"The problem, aside from the skilled labour shortage, was a lack of the high-tensile "D" quality steel needed for Tribal construction, a steel not yet produced domestically. The mild steel used in the first building programme of corvettes and Bangors was of a relatively simple type, easily produced in Canadian mills. High performance vessels like the Tribals required a very specific type of high-grade steel because the long, narrow hulls were subject to enormous and complex stresses. "D" quality steel was strong enough to resist such pressure, yet also light enough to allow for no sacrifice in speed, a factor of vital importance to destroyer construction. Again, Britain was unable to help. The Canadian steel industry was in the process of developing such capacity, but did not yet possess the necessary plant.' Early in the war there had been an opportunity to develop it by refurbishing DOSCO's plate mill at Sydney, NS, but whether for financial reasons, as Howe claimed, or a "regional bias," as E.R. Forbes later argued, the opportunity was lost." A detailed study by Munitions and Supply in October 1940 noted the potential of the Sydney plate mill which, although it had not been in operation since 1919, had an impressive capacity of 50,000 tons per year on a single shift. The proposal to refurbish the plant was rejected by Howe because of the great cost, the already considerable investment in the "big 3" Ontario steel mills (Algoma, Dofasco and Stelco) and the lack of domestic demand.' The inaction was doubly unfortunate, due to the obvious advantages that would have accrued both in ease of transportation and the fact that Halifax Shipyards was a wholly-owned subsidiary of DOSCO. Later, by 1942, DOSCO's plate mill was refurbished and did produce the necessary plate for the Tribals, but this was done too late for the first two vessels; Nova Scotia steel was used only on the second pair of destroyers."
"With no domestic source of supply, and with British supply problematic, the obvious place to look was to the United States. The US seemed a natural source of supply, as in the prewar period one-third of steel used in Canada originated there." The problem was that the Admiralty "D" quality steel needed for the Tribals had very specific properties and chemical composition. American steel plants were, of course, producing high-tensile steel for their own naval building programme, but its composition differed slightly from Admiralty specifications and they were unwilling, not surprisingly, to alter production for the relatively small amount of metal required for two or even four destroyers, as their own programme dealt in exponentially larger numbers. These problems were overcome eventually, and US-grade steel was adapted for the Tribals by minor design changes and extra stiffening and used on the first pair of vessels. This need for redesign resulted in yet further delays. As a result, the keels for the first two Tribals were not laid until 20 May 1942, almost one year after the contract had been awarded, and nearly a year and a half since the project had informally begun."
That is not correct. American plants were fully capable of producing Admiralty style "D" quality steel especially with the info the Canadians got however, it was not in their overall interest to tweak their plants for such a small batch of foreign designs. It turned out in the end that the Canadians didn't really need it for the Tribal's itself. It was useful later on but again it doesn't change the boondoggle of a procurement itself. A lot of hassle would have been avoided had the ships been produced in an actual suitable yard with less of a reliance on the British.
