Ok. Was the Kikogun part of the original mobilization plan?
I couldn't find anything that indicates such. A reconstructed 'hypothetical' (予想の一例) order of battle for Kantokuen as suggested by the Kantogun on July 8 is in the Senshi Sosho vol.20 as an appendix, but no such tank formation appears there. Operational maps suggests tanks units being scattered to the two main formations, the Third Army and the Fifth Army. For the Kikogun itself vol.73 p.107 cites Hara Tomio in pointing the Yamashita mission of 1941 as its origin.
Then it looks like the Soviet/Russian narrative of events is right. Japan wanted to win "maloy krov'yu, moguchim udarom" (little blood, mighty blow), but the chance to do so never came; this suggests to me that Japan was not nearly as serious about invading the USSR as I previously believed. I wonder it the outcome would have been different if there was more cooperation with Germany from the beginning, for example if Hitler extended a formal request to Matsuoka for a joint attack during his visit to Berlin in March. Historically Matsuoka went on to conclude the Neutrality Pact with the USSR in April but then turned around and advocated for war after Barbarossa began in June. There were also the preparations for the offensive south after the imperial conference on July 2.
The General Staffs was very serious about it, and information about the impending German invasion of the Soviet Union was known to the Army since April 16 when ambassador Oshima reported back about the German preparation. It was barely after the Soviet-Japanese Treaty was signed, and Foreign Minister Matsuoka in his wisdom simply ignored him, but certain figures within the Army including Tanaka accepted Oshima's information as genuine, with Tanaka himself drawing a general layout for a future operation against the Soviet Union, detailed in his journal entry for April 22 1941. Tanaka's 45 volume long war journal isn't available online and only accessible from the NIDS library, (page 128 of
this catalogue) but on the matter of Kantuken, other historians have read and referred Tanaka's documents. According to
Yoshii Kenichi's 'The actual conditions of Kanto Army Special Practice', this April plan called for the Japanese force in China to be skeletonized by 10 divisions, with 5 divisions being transferred to North China through the Jinghu Railway, 3 to Manchuria through Dairen, and the remaining 2 to Korea through Busan. This plan operated on an assumption that the Soviet Theater would be supplied with three
Kaisenbun to each divisions, and to this end other theaters were to be slashed with only one Kaisenbun.
The problem is that everyone in Japan had their agenda each and not a single figure in the government could settle differences to set a straight course. The Northern Strategy was one of such agenda of the General Staffs, pet project even, specifically of Tanaka, but not of whole Japan. When the July 2 conference was held the Army was indecisive because the Army itself was divided over the question of North or South, the Navy was absolute in its support for the Southern Strategy, all the while the Foreign Ministry suddenly found itself pushing for a war on the Soviet Union. Thus they arrived on the consensus that, since they couldn't decide for either way, they should follow both the course and prepare for the Southern Strategy and for the Northern Strategy too.
I see.
EDIT: Just some more thoughts.
On page 25 of his book, Anatoliy Koshkin (mentioned below) wrote that the 30-division plan was abandoned on 31 July 1941 - partly because of the negative impact it would have on Japanese efforts in China - but that the 'wait and see' game would continue. On the following page it is stated that after the war Masanobu Tsuji recalled that in early August 1941, the War Ministry came to the conclusion that "in case of operations against the Soviet Union all oil reserves would be used up within six months to a year" and that "therefore, as far as oil was concerned, there was no way out other than moving south."
This indicates that while other factors dissuaded an all-out Japanese offensive (or at least the buildup to reach such a capability), the threat was not completely removed until Japan decided to attack the ABDA powers.
The full (translated) quote is as follows:
"Therefore, at meetings of the leadership of the General Staff and the War Ministry, the issue of allocating an additional number of divisions for war with the USSR was discussed. On July 16, 1941, the Japanese General Staff stated that, “even if the transfer of the Soviet Far Eastern army is not carried out as scheduled, an attack on the USSR must be launched.” The troops were tasked with being fully alert to launch an offensive at any time. At the same time, a further buildup of troops was planned in Manchuria and Korea. The issue of using 30 divisions with a total number of 1.2 million people was actively discussed for war with the USSR. In 1941, there were 51 divisions in the Japanese ground forces, of which 27 were fighting in China. According to the new plan, in case of war with the Soviet Union 6 divisions were to be transferred from the Chinese front. This was strongly opposed by the China Expeditionary Army. Its commander, General Hata Shunroku, said that such a reduction in troops on the Sino-Japanese front would be very risky and would inevitably lead to the China war being prolonged further. In the end, GHQ had to agree with this because Japanese forces in China had already been greatly weakened. On July 31, the plan to use 30 divisions against the USSR was abandoned in the expectation that sooner or later the Soviet leadership would be forced to begin a large-scale transfer of troops to the west."
So a nail on the coffin as I contended. To add on the Tsuji's statement, Senshi Sosho vol.73 p.4 points to Shibafu Hideo from the War Preparations Section of the Army Ministry (Chief: Okada Kikusaburo) as responsible for the study resulted in that conclusion.
Since you have Senshi Sosho, may I ask a few more questions?
1.) Yutaka Imaoka (military historian/former staff colonel) recalled that on 16 September 1941 'for operational preparations lasting three months and involving 23 or 24 divisions on the offensive (including the Korea Army), the following logistical basis was decided: 1,200,000 men, 300,000 laborers, 200,000 Japanese and 200,000 Chinese horses, 35,000 motor vehicles, and 500 tanks.' Because of the term 'on the offensive,' the implication is that this excludes the 6th Army on the Mongolian front as well as internal garrison or Manchukuo forces. Compared to the original mobilization plan (22 divisions, 850,000 men) the difference is enormous; what was the source of this discrepancy? Is this the same plan (30 division variant) discussed by Koshkin?
While Senshi Sosho vol.73 p.80 indeed confirms that the force size being limited to 23-24 divisions after August, for Yutaka's numbers I have no idea. If it is on Senshi Sosho I couldn't find them. The most significant change to the operational plan after Kantokuen was splitting its offensive operation into two stages. At the first stage, the Ussuri front was to be overwhelmed within 21 days, and then a second offensive would be launched to north, targeting Blagoveshchensk. This was change from the original plan that called the both front to be attacked simultaneously. The background history behind is detailed in Senshi Sosho vol.20 pp.364-367, as I quoted above, but in short, this was the result of an operational dispute between the General Staffs and the Kantogun, originating from the Kantogun's uneasiness with the planned northern drive on Blagoveshchensk. On July 9, as an alternative to the proposed offensive towards north, the Kantogun suggested attacking Khabarovsk in further east instead, but no consideration for such operation was previously done, and operational study and planning from scratch would require at least six weeks. The General Staffs dismissed this alternative version, but tried to alleviate the concern by increasing the planned size of the northern offensive force, which became the origin of the 30 divisions plan of July 11, but nothing ever came out of it.
By July 29, when the Kantogun sent Tokyo a new variation of the operational plan, the General Staffs' 30 divisions plan was no longer in the picture of the Kantogun. In this plan, the force size was as originally conceived under the 25 divisions plan, but while the Ussuri front was strengthened to 16 divisions, an increase of 3 division from 13 divisions in the original plan of July 8, the Northern front (Blagoveshchensk) was shrunken to 2 divisions from 6 divisions from the original plan. On the very next day, July 30, the Chief of the General Staff (Sugiyama Hajime) discussed the matter with the Vice Chief of Staff of the Kantogun (Ayabe Kitsuju), and informed him that the initiation of the war wouldn't be decided within August, and that if the war ever comes, the window for military operation would be limited to October. A new variation that employed only 24 divisions was drawn, of which 17 divisions were to be concentrated to the Ussuri front, but as the planned drive towards Blagoveshchensk was kept in the operational plan as the second stage operation in the next year, it would appears this version was discarded too.
2.) Is there a specific list of divisions, brigades, regiments, etc. that were to be mobilized under the various plans, or only vague terms like '4 divisions from the homeland and 5 from China?'
As I mentioned above, there's a reconstructed 'hypothetical' order of battle for Kantokuen in the Senshi Sosho vol.20 pp.365-366. It's hypothetical because aside from the original 16 divisions that were mobilized in real history, all other transferred divisions on this list were
frompicked based on the authors'
estimatesspeculation, (edit - tried to word better)
It has four variations, the first two are the 20 divisions plan and the 25 divisions plan, both prepared by the Kantogun on July 8. The third one is the modified 25 divisions plan as prepared by the Kantogun on July 29, the fourth and last one is the 24 divisions plan drawn after the meetings between Tojo and Tanaka on July 31 established the 24 division limitation.
For limited but more precise information, its p.369 notes that five divisions in China were earmarked for the transfers, on the presumption that the decision to initiate the war would be made no latter than August 10.
The 21st Division from Baoding, scheduled to start moving in mid August, estimated to arrive North Manchuria by early September
The 33rd Division with its main strength assembled in Taiyuan, same as above, with its detached infantry regiment in Jiujiang estimated to arrive North Manchuria by September 15
The 4th Division from Hankou, scheduled to start moving once the war decision has been made, estimated to arrive North Manchuria by September 15
The 6th Division from Wuhan, scheduled to start moving once the war decision has been made, estimated to arrive North Manchuria by late September
The 41st Division, scheduled to be assembled to Linfen, estimated to arrive North Manchuria by late September
While discussing the contingency plan of January 14 1942, the Senshi Sosho vol.35 p.366, the authors name 16th Division, 51st Division, 52nd Division, and 71st Division as the potential reinforcements to the Kantogun.
3.) Anatoliy Koshkin, a Russian historian, claims that in response to German pressure Japan developed a plan called "Operation No. 51" in the spring of 1942. This plan envisioned that in addition to 16 infantry divisions in the Kwantung Army and 3 in Korea a further 7 would be transferred from Japan and 4 from China. Of these, 17 would be used on the eastern front, 6 on the northern front, and 1 on the western front while the rest were apparently in reserve. 3 tank divisions in the Kikogun (which historically only had two) would participate in the offensive on the eastern and northern directions. This plan, says Koshkin, was shelved after the Japanese defeat in the Battle of Midway. On July 20 1942, General Tanaka wrote in his diary: "At present, it is necessary to resolve the question of the principles of managing the war as a whole. Apparently, in 1942-1943 it would be advisable to avoid decisive battles and wage a protracted war. It is currently impractical to carry out the operation against the USSR."
In reality, I understand that "Operation No. 51" was actually the code-name for an offensive in China that became Operation Ichi-Go. That said, is there any truth to the rest of the above?
It is true that early in 1942 Tanaka and his staffs operated under the presumption that the 'favorable moment' would eventually arrive in that year, according to the Senshi Sosho vol.35 p.602. However such optimism was apparently gone by April when an American B-25 bomber from the Doolittle Raid landed on the Soviet Union. He still was fairly confident that the Soviet Union and Japan would eventually go to war against each other, but he wasn't after the German pressure but the American pressure. As noted in the earlier discussion, the potential air campaign launched from the Soviet territory was a serious consideration in 1941, and that just became a threat. Tanaka in his journal on April 20 suspected the Americans of emanating pressures to force the Soviet Union to enter the Pacific War. Under such consideration he visited the Kantogun to inspect their war preparations, but after two weeks of closer inspection throughout late April and early May as observed in the Senshi Sosho vol.59 pp.107-120, Tanaka now aimed for 1944 in completing the preparation, beginning with his observation about the northern Manchuria border on April 30. Delaying the potential operation against the Soviet Union to 1944 became the official policy only on June 9, and I have no evidence to prove that this inspection is what caused Tanaka to back off, only the timing is such like that.
Additional notes:
1. Besides Senshi Sosho, another Japanese language source I have encountered in western texts is "Boeicho Boeikenshusho Senshishitsu / Office of Military History, Institute for Defense Studies, Defense Agency," often abbreviated as "BBSS" (don't know the kanji). Do you have this text? If so, what does it say about this topic?
- Another book I've heard about but never seen: "Kantokuen: Syusenji no Taiso sen" (1974) by Hikosaburo Hata
2. If you are interested, here are some Russian language resources (linked):
(If you can't read cyrillic, Google Translate does a decent job)
I've had no chance to read Hata Hikosaburo's book, sorry. And the "BBSS" isn't text but a government office that collects and publishes military history, the Senshi Sosho series being one of such work.
This link leads to its official website. I'll take time to read both the Russian books, thanks for the links.