Combined Fleet destroys USN at Midway? Effects?

The cunning plan would be flying the Spits and Thunderbolts from Southern England instead of Eastern England :) 175 miles alone from Portsmouth is more than enough to cover Normandy. As for relative numbers, RAF alone was superior to Luftwaffe in the West, with Fighter Command having some 100 squadrons in early 1943.

Even if flown from there, Normandy itself is essentially the extent of their combat range. The Thunderbolts could, as the map shows, cover the region but even into the Summer of 1943 there was only five Fighter groups in England:

plH9LM8j_o.png


Also of critical importance: no tac air and less than half of the heavy bomber groups they'd have by OTL D-Day. German armored columns, operating on unsmashed infrastructure and without fear of allied fighter bombers will utterly smash up green American divisions and the Brits too for that matter.
 
Even if flown from there, Normandy itself is essentially the extent of their combat range. The Thunderbolts could, as the map shows, cover the region but even into the Summer of 1943 there was only five Fighter groups in England:

plH9LM8j_o.png


Also of critical importance: no tac air and less than half of the heavy bomber groups they'd have by OTL D-Day. German armored columns, operating on unsmashed infrastructure and without fear of allied fighter bombers will utterly smash up green American divisions and the Brits too for that matter.

Without Torch and resulting Med campaigns the airpower sent there could have been sent to England instead. USAAF strength in MTO was 14 fighter groups, 8 heavy and 8 medium bomber groups.

As for Germans smashing UK and US divisions, no, they both had superior artillery and NGFS.

The best possible result from Midway, of course, would have been Sledgehammer in late 1942, but that's possibly too wishful thinking.
 
Without Torch and resulting Med campaigns the airpower sent there could have been sent to England instead. USAAF strength in MTO was 14 fighter groups, 8 heavy and 8 medium bomber groups.

As for Germans smashing UK and US divisions, no, they both had superior artillery and NGFS.

NGFS which they would have no experience in using and artillery which could be countered by aggressively handled Panzer divisions. Rick Atkinson's The Day of Battle gives a good example of this, in that German counter-attacks against the Salerno Landings nearly forced Mark Clark giving the order to evacuate. Now imagine completely green American divisions going up against II SS Panzer, nevermind whatever else the Germans can throw at the beaches.

As for 14th Air Force, that's a net gain for the Germans; 60% of fighter losses in 1943 were in the Med, so removing them that Theater means the Luftwaffe can solely focus on defending Western Europe. Should also be noted that their fighters were overwhelmingly older types like the P-40, which were also lacking in range and comparable to the Spitfire in that regard.
 
NGFS which they would have no experience in using and artillery which could be countered by aggressively handled Panzer divisions. Rick Atkinson's The Day of Battle gives a good example of this, in that German counter-attacks against the Salerno Landings nearly forced Mark Clark giving the order to evacuate. Now imagine completely green American divisions going up against II SS Panzer, nevermind whatever else the Germans can throw at the beaches.

As for 14th Air Force, that's a net gain for the Germans; 60% of fighter losses in 1943 were in the Med, so removing them that Theater means the Luftwaffe can solely focus on defending Western Europe. Should also be noted that their fighters were overwhelmingly older types like the P-40, which were also lacking in range and comparable to the Spitfire in that regard.

In addition to green American divisions there would have been veteran Commonwealth divisions.

If the Allied main effort is in NW Europe it makes no difference, Luftwaffe is simply destroyed there instead of MTO. As for Operation Avalanche it cannot be compared to a main landing in 1943 due to resources available. Furthermore, in a scenario without Torch but Libya captured the Germans would have to guard Sicily, Italy, Sardinia, Corsica and possibly French Mediterranean coast against possible Allied invasion.
 
Even if the USN is driven off taking Midway is iffy at best. And CalBear's right, holding it is just about impossible. Unless Kido Butai hangs around the US will be raiding every clear day with B-17's from Hawaii and carrier raids. And Japan will have to supply everything to the garrison with US subs constantly lurking around; even with bad torpedoes there will be losses. And every transport required for Midway is one less transport taking supplies elsewhere. And Japan is already critically short on transport...
 
Even if the USN is driven off taking Midway is iffy at best. And CalBear's right, holding it is just about impossible. Unless Kido Butai hangs around the US will be raiding every clear day with B-17's from Hawaii and carrier raids. And Japan will have to supply everything to the garrison with US subs constantly lurking around; even with bad torpedoes there will be losses. And every transport required for Midway is one less transport taking supplies elsewhere. And Japan is already critically short on transport...

Yes, every conquest Japan makes actually makes it weaker as the transportation distances get longer. In fact, when you think about, would Japan have been better off by just taking New Britain, New Ireland and northern Papua in SW pacific and staying satisfied with Wake in Central Pacific? This would have given them slightly shorter internal lines of communications and the USN would have had to master the offensive force to retake them.
 
I'm thinking the losses would be the 1500 man combined assualt groups. The remainder, about 1000 airfield crew, artillery crew, and quarter master company would be witheld as the assault force dies.

Maybe. Assuming someone doesn't get the bright idea that "Army troops are Army troops, and those men ashore desperately need reinforcements" and tries to employ them in a second wave. And hey, better those poor fuckers then stripping spare men from any Navy ship in the area!
 
Actually about half were Navy. A SNLF battalion comprised one of the two assualt battalions & there were Navy units in the follow up echelon.

At Wake the naval commander was bright enough to cut his losses & cancel the first attempt at landing. If the Daihatsu barges are drifting along the reef, the landing force not communicating, or visible other than bodies in the surf, and the 127mm guns of the defense getting hits on the ships, the naval commander may decide to back off to 'adjust'.
 
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SsgtC

Banned
And every transport required for Midway is one less transport taking supplies elsewhere. And Japan is already critically short on transport...
Once you factor in the distances involved, it's more like every transport sent to Midway is 3 that's aren't going somewhere else
 
It is not just the transports, it is the oilers involved in keeping the ships going to and fro. This adds on yet another stream that would have to have a dedicated group of them working on supplying the black oil needed, let alone the avgas and other pol products needed. This is not just to refuel at sea but to also supply the tank farms a various bases that would be on the way to this added burden.
 
It is not just the transports, it is the oilers involved in keeping the ships going to and fro. This adds on yet another stream that would have to have a dedicated group of them working on supplying the black oil needed, let alone the avgas and other pol products needed. This is not just to refuel at sea but to also supply the tank farms a various bases that would be on the way to this added burden.

I dont have numbers for June 1942, but in 1941 there were a total of 60 oil transport ships controled by Japan. Of these forty were relatively modern blue water ships. The others were old, some used as storage hulks in harbors, and small coasters used for local delivery. By contrast the Brits & associated allies controlled 300+ during 1941. Its a bit more difficult with the US since most of the tankers controlled by Standard Oil & the other US based companies were registered in other nuetral nations.
 
Even if flown from there, Normandy itself is essentially the extent of their combat range. The Thunderbolts could, as the map shows, cover the region but even into the Summer of 1943 there was only five Fighter groups in England:

Thanks for the useful chart on air strength in the UK.

Away from my office so I cant pull up assortment of charts and graphs. But, more than one historian has trawled through the Luftwaffe records & the short version is the Germans took 68% of their losses in the west in 1943. From early spring the losses in pilots were unsustainable and the losses in aircraft were made up by replacing twin engine production with interceptors only. A drop in production quality occured as well, adding to the non combat operating losses.

Ellis in 'Brute Force' provided summaries of the Luftwaffe operating strength for 1942-1945. In 1943 the number fluctuated between momentary lows of 4500 & peak spikes of near 6,000. The average was between 5,000 & 5,500 for the year. About half that was on the Eastern Front until the autum of 1943. The other half was spread from Norway (250-300) to the MTO, with the numbers in each area fluctuating widely as the year passed. At the start of the year Germany was increasing its Mediterranean strength to offset declining Italian air strength & to defeat the Allies in Tunisia. For the first half or the year the MTO asorbed a bit over half the operational aircraft in the west, & between 800 & 1200 were spread across France & the Low Countries, or defending Germany.

Three times the Luftwaffe tried to make a stand up fight in the MTO. Over Tunisia in the winter & early spring, over Sicilly during the summer, and southern Italy in September. Each time the combined Axis air forces were shot out of the air & broke off the campaign as losses became unsustainable. The ground forces were left exposed to Allied air attack & the Italian navy ceased effective operations in early spring. That the Brits were able to run cargo ship convoys unmolested through the Sicillian Strait in June, when the Axis still control Sicilly speaks loudly. The Axis air commanders felt it was more important to preserve strength than to keep the Mediterranian sea route closed. In October the Luftwaffe leaders threw in the towel in the MTO and engaged only when conditions were very favorable. Units were withdrawn to Germany & air strength in the MTO declined by half in the remainder of the year.

Also in the autum 600+ interceptors were moved from the Eastern Front to Germany. (One source stated 800, but that may have included some bombers.) This was in response to the increasing 8th & 15th AF raids. That is the core strength of the Luftwaffe became confined to Germany & operations in the periphrial regions shrank significantly. Anyone who thinks the German air force could defeat the Allied air forces over France in 1943 needs to study closely the Mediterranian campaign. The weather & inadaquate infrastructure hindered the Allied air effort there more than the combined Axis air forces. Yes the Axis had some spectacular tactical sucesses in the MTO in 1943. Blowing up a ammunition ship in the center of the invasion fleet off Sicilly got everyones attention, the Brindisi raid was a great sucess, its correct there was a favorable attrition rate for the Germans in fighter vs fighter combat. Yet the Germans lost and badly. At the stratigic & operational levels they lost pilots faster than they could train them and could barely replace losses in aircraft. Conversely the Allies increased training time for their rookies, and doubled their operating strength in the UK and MTO for 1943


Also of critical importance: no tac air and less than half of the heavy bomber groups they'd have by OTL D-Day. German armored columns, operating on unsmashed infrastructure and without fear of allied fighter bombers will utterly smash up green American divisions and the Brits too for that matter.

The Luftwaffe failed to do that in the MTO. What would be different in France?
 
Poor Joe Rochefort, whose leadership and command of Station HYPO made the American victory at Midway possible, saw, in OTL, his career essentially ended when Washington bureaucrats took credit for his achievements and denied him recognition. Can you imagine what will happen to Rochefort if the Japanese win? He will be lucky to get off without an all expenses paid vacation at Portsmouth Naval Prison.
 
This intervention by a former Secretary of Defence might be interesting to this thread (My use of bold)
In another thread I have made the argument that Midway is not decisive because after VE day Japan is doomed to fall quickly. This provides an argument that Midway is decisive because it allowed the US to focus on getting to VE day ASAP.

From: https://www.history.navy.mil/resear...pect-the-still-under-appreciated-victory.html



"Midway in Retrospect



The Still Under-Appreciated Victory

by James R. Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense

I am delighted to be here with you tonight as we commemorate the 61st Anniversary of the Battle of Midway--and honor those who turned the tide of battle with a victory over ostensibly overwhelming force. There are too few of us who understand Midway's world-historic significance. And, as I will develop, it is essential for us to go forth and proselytize.

Since I wrote a piece a year ago in the Wall Street Journal on the 60th Anniversary of Midway, I have continued to be puzzled that the assertion that Midway played the crucial strategic role for the war in Europe--came as something of a revelation. So the question before us is: Why is not Midway recognized as the crucial battle for the West of World War II--just as Stalingrad is recognized as a crucial battle for the Soviet Union? The comparative neglect of Midway is a great historic puzzle--and, in a sense, a great injustice.

So, this evening, I shall talk about history and, in particular, in relation to what Churchill and others call Grand Strategy. Midway was far more than a decisive naval victory. It was far more than the turning of the tide in the Pacific war. In a strategic sense, Midway represents one of the turning points of world history--and in that role it remains under-appreciated.

Consider the Grand Strategy of the allies, which Churchill quite naturally preferred and Roosevelt was eager to endorse. It was quite simply: to deal with Hitler and with the threat in Europe first. It had been embraced, shortly after Pearl Harbor, at the Arcadia Conference. Roosevelt clearly recognized--and acted on the conviction--that the Third Reich was the greater menace. Dramatic as had been the Japanese advance after Pearl Harbor, it was into slightly developed colonial regions--to be sure possessing rubber and tin. Yet, at the base it was far less dangerous than was Hitler's continuing advance, crushing and then organizing the industrial nations of Europe, while to that point almost entirely obliterating far more formidable resistance.

Yet, it was Japan that had attacked the United States, and it was Japan on which the anger of the American people had focused. Though Churchill could almost automatically concentrate on Europe, it required considerable courage for Roosevelt to carry through on the Grand Strategy. Germany's declaration of war on the United States on December 8th, 1941, provided a small opening. Yet, had it not been for Midway, Roosevelt could not have persevered with a Europe-first policy. Public opinion would not have allowed it. Indeed, even after Midway, he paid a substantial political price. In the mid-term election of 1942, the Democrats lost 44 seats in the House of Representative, barely retaining control--with comparable losses elsewhere! In a subsequent poll of all the Democratic congressional candidates, the principal reason give for the debacle: "...frustration and fury at Roosevelt's Germany-first strategy, which translated into failure to punish the Japanese more aggressively for Pearl Harbor." Nonetheless, despite the inclinations of the American people, Roosevelt recognized that the larger threat lay elsewhere--and was prepared to pay that domestic political price for that larger national objective, defined by his Grand Strategy.

Now consider the overall military situation in the spring of 1942. Japan was on a roll. The Philippines had fallen, including the final outposts of Bataan and Corregidor. The Japanese had swept down through the Malay Peninsula from French Indochina, and on 15 February, the supposedly "impregnable fortress" of Singapore had fallen--to numerically inferior Japanese forces. The Dutch East Indies had been captured. Japanese forces were advancing into Burma and might proceed to India. Even Australia appeared to be threatened. American naval forces, significantly weakened by the attack at Pearl Harbor, appeared vastly inferior to the armada that Japan was gathering to advance eastward in the Pacific toward Midway--and then possibly to the Hawaiian Islands or even the West Coast. Additional Japanese victories would have made it politically impossible for Roosevelt to continue to pursue the Grand Strategy of Europe-first.

Then came Midway. Through an extraordinary combination of the skill and courage of our pilots, splendid intelligence, prudent risk-taking by our commanders that paid off, and sheer good luck, the apparently inferior American forces were victorious. This victory occurred despite the inferiority of our aircraft, the ineffectiveness of our torpedoes, the substantial absence of backup surface ships, and our overall numerical inferiority. You know the rest! Four Japanese carriers had been sunk. It all confirmed the dictum of Otto von Bismarck: "the Lord God has special providence for fools, drunkards, and the United States of America." The Japanese offensive had now been blunted. The Japanese fleet turned back toward the Home Islands and the opportunity for victory had been lost forever. Roosevelt could now execute his Grand Strategy, with all that was to imply regarding the condition of post-war Europe.

After Midway, the United States could, to the chagrin of Douglas MacArthur, turn its primary attention back to the European theatre. After the stunning surrender of Tobruk, which appeared to jeopardize both Cairo and the Suez Canal. Roosevelt, thus, could accommodate the somewhat distraught Churchill's request for 300 of the new Sherman tanks to bolster the defenses in Northeast Africa, ultimately leading to the victory at El Alamein. The Battle of the Atlantic gradually turned--with the steady improvement in anti-submarine warfare, thereby helping to ease the shortage of shipping. By the fall, Operation Torch, the landings in North Africa, initiated offensive operations, which ultimately led to the destruction of Rommel's Afrika Korps. The invasion of Sicily would soon follow succeeded by the invasion of Italy, and eventually the landings in Normandy.

Had these events not taken place or been much delayed, it is possible that the Soviet Union would not have survived. But, if it had, and succeeded in its march westward, the face of post-war Europe would have been vastly different. Soviet forces would have deployed further to the west. Germany would likely have been occupied in its entirety. The West's foothold in Europe would have shrunk, perhaps dramatically. The ability of France and Italy to survive Communist pressures, precarious as it was in 1947, would have been much reduced. In brief, it was Midway, that battle in the distant Pacific, that shaped the face of post-war Europe.

Yet, despite the crucial historic role of Midway, its gets scarcely more attention in out history books than the naval battles on Lake Champlain or Lake Erie--let alone the scant attention that Europeans have paid to it. Let us reflect for a moment on a few of the other notable battles that turned the tide of history.

In 480 B.C., Athens had fallen to the Persian army, but Athens had in a sense survived in the form of its 200 naval vessels that Athens, prodded by Themistocles, an early apostle of naval construction, had created. On the 28th of September in the straits of Salamis, before the very eyes of the Emperor Xerxes, the combined Greek naval force delivered a devastating blow, sinking some 200 Persian ships--with the loss of only 40 of their own. Xerxes, as Herodotus describes, had wanted to rule Europe as well as Asia. Fearing an attack on its bridges over the Hellespont, the Persian army largely withdrew. Greek (and European) civilization had been preserved. Indeed, if I may indulge in a lapse from political correctness, Europe had been saved from Oriental Despotism. It was a naval battle that decided the fate of a civilization, a world/historic event, a turning point of history.

Each year, the English-speaking world celebrates Trafalgar. Yet, it is not clear that even in the absence of victory that England would not have survived. Midway, at a minimum, was the most decisive naval victory since Trafalgar, and perhaps the most strategically decisive victory since Salamis.

Let us turn to the crucial battles here in the United States. Yorktown is, of course, appropriately celebrated. Yet, after the Battle of the Capes, Yorktown was but the frosting on the cake, an almost inevitable triumph. Saratoga, by contrast, is rightly seen as the turning point of the Revolution.

One is, no doubt, obliged to speak of Gettysburg. Yet, while Gettysburg may have been the high water mark of the Confederacy, the outcome of the Civil War was never much in doubt. Just recall the remarks of that military logistician, Rhett Butler, at the beginning of Gone With The Wind, when he rebukes some Southern hotheads by pointing to the overwhelming industrial domination of the North.

Well then why, if Midway had such world/historic strategic significance, has it received so much less attention than it deserves? A recent documentary supposedly detailing the Pacific War, produced by Steven Spielberg and Stephen Ambrose, moves smoothly from Pearl Harbor to island-hopping in the western Pacific, with scarcely a mention of Midway. How could such a momentous victory come to be overshadowed? There are, I believe, three prominent reasons.

First, the Europeans are quite naturally even more Euro-centric than are we. For them the crucial battle for the European theatre had to be in the European theatre itself--and not some remote spot in the Pacific. There is still little sense in Europe of what a vast enterprise the war in the Pacific was. El Alamein continues to be celebrated in the United Kingdom. Similarly, the Battle of the Bulge is annually celebrated here. But the outcome of both those battles was almost foreordained by the balance of forces.

Moreover, the most prominent, indeed almost the canonical, history of World War II was written by Winston Churchill himself. And where would Churchill look? Not to some purely American engagement in the distant Pacific. Midway is only mentioned in Churchill's six-volume history--with no indication of how it shaped the outcome in Europe.

Second, Midway always has lain in the shadow of D-Day, which occurred two years later, but which coincides with Midway in the calendar year. D-Day, which was truly touch and go, deserves all the attention that it has received. But, it should not be to the detriment of Midway itself. For without Midway, there would have been no D-Day on 6 June 1944--with all that that implies about the condition of post-war Europe.

Third, it is also in a sense the fault of the U.S. Navy itself. The Navy (take no offense) is both too shy--in blowing its own horn--and too complacent--for in naming a carrier after a battle is so high an honor that nothing more needs to be said.

Moreover, Midway may be the victim of intra-service politics or more exactly intertribal fights. If one glorifies what was so dramatically a carrier victory, it might be interpreted to the detriment of the surface navy and/or the submarine force. So, tact required a relatively discreet silence. Thus, regarding the crucial significance of Midway in world history, it is more than the submarine force that has been the Silent Service.

Our British allies have perennially demonstrated a masterly touch in displaying, not to say marketing, their armed forces and their accomplishments. Go to London! See the centrality of Trafalgar Square in the city! Observe that obelisk for Admiral Nelson towering over the Square! It all provides a setting and a reinforcement for the annual celebration of the naval battle itself. By contrast, Farragut Square is a very dim competitor. And where, pray tell, is Midway? It is, of course, the Midway, a part of Chicago, named after the 1893 World Fair--or a nearby airport, a transition point halfway across the United States.

So, gentlemen: Now Hear This! It is time to go forth and proselytize--and underscore the world/historic role of Midway.

MIDWAY DESERVES NO LESS!"

Note: James R. Schlesinger delivered these remarks during a commemorative dinner to recognize the 61st anniversary of the Battle of Midway at the Army & Navy Country Club, Arlington, Virginia, on 5 June 2003.
 
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two thoughts strike me on this:
if the USN is sunk at Midway, but the Japanese fail to capture the island... I'd think that DC would declare it as a victory... in spite of the naval losses, the Japanese finally failed to capture something (in the early days of the war, they seemed unstoppable).
what happens with operations in New Guinea? IIRC, the loss at Midway really put a wrench in Japanese operations there. Without that loss, what happens now?
 

marathag

Banned
two thoughts strike me on this:
if the USN is sunk at Midway, but the Japanese fail to capture the island... I'd think that DC would declare it as a victory... in spite of the naval losses, the Japanese finally failed to capture something (in the early days of the war, they seemed unstoppable).
what happens with operations in New Guinea? IIRC, the loss at Midway really put a wrench in Japanese operations there. Without that loss, what happens now?
Not only fail to capture, but annihilated in the attempt. Wake sank two DDs with old preWWI 5" guns, Midway had a lot more firepower.
 

marathag

Banned
Why? The result at Midway has no impact on the Manhattan project and little on the delivery options for nuclear weapons.
Tinian and Iwo were in the 'Nice to have' category, but B-29s did sortie from Guam. So once that is liberated in the Marianas, Instant Sunshine is a go for August 45
 
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