Japanese victory in the pacific war - is it really ASB?

Leaving the connections between Mainland Asia and the Home Islands was of vital importance for Japan, who were able to transfer numerous divisions even into August this means. Closing this was critical if the blockade strategy was to work.

What difference would keeping the Tsushima Straights open make if the Russians occupy Busan?
 
I've read the Americans planned to drop 2 new Fatman type Bombs on cities in late August, 3 Bombs for Kyushu, and 6 for Coronet, the capture of Tokyo. So for pride the Japanese People would have to endure 13 Atomic Bombs?

It would be more than that, if we're talking about extending the war through the spring of 1946. The planned production rate was for 3 bombs per month in August, which was expected to rise to 5 bombs per month in November, and 7 bombs per month in December. In 1946, it could rise much higher.

It seems close to certain that Groves (with Truman's approval) would have kept up a tempo hitting Japanese cities in the interludes before the major invasion(s) - as a way of ratcheting up pressure on the War Cabinet, and giving the impression to them that the United States possessed a sizable stockpile of bombs - an impression which would increasingly become reality.
 
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What would make you think that the United States, and Canada wouldn't continue to provide Lendlease food, and other supplies to the Soviets, even if the UK had some type of armistice with Germany? The UK would be building up a 30 division army at home, a 20 division Indian army, and another 10 Empire divisions. The RN would continue to build a huge fleet of new, and upgraded ships. The RAF would build up a heavy bomber force of 3,000 aircraft, and at least and as many tactical aircraft.

There might be aid (or sales) of some kind but it seems doubtful it would be *Lend-Lease*, a program specifically tailored and politically sold for Great Britain. At the least, I would expect less aid, on less favorable terms. (Food is, admittedly, probably the easiest aid to justify.)

In this scenario, Britain has actually made peace with the Nazis, which takes a little bit of their edge of menace off; and aiding the Soviets, in the absence of British/Commonwealth belligerency, is going to be a harder sale in Congress. "What? A fight to the death between the Nazis and the Communists? Let's cook up some popcorn!"
 
Transfers from Manchuria and Korea basically stopped after April 5, 1945, because the Soviet Union notified Japan that they would not renew their Neutrality Agreement from four years earlier. This led to a frantic 'scramble' to reinforce Manchuria through local mobilization of whatever remaining manpower was available plus the addition of understrength divisions from China. [Giangreco p. 22]

The last group of divisions transferred out of Manchuria consisted of the 11th, 25th, 57th, and 1st Armored divisions back to Japan in March and the 111th, 120th, and 121st divisions to Korea. These latter divisions were redeployed to counter a possible US invasion there, while in China four other divisions were withdrawn towards the coast as a similar precaution. [p. 21]

Helpful info. Thanks for posting it.
 
Approaching ? I think it's a lot bigger then that.

Well, Parshall at Combined Fleet concede that if Japan tries it as part of the Pearl Harbor operation (as opposed to the summer of 1942), they have a *chance* of pulling it off. "However, in the interests of discussion, let us suppose that the Japanese actually contemplated such a move. I will grant that had three Japanese divisions magically appeared on the shores of Hawaii on the morning of December 7th, hard on the heels of one of the most shattering military defeats in U.S. history, it is unlikely that the U.S. Army garrison there would have been able to put up a cohesive defense. So the Japanese could, conceivably, have taken the Hawaiian islands under these particular circumstances."

But as he points out, doing so would require cancelling the entire Philippines the campaign, and at least greatly delaying the DEI invasion as well. Because you'll need every bit of those troops, supplies, and transports to even have a chance of pulling it off.

Personally, I tend to think that the ceiling would be a major foothold, which stalls out in the face of the U.S. garrison's resistance (and lots of heavy artillery from the coastal fortifications and the surviving battleships in the harbor, which could reach any point on the island and miles out to sea, too), logistically collapses and is killed off more or less to the last man by sometime in January. But I respect Parshall's assessment.

But an invasion in 1942 really is even worse than Unmentionable Sea Mammal, no question.
 
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Just because you land and take one of the Islands does not mean you are getting them all. And if you did that will REALY get the US citizenship up in arms. And if the pull typical Japanese outrages this will make it 100% sure that the US NEVER gives up. And that the treatment of Japan will be much harsher
 
What would make you think that the United States, and Canada wouldn't continue to provide Lendlease food, and other supplies to the Soviets, even if the UK had some type of armistice with Germany? The UK would be building up a 30 division army at home, a 20 division Indian army, and another 10 Empire divisions. The RN would continue to build a huge fleet of new, and upgraded ships. The RAF would build up a heavy bomber force of 3,000 aircraft, and at least and as many tactical aircraft.

The subject in question was if Japan struck North against the USSR, given that Vladivostok was the importation point of ~50% of Lend Lease and the vast majority of the food.

1941: 360,778t, of which 13,502t Persian Gulf, 193,229t Soviet Far East, 153,977t North Russia.
1942: 2,453,097t of which 705,259t Persian Gulf, 734,020 Soviet Far East, 949,711 North Russia, 64,107 Soviet Artic.
1943: 4,794,545t of which 1,606,979 Persian Gulf, 2,388,577 Soviet Far East, 681,043 North Russia, 117,946 Soviet Artic.
1944: 6,217,622t of which 1,788,864 Persian Gulf, 2,848,181 Soviet Far East, 1,452,775 North Russia, 127,802 Soviet Artic.
1945 3,673,819t (last shipments 20 Sept) of which: 44,513 Persian Gulf, 2,079,320 Soviet Far East, 726,725 North Russia, 680,723 Black Sea, 142,538 Soviet Artic.
 
What difference would keeping the Tsushima Straights open make if the Russians occupy Busan?

Transfer of resources and divisions in the meantime. To quote Gianreco:

Beyond Truman’s domestic considerations was the assessment that manpower requirements of a blockade and bombardment would impose very real constraints on the United States’ strategic options because such a course could entail the maintaining of massive, and largely inactive, forces in the Pacific while waiting for the blockade to finally strangle Japan (U.S. planners generally believed that this could take as long as two years). 7 The IGHQ’s army staff group maintained that the U.S. landings necessary to truly close a ring around the Home Islands were the Korea Straits and the “Central CHINA coast” at Shanghai, in addition to Kyushu, but that such moves would mean that there “will not be enough [American] troops to use in the decisive battle in the KANTO area the following spring.”

The staff group believed that U.S. troops would still have to land at Kyushu to form an effective blockade. The result of the multiple assaults, they argued, was that U.S. forces would have to “be deployed from the KYUSHU area” to make an invasion of the Tokyo area possible, and that if the initial invasion force could not be destroyed, Kyushu’s defenders should prevent these troops from being used against Tokyo by prolonging aggressive action on Kyushu
 
The point is the bomb would be dropped before the invasion fleet arrived. They would have no idea when it would drop, or when the invasion would start. It would be a bolt from the blue. The Bomb would be detonated at an altitude of couple of thousand feet, so the blast would roll down the sides of the mountains. Obviously it would be a good thing to be on the other side of a mountain when an atom bomb goes off. Do you really think most Japanese solders would be living underground for months waiting for something? What happens if they drop a few bombs on troop concentrations in Southern Kyushu, where the Japanese are expecting an invasion, and then the Americans land somewhere else?

I've read the Americans planned to drop 2 new Fatman type Bombs on cities in late August, 3 Bombs for Kyushu, and 6 for Coronet, the capture of Tokyo. So for pride the Japanese People would have to endure 13 Atomic Bombs?

The U.S. had no intention of landing elsewhere and, for the most part, yes, the Japanese would largely be safe from such a strategy; Iwo and Okinawa both saw them largely living in their fortifications. Confined by the mountains the damage would be light.
 
The subject in question was if Japan struck North against the USSR, given that Vladivostok was the importation point of ~50% of Lend Lease and the vast majority of the food.

1941: 360,778t, of which 13,502t Persian Gulf, 193,229t Soviet Far East, 153,977t North Russia.
1942: 2,453,097t of which 705,259t Persian Gulf, 734,020 Soviet Far East, 949,711 North Russia, 64,107 Soviet Artic.
1943: 4,794,545t of which 1,606,979 Persian Gulf, 2,388,577 Soviet Far East, 681,043 North Russia, 117,946 Soviet Artic.
1944: 6,217,622t of which 1,788,864 Persian Gulf, 2,848,181 Soviet Far East, 1,452,775 North Russia, 127,802 Soviet Artic.
1945 3,673,819t (last shipments 20 Sept) of which: 44,513 Persian Gulf, 2,079,320 Soviet Far East, 726,725 North Russia, 680,723 Black Sea, 142,538 Soviet Artic.
Just... why the HELL would Japan attack the Soviet Union first in 1945? Japan already losing on all fronts and literally everyone knew that. It makes literally zero sense to attack the Soviets when your navy got decimated, air force full of untrained pilots, armies starving and being pushed back, and literally your cities hammered to nothing.
 
Just... why the HELL would Japan attack the Soviet Union first in 1945? Japan already losing on all fronts and literally everyone knew that. It makes literally zero sense to attack the Soviets when your navy got decimated, air force full of untrained pilots, armies starving and being pushed back, and literally your cities hammered to nothing.

My understanding was the topic at hand was an earlier attack by Japan against the USSR, say 1941 or such.
 
It would be more than that, if we're talking about extending the war through the spring of 1946. The planned production rate was for 3 bombs per month in August, which was expected to rise to 5 bombs per month in November, and 7 bombs per month in December. In 1946, it could rise much higher.

It seems close to certain that Groves (with Truman's approval) would have kept up a tempo hitting Japanese cities in the interludes before the major invasion(s) - as a way of ratcheting up pressure on the War Cabinet, and giving the impression to them that the United States possessed a sizable stockpile of bombs - an impression which would increasingly become reality.

Interesting, I didn't know their production would be that high. Post war it wasn't. At the start of the Berlin Crisis in 1948 we only had 12 disassembled Plutonium Bombs in stock. Later I think they ordered 400 improved bombs to be ready by 1952. After that we get into H Bombs, and the irrational numbers of the Cold War. Thanks for the info.
 
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The U.S. had no intention of landing elsewhere and, for the most part, yes, the Japanese would largely be safe from such a strategy; Iwo and Okinawa both saw them largely living in their fortifications. Confined by the mountains the damage would be light.

The U.S. had many options, and was regularly reassessing it's plans. Olympic wasn't written on stone tablets. For reasons of fitness and health the Japanese didn't put their men underground on those islands until the enemy fleet showed up. Not all the Japanese on ether island were living underground. Field fortifications aren't what your thinking they are. There not stone tunnels, with steel blast doors. Just digging tunnels into the sides of mountains, and piling all your men into them won't do you much good. You have to hold the slopes, and the ground between them, or the enemy just surrounds you. If that happens he can just bypass you, moving on to other objectives, and starving, or burning you out tunnel by tunnel.
 
My understanding was the topic at hand was an earlier attack by Japan against the USSR, say 1941 or such.

If the Japanese attacked the Soviet Union in 1941 it would've been very bad for the Soviets, it also would have been very bad for Japan. Has it was Japan was overstrained fighting the United States, China, Britain, India, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada. Did I leave anyone out?
 
How many non-white soldiers served in the U.S. military units that fought in the Pacific? Asking because one dirty idea Japanese could perhaps try is play on ethnic and racial differences of Allied soldiers.

Given the race card had already been well and truly played against them (and by them as well), it's probably to not going work very well


With all due respect, there is a difference between peacetime buildups during a period of active international conflict and those when an international situation is relatively stable. If Europe has fallen to the Germans and Japan has essentially taken SE Asia for itself without a USSR to deal with, yes the US may ne paying more attention but there is still a very strong isolationist wing which will not support rearmament or buildup if the US is not directly threatened. And eventually it will be one way or another.

Only isolationist doesn't mean stupid, plus there's no way the Japanese can win in time to stop the US manufacturing and population from steam rolling them. And once Japan attacks that's it you've poked the bear and the bear won't stay isolationist or at least won't until you are good and mauled


German aerospace and naval technologies were often well ahead of the Allies, though that gap was closing by war's end in OTL. Look at the impact of the Messerschmitt P.1101, Type XXI submarine, V2 rocket, and Siemens T-52d/T-52e/T-43. Beyond that consider the Me 262, magnetophon recorders, Nipolit/glass mines, and fuel-air weaponry (Hexenkassel project under Mario Zippenmayr - the May 1945 commentary about it from German military leadership in US interrogations is disturbing).

Only looking at the impact of them, they didn't have much impact.

Also you've taking some very specific and isolated items to highlight but the reality was German aerospace and naval technologies were not in advance of the allies in terms of air forces and navies (or air force and navy tactics, let alone air force and navy logistics)

Well. . . I can't agree on the Me-262. It was . . . effective enough in combat.

Sure, the engines didn't last long; it was very vulnerable on takeoff and landing. And anyway, too few, too late, too little petrol.

But "garbage" is not really fair.

While I know you are kind of joking being effective in combat when you get there doesn't mean much without the rest (oh and killing however many pilots due to difficulties in piloting it).
 
Just... why the HELL would Japan attack the Soviet Union first in 1945? Japan already losing on all fronts and literally everyone knew that. It makes literally zero sense to attack the Soviets when your navy got decimated, air force full of untrained pilots, armies starving and being pushed back, and literally your cities hammered to nothing.

For failing to renew the 1941 Nonaggression Pact. Such an arrogant insult could not go unanswered. But seriously this discussion is about how much pain, and suffering the Japanese Militarists could inflict on their own People before accepting reality.
 
For failing to renew the 1941 Nonaggression Pact. Such an arrogant insult could not go unanswered. But seriously this discussion is about how much pain, and suffering the Japanese Militarists could inflict on their own People before accepting reality.
I feel like we’re playing a “beat me up” rag doll flash game😀https://www.addictinggames.com/action/beat-me-up

We should just rename this thread “How to abuse and hurt the Japanese people as much as possible”
 
Interesting, I didn't know their production would be that high. Post war it wasn't. At the start of the Berlin Crisis in 1948 we only had 12 disassembled Plutonium Bombs in stock. Later I think they ordered 400 improved bombs to be ready by 1952. After that we get into H Bombs, and the irrational numbers of the Cold War. Thanks for the info.

Yeah - once Japan surrendered, the plans and infrastructure for accelerated core production were shelved.

But it does appear that Groves' team was confident that by the end of 1945, the U.S. could have produced 21 bombs; and what looks like at least another 30-40 by the end of March.

They could have kept up a remarkable atomic bombing campaign throughout this period while still reserving (say) a half dozen bombs for X-Day of both MAJESTIC (assuming it still happens after Louise) and CORONET each. This would be on top of any conventional bombing raids, of course.
 
If the Japanese attacked the Soviet Union in 1941 it would've been very bad for the Soviets, it also would have been very bad for Japan. Has it was Japan was overstrained fighting the United States, China, Britain, India, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada. Did I leave anyone out?

The IJA could certainly make some gains against the Soviets; before long Stalin would simply have to prioritize the German front, for obvious reasons.

And then their feeble logistics would kneecap 'em.

But yes, the problem is, going North instead of South doesn't solve their oil problem. If Japan doesn't resolve THAT, the entire economy screeches to a standstill in 1943.
 
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