DBWI: Mao doesn't accept the 'white peace' ceasefire in Korea in 1950.

[Graffoset]

To refresh the memory, during the Korean Conflict of 1950 three phases of advance occurred. These were essentially:

1. The North Korean advance to the Pusan perimeter, from 25th June 1950,
2. The U.N defense of the Pusan perimeter, the Inchon landings and pursuit to the Yalu River, 15 September 1950 to 25 November, and
3. The Second Phase Offensive with the intervention of the Chinese peoples volunteer army, 25 November to 14 December culminating in the surprise acceptance (OOC our P.O.D) by Chairman Mao of the 11 December ceasefire offer by the United States, re-establishing a border along the 38th parallel.

The acceptance of the ceasefire faced no small amount of resistance from many of those surrounding Mao who though that the U.N forces could be kicked off the Peninsula. Additionally the exact reasoning of Mao in accepting the ceasefire is inadequately covered by Chinese historiography of the conflict & can only be speculated upon. What if he hadn't accepted the U.S offer?

(OOC regarding the plausibility of this P.O.D see Foot, Rosemary. A substitute for victory : the politics of peacemaking at the Korean armistice talks. Ithaca, N.Y. : Cornell University Press, 1990. 30-31)

It was essentially the low point of Allied Morale after the Chinese intervention.)

 

[Amadeus]

To refresh the memory, during the Korean Conflict of 1950 three phases of advance occurred. These were essentially:

1. The North Korean advance to the Pusan perimeter, from 25th June 1950,
2. The U.N defense of the Pusan perimeter, the Inchon landings and pursuit to the Yalu River, 15 September 1950 to 25 November, and
3. The Second Phase Offensive with the intervention of the Chinese peoples volunteer army, 25 November to 14 December culminating in the surprise acceptance (OOC our P.O.D) by Chairman Mao of the 11 December ceasefire offer by the United States, re-establishing a border along the 38th parallel.

The acceptance of the ceasefire faced no small amount of resistance from many of those surrounding Mao who though that the U.N forces could be kicked off the Peninsula. Additionally the exact reasoning of Mao in accepting the ceasefire is inadequately covered by Chinese historiography of the conflict & can only be speculated upon. What if he hadn't accepted the U.S offer?

(OOC regarding the plausibility of this P.O.D see Foot, Rosemary. A substitute for victory : the politics of peacemaking at the Korean armistice talks. Ithaca, N.Y. : Cornell University Press, 1990. 30-31)

It was essentially the low point of Allied Morale after the Chinese intervention.)

If Mao remains stubborn then the war may drag on indefinitely. There might be pressure on Truman to use nuclear weapons, or at least threaten to use them. Truman probably runs again in 1952 as he did in OTL, though given that the war would be unpopular by then he'd most likely lose. Remember that he beat Taft by a narrow margin of only 3% in the popular vote...

 

[David T]

OOC: My understanding is that the US was so desperate that by January 1951 it agreed to a ceasefire line not on the 38th parallel but south of Seoul! https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...january-1951-un-cease-fire-resolution.315177/ If Mao was so confident of total victory that he didn't accept that, what chance was there that he would accept the 38th parallel in December?

 

[CountDVB]

Then the Korean War would’ve remained an indefinite conflict that could’ve caused problems for Mao and his successors in the long run.

Here, it showed he was willing to work with the Americans a bit more and it’s how we got Eisenhower going to China to discuss matters with Mao in 1956 after Truman retired from his successful years

Granted, some Chinese scholars cited this as a turning point in Mao’s relationships with the Communists and indeed, the struggles of the party. Some saw it as reasonable and others as weakness and they began duking it out for influence. It’s why Mao’s death was a colossal clusterfuck and the guy who took charge afterwards pretty much caused a lot of problems with what used to be North Korea, which already had problems because of the guy in charge. In the end, he got killed and when China tried to install a puppet ruler, they rejoined South Korea to become a unified Korea.

China did eventually recover from that when the minority problems pretty much exploited the schisms to take over and become the new Republic of China in the 80s. President Mo Udall benefitted from that a fair bit to put a lot of reforms in. They pretty much went and dealt with the Communist states in SEAsia post Cold War when the USSR fell.

 

[Amadeus]

Then the Korean War would’ve remained an indefinite conflict that could’ve caused problems for Mao and his successors in the long run.

Here, it showed he was willing to work with the Americans a bit more and it’s how we got Eisenhower going to China to discuss matters with Mao in 1956 after Truman retired from his successful years

Granted, some Chinese scholars cited this as a turning point in Mao’s relationships with the Communists and indeed, the struggles of the party. Some saw it as reasonable and others as weakness and they began duking it out for influence. It’s why Mao’s death was a colossal clusterfuck and the guy who took charge afterwards pretty much caused a lot of problems with what used to be North Korea, which already had problems because of the guy in charge. In the end, he got killed and when China tried to install a puppet ruler, they rejoined South Korea to become a unified Korea.

China did eventually recover from that when the minority problems pretty much exploited the schisms to take over and become the new Republic of China in the 80s. President Mo Udall benefitted from that a fair bit to put a lot of reforms in. They pretty much went and dealt with the Communist states in SEAsia post Cold War when the USSR fell.

Without those reforms Udall would probably have lost re-election in 1984.

 

[CountDVB]

Without those reforms Udall would probably have lost re-election in 1984.

Udall giving us universal healthcare was a massive appreciated boon and he also helped confront Exxon-Mobil on climate change thanks to one of his Dept heads in Al Gore when the scientists reported their findings. President Udall and his successor in Mondale did alot of good for the environment, climate change, renewable fuels and the economy along with other boons.

Alot of the saber rattling politicians pretty much lost it at the miltiary cutbacks, but then the USSR fell and they were made to look like fools.

But yeah, Korea is doing pretty all right, if in China's sphere of influence.

 

[Graffoset]

OOC: My understanding is that the US was so desperate that by January 1951 it agreed to a ceasefire line not on the 38th parallel but south of Seoul! https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...january-1951-un-cease-fire-resolution.315177/ If Mao was so confident of total victory that he didn't accept that, what chance was there that he would accept the 38th parallel in December?

OOC: I think the most plausible P.O.D for this is the mutual suspicion between Mao and Stalin leading to Mao thinking Stalin is trying to play China and the U.S off against each other - to have the China and the U.S disproportionately invested in military efforts on the Korean peninsula rather than reconstruction or economic expansion while the Soviet Union continues to recover from the damage of WW2. Thinking that with a white peace he can claim a 'victory' (e.g the line to international Communists would go something like: 'the initial North Korean effort to defend themselves against American led aggression was inadequately supported by the Soviet Union. Only Chinese intervention managed to stare the American imperialists down and salvage a dangerous situation) and get some breathing room.