So I’ve asked before about how the Republicans evolve to challenge McGovern, both in 1976 and beyond, but I’m also excited to see how well McGovern is able to keep the Democratic Party united behind him. Even if the party (Wallace and his folks aside) comes together to support his re-election (which, compared to Carter OTL, would be an achievement in itself), I can’t help but wonder how popular he’s going to manage to stay even among Democrats by the end of his (hypothetical) second term.
In terms of legacy, there’s difference - even before getting to things like how historians write your story and rank you - between Theodore Roosevelt, Dwight Eisenhower, Ronald Reagan, and (imho - though it’s posdibly still too early to say) Barack Obama - between them Woodrow Wilson or, say, George W Bush.
I'll try to unpack some of this without giving away too much spoileration for the next two election cycles, midterms b/c we'll get to see that monkey try to hump a football two chapters hence, and the Bicentennial because it is the very climax (bad monkey! down!) of this part of the narrative. In each case, whether we want to talk about the fluid dynamics of the GOP or of the Democrats, there's a considerable amount of parallel evolution afoot. For the Republicans, if we move across their spectrum from the very leftward edge all the way over to folks who are basically neo-Confederates who've now, rather bizarrely, staged a
major entryist incursion into the Party of Lincoln, it looks a bit like this:
- You have some of the very most liberal Republicans, especially those who at this point have no presidential ambitions and even more particularly ones in the Senate where the GOP caucus in the 93rd Congress skews quite a bit more liberal than the House caucus or the GOP voting base, actually ready to work with the McGovern administration, subject to a few conditions. Once exposed to a real, practicing McGovern administration that generates empirical data about its actions rather than just the fever dreams of pro- and anti- partisans, several of them recognize the capital-P Progressive strains in its worldview, methods, and policy priorities. Those are things with which these ultra-liberal Goopers can work, and indeed sometimes the administration reaches out to them because it needs votes from across the aisle to counteract the most hard-core of Southern Grandees who still wear the "D" after their names, most notably Mississippi's James Eastland and Arkansas' John McLellan (a study in contrasts there because McLellan's state-mate William Fulbright is one of McGovern's best friends in the Senate despite their divergences on some domestic-policy matters.) What the ultra-libs want is (1) efficiency, by which they usually mean managed costs and restraint on taxes as much as possible (they recognize valuable governmental functions cost money but they'd like them empirically efficient) and (2) "lean," or where possible small or devolved, administration. So, no ever-growing federal bureaucracies, power devolved to states and localities where possible, and an interest they share with some mid-level McGoverners in a "small is beautiful and also more democratic" approach to administering the work of government.
- Rockefeller Republicans, in their way, consider the McGovern administration a political gift. Not only has its existence tamped down some of the ongoing civil war between RRs and the New Right inside the GOP, but the RRs feel "McGoverning" has made the Rockefeller Republican worldview a kind of "Goldilocks faction" (akin to Goldilocks planets) within the GOP. The RRs are solid on LAWNORDER, more hawkish on foreign policy and defense spending, and orthodox friends of big business, while they also embrace - with some reservations about taxes that may play well in the suburbs - a number of the more popular elements of the McGovern program like a generally proactive view of nuclear weapons-focused arms control, a tax code that's more redistributive for working blue-collar families, public institutions seen to be honest and healthy and, hey - they are keen to point out - the roots of MECA (McGoverning's approach to Medicare-for-All) lay in a RR plan, sponsored on Rocky's behalf in the Senate by Jack Javits. Tl;dr they won't sacrifice what David Broder's sanctified "middle opinion" thinks are material benefits of McGoverning-thus-far, but will take a more "responsible" and in places actively conservative line on things where the average split-level-and-station-wagon family in the 'burbs may view the McGoverners as starry-eyed hippie coddlers. The question is whether and how RRs can mobilize that potential chance to seize "middle opinion" and club President McGovern with it like a baby seal, while still retaining the mouth-frothier parts of the GOP Base.
- For different reasons the Goldwaterite New Right sees the McGovern administration as a gift also. As sincere ideologues, the New Right crowd gets up every morning grateful that the McGoverners have "heightened the contrasts" for them, without their (Goldwaterites) having to make policy and take risks themselves. When it comes to political motives and methods, the New Rightists preach a faith and try to win converts. That means they'll double down on building organs of opinion and evangelism to sell their case that George McGovern is wrecking America with half-assed socialism pursued by undemocratic means, advancing the interests of an elite left-leaning cabal as he hounds a distinguished former president through the courts (hi, Dick!), is a hot-dish-eating surrender monkey when it comes to Moscow, etc. The organizing and fundraising potential of the McGovern administration for the Goldwaterites as compared to, say, the Johnson administration, is the like the difference between powder cocaine (Johnson) and crack (McGovern.) As they truly believe that Only Our Flying Freak Flag Will Save America, they tend to believe TTL!now is the moment of decision - as Saint Ronald of Pacific Pallisade's stump number from the Sixties (just called "The Speech" by his SoCal huckster buddies) would call it, "A Time for Choosing." After all, hell, George McGovern done gone and socialized medicine! (Well, not really, he's kind-of socialized health insurance, more than not, but it's got nothing on the British NHS model.) This is tasty, tasty chum for The Base. They will take a MOAR PURER approach to both the '74 and '76 cycles as a matter of Trend, because not only is that who they are, they also read the early phases of the McGovern administration as (1) a serious threat to their worldview and (2) proof they must act (heroically, obvs) in response. Question(s) is/are, can they winnow down their policy wish list to a few specifics and unify behind a specific candidate in '76.
- From there we get into the Dixiecrats, the real Uncut Neo-Secesh Product folk. They likewise benefit not only from the party unity(ish) that being in opposition brings, but also because George McGovern might as well show up to work each day in a Union Army uniform with the navy-blue greatcoat and kepi with the crossed muskets on it. Right now they're in a delicate position. ITTL two George Wallace presidential runs in consecutive cycles has given at least some legs to the AIP as a potential vehicle for the fears, anger, and dissatisfaction of Southern white yeomanry. The Dixiecrat Republicans have outflanked that in part, on what's really a class basis: by reframing (with Lee Atwater's infamous heuristic) a lot of racial and status animus in terms of low taxes, growth for business, "good" (i.e. as close to whites-only as you can still get) schools, etc., the Dixiecrat Goopers have seized the initiative in the growing suburbs of Southern boom towns. At the same time a lot of the white blue-collar population is still tribally Democratic, at least at the state-and-local level, and quite receptive to redistributive economic policies so long as Those People get less, or none wherever that's still feasible. The degree to which Wallace has held the AIP close as something of a vanity project works to the Dixiecrat-Rs' advantage in structural and organizational terms. But if any of the state-level AIP organizations win free of top-down Wallace control they could pose a legitimate threat to control of the voting base the DRs are chasing after. It helps therefore that the DRs can say they're already in Washington where they battle the McGoverners on a daily basis. Also on a number of economic and other macro-policy issues the DRs have growing common ground with the Goldwaterites. That means the two factions can haggle over how to be useful to one another, or butt heads over who has the more attractive candidate(s) for office in a given situation, so they could force the other faction to ride along in a subordinate role.
Then, of course, there's the Democrats. On one hand it's always fundamentally
useful to have control over two branches of government (executive and legislative) plus what could be called heavy sway over the third (through SCOTUS and several Democratic presidents' district/appellate judges.) So long as George McGovern doesn't hand the launch codes to Moscow or eat Goldwaterite babies at state dinners, that means there's at least a
transactional series of relationships available between the McGoverners and their congressional or state-level allies and what we could call the institutional majority in the Democratic Party of the early Seventies.
In a number of cases the McGovern administration can either actively support or quietly stay out of the way of liberal-to-left legislation that looks set to pass through Congress on its own terms. And they can work with Congress to pass legislation that's seen as "progressive yet reasonable" in the political climate of the times, anything from constitutional-level work on the War Powers Amendments (as they're known colloquially, passed in response to both Vietnam and living in the nuclear age), to MECA (Medicare Expansion & Consolidation Act), FFRA (Food & Farming Renaissance Act), the more aggressive earned-income tax credits program, a progressive reform platform for the Bureau of Indian Affairs, etc. In other cases the administration-plus-allies and the institutional majority can feel and stumble and haggle their way toward a sort of workable middle ground, where each side's dissatisfied in some ways but a functional program moves ahead. One good example of this is defense policy, where the sides accept the administration hacking away at the institutionalized-crazy aspects of SIOP and
overall trimming of the scale (and bills) of the post-Vietnam military, where at the same time the administration has gotten some things it wants on procurement policy, institutional organization, big Army and USMC personnel cuts, legislating-by-budget-and-basing against land wars in Asia, etc., while more pragmatic interests have gotten continued funding for
Nimitz-class carriers, a reasonable buy rate for the F-15 in return for aggressive production on the A-10 (that the McGoverners actually wanted and the zipper-suited sky gods hate), etc. That's all on the practical end of what could be done with any more-liberal-than-not Democratic administration in place.
On other economic matters things are more complex. As of
McGoverning!now the Demogrant is a dead letter, for example. From a working politician's point of view, McGovern got something out of the process in its place, the much more expansive (at this point on a timeline) than OTL earned-income credit system pushed by Vice President Hart then steered by Russell Long. But there's something of a devil's bargain in that anyway: it's designed for people who have a family adult who works, or who did work and now receive Social Security, or who are actively looking for work in a formal, registered way. There are a dozen little ways in which that legislation's designed, by the Russell Longs of the world, to let "irresponsible women" or the poorest people of color, or very often people who happen to be both (in America? Shocking, I know...) fall through the cracks. The Demogrant was designed to be solid, simple in execution, and universal: what they got instead was Congressional legislation, managed according to the prejudices of a deliberative body of mostly-white nearly-all-men, many of whom with the greatest parliamentary power had been marinated in Jim Crow boyhoods. But at least they got
something.
Likewise, the McGoverners could actually thread the hair's-breadth by which they're trying to pass the Revenue Reform Act (RRA) - designed to close dozens of loopholes and put some teeth back in progressive taxation that have been filed down since the last years under Eisenhower - with the aid of Southern populists, many of whom would like to keep at least a barge-pole's breadth between them and the administration at all times. They may pull that off especially if they keep the "Mills-Mansfield" label on RRA like OTL's 1972 tax-code review. Likewise on the drive toward a coherent industrial policy there are a number of Rockefeller Republicans who'd be ready to do business in the sub-clauses: Big Government in the service of Big Business is after all, as the Youth of Today might say, extremely their shit. They'd like the process of decision and execution skewed hard in the direction of business, with Big Government there as a useful tool, but they're still willing to haggle. At the same time there are other issues where they too want miles between themselves (the RRs) and the McGoverners.
Among Democrats there are big frictions. Some of these come from culture clashes that are like a mirror image of OTL's Carter administration woes. McGovern himself, and a number of key people around him are as much capital-P Progressive in their outlook and instincts - "practical idealism" made policy and practice; drives for simplicity, transparency, and ethics front and center; skeptical pragmatism about running the "Free World"; attention to smaller communities and rural states; suspicion of closed old-boy networks of all kinds and a preference for meritocratic inclusion - rather than old-school Democratic. It's a
different clash than with Carter's small-c-conservative technocracy, but one side is common to both fights: those institutional Democrats, to use my term, who are part and parcel of a party that grew up out of machine politics, both the old big-city machines often dependent on "Catholic ethnics" or organized labor, and the Southern machinery of the old "courthouse rings." The attention to rural issues and devotion to redistributive economics are net pluses for the McGoverners, all things considered, because that lets them still speak to
some Southern populists not taken aback by McGovern's OG Rainbow Coalition, and rural interests in the Midwest and Plains states, along with inland areas of the West Coast. Also to
some areas in the Steel Belt and Northeast Corridor where there's a more explicitly political cast to organized labor rather than just looking out for
herrenvolk interests (that then includes things like trying to keep women and minorities
out of some union locals.)
The other culture clash, common between the OTL!Carter and TTL!McGovern experiences, is the deep and
powerful It Wasn't Your Turn Dammit spirit that eddies through the institutional party. In
ideological terms, the natural pole for opposition is the Coalition for a Democratic Majority, the go-to vehicle for Jacksonian Democrats that soon we will see is a good bit more open and muscular than IOTL. More generally, the institutional types mean to keep the McGoverners away from as many levers of long-term power in the party as they can. That's gotten a little bit
harder in one particular way, though that data point also
reinforces the culture clash in other ways. That is: since McGovern hasn't rearmed the military with
gladiolus plants or eaten any babies, as people try to figure out how to do business with (or sandbag) the current administration one of its principal means of
support turns out to be the Kennedy Mafia, not just family flunkies and hangers-on but the various networks of patronage and trained experts that had been attached to Jack's actual administration and later Bobby's campaign. (In its own way this gives life to certain wingers raising old Bircher ghosts about Kennedy the Russian mole/patsy by characterizing McGovern as a Potemkin front for "Kennedy's people" - this has the delightful side affect of reaching
deep into the American-nativist muck of anti-Popery - but that's another matter.) You can see it in plain sight after all: McGovern's alter ego Frank Mankiewicz was Bobby's press secretary; Secretary of Defense Cy Vance another Kennedy stalwart; most of McGovern's Keynesian Justice League on economic/industrial policy are Kennedy vets including former Ambassador to India turned Treasury Secretary Ken Galbraith; etc. George himself of course was the second boss and true original spirit of the Food For Peace Program in Jack's time. That of course plays into a number of fissures within the party too, and those may build and variegate over time.
Who are McGovern's people? In terms of rank-and-file Democrats or just ordinary US residents, that is. Minorities, the "political" elements of organized labor, a number (though not always all) of liberal-minded professional types - perhaps the key for McGovern is that we start to see the first flickers of a definite gender gap as we're moving along here. Prior to that, though for very different reasons than we see today IOTL, party affiliation and voter preference was relatively "tribal" in the sense that the sex of the voter
didn't seem to signify by very much in either direction. To some degree that was a function of the New Deal-and-Postwar eras, if you go back to the Twenties and beyond (even to polled preferences of women before the Nineteenth Amendment) there was often splitting on specific issues with women more often drawn to social-reform policies, some of which we'd consider quite liberal, others wholly reactionary (hi, Prohibition!) In the
McGoverning!Seventies there are temblors, to go full
Earthquake! (hit the cinemas IOTL in 1974), of a political gender gap. Those could get dampened if you had - to choose one of a half-dozen or more possibles - Chuck Percy as the GOP nominee in 1976. But the more you go full Right - yer Saint Ronnies, yer Ed Gurneys, yer Westmorelands, etc. - the more you could see a definite gender gap of women -> George and men -> Winger of Choice. Rural voters are another
interesting potential battleground, there are still a number of legitimately-small farmers out there in the Heartland at this point (the farm-property extinction event of OTL's 1980s hasn't hit yet) and with George around they may be in play. Money and commerce of course loathes George - he's all administration and management and national priorities and other-directedness, they all want to get rich quick because there
is money to be made in inflation if you know what you're doing and then put the screws to your lessers in order to tamp it back down and protect your winnings (hi, Classical Economics gaining lower inflation through higher unemployment and regressive taxation!) In an effort to, y'know, get reelected, some of George's smarter minions have taken a look at all this and,
contra the peevish Pat Caddell, suggested that McGovern
not make The-Beast-With-Two-Backs with Wallace voters but instead trade
some proportion of Hard Hats and Rednecks for some proportion of women, liberal professionals, and smallhold farmers. The mileage on that may vary.
Tl;dr there's a lot going on, but it's fun