AHC: post-1942 Luftwaffe 'sanity options'

Deleted member 94680

Actually I think I want to write an ASB AH story in which Nazi fanboy ends up providing information for Führer via time machine - with some rather unexpected results...

I'd read the s*it out of this TL...

Not quite a Nazi fanboy, but the secondary character in “The Foresight War” is an advisor to the Wehrmacht with future knowledge.
 
The same for centimetric radar for nightfighters. They had sets to copy from 1942 but never took advantage of this until March 45 too.
Centimetric radars need magnetron, expecially if you reverse engineer them from Wallied ones. But Wallied cavity magnetrons were made of natural magnet, and Germany had none: electromagnetic ones required re-design and were more expensive.
This is a pre-1942 POD IMHO.
 
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Tens of thousands of casualties with a high proportion of deaths across the South East of England and Antwerp and it's environs is not hardly any damage if it is your family being killed, wounded or made homeless. They had already had 5 years of conventional bombing not to mention the same from coastal artillery so 'we won't bother this time' is not going to be an option. The troops in NW Europe are not going to be impressed if nothing is done to protect their children and parents. The brake on advances on the ground was logistics not weaponry so the defence of South East England and Antwerp had little impact upon the advance into Germany. AFAIK the whole V1/V2 matter was not a Luftwaffe affair anyway.

A large reason the V1 did less damage than expected was the use of the XXX Deception system to convince the Germans to move the aim point into empty country side. The first few months most hit inside London. After the deception op succeeded most fell on near empty farm land. Unfortunately the same could not be done for Antwerp & that city took a beating in the winter of 1944-1945. Lots of civilian deaths, military deaths, and industrial operations disrupted. Fortunately the port operations were unhindered.
 
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It still armed, and it goes off when the barometric trigger says 'go'

& the triggers were triple redundant. Parsons was not taking any chance of a malfunction. Triple wiring for the electric detonation circuits. There was also a radar proximity fuze and a timer trigger. Activated when the bomb was released. After take off Parsons and his technicians tested every circuit, carried spare initiators, the timer-barometer-& proximity fuze. If the airfract were shot down Parsons probably would have detonated it himself. His primary flight station was in the bomb bay, secondary was the compartment adjacent. That bomb was going to detonate, period.

Intercepting 350mph bombers at 34,000 feet isn't as easy as big B-24s flying at 24,000feet 150 mph slower.
The US was building the infrastructure to mass produce bombs, 3 per month, increasing as the months go on into Fall and Winter

You have to stop every single B-29, that's rough job

The Japanese tried to intercept the B29s flying high altitude weather recon & photo recon. They failed. It was difficult to intercept those at medium altitudes due to the speed.
 

marathag

Banned
Centimetric radars need magnetron, expecially if you reverse engineer them from Wallied ones. But Wallied cavity magnetrons were made of natural magnet, and Germany had none: electromagnetic ones required re-design and were more expensive.

Magnetrons had a brief popularity for Military Radar use, before other more efficient(and capable of higher frequencies, and being easily tunable) tubes replaced them, leading to where the most common use of Magnetrons is making water molecules shake in microwave ovens.

Want to know more?
https://www.radartutorial.eu/18.explanations/ex19.en.html
 

marathag

Banned
They failed. It was difficult to intercept those at medium altitudes due to the speed.

'But muh Ta-154 und Me-163!', cry the Wehraboos

that's when you point out that they weren't stopping the Spitfire and Lightning high altitude photo-recon craft overflying the Reich daily in 1944
 
Somebody mentioned having Galland replace Goering. Admittedly, the same person also recommended putting Speer in charge of production sooner, which seems unlikely to be of benefit insofar as at least the present historical consensus is that Speer's biggest talent was taking credit for other people's work. Still, I'm less familiar with Galland's current reputation. Further, while a lot of Luftwaffe problems were unsolvable, Goering does seem to have committed some unforced errors, so replacing him with someone else might well have improved things slightly. Does anybody have a good sense as to whether Galland in particular would actually have been a substantially better choice?
 

thaddeus

Donor
my timeline for a fast bomber or recon/bomber is always HE-119/HE-219 (not the historical He-219, but rather adding a second "power system")/HE-319 (a Heinkel "Blitz" or a "mash-up" if you will of AR-234/HE-343)

with all of the above eclipsing the HE-177, also this speculation is only for 100 - 200 year

A large reason the V1 did less damage than expected was the use of the XXX Deception system to convince the Germans to move the aim point into empty country side. The first few months most hit inside London. After the deception op succeeded most fell on near empty farm land. Unfortunately the same could not be done for Antwerp & that city took a beating in the winter of 1944-1945. Lots of civilian deaths, military deaths, and industrial operations disrupted. Fortunately the port operations were unhindered.

this was the type of scenario, and certainly many more on the Eastern Front, that my speculation was to deal with?
 
'But muh Ta-154 und Me-163!', cry the Wehraboos

that's when you point out that they weren't stopping the Spitfire and Lightning high altitude photo-recon craft overflying the Reich daily in 1944

As it can be verified quickly, Anglo-American piston engines in service from late 1942 on were superior to German engines, and WAllies kept that advantage until the end. In better part of 20th century, engine was a heart of a fighter/interceptor.
That Luftwaffe didn't fielded a piston engine with a 2-stage supercharger before 1945 was a German mistake, and their only; 2-stage superchargers were a known quantity by 1930s in UK and Germany. A fighter with 1-stage supercharged engine will have hard time to intercept a recon that has engine with two stages of superchaging (= mostly mid- and late war Spitfires, Mosquitoes etc, plus any turboed aircraft of the time).
Japanese were in the same position.
 
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Every thing you wanted to know about they the German air force but were afraid to ask.
Why the Luftwaffe failed in World War 2

Logistics of the German Air Force in World War 2
 
As it can be verified quickly, Anglo-American piston engines in service from late 1942 on were superior to German engines, and WAllies kept that advantage until the end. In better part of 20th century, engine was a heart of a fighter/interceptor.
That Luftwaffe didn't fielded a piston engine with a 2-stage supercharger before 1945 was a German mistake, and their only; 2-stage superchargers were a known quantity by 1930s in UK and Germany. A fighter with 1-stage supercharged engine will have hard time to intercept a recon that has engine with two stages of superchaging (= mostly mid- and late war Spitfires, Mosquitoes etc, plus any turboed aircraft of the time).
Japanese were in the same position.

Later in the war what the Germans needed was higher octane fuel(av) to allow a higher compression ratio and more powerful engines. .
 
'But muh Ta-154 und Me-163!', cry the Wehraboos

that's when you point out that they weren't stopping the Spitfire and Lightning high altitude photo-recon craft overflying the Reich daily in 1944
Thats partially untrue, because in Mano Ziegler's book Rocket Fighter, a rotte of Me 163 almost intercepted a P-38 recon, but the Me 163 suffered some technical difficulties and was forced to break off.
But for the most part, the Ta 154 and Me 163 were useless.
Ho 229, He 219, and Ta 152 were much better.
 
Later in the war what the Germans need was higher octane fuel(av) to allow a higher compression ratio and more powerful engines. .

Supercharged engine requires low compression ratio - talk 6:1 on the Merlins and Griffons, Soviet even went to 5.5:1 with AM-42. Most of the other engines were between 6.5:1 and 7.5:1. Germans did have C3 as a high octane fuel, used on BMW 801D engines for example, plus there is a way around with using water/alcohol injection to forestall detonation problems when 87 oct fuel was used (as it was the case on late-war DB 605s, for example).
Any time the Germans went from low-ish compression ratio upwards, it took them 6-18 months to cure reliability problems, and engines were still barely making same power when compared with best WAllied engines (and usualy were making less power at altitude vs. WAllied best engines).
The best performing German hi-alt engine used in ww2, in 1945, was using 87 oct fuel.
 
I never get the "Aggregate costed as Manhattan": money has no value in war. Alcool for V2 costed 10 in Germany but (probably) less in UK and USA.
I have never seen a PPP analysis of that statement.

And you never should. PPP is based around free labour and consumer goods with a few curious assumptions about how workers should subsist.

While the United States closely resembled the model for PPP 1932-1946, Germany didn’t.

After 1942 US and German commodities (Marxist sense) entered a period of incommensurability anyway, so comparing Rm or grammes of Auschwitz 1 bread to USD is perverse in a purely scholarly sense.

%GDP/capita measures aren’t any better as GDP is closely aligned with assumptions that didn’t exist in the Soviet Union or Germany, even though they were states where wage labour existed as the determinate labour form (especially in camps) and small groups of people controlled investment of social worth for profit.

Even then these expenditures aren’t convertible. You can’t take a capacity to make atomic weapons and turn it into a universal health care system.

Many of the core assumptions of marginalist economics are those of a model whose known deficiencies compared to historical human societies make its measures and claims ridiculous for certain historical analyses. Political economists fare a bit better.
 
And you never should. PPP is based around free labour and consumer goods with a few curious assumptions about how workers should subsist.

While the United States closely resembled the model for PPP 1932-1946, Germany didn’t.

After 1942 US and German commodities (Marxist sense) entered a period of incommensurability anyway, so comparing Rm or grammes of Auschwitz 1 bread to USD is perverse in a purely scholarly sense.

%GDP/capita measures aren’t any better as GDP is closely aligned with assumptions that didn’t exist in the Soviet Union or Germany, even though they were states where wage labour existed as the determinate labour form (especially in camps) and small groups of people controlled investment of social worth for profit.

Even then these expenditures aren’t convertible. You can’t take a capacity to make atomic weapons and turn it into a universal health care system.
So the problem is not PPP, but (neo)classic economics: tell that to the CIA, they use PPP for North Korea.
Also, I prefer not to use Marxist analysis in macroeconomic analysis.
Anyway, that is exactly what I mean. Saying "Aggregate costed X RM, so Y $" means nothing, probably Aggregate in the USA would cost a tiny fraction of the estimated German "price".
What would you use to compare Germany, USSR and the USA in IIWW? Input-output model?

Many of the core assumptions of marginalist economics are those of a model whose known deficiencies compared to historical human societies make its measures and claims ridiculous for certain historical analyses. Political economists fare a bit better.
BTW, it is macro- and micro-economics: 'cause it is a measure contest :p

Magnetrons had a brief popularity for Military Radar use, before other more efficient(and capable of higher frequencies, and being easily tunable) tubes replaced them, leading to where the most common use of Magnetrons is making water molecules shake in microwave ovens.

Want to know more?
https://www.radartutorial.eu/18.explanations/ex19.en.html
A better question is: why Germany never switched to tubes? Was it a technical problem as with magnetron or an operative one? EDIT: of cours it was brain-drain...

2-stage superchargers were a known quantity by 1930s in UK and Germany. A fighter with 1-stage supercharged engine will have hard time to intercept a recon that has engine with two stages of superchaging (= mostly mid- and late war Spitfires, Mosquitoes etc, plus any turboed aircraft of the time).
Japanese were in the same position.
Again: why?

It always shock me how wide the gap is between the myth of Uber-teknological-Nazi-Cermany and the reality.
 
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tell that to the CIA

But you appear to want to contradict my argument, not support it with further evidence.

What would you use to compare Germany, USSR and the USA in IIWW? Input-output model?

Comparisons between Germany and the USSR and Germany and the United States were made empirically in the stupidity of the consumption of useful things.

Comparing the composition of value between the USSR and United States in the period is merely stupid.
 
Supercharged engine requires low compression ratio - talk 6:1 on the Merlins and Griffons, Soviet even went to 5.5:1 with AM-42. Most of the other engines were between 6.5:1 and 7.5:1. Germans did have C3 as a high octane fuel, used on BMW 801D engines for example, plus there is a way around with using water/alcohol injection to forestall detonation problems when 87 oct fuel was used (as it was the case on late-war DB 605s, for example).
Any time the Germans went from low-ish compression ratio upwards, it took them 6-18 months to cure reliability problems, and engines were still barely making same power when compared with best WAllied engines (and usualy were making less power at altitude vs. WAllied best engines).
The best performing German hi-alt engine used in ww2, in 1945, was using 87 oct fuel.

Why was the BF109 so slow compared with the P51?
Why is the ME 109G with it's huge engine in a small airframe about 40-60mph slower than the P51 Mustang? In this video we look at the key differnces between the Merlin 1650 and Diamler Benz DB 605 as they relate to power.
 
But you appear to want to contradict my argument, not support it with further evidence.
I concur with you that PPP (and neoclassical conomics in general) is a very limited model, but it would be better than simply compare RM to $.

Comparisons between Germany and the USSR and Germany and the United States were made empirically in the stupidity of the consumption of useful things.

Comparing the composition of value between the USSR and United States in the period is merely stupid.
So you do not compare at all?
 
"Mine Fuhrer, I have the perfect plan!"

*One Hess like flight later*

"For the love of God, I surrender because fuck all of that noise."
 
Why was the BF109 so slow compared with the P51?

... I don't even understand why the comparison...

There's a limit to what an engine can do, otherwise we could stuck a Merlin in a Sopwith Camel. The Me-109 first flew in 1935, which means pretty much all of it's fuselage, wings and tail were designed with early/mid 1930s knowledge of aerodinamics, structural design and manuractoring techniques. The P-51 was built in 1940, befiniting from all the advances made in the late 30s, such as the Meredith Efect. This, plus improved materials and construction techniques, gave it a huge head start.
 
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