1c. Egypt. (nationalist uprisings against colonial foreign rule.)
1d. Malta. (Frisky Italians.)

Also, I found fascinating a scheme to invest in the Canadian industry in early 1938 (machine tools, factories) so that by late 1939, Canada can ship significant quantities of material. If I remember correctly from various readings, rifles, machine guns and infantry equipment could have been made in time in Canada. Moreover, Ontario had a relatively big automotive industry that could have provided at least a few thousand lorries by fall 1939. Similarly, there was a scandal when 25pdr production was outsourced in Canada. A more effective approach may had resulted in ~100 canadian 25 pdrs (that was the initial order I think) in BEF by early 1940. Otherwise, the 1st Canadian Division could have been 100% equipped with local resources and without the OTL lack of material and ready by April 1940

.

Same problems Britain has, are Canada's, minus the imperial garrisons. (Australia ditto.)

While training is definitely a pre-war issue as you state, I think the lack of training in France during the winter 1939-1940 isn't connected so much to the old policy failures. Monty for example actively sought to train his men. Almost everybody else, continued issuing orders for digging even after the Dyle Plan was approved.

Shrug. Training helps. Knowing how and what works helps more. (Landmines in the Ardenne forests and backtrails, for instance.) Kind of obvious in hindsight.

 

[McPherson]

That would be the hope, enough medium tanks built to discover that the tracks and pins were garbage, needing new materials, the worthlessness of the sub turret, and the need for a reliable 3-400hp motor.

If you mean the garbage that is the backwards step-off and do-not-do-it Vickers Mark III that was based on the "Independent?" (See below why human factors and WW I battlefield tank experience matters.).

Number 4. is the kicker. You want HE shell to kill enemy infantry, Arty (pesky guy.) and machine gun nests as well as shoot enemy tanks. Repeat after me; "Tanks are supposed to kill EVERYBODY; not just enemy tanks. with the MAIN GUN."

 

[marathag]

Circle was a spot to put a stretcher. Nice in theory, but dropped almost immediately.

 

[marathag]

I may be wrong but I cannot think of a single design from 39 onwards that was still being made with them

Canadian Ram tank, prototype finished on June 1941

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Canadian Ram tank, prototype finished on June 1941

let me try again.........I may be wrong but I cannot think of a single design from 39 onwards that was still being made with them.....that was actually useful

 

[McPherson]

British tank ditty.

"How safe I am in my tin can,
How dead I'll be 'gainst AT artillery."

"Cause the guys at the TDC
Said AP's good enough for me."

"I wish I had some good HE,
to use on them immediately."

 

[SwampTiger]

Establish the Experimental Mechanized Force of 1928-30 as a permanent unit within the Army. From this base, determine the needs of the British Army for equipment and training. You could have a decision by 1934/5 to create 3-4 independent mechanized brigades and 4-6 tank battalions to support the infantry/motorized infantry divisions. Such a base would teach the British lessons on equipment and combined operations. The early lessons were heading in the right direction.

I am not a fan of the Christy system. Repair in the field is impossible. Units will receive damage in combat. Thus, tanks must be returned to depots for repairs. The Horstmann design allows repair in the field. The improvement in smoothness of ride, and a slight speed advantage, are insufficient to account for the delays in repairs of damaged vehicles.

Why did the British stick to the OQF 3 pdr when the Hotchkiss 6 pdr was available? The 6 pdr offered better armor penetration and HE content in the same gun. The additional weight, reduction in number of shells carried, and increased space required were easily offset by the more powerful shell. The 2 pdr was a step backwards. The next step should have been OTL OQF 6pdr/7 hwt or a development of the 13 or 18 pdr guns.

I would propose a Six Ton based 12-15 ton Medium tank using a Hotchkiss derived gun, note they were built in several lengths. Additional 6 pdr guns were under development by the RN early in the century. Cardin utilized the Horstmann suspension in the late 20's for light tanks. Thus the British Army could have a 14 ton, 57 mm armed, Horstmann suspended medium tank by 1933/4 if they requested one. With 25-30 mm armor and 120-180 horsepower available in the AEC engine, such a tank would have been equal to any German tank before 1941.

Such a tank would also be cheaper to build than the 16 Ton Mk III. The British needed numbers, Which is why they built so many light tanks. They would certainly not build the 16 Ton Mk III in the same numbers as the light tanks as has been suggested. That tank was too expensive.

 

[Derwit]

The British Treasury is always going to wait till war is certain before spending big on armaments. This is always going to be too little too late.

what we need is a moderate threat in the mid thirties that could be dealt with by a beefed up Regular Army force. Preferably this would be in an area of the world where mechanised forced would be especially useful. Hmmmm......🤔

So the ITTL Benny the Mouse is considered a greater threat to British interests in the Middle East. So the British decide to produce more and better tanks. Numbers aren’t going to be huge but the A6’s will be improved over several models. To get them into production the old 3 pounder is used but as an interim Vickers develop a higher velocity 3 pounder (which less useful as a tin opener than the 2 pounder does fire a small but useful HE round).
The advantages of this for the British war machine are; more investment in AFV design and improvement, building more AFVs = greater manufacturing capacity, more experience in using and moving larger AFV’s (WW1 lessons largely forgotten) and focusing doctrine on medium tanks which will later become Main Battle Tanks (butterflying away the Cruiser/Infantry tank split).

by 1938 the British are firmly focused on Nazi Germany and the Treasury are willing to spend on more of everything. So design starts on a next generation medium tank in the 20 to 30 ton range armed with a 6 pounder gun.

The old A6’s soldier on in secondary theatres and as training tanks. I wonder what effect a battalion or two of improved A6’s would have had in Malaya in 1941 or Create?

 

[marathag]

To get them into production the old 3 pounder is used but as an interim Vickers develop a higher velocity 3 pounder

Already existed. The Naval 3pdr, around since the 1880s, was far more powerful. It just needed modern design for the barrel to get the weight down.

 

[tomo pauk]

Actually, any 3in gun is pretty useless as a HE thrower. It has too high a muzzle velocity and packs a relatively light amount of filling. The 2pdr shell might be a bit lightweight but until 1941 it is adequate for the jobs required of it. The British army always had a HE round for the 2pdr. It was nose fused (as against the Australian base fused round).
...

The 3in is useless HE thrower, but 2 pdr is adequate for the job? Any math to back up this?

Now, if you could stop the British Army from being controlled in a "closed shop" manner, then from the start, the tanks could have been issued with HE rounds and be allowed to fire them.

This is what it's all about - once British Army embraces the combined arms concept, many things will fall in their place and Axis land forces will receive kicking.

...
The American 3in gun was 76.2mm, not 75mm. The 76.2mm round had a drastically lower amount of HE filling than the 75mm gun because of it's considerably higher velocity. The British 17 Pdr was also 76.2mm but it was designed to fire a HE round at a lower velocity than the American gun.
...

17 pdr have had also small HE content, just like the US 3in gun, since the shell was fired with full charge by both guns.