Japanese victory in the pacific war - is it really ASB?

Sure, but how does this win the war for Japan?

The only reason the Allies are going in to Japan in a hurry is to deny it to the Russians. Once that option is gone the urgency is gone. You are left with negotiated peace. While Japan is descending back into the stone age every day.

Starvation on the home islands was a thing otl. How long do you expect them to continue? What sort of bargaining power do they have. Surrender and let us keep our starting position and we promise not to starve to death on you.

It would't win it for them, but it would likely force the US to accept a conditional surrender/peace treaty. Again, the situation in Japan 1945 was horrible, but the elite planed to fight on and the soldiers were ostensibly willing to (before the emperors surrender speech not a single japanese unit surrendered. And look at all the military holdouts that continued to exist for months and even years after the surrender). I just wanted to make an example, showing that it clearly was not "After 7. December 1941, american soldiers would inevitably stand in Tokio. The only question is how long it'd take".
 
It would't win it for them, but it would likely force the US to accept a conditional surrender/peace treaty. Again, the situation in Japan 1945 was horrible, but the elite planed to fight on and the soldiers were ostensibly willing to (before the emperors surrender speech not a single japanese unit surrendered. And look at all the military holdouts that continued to exist for months and even years after the surrender). I just wanted to make an example, showing that it clearly was not "After 7. December 1941, american soldiers would inevitably stand in Tokio. The only question is how long it'd take".
The Japanese military can hold out all it wants, the US will just switch to blockading Japan until they starve or surrender, whichever comes first.
 
It would't win it for them, but it would likely force the US to accept a conditional surrender/peace treaty. Again, the situation in Japan 1945 was horrible, but the elite planed to fight on and the soldiers were ostensibly willing to (before the emperors surrender speech not a single japanese unit surrendered. And look at all the military holdouts that continued to exist for months and even years after the surrender). I just wanted to make an example, showing that it clearly was not "After 7. December 1941, american soldiers would inevitably stand in Tokio. The only question is how long it'd take".

The Allies weren't taking anything other then Unconditional Surrender in WW2, let alone by 1945 with the end of the war obviously in sight.
 

Garrison

Donor
Many people believe that once the japanese attacked Pearl Harbour, they had no chance to win. But one has to ask then, why DID Japan attack Pearl Harbour? Where all people in the japanese government and military command just stupid? Of course not. One has to take a closer look at Japans war strategy to understand why they did this.

They weren't stupid per se, but they did embrace the same sort of ridiculous fantastical thinking the Nazi's did. In the case of Japan it was the belief that the Bushido sprit of the Japanese would overcome the weak willed Westerners, especially the Americans. Even those who knew better like Yamamoto went along, since any attempt to put the brakes on would have invited assassination. They launched themselves into a war they knew perfectly well they lacked the material resources to win and, much like the Nazi's, simply hoped their opponents will to fight would crumble and they could obtain favourable terms. There is no plausible scenario for Japanese victory in WWII.
 

Garrison

Donor
As late as 1944, the Japanese were making massive gains of territory in China even with the backing of the United States.

They were occupying more useless territory that they had to garrison in the face of constant guerilla attacks. And of course they were mounting these pointless offensives in China even as the USA was island hopping their towards Japan and British/Indian troops were inflicting a decisive defeat at Imphal and Kohima.
 

Garrison

Donor
What I meant with "guarantees territorial integrity" was "give all the occupied american islands, uncluding Hawaii, back".

Not a hope in hell since that would mean handing back a whole series of potential bases the USA could use for an island hopping campaign exactly like the one from OTL. Any Japanese even proposing such a thing would be assassinated.

Ok, I admit that 2 Divisions are not enough. But with 3 to 4 japanese divisions plus air and naval superiority, you can't really say that the japanese stand no chance. Don't get me wrong, victory is never a certainity, but in this situation they got a good chance in my opinion.

Except there is no plausible way to get two Divisions to Hawaii let alone four and no way of supplying them. The Japanese were at the limit of their resources to mount the raid, an invasion is out of the question.

And if were talking long run here (i.e. 43, 44) it's unlikely the japanese are able to hold Hawaii anyway. It's not so much about holding Hawaii than about taking it in a decisiive battle that cripples the US navy.

See above.

Didn't the japanese have air superiority during the Pearl Harbour attack? And fun fact, over the course of the war, the japanese had 350k soliders on Papua New Guinnea (i.e. not the best place supply wise), which only surrendered after the central government in Tokio did so. Yes, New Guinea is not as far away as Hawaii, but it has a lot less infrastructure and means to sustain troops. If the japanese take Midway on top, they would have pushed their defensive perimetre a lot further east (as someone allready mentioned), so a shipping route to Hawaii should be secured for at least a year (of course there would still be harasment by american subs).

The Japanese troops on New Guinea looted all the available food and then began to starve, with some accounts claiming they even resorted to cannibalism. Hawaii in WWII was not a food exporter and was heavily dependent on imports, there are no means to sustain troops to be found there. Japan paid little or no attention to logistics. Multiple battles were fought on the assumption that Japanese troops would feed themselves from captured enemy supplies after they were victorious. When they didn't win they starved.

So the japanese ruling class planed to collectively shoot itself in the head all along? I don't think so. And also 1.) It's not true that the war in the pacific was only or even mainly a naval conflict (both land and naval battles decided the fate of the conflict), and 2.) why should a naval conflict create less war exhaustion persé? People die there, too, and ships are expenisve aswell. Even in OTL, rationing existed in the US before it really got involved in Europe.

And there's the basic problem, you are assuming there must have been a degree of rationality and reason in the Japanese leaderships planning that is not supported by the historical record.
 

Well, actually no. Thats like suggesting if Nazi German fails at sealion, they'd try a secon time, and a third time. The domestic repercussions of such a failed invasion would be tremendous (that beeing an understatement). Some in the navy estimated that, even in a successfull invasion of Japan, the US would loose more men than they did in the rest of the war combined.

And that a second, and a third time? Nah not really. What would happen in the aftermath is hard to predict.

The Japanese military can hold out all it wants, the US will just switch to blockading Japan until they starve or surrender, whichever comes first.

I allready commented this. The US government estimated that blockading Japan into surrender could take another 1 or 2 years, and they didn't know if the public was ready to continue that long.

Okay, no, let me stop you right here. An invasion of Hawaii by Japan founders on three insurmountable problems:
1. Lack of oiler capacity
2. Lack of transport shipping
3. Lack of available troops

To the first: Japan devoted eight oilers to the Pearl Harbor operation OTL. This was half their available fast oiler capacity. Despite all the oilers made available fuel shortages were so acute in the First Air Fleet that conducting a third strike likely would've meant abandoning their destroyers for lack of fuel. Japan could make all their oilers available, and that gets them another two refuelings. Just under three weeks of additional operations - except that's just for the Kido Butai and not any of the invasion transports, their escorts, and their fire support. Overall, Japan does not have the at-sea refueling capacity to conduct sustained operations off of Hawaii.

This on top of the fact that the carriers have limited ammunition stores and no way to replenish them, and that the Japanese were sustaining increasingly severe losses over Pearl Harbor. Sticking around and launching more sorties is a good way to gut the Kido Butai's irreplaceable pilot corps right at the start of the war.

To the second: You cited Japan's Manchurian divisions sitting on the border with the Soviets as if they can be magically moved into the overseas operations. They cannot. Japan started the war with 6.5 million tons of shipping. Almost half of that, over 3 million tons, was earmarked solely to move the eleven divisions and their supporting naval elements already dedicated to attacking the targets in the Southern Resource Area. Added with other requisitioned Army shipping, and this gives the Japanese economy 2.5 million tons to play with - and they needed 10 million tons. There is simply no extra shipping to even move these troops outside of Manchuria.

And as pointed out, diverting tonnage from those attacks is to miss the entire point of the war in the first place. Japan is on an extremely strict timetable, and any delays would mean failure of the entire operation. The Japanese could, maybe, divert a division and a third from Burma operations, but that's it, and against two American divisions on Oahu is a recipe for a slaughter.

To the third: Leaving aside shipping constraints, politically the Army would have never released the necessary six divisions to invade Hawaii, which leads me to my last point.

Operationally, invading during the Pearl Harbor invasion is a disaster waiting to happen before they even land troops. The OTL raid depended on Japan being able to dash in and out beyond strike range of aircraft on Pearl - and they still expected to lose two carriers. If the Kido Butai has to babysit an invasion convoy that's not going to happen; the convoy is going to be extremely slow and at great risk of being spotted and attacked. Even if the raid happens first and then the invasion convoy goes in, there's still not-inconsiderable strike capability left on Oahu, and more importantly, Enterprise and Lexington are charging in. While the two wouldn't be able to take on the Kido Butai by themselves the invasion convoy would be an excellent target for them, as well as for the thirty-odd destroyers and several light cruisers that escaped damage.

Further, even assuming landed troops the invasion is no sure thing even with six divisions. Oahu is one of the most fortified places on the planet, bristling with fortifications and coastal artillery. Only two American divisions, but those fortifications are a major force multiplier.

And the final nail in the coffin, and the biggest reason why abandoning the Southern Resource operations was a no-go: how in the name of the flying spaghetti monster is Japan supposed to keep Hawaii supplied and invade the East Indies with eleven divisions? Multiple divisions, at that distance, is going to eat up all the shipping resources that you claimed could be redirected back toward taking the East Indies. This before American submarines go to work. Congrats, Japan just played themselves.

And then, and then, even if Alien Space Bats descend and make all this work - the US is going to be back. They are not going to be in the mood for negotiating. Not when Japan is almost certainly going to be treating its POWs and the population of Oahu with the same loving, tender care they did everywhere else. And Japan is back to square one except with no oil stockpiles.

Ok, this right here convinced me, especially the point with the fast oilers. I actually didn't knew that the shipping situation was THAT dire.

I still think that an invasion of Hawaii could have hypotheticly been possible, however it would either be SEA or Hawaii for the japanese then, and that wouldn't leave them with an actual choice. I still think that they could've landed on the DEI (they only lost 800 men in this whole operation in OTL). But actually taking control of all the islands and making sure that the oil flows is another question. Moreover they would (according to what you said) not be able to take Malaysia and Singapore at all then, which would keep the RN operating in the south-west pacific.

Yet I still think that Japan could've archieved a favourable peace. This whole "war exhaustion" thing remains (it was the core of japanese planing for war against the US, and a great fear of the US navy).

I can't just craft another scenario right off the bat, but what if...

1... the aircraft carriers Lexington and Enterprise are at Pearl Harbour on this faithfull 7. of December 1941, and are sunk?

2... the japanese won the battle of the Coral Sea, sinking both US fleet carriees while loosing only the Shoho, with the Shokaku beeing lightly damaged. This would leave them with an active carrier (Zuikaku) to support the Port Moresby Operation, possibly allowing them to take this important harbour.

3... if the japanese won the battle of Midway?

Would/could this prolong the war enough, for the US public to demand peace?
 
Well, actually no. Thats like suggesting if Nazi German fails at sealion, they'd try a secon time, and a third time. The domestic repercussions of such a failed invasion would be tremendous (that beeing an understatement). Some in the navy estimated that, even in a successfull invasion of Japan, the US would loose more men than they did in the rest of the war combined.

Nazi Germany didn't have the resources or doctrine to even try Sealion once. The USA had both of those and the grit, in spades. The USA is not surrendering in any conflict that looks remotely like OTL Pacific Theater. Hell, in our timeline, they didn't even give it first priority and they still out produced Japan to an outrageous degree. Political will was not lacking as I can't think of a single pro-peace voice in American politics after Pearl Harbor.
 
Ok, this right here convinced me, especially the point with the fast oilers. I actually didn't knew that the shipping situation was THAT dire.

I still think that an invasion of Hawaii could have hypotheticly been possible, however it would either be SEA or Hawaii for the japanese then, and that wouldn't leave them with an actual choice. I still think that they could've landed on the DEI (they only lost 800 men in this whole operation in OTL). But actually taking control of all the islands and making sure that the oil flows is another question. Moreover they would (according to what you said) not be able to take Malaysia and Singapore at all then, which would keep the RN operating in the south-west pacific.

Yet I still think that Japan could've archieved a favourable peace. This whole "war exhaustion" thing remains (it was the core of japanese planing for war against the US, and a great fear of the US navy).

I can't just craft another scenario right off the bat, but what if...

1... the aircraft carriers Lexington and Enterprise are at Pearl Harbour on this faithfull 7. of December 1941, and are sunk?

2... the japanese won the battle of the Coral Sea, sinking both US fleet carriees while loosing only the Shoho, with the Shokaku beeing lightly damaged. This would leave them with an active carrier (Zuikaku) to support the Port Moresby Operation, possibly allowing them to take this important harbour.

3... if the japanese won the battle of Midway?

Would/could this prolong the war enough, for the US public to demand peace?
1. US recalls Hornet and Yorktown from the Atlantic, fights on mostly as OTL.

2. US might not give battle at Midway, but that's about it; Zuikaku's air groups are still chewed up and not of much use supporting the Port Moresby operation. Also, the Japanese invasion force was commanded by Aritomo Goto and had to contend with an Austro-American cruiser-destroyer group. Goto is an incompetent who'll get the invasion force all sunk. See Cape Esperance.

3. US doesn't contest Solomons, war goes on another six months.

tl;dr no. Essexspam is still coming.
 
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Garrison

Donor
Well, actually no. Thats like suggesting if Nazi German fails at sealion, they'd try a secon time, and a third time. The domestic repercussions of such a failed invasion would be tremendous (that beeing an understatement). Some in the navy estimated that, even in a successfull invasion of Japan, the US would loose more men than they did in the rest of the war combined.

And that a second, and a third time? Nah not really. What would happen in the aftermath is hard to predict.



I allready commented this. The US government estimated that blockading Japan into surrender could take another 1 or 2 years, and they didn't know if the public was ready to continue that long.



Ok, this right here convinced me, especially the point with the fast oilers. I actually didn't knew that the shipping situation was THAT dire.

I still think that an invasion of Hawaii could have hypotheticly been possible, however it would either be SEA or Hawaii for the japanese then, and that wouldn't leave them with an actual choice. I still think that they could've landed on the DEI (they only lost 800 men in this whole operation in OTL). But actually taking control of all the islands and making sure that the oil flows is another question. Moreover they would (according to what you said) not be able to take Malaysia and Singapore at all then, which would keep the RN operating in the south-west pacific.

Yet I still think that Japan could've archieved a favourable peace. This whole "war exhaustion" thing remains (it was the core of japanese planing for war against the US, and a great fear of the US navy).

I can't just craft another scenario right off the bat, but what if...

1... the aircraft carriers Lexington and Enterprise are at Pearl Harbour on this faithfull 7. of December 1941, and are sunk?

2... the japanese won the battle of the Coral Sea, sinking both US fleet carriees while loosing only the Shoho, with the Shokaku beeing lightly damaged. This would leave them with an active carrier (Zuikaku) to support the Port Moresby Operation, possibly allowing them to take this important harbour.

3... if the japanese won the battle of Midway?

Would/could this prolong the war enough, for the US public to demand peace?

Here you are illustrating the problem with why Japan winning the war in the Pacific is regarded as bordering on ASB. To give them any chance at all you have to keep piling on the PODs to the point where they simply lose any shred of plausibility. None of your new suggestions is really likely to get the USA to make peace, indeed they are more likely to lead to a diversion of more resources to fighting in the Pacific at the expensive of Europe and the Mediterranean.
 
Yet I still think that Japan could've archieved a favourable peace. This whole "war exhaustion" thing remains (it was the core of japanese planing for war against the US, and a great fear of the US navy).
And here's the great problem with every one of your scenarios: this is a problem the Japanese neatly solved for the US Navy by attacking Pearl Harbor. Well, for the next four years or so.

If you want Japan to have any sort of chance at a negotiated peace, you need to ditch Pearl Harbor.
 
Nazi Germany didn't have the resources or doctrine to even try Sealion once. The USA had both of those and the grit, in spades. The USA is not surrendering in any conflict that looks remotely like OTL Pacific Theater. Hell, in our timeline, they didn't even give it first priority and they still out produced Japan to an outrageous degree. Political will was not lacking as I can't think of a single pro-peace voice in American politics after Pearl Harbor.

Ok I'll admit it, my Sea Lion analogue wasn't all that intelligent.

But estimates for US military fatalities (not total losses, just deaths) ranged between 100k to 800k (!). And thats if the invasion is successfull.
If it fails, theres no way the americans would try this again, and again, and again.
 
Ok I'll admit it, my Sea Lion analogue wasn't all that intelligent.

But estimates for US military fatalities (not total losses, just deaths) ranged between 100k to 800k (!). And thats if the invasion is successfull.
If it fails, theres no way the americans would try this again, and again, and again.

What is the other response? Going back on long established war goals? Letting the USSR invade? Conceding victory after all the blood and toil?

Not going to happen, also if Americans get boots on land they are going to stay. There is no way the Japanese drive them back into the sea.

And yeah, the estimates were dire. They were dire for D-Day too, and they didn't come true. Not saying that will happen in Japan but those estimates were often worst-case scenarios and the fact the USA would have ordered it without blinking should tell you something.

Where is the negotiate peace faction coming from? Where is its leaders? Who supports giving up and throwing in the towel with Japans obviously evil and obviously defeated?
 
Ok I'll admit it, my Sea Lion analogue wasn't all that intelligent.

But estimates for US military fatalities (not total losses, just deaths) ranged between 100k to 800k (!). And thats if the invasion is successfull.
If it fails, theres no way the americans would try this again, and again, and again.

Operation Starvation was already underway before then, it would later add defoliants to the mix and keep bombing & mining all infrastructure from the air. With no agriculture and no transport, Japan ceases to exist as a modern society. The Americans will make Japan a desert and call it peace. Historically, in the majority of straight up fights (normal US troops vs Jap without Japanese air superiority) the Japanese light infantry was no match for modern firepower. As for the guerrillas, its dependent on the Americans treating the Japanese civilians better than the Japanese did with their POWs and subjects.
 
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Governments of the time don't have the benefit of hindsight, hence prudent governments can sound awfully pessimistic. Downfall was put forward because it was thought that the casualties incurred would be less bad than waiting two years. Then Okinawa happened and intel discovered the Japanese were stronger than thought, the casualty estimates started being revised upwards, as the estimates that led to Downfall getting the go ahead were not realistic. Hence why the Navy really started disagreeing with Downfall by August '45, saying it would have horrible casualties. The Army still supported it, but MacArthur was shading his casualty estimates to keep them low, hence why you never see his estimates being used. It's quite possible with the Army and Navy disagreeing the Operation is cancelled

As for it failing? Unlike Nazi Germany the US does have the sealift and naval power to try again, and Japan is getting weaker while the UK would be getting stronger

US government of the time did not have hindsight, hence them worrying about something that probably was not a problem, that happened a lot and it is not a bad thing. The opposite, not worrying about potential problems is a bad thing

Just because one side makes something an important part of their strategy does not make it right. War Exhaustion was overrated by the Japanese who assumed that the US of 1941 was like Russia of 1904, and through group-think and confirmation bias built strategy around that. Based on British performance the US would keep at it at least until 1947, US political system would likely mean early '49 because of how elections work

As for your scenarios, Japan makes some modest additional gains in '42, then still gets hammered flat in '44 as the US had so many carriers on the way the IJN could not face them and win, best case they buy 12 months and the Midway class get their share of the glory, not to mention the sub force being down to shooting fishing boats by Summer of '45 OTL

One also has to deal with Japanese peace demands being unrealistic. IE when the US is willing to accept a reasonable peace they are from OTL unlikely to offer such, and when they are willing to offer such, they are clearly on the ropes
 

marathag

Banned
Plus the US was developing various chemical agents (such as the appropriately named chemical 2,4 dichlorophenoxyacetic acid = Vegetable Killer Acid or VKA) to attack the Japanese rice crop and to generally defoliate the area behind the landing zones. Japan would have been deep in famine by the time the US forces landed on the Kanto Plain in 1946 if they didn't surrender by then.
2,4D has little effect on Potatoes or Rice, which is whay the US moved onto working on weaponizing other things
from the wiki
The use of a chemical or biological agents to destroy Japan's rice was contemplated by the Allies during World War II. In 1945 Japan's rice crop was terribly affected by rice blast disease. The outbreak as well as another in Germany's potato crop coincided with covert Allied research in these areas. The timing of these outbreaks generated persistent speculation of some connection between the events however the rumors were never proven and the outbreaks could have been naturally occurring.[1]
 
But one has to ask then, why DID Japan attack Pearl Harbour?
Because frankly Japan misunderstood what it was getting into. Japan had fought the Western powers twice before, Russia in the R-J War, and Germany in WWI. The Russo-Japanese War is the real key example here. Japan launched a surprise attack before declaring war, devastated the Russian fleet in the Pacific, seized what they wanted, beat the reinforcement fleet, and the Russians threw in the towel. Now where have we heard that same basic idea before? Oh right, its pretty much exactly what they planned to do in WWII. But, they were wrong. The United States wasn't Tsarist Russia. The Tsar could give up in the Pacific and never have to answer to anyone. The American president did. If he gave up after a surprise attack and mass slaughter of American citizens he'll be out of office on his ass before he can blink.

The Japanese thought they were waging a 19th century Imperial war. The United States (and Britain) were planning to wage industrial total war. And in that sort of war Japan was always going to be crushed.

Good argument, but if 2 divisions arent enough, make it 3 or 4. Its not that Japan didn't have enough men or guns.

Except they didn't have those men. If the Japanese throw themselves at Hawaii they can't take Malaysia, the Philippines, or Indonesia. And it won't take 30,000 men. Or sixty. To have any shot the Japanese will need to field upwards of 100,000. And even THAT only gives them a numerical advantage of about 2-1. You want the usual thinking, a 3-1 advantage the number is over 130,000. Six-seven divisions. I.e. over HALF of what they had earmarked to take over southeast Asia. And for all that work they get nothing.

That's not even getting into the problems of fueling this massive force so far around the world, nor of having to keep their fleet on station the entire time, OR of having to abandon ships on their way back, OR having to try and hold the islands if captured.
 
By god, I'm not a professional, nor even throughoutly educated on this topic. But ask yourself, if the two nukes were not ready by mid to late 45, and if Operation Downfall failed with hundreds of thousands of american casualties (actually not that unlikely if you look at the orriginal plan and the planed japanese countermeasures. There's a good video by "Military History Visualized" on that topic), would the americans really try a second time? Or a third time?

No, they simply starve, burn, torch, and nuke the Home Islands until either someone high enough calls uncle or until three houses at a crossroads become a target worthy of the B-29 raid, by Japan's surrender both the 8th Airforce and RAF bomber command had begun moving towards the Pacific on top of the considerable USAAF heavy assets parked on the Mariana's. Japan's urban centers would cinders, it's transportation hubs non-existent and it's stockpiles of food and ammo on top of it's best troops expended and immovable in Southern Kyushu.

If and when the Americans come back knocking back at the shores of Kanto Bay with an armada at their backs and every long-range aircraft capable of reaching the home islands there will be almost nothing to stop them
 
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