Why are you lying?There's literally no credible evidence for that.
Castro's 1962 plea for Kruschev to wipe out America is widely accepted fact.
Why are you lying?There's literally no credible evidence for that.
I very much enjoy these seemingly small PODs which have big consequences.. . . high enough in the Command Structure to know about Cuban nukes.
This would cause a huge shitstorm while the INF Treaty was being hashed out.
Keeping ballistic missiles secret for that long seems a bit of a stretch to me. A small stash of gravity bombs for fighter bombers might be more plausible.Gen. Rafael del Pino Dia was the highest ranking defector, in 1987.
He was high enough in the Command Structure to know about Cuban nukes.
This would cause a huge shitstorm while the INF Treaty was being hashed out.
Which leads to a question: if the US discovered the missiles by espionage rather than U-2 overflights, could they have made the information public? The SA-2 Guideline/S-75 Dvina had already shot down a U-2, so it’s conceivable they’d stop flights over Cuba if there were SAMs in place and the risk of a shoot-down was deemed too high.
Why are you lying?
Castro's 1962 plea for Kruschev to wipe out America is widely accepted fact.
I'll admit that bit was in poor taste. It was late and I should have given that a second look.I won’t accuse you of lying
With regards to nuclear exchange, responding to a beach landing with a full counter value (not tactical or even counter force) strike is 100% a first strike, and is such an disproportionate escalation that it is essentially preemptive.Not as a first strike, not preemptively and not unprovoked.
Here have your pick of the news outlets.Also, I wouldn’t call it “widely accepted fact” when I’ve never seen it anywhere else previously to your sharing the link.
With regards to nuclear exchange, responding to a beach landing with a full counter value (not tactical or even counter force) strike is 100% a first strike, and is such an disproportionate escalation that it is essentially preemptive.
States protect their borders, there's nothing preemptive about launching when you're being invaded. Cuba doesn't have the luxury of humoring any diplomatic process when their beaches are compromised.100% a first strike, and is such an disproportionate escalation that it is essentially preemptive.
Because the Americans didn't plan on it, and Castro didn't say "only if they use nukes as part of their invasion".How is it first strike when the Americans have nuked the beaches first?
Responding to a non-nuclear attack with nuclear weapons is called a first strike. It is initiating the nuclear exchange.States protect their borders, there's nothing preemptive about launching when you're being invaded.
If China and the USSR, and India and Pakistan can fight full blown border wars without running for the big red button, then Castro can have the good sense to not demand that another nation wipe out America for his sake.Deterrents aren't conditional, it's unreasonable to assume any country would give their attackers the courtesy of a warning before they counter-attack.
It is an escalation. But it's not a surprise.
I thought we were talking about a missile crisis gone hot. That was the only scenario I know of IOTL where Castro is on record about how he would have actually responded.What invasion was he repelling in the 1980s?
Please see the page numbered 28 (the tenth page of the PDF).I thought we were talking about a missile crisis gone hot. That was the only scenario I know of IOTL where Castro is on record about how he would have actually responded.
He said he was willing to launch, for what it's worth.
IIRC the Soviets deployed a motorised infantry brigade alongside the missiles to Cuba which they didn't repatriate when the weapons were removed, the Americans not learning about them for nearly twenty years.Keeping ballistic missiles secret for that long seems a bit of a stretch to me. A small stash of gravity bombs for fighter bombers might be more plausible.
Even Kennedy didn't listen to the RAND corporation, when they showed him the nukes on Cuba were actually completely insignificant in the global military balance (They didn't offer a new thread that wasn't already there from nukes from subs) and that starting a crisis about them would have a 10% risk of escalating in a nuclear holocaust. He still started the crisis for personal political reasons, namely to look strong after some earlier minor defeats in the Cold War. Now, you may say 10% is a small number, but it remains still a possible outcome, which he was to risk for political gain. There are only very few politicians (and people) who entirely understood the consequences of a nuclear war.Please see the page numbered 28 (the tenth page of the PDF).
If Danilevich can be believed, Castro was indeed a nutter.
Huh? Russian missiles on Cuba were very very significant when it came to the USSR's ability to attack the Coninteal US. The USSR in 1962 had only some 30+ ICBMs and 150 or so bombers capable of delivering nuclear weapons to the US. Soviet ICBMs were both unreliable with failure rates approaching 33% around the time of the crisis for even the newest missiles and CEPs of around 2.5 km and Soviet bombers would've had to cross three separate radar lines, evade over a thousand NORAD interceptors and then avoid the NIKE, and BOMARC SAM systems to deliver their payloads. The positioning of Soviet MRBMs in Cuba, however, gave the USSR an ability to more easily hit US cities in a far more reliable manner than bombers or ICBMs and did alter the threat of nuclear attack in North America. Could JFK had left the missiles in Cuba alone? Sure but, he also had good reasons to be concerned about Soviet missiles 90s miles from the coast of Florida which had the ability to reach Washington in 30 minutes.Even Kennedy didn't listen to the RAND corporation, when they showed him the nukes on Cuba were actually completely insignificant in the global military balance (They didn't offer a new thread that wasn't already there from nukes from subs) and that starting a crisis about them would have a 10% risk of escalating in a nuclear holocaust. He still started the crisis for personal political reasons, namely to look strong after some earlier minor defeats in the Cold War. Now, you may say 10% is a small number, but it remains still a possible outcome, which he was to risk for political gain. There are only very few politicians (and people) who entirely understood the consequences of a nuclear war.
I meant the subs with missiles who could pose the exactly the same threat. They were then in the end of their development phase, but american intelligence knew they were soon operable, and planners were already anticipating. A think-tank like RAND also put them into their calculations and concluded they weren't worth the risk of a crisis situation (I believe, but i'm not 100 % sure, they already advised the final political outcome of the crisis, exchange with the nukes in Turkey, before the start of the crisis, to be negotiated on a special summit.)Huh? Russian missiles on Cuba were very very significant when it came to the USSR's ability to attack the Coninteal US. The USSR in 1962 had only some 30+ ICBMs and 150 or so bombers capable of delivering nuclear weapons to the US. Soviet ICBMs were both unreliable with failure rates approaching 33% around the time of the crisis for even the newest missiles and CEPs of around 2.5 km and Soviet bombers would've had to cross three separate radar lines, evade over a thousand NORAD interceptors and then avoid the NIKE, and BOMARC SAM systems to deliver their payloads. The positioning of Soviet MRBMs in Cuba, however, gave the USSR an ability to more easily hit US cities in a far more reliable manner than bombers or ICBMs and did alter the threat of nuclear attack in North America. Could JFK had left the missiles in Cuba alone? Sure but, he also had good reasons to be concerned about Soviet missiles 90s miles from the coast of Florida which had the ability to reach Washington in 30 minutes.
Also yes the US was being completly hypocritical when it came to the deployment of Soviet missiles to Cuba the fact that they were doesn't particurly matter when it came to the American reaction.