Combined Fleet destroys USN at Midway? Effects?

So without the damaging China Raids and most if what was done from bith Guam and Tinian, July 1945 has relatively minor damage to cities, but in the month to follow, Cities start disappearing under mushroom clouds with increasing frequency, starting with Tokyo.
How long for Japan to throw in the towel?
The bombings from the Marianas started in November ‘44. They did not become city attacks until March of ‘45, after the less than optimal results of Eight Air Force style daytime “precision” raid attacks apparent.

As I said, ITTL it’s not clear whether they will go in immediately with city attacks.
 
In Dec' 41 the USMC flew a squadron of Vindicators from PH to Midway with a PBY acting as a shepherd. So you wouldn't necessarily even need carriers.

Another interesting question would be whether or not Japan attempts to avenge their landing force slaughtered at Midway.

Unless they’re planning on hanging off Midway for at minimum several weeks while a new landing force is readied (and shitty torpedoes or not, the USN sub community will LOVE having the IJN scooting around at fuel saving minimum speeds in a highly predictable area), by the time they’re ready for a second landing, Midway will be even more reinforced, and more of a poisoned bear trap then the first time around.

Now having the capital ships dump their shell magazines into the island after they decide the USN battleline isn’t showing, that’s a different story. For probable effects see basically every preinvasion bombardment conducted by the allied forces during the war and how they rarely, if ever, lived up to expectations.
 
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Three words. "The Brisbane Line."

Australia was willing to give up two thirds of its landmass and stay in the fight.

Australia and New Zealand are too far away from anything to be isolated. Take Fiji you swing your ships further south. Then Tonga. Then the Cook Islands. Then once you hit Easter Island you do it old school and sent supplies south through the roaring 40s. Admittedly you start hitting problems with the number of merchant hulls available, but that bites the Japanese too.

At the end of the day the Australians and New Zealanders who matter know that they can't be taken out and are backed by the US and Empire. They just need to hold out.

Sydney Harbor had already been attacked and aerial bombing elsewhere in Australia occured with fears that Curtin's government might fall or that the general populace might fall prey to defeatism. There was major concern about a possible invasion in both Australia and New Zealand, if FS goes ahead especially in the face of a reverse Midway I think Japan might try to conclude a separate milder peace, especially as both have lots of their manpower tied up elsewhere and would then have limited opportunities for defense at sea.
 

marathag

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The bombings from the Marianas started in November ‘44. They did not become city attacks until March of ‘45, after the less than optimal results of Eight Air Force style daytime “precision” raid attacks apparent.

As I said, ITTL it’s not clear whether they will go in immediately with city attacks.

Why wouldn't they? When the XX Bomber Command first had the ability from China, they started hitting cities first.
Ahem.
Factory complexes in Cities.

I agree they won't be doing low level firebombing at first, but will be bombing cities, with the first atom bomb with some factory as its Ground Zero
 

CalBear

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You are looking at it from a post war perspective and concentrating on '44 and '45. Yes the Allies had enough capabilities to fight two essentially seperate wars. And Midway defeat, or even a Japan MAX situation (USN PACFLT capital ships all destroyed, carrier raids on the West coast, an unlikely but still plasufible senario) would only extend the war by 6-18 months at best.
But, we are looking at '42. For most of that year the massive Armies, Navies, Air Forces and support infrastuture were orders on paper. We historically saw BOTH the British Empire and the Americans shifting or diverting assets to the Pacific when that blew up. And it having major affects on ETO and Med ops, just see N Africa as an example. In 1942 for most of the year the combined chief didn't think of theatres of war and assets to be sent, they thought about a global war and sending troops wherever they were needed. Chiefly because they did not as yet have resources needed to fight everywhere without going on the defensive or abandoing plans elsewhere.
To a General saying "don't worry, in 6-9 months you'll have enough men and material to do whatever you want, no need to shift" is not going to be a persuasive arguement when he feels he needs them in 3*.
So yeah, the Generals and political leadership of 1942 is going to be super conservative. They are going to go deep into stabalization mode in the Pacific and thats absolutley going to affect Pacific Operations as assets are transferred or diverted.
For the ETO and Med this means Torch is errr torched. Instead we get the original plan of an American division or two reinforcing Eight Army in Egypt. No Torch means that Rommel does not withraew 1500 miles to Tunisa he did in OTL, instead he is going to dig in in Libiya. Reinforcements from France do start coming in (plans for that pre-dated El Alamein). When the situation stabalizes then probbaly a Torch like landing, in April/May of '43. Which means a collapse in N Africa in July or August (no consilidation we saw in OTL), Sicily in October and mainland Italy landing in December or January of '44. Admittedly, for the ETO at this point ATL and OTL merge.

As far as the Pacific is concerned, it means the USN is going be unable to protect the US coast and Australia at the same time, which means the RN has to take over the latter. It also means that the RN keeps large ships East of Suez instead of returning to the Med as they did in OTL '43. Probably start offensives in '43 in the Bay of Bengal and the Malayan peninsula from Ceylon and the Eastern Seaboard of British India, which IOTL, Churchill was oushing for. No offesive in the South or Central Pacific for at least a year.
Which means comes German capitulation, the Japanese fleet is still in being and the Allies are still far from the homeland rather than the doorstep as they were in the real '45.

*It must be noted that all Generals on all sides underestimated just how much material could be produced how quickly by industry.



No. The Interim and Taregt committees were set up in spring '45.
https://www.atomicheritage.org/history/interim-committee

They considered how best to use the bomb, and when they did, vast armadas of B-29's were bombing Japan, it was an easy enough recommendation to be made that it be against a Japanese city
The other options, which were dfiscussed in some detail OTL, will look more attactive, if heavy bomber are out of range of Japan ITTL.
LIke againt a Naval base or large military post, which was rejected (chiefly since the B-29 and the carriers had already mostly pounded those to smithereens, both in Japan and elsewhere).
It should be remembered that when the committees met, the estimation of the yield was lower, about 1-5 KT, it was not after Trinity that they realised it would be pretty big.
Thats not too much bigger than some of the larger raids, and would make a city attck less attractive.

So war might end with the Japanese citiies mostly unharmed.


The U.S. military knew that the Japanese couldn't manage a strike against the Pacific Coast unless the held Hawaii, it's logistical impossibility. The public didn't, which why there the early war panics in LA happened (this will, of course, require that there be a highly publicized dog & pony show showing how the Army and Navy have stoutly reinforced the West Coast, and things like Civil Defense drills, civilian aircraft observers, etc. to keep the voters happy at the supper table).

While the exact range of the IJN vessels are not known, a very good estimate could be made based on simple observation by military attaches attached to the Embassies. A ship of a given tonnage has a maximum load capacity. While the range of a carrier, probably more than any other ship type is more difficult to determine (it is necessary to take an educated guess at how bunkerage is split between Av Gas and fuel oil, so an error of a several hundred miles is inevitable) this is very much not the case for destroyers, cruiser and battleships. the number of fleet tankers is also fairly well known (and the Japanese, unlike the U.S. & UK, even the Dutch, had a remarkably small tanker fleet, including basic 8 knot civilian cargo carriers). That provides a clear maximum range for any non-suicidal attack. The absolute max range for a IJN action coming from either the Home Island or the Marshalls was about 4,000 miles. The minimal range from the Marshalls (assuming the shipping doesn't literally sail withing a couple hundred miles of the Hawaiian Islands) is ~4,700 miles. Even with all available tankers and deck loading of fuel drums the Japanese destroyers run dry at least 800 miles short. That means sending the Kido Butai, without escorts, some three days sailing to attack positions off the West Coast. The U.S. has multiple submarine bases (Bremerton, San Francisco, San Diego) with boats operating in those waters. The U.S. is also, unlike on December 7th, at full war alert with heavy recon flights and patrol shipping ranging out 500+ miles (mostly B-18 and PBY, although some B-17 training was also used in a double role). The IJN command knew this and they were not going to screw with that hornet's next.

Actually the same can be said for the mythical invasion of Australia. While the IJN may have been utterly intoxicated with Victory Disease, the IJA was not. The IJA only devoted the troops for the capture of the Southern Resource Area because of fuel and other raw material, especially rubber, considerations. The IJA was chest deep in China where for some bizarre reason the damned Chinese refused to admit they were defeated and kept fighting. The IJA was not going to follow the Navy on some idiotic attempt to capture a CONTINENTAL LAND MASS while trying to take China. Since the Army, just like the Navy, could bring down the government at a whim (and since the Army's field grade officer corps had demonstrated a remarkable willingness to sort of kill political opponents that might impede the Chinese conquest) Australia wasn't going to happen. The WAllies had no way of being certain on this point, so there will, undoubted, still be the withdrawal of Australian divisions from the Western Desert (on about the same schedule as IOTL), and the U.S. will need to send/retain the 1st Marine Division in Australia, with the 2nd Marines maintaining there OTL basing in the South Pacific, including New Zealand. Additionally the aircraft assets spent on Watchtower will almost certainly be sent instead to Australia, along with the U.S. Army units dedicated to the early Solomons campaign. Of course none of this impacts the ETO even a trifle.

Japan was very much the lesser threat and those in power knew it. Watchtower was a lucky break thanks to OTL's Midway, an offensive done on a shoestring because the opportunity presented itself. There was no Watchtower before Midway. It, along with Cartwheel, were entirely divorced from the ETO. What could the early ETO actions, Torch (North Africa), Husky (Sicily), even Avalanche (Salerno) and Slapstick (Taranto), really provide to the PTO. The PTO was all about aircraft carriers, specifically carriers that could deal with the long ranges in the Pacific, and, prior to Leyte/Luzon, relatively small 2-3 division operations. The Torch force does nothing to help, nor does Husky (by which time the pipeline for new carrier construction was wide open in any case). The major U.S. buildup in the ETO was a early-mid 1943 event, not early-mid 1942. The only possible change is that it take a couple extra months to get the 8th AF up to full strength (not entirely a bad thing since this means somewhat fewer losses while the Mustang finishes its transformation from ground attack to long range escort) with additional B-17s sent to Australia and Hawaii.

Regarding Japanese cities - The USAAF was very much a believer in its Strategic precision bombing strategy right up until it needed something else (of course Arnold et al knew "precision" was crap with BDA shoing bombs hitting six miles from the IP on a regular basis). LeMay did probably twig to the harsh reality earlier than some in the chain-of-command (of course Arnold sent him out to the Pacific fwor a reason, and it wasn't to remove him from the ETO), but the reality was going to happen. Japan was tailor made for firebombing. The Japanese relative lack of air defenses, especially night fighters and radar directed AAA, made lower level tactics doable, napalm made the Mark 69 bomblet horrifically effective (especially against Japanese city structures, as demonstrated during tests in 1943), and the Japanese industrial practice of using many small supplies scattered across industrial city residential area provided a fig leaf for the less bloody-minded to use for cover regarding the "morality" of the attacks.

Japanese cities were going to die. Not a happy or even palatable reality, but it was the reality of Total War.
 
Wondered if you had 3 or 4 jeep carriers. Could you have them hit and attacks to keep the Japanese guessing?
 

SsgtC

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Now having the capital ships dump their shell magazines into the island after they decide the USN battleline isn’t showing, that’s a different story. For probable effects see basically every preinvasion bombardment conducted by the allied forces during the war and how they rarely, if ever, lived up to expectations.
Even more useless than the usual WWII Shore Bombardment. IJN battleships didn't use HE shells at this point in the war. So all those battleships are loaded with is AP shells. On a shore bombardment, most of those shells won't even detonate
 
even a Japan MAX situation (USN PACFLT capital ships all destroyed, carrier raids on the West coast, an unlikely but still plasufible senario)

Well, there is no Japan MAX situation that allows them carrier raids on the West Coast. Logistically impossible for them, especially if they can't base out of Oahu.
 
The problem will be down south where the IJA wants Australia isolated so it can’t be used as a base for retaking the ‘Southern Resource Area’. Pushing the SLOC further south will require more shipping due to the longer transit and probable need for convoy.

It's not that much of a problem, save for occasional small bomber sweeps out of Guadalcanal. The Japanese can't take New Caledonia. They can't take Samoa. They can't take Fiji. They might not even be able to take Espiritu Santo.

They were just about at their logistical limit by summer of 1942. They could take Port Moresby, perhaps, if they moved quickly enough and had a little luck.

Admittedly, Allied planners were not fully aware of Japanese limitations, and had to worst case things in planning.
 
Quite plausible IMO. Deciphering an incorrect location of the attack on Midway could also change the outcome without knocking out the US fleet, if McClusky arrives 15 min earlier or later the Japanese carriers might survive his attack in much better stead. An intact Japanese carrier fleet capable of attacking American bases *and actually doing so* may be enough.

You could sink every single American fleet carrier and it wouldn't be enough to alter the Germany First policy. Washington and London were far too deeply invested in it - and rightly so.
 
So maybe you get an additional 3-6 Independence class decks, rush order.
That would be unfortunate. Those carriers were both poor sea boats and very poor aviation platforms with no growth margins. It was a bad design, barely an actual conversion at all and more a "slap a flight deck on a half finished cruiser". Generally speaking the CVEs were better ton for ton and dollar for dollar except for being slow.

The later Saipan on CA hull and machinery finally fixed the CVL design, mostly.

Doing more Independence class that late probably means the damn thing are still joining the fleet in late 44, at which point they are a total waste. The Independence class available in 41 or 42 is useful, but once the Essex tidal wave hits they are just using crew, planes, fuel, and other resources better spent on many other things. Hopefully someone would figure that out.
logistical issues-not enough landing aircraft or available shipping, for one bottleneck-made
Depends on if the Pacific is being put on pause completely or continuing to get resources and such, impossible to say really.
nothing in this scenario changes that.
Domestic political fallout might in the US, there was strong American public opinion toward a Japan first preference, illogical though it was.
carrier raids on the West coast, an unlikely but still plasufible senario
Entirely and completely implausible, farcical, fantasy, barking at the moon lunacy, impossible.
 

CalBear

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That would be unfortunate. Those carriers were both poor sea boats and very poor aviation platforms with no growth margins. It was a bad design, barely an actual conversion at all and more a "slap a flight deck on a half finished cruiser". Generally speaking the CVEs were better ton for ton and dollar for dollar except for being slow.

The later Saipan on CA hull and machinery finally fixed the CVL design, mostly.

Doing more Independence class that late probably means the damn thing are still joining the fleet in late 44, at which point they are a total waste. The Independence class available in 41 or 42 is useful, but once the Essex tidal wave hits they are just using crew, planes, fuel, and other resources better spent on many other things. Hopefully someone would figure that out.

Depends on if the Pacific is being put on pause completely or continuing to get resources and such, impossible to say really.

Domestic political fallout might in the US, there was strong American public opinion toward a Japan first preference, illogical though it was.

Entirely and completely implausible, farcical, fantasy, barking at the moon lunacy, impossible.
FDR was going nowhere and he was the main driver of Germany First.

The one thing that might have changed things is if the American/Philippine forces repel the Japanese invasion and are left besieged, but looking like they have hope. It would be a military error of the first order, but might be politically inescapable.
 
Good point - even OTL with very heavy losses the IJN flattops were not complete losses in terms of crews.

But the losses of Aircraft mechanics and deck handling crews and pilots and still on board was almost total. New Japanese carriers have to start those divisions from scratch, no cadres from the lost carriers.
 
But the losses of Aircraft mechanics and deck handling crews and pilots and still on board was almost total. New Japanese carriers have to start those divisions from scratch, no cadres from the lost carriers.

Also important to note that in TTL neither the Shokaku nor the Zuikaku get the infusion of veteran crews from the four carriers sunk at Midway. IIRC these crew members dramatically increased their effectiveness for the remainder of the war. Let's also remember that the Japanese weren't completely ignorant about damage control. They did learn some lessons from Midway which served them well in the Solomons and after. In TTL those lessons go unlearned meaning that the USN/RN still can exploit them.

Assuming an alternate battle of Midway that sees all 3 US carriers sunk in exchange for no Japanese and a near complete massacre of the landing force, would we see the Japanese resume the offensive in August 1942? Obviously, they want to strike while the iron is hot but they'll need at least until August to get the Shokaku and Zuikaku operational after the Battle of the Coral Sea. (I'm assuming that due to Japanese doctrine the remaining fleet carriers will take until September to deal with any damage to their ships and aircrew losses.) Perhaps in TTL they send their two fleet carriers to cover Operation FS while their light carriers cover a second attempt on Midway? Remember, according to Japanese intelligence they've sunk 5/6 US fleet carriers by this point in TTL. It could set up an interesting situation for the US, do they send the Saratoga and Wasp to the South Pacific or do they back up the Marines on Midway for Round 2?

I'd love to see the look on Yamamoto's face when news reaches him that not only are his two newest carriers now gracing the bottom of the Pacific, but the second assault on Midway was also massacred despite no naval opposition and increased shore bombardment. (Granted this means that Nimitz has balls of steel in TTL to send his only two carriers to the South Pacific but I don't think it's completely implausible...)
 
Japanese BB were loaded for a possible surface action, not shore bombardment, meaning a minimal number of high capacity shells. The fact that Midway had a very substantial coastal artillery (including 7"/45 Mark 2 guns from the Mississippi class pre-dred BB and five 5"/51).

Midway was Tarawa, but better armed, being attacked by under 3,000 troops (the U.S. tossed close to 5,000 men at Tarawa in the first 12 hours, and the Americans had Amtracs). If you want to know what the a Japanese landing effort would have looked like just read this: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Tenaru (the IJA unit that was destroyed was under the command of the same officer, Kiyonao Ichiki, who had one wing of the embarked landing force for Midway and was comprised of 900 of the troops designated for Midway operation). Ichiki attacked with 795 men. The Marines collected 15 prisoners, 30 stragglers managed to get back to the Line of Departure. The rest of the Ichiki detachment was wiped out.


Talking about the Battle of Tenaru you must admit that this guy https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jacob_C._Vouza was pretty awesome ! Gets stabbed by the Japanese (At times you wonder if the IJA watched Hollywood films and got the roles mixed up. At time like these you wonder if they pointed at villains and said "I want to be like them!") and left for dead. He crawls to US lines and warns them(This even reads like a 1920's Hollywood film) giving them time to set up. After 12 days in the hospital receiving 16 pints of blood he recovers and returns to duty. He was given the silver star and the legion of merit from the US as well as being made an honorary Sargent Major of the United States Marine Corps. He is award both the MBE and a KBE from the Brits.
 
You could sink every single American fleet carrier and it wouldn't be enough to alter the Germany First policy. Washington and London were far too deeply invested in it - and rightly so.

If Japan is threatening Hawaii directly and there are no functional American carriers left I'm not sure Washington's resolve would continue.
 

CalBear

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Talking about the Battle of Tenaru you must admit that this guy https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jacob_C._Vouza was pretty awesome ! Gets stabbed by the Japanese (At times you wonder if the IJA watched Hollywood films and got the roles mixed up. At time like these you wonder if they pointed at villains and said "I want to be like them!") and left for dead. He crawls to US lines and warns them(This even reads like a 1920's Hollywood film) giving them time to set up. After 12 days in the hospital receiving 16 pints of blood he recovers and returns to duty. He was given the silver star and the legion of merit from the US as well as being made an honorary Sargent Major of the United States Marine Corps. He is award both the MBE and a KBE from the Brits.
There are a number of these men, few of whom ever get the recognition they deserve.
 
There are a number of these men, few of whom ever get the recognition they deserve.

One of a group like the French at Cameron, the Sikhs at Saragarhi, Ernest Edwin Evens, Benito Roy Benavidez, Joe Rodriguez, Richard Sorge, and so many others whose real stories would make for better movies than most of what Hollywood makes nowadays.
 
If Japan is threatening Hawaii directly and there are no functional American carriers left I'm not sure Washington's resolve would continue.
How are the Japanese going to threaten Hawaii directly?
As of June 1942, there were 2 combat divisions in the Hawaii Territory with a total of over 100,000 ground troops, the USAAF had over 15,000 men, 200+ fighters, and over 100+ heavy and medium bombers. That's not counting the USN and USMC aircraft stationed and in transit there. There were functioning radars around the islands. As Calbear stated above, the USN knew that the IJN had to be at their utmost logistical limit just getting to the islands, trying to stay any length of time is just not going to happen. What can they do? A couple of days worth of air attacks against prepared opponents.

With travel time back from Midway, refitting and rebuilding the lost aircrews, and travel time to the Hawaiian Island, the earliest the IJN can get there is mid-August, probably later. You don't think that the US would be loading up the islands with every available airplane to ensure its defense? As crazy as the Japanese are, even they realize that another go at Pearl Harbor is a bad idea.

I see the Japanese as having two viable alternatives in the above scenario. Either proceed with Operation FS which has a high probability of getting defeated or making another attempt at Port Moresby, that will be tough but it has a higher chance of succeeding than Operation FS. The Japanese may have not realized it but by June 1942 they have reached their culminating point. They cannot keep advancing with facing major defeats in whatever they attempt.
 

CalBear

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If Japan is threatening Hawaii directly and there are no functional American carriers left I'm not sure Washington's resolve would continue.
Except there are two American carriers, the Sara and Wasp. This being the case it is sort of a moot point. As has also been pointed out there is also still the Ranger (although it probably would have taken the loss of both of the other U.S. decks to get Ranger sent into the Pacific.

As I mentioned earlier; but summer of 1942 Hawaii was impregnable. If this scenario played out as presented (extraordinarily unlikely) the U.S. would have north of 400 combat aircraft, all first line (P-40C/D/F, P-38, B-17, F4F-4, SBD, TBF, etc.) with heavy radar ranged 3" and 90mm AAA and massive numbers of 40mm medium AAA guns, including both fixed and mobile units, and 360° radar coverage 24/7. There were also better than two fully trained and kitted out divisions on Oahu.

The U.S. would send a Christmas gift to any IJN senior officers who sent the Kido Butai into that kill sack.
 
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