X: First Suva (8/42)
X: First Suva, August 1942
The Suva Defence Zone, designed long before Pearl Harbour, was where General Mead decided he would make the stand for control of Fiji. Beginning ten kilometres west of Suva and extending north into the hills, then east to the coast, the defence zone covered all major installations in the eastern half of Viti Levu, most importantly the airfield, port and supply stores. Originally designed to be manned by a brigade, it was now defended by 10,000 New Zealanders, equipped with two to three months’ supplies. The lack of coordinated command that had troubled the garrison throughout early 1942 had finally been solved in July, when General Mead was appointed Supreme Commander, Fiji. His position gave him authority over both the New Zealanders and the Americans on the island, a decision made in light of the fact that the New Zealanders had been building defences since early 1940, while the Americans had only been there for two months.
Much has already been written about the abysmal standard of the Japanese supply system, operating more than three thousand kilometres from their major bases. What is often ignored is that the Allies had it little better. While Fiji was a friendly territory, the local agriculture could not feed close to 20,000 Allied soldiers as well as their own people, and there was no weapons industry on the islands. New Zealand had a small amount of industry, barely enough to keep the original garrison in supply, and anything coming from Auckland would have to travel two thousand kilometres by sea. With Australia’s industries desperately working to reinforce MacArthur’s “Brisbane Line” before a feared Japanese landing could occur, anything beyond small arms and a few old artillery pieces would have to come from the US West Coast.
In spite of the difficulties, Mead and his predecessor William Cunningham had built a formidable defence. Barbed wire surrounded the defence zone by land, and a small minefield protected Suva Bay by sea. Inside the perimeter he had eight Bofors AA guns, which had already seen success destroying Japanese bombers in the first days of the invasion. Sixteen howitzers were also available, although nearly all dated from the Great War. At the last moment before the Japanese move on Suva began, Mead was also informed that the USS Wasp had been repaired at Tongatabu. Under Fletcher’s command, the carrier could provide much-needed air support to Suva’s besieged garrison.
After waiting a day to survey the Allied position, General Yi ordered his army to attack on August 9th. Breakdowns and guerilla attacks from the Fijians had reduced his force to just 39 tanks, which now made short work of the first-line defences. Yi sent the infantry in behind them, while the New Zealanders fell back to the second line on the Tamavua River. While the first line served as little more than a warning system, the second line was a true defensive position. The Tamavua is around fifty metres wide, with both banks heavily forested, and was within the range of several of Mead’s artillery pieces. Knowing that this would be the main Japanese attack, Mead moved half of his infantry to the river line, where trenches had already been prepared.
Yi’s assault of the Tamavua line began around 1300. With the tanks providing covering fire in place of proper artillery, the Japanese infantry attempted to storm across the river, only to be met with heavy shelling from Mead’s guns. Trained on the location, the guns provided a bombardment more accurate than most, and within minutes Yi had lost several hundred men. Most casualties were merely wounded, but with no hospitals on the island under Japanese control, any casualty was a man out of the fight for Fiji. Yi made a second attempt to cross in the late afternoon, with similarly disastrous results. With ammunition beginning to run short, an end to the effort was called in the evening. The sole Japanese success that day came when the submarine I-11 sank an American destroyer that had been sailing towards Fiji.
Rather than continue wasting men attempting to cross the river, Yi decided that Suva could be more easily taken if the river position was outflanked, as had been done successfully at Efate. Throughout the night, the bulk of the Japanese infantry moved north into the hills and forests. A small unit of Fijian guerillas was encountered, and a fierce fight began. The Fijians alerted General Mead in Suva, but were soon overwhelmed by the much larger Japanese force. The Japanese heavy equipment, most importantly the tanks, had to be left near the coastal road.
It would be the New Zealanders that launched the next offensive the following morning. Now able to call on aircraft from the Wasp, General Mead was under pressure from the Fijians to push the Japanese away from Suva. Mead dismissed any notion of storming the west bank of the Tamavua: the Japanese tanks could ruin any crossing just as easily as his own machine-gun crews had. Instead he chose to send his reserves to the north, meeting the Japanese in the forests, where the Tamavua is just a small creek. Wasp’s aircraft, as well as land-based planes operating out of the airfields near Nandi, were directed towards the entire Japanese line.
Wasp’s aircraft were largely ineffective, more often bombing empty forest than enemy force while under fire from the small Japanese AA guns, and on the ground the engagement was a draw, with both sides retreating in the afternoon. The Japanese by this time were down to perhaps 60% of their original effectiveness, and supplies, most importantly ammunition, were almost out. Had the New Zealanders known this, they could have probably defeated the Japanese force the following day. Instead, General Mead decided to fall back to his own lines. He had used up a lot of supplies of his own, and overestimated Japanese capabilities (unsurprising, given their endless list of successes until now). Both sides called for reinforcements. In Rabaul, the second half of the Japanese invasion force was just about to leave port, while Auckland had very little available. General Yi also reported sightings of larger numbers of F4F Wildcats than had previously been seen over Fiji, and Yamaguchi made preparations for the long-awaited decisive battle.
- BNC
The Suva Defence Zone, designed long before Pearl Harbour, was where General Mead decided he would make the stand for control of Fiji. Beginning ten kilometres west of Suva and extending north into the hills, then east to the coast, the defence zone covered all major installations in the eastern half of Viti Levu, most importantly the airfield, port and supply stores. Originally designed to be manned by a brigade, it was now defended by 10,000 New Zealanders, equipped with two to three months’ supplies. The lack of coordinated command that had troubled the garrison throughout early 1942 had finally been solved in July, when General Mead was appointed Supreme Commander, Fiji. His position gave him authority over both the New Zealanders and the Americans on the island, a decision made in light of the fact that the New Zealanders had been building defences since early 1940, while the Americans had only been there for two months.
Much has already been written about the abysmal standard of the Japanese supply system, operating more than three thousand kilometres from their major bases. What is often ignored is that the Allies had it little better. While Fiji was a friendly territory, the local agriculture could not feed close to 20,000 Allied soldiers as well as their own people, and there was no weapons industry on the islands. New Zealand had a small amount of industry, barely enough to keep the original garrison in supply, and anything coming from Auckland would have to travel two thousand kilometres by sea. With Australia’s industries desperately working to reinforce MacArthur’s “Brisbane Line” before a feared Japanese landing could occur, anything beyond small arms and a few old artillery pieces would have to come from the US West Coast.
In spite of the difficulties, Mead and his predecessor William Cunningham had built a formidable defence. Barbed wire surrounded the defence zone by land, and a small minefield protected Suva Bay by sea. Inside the perimeter he had eight Bofors AA guns, which had already seen success destroying Japanese bombers in the first days of the invasion. Sixteen howitzers were also available, although nearly all dated from the Great War. At the last moment before the Japanese move on Suva began, Mead was also informed that the USS Wasp had been repaired at Tongatabu. Under Fletcher’s command, the carrier could provide much-needed air support to Suva’s besieged garrison.
After waiting a day to survey the Allied position, General Yi ordered his army to attack on August 9th. Breakdowns and guerilla attacks from the Fijians had reduced his force to just 39 tanks, which now made short work of the first-line defences. Yi sent the infantry in behind them, while the New Zealanders fell back to the second line on the Tamavua River. While the first line served as little more than a warning system, the second line was a true defensive position. The Tamavua is around fifty metres wide, with both banks heavily forested, and was within the range of several of Mead’s artillery pieces. Knowing that this would be the main Japanese attack, Mead moved half of his infantry to the river line, where trenches had already been prepared.
Yi’s assault of the Tamavua line began around 1300. With the tanks providing covering fire in place of proper artillery, the Japanese infantry attempted to storm across the river, only to be met with heavy shelling from Mead’s guns. Trained on the location, the guns provided a bombardment more accurate than most, and within minutes Yi had lost several hundred men. Most casualties were merely wounded, but with no hospitals on the island under Japanese control, any casualty was a man out of the fight for Fiji. Yi made a second attempt to cross in the late afternoon, with similarly disastrous results. With ammunition beginning to run short, an end to the effort was called in the evening. The sole Japanese success that day came when the submarine I-11 sank an American destroyer that had been sailing towards Fiji.
Rather than continue wasting men attempting to cross the river, Yi decided that Suva could be more easily taken if the river position was outflanked, as had been done successfully at Efate. Throughout the night, the bulk of the Japanese infantry moved north into the hills and forests. A small unit of Fijian guerillas was encountered, and a fierce fight began. The Fijians alerted General Mead in Suva, but were soon overwhelmed by the much larger Japanese force. The Japanese heavy equipment, most importantly the tanks, had to be left near the coastal road.
It would be the New Zealanders that launched the next offensive the following morning. Now able to call on aircraft from the Wasp, General Mead was under pressure from the Fijians to push the Japanese away from Suva. Mead dismissed any notion of storming the west bank of the Tamavua: the Japanese tanks could ruin any crossing just as easily as his own machine-gun crews had. Instead he chose to send his reserves to the north, meeting the Japanese in the forests, where the Tamavua is just a small creek. Wasp’s aircraft, as well as land-based planes operating out of the airfields near Nandi, were directed towards the entire Japanese line.
Wasp’s aircraft were largely ineffective, more often bombing empty forest than enemy force while under fire from the small Japanese AA guns, and on the ground the engagement was a draw, with both sides retreating in the afternoon. The Japanese by this time were down to perhaps 60% of their original effectiveness, and supplies, most importantly ammunition, were almost out. Had the New Zealanders known this, they could have probably defeated the Japanese force the following day. Instead, General Mead decided to fall back to his own lines. He had used up a lot of supplies of his own, and overestimated Japanese capabilities (unsurprising, given their endless list of successes until now). Both sides called for reinforcements. In Rabaul, the second half of the Japanese invasion force was just about to leave port, while Auckland had very little available. General Yi also reported sightings of larger numbers of F4F Wildcats than had previously been seen over Fiji, and Yamaguchi made preparations for the long-awaited decisive battle.
- BNC
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