U.S. nukes the Soviets before 1949

What if the United States dropped an atomic bomb in a preemptive attack against the Soviet Union before the Russians could get the bomb in 1949? Obviously this starts world war 3. How would the American public react? The world? Could the U.S. push the Soviets out of eastern Europe?
 
US capabilities for manufacutre were limited, besides the USSR was pushing hard to have all nuclear weapons placed under UN control (until they could make their own in quantity). All this does is reinforce theor point and besides the US was toying with ICBMs by 1947 under the MX-774/Hiroc program anyway.
 
so we're looking at a United States with around 180 atomic bombs if the United States is able to pull off a surprise attack the Soviet Union probably collapses in a matter of months but with all the spies in the US the Soviet Union is probably tipped off about this War last a one year Soviet Air Forces are able to repel enough bombers to actually keep itself alive after the first strike. cold war is ended before it can begin. Chinese Civil War is probably affected by this communist lose their as well with us dropping A bombs everywhere. United States loses all its moral High Ground for the rest of its existence and minor nuclear winter probably happens to.

Mark 8:36 What good is it for someone to gain the whole world, yet forfeit their soul? the United States just did that in this scenario.
 
US retains industrial supremacy but Western Europe likely unites into an EU-like federation earlier. Germans are shocked and end up leading this potentially as a united country. Eastern Europe is freed much earlier and US retains allies there. By the 1960s the world is recovering and a Russian rump state of some kind exists. Decolonization is more violent and Vietnamesque without Soviet arms to aid its progress but it still happens.
 

marathag

Banned
US could indeed drop a bomb, somewhere in the USSR.
If it would be on the correct city, that's another matter entirely in 1949.

Inertial Navigation was still a slowly realizing dream for Doc Draper at this point, 4 years away.
 
I think @ObssesedNuker has a few interesting things to say about the US nuclear capabilities in this period.

Indeed I have!

As for strategic air power, I highly recommend John M. Curatola's “Bigger Bombs for a Better Tomorrow”, which goes into exquisite detail, without sacrificing readibility, on just how ineffective the US strategic air arm in general and nuclear arsenal in particular was in the 1946-50 period. All the information I'm posting here is pulled from there. His assessments tended to be echoed by books like Steven Ross's "American War Plans, 1945-1950" or Raymond Ojserkis's "Beginnings of the Cold War Arms Race", although the latter does not directly focus very much on the state of the nuclear arsenal.

So, first: the arsenal. The earliest tentative USAAC/USAAF estimates drafted in 1945 said that to inflict a crippling blow on the Soviet Union they would need a minimum stockpile of 123 weapons and a ideal one of 466, a figure that would only grow with time. By the end of 1947, total US stockpile of bomb components (not full-on bombs, more on this in a moment) was 13, and further production was being bottlenecked by technical issues with the reactors needed to produce plutonium. The first generation of nuclear bombs, and their associated aircraft, were crude and unwieldy devices that took considerable time and preparation before usage. Yet the problem of assembling these early bombs took a host of specially trained teams that after the war the US had a critical shortage of. And even the bomb teams they did have were found to be woefully inadequate at assembling their weapons. The issue was so bad that the Atomic Energy Commission privately admitted that they were unable to assemble any of the bombs under wartime conditions. Just assembling bombs for the testing programs of Crossroads and Sandstone maxed out their capabilities. What's worse, the bombs were not under military control: they were under control of the civilian Atomic Energy Commission and were only to be released to military control after the bombs had been transported to the airbases and assembled by the aforementioned AEC teams. But the AEC was not on talking grounds with the military: the head of the AEC, David Lilienthal, was deeply suspicious of military personnel and vigorously opposed military influence in atomic decision-making. As a result coordination and communication between the AEC and the military was practically nonexistent. So not enough weapons which the people in charge of assembling the weapons, who aren't coordinating with the people in charge of delivering the weapons, can't be relied upon to put together. We're off to a great start!

So that's the bomb situation, how about aircraft? The number of atomic-capable aircraft available to the air force in 1947 was... 18 and these were all described as "well worn and beginning to show their age". But that's the total number. When one takes into account that 56 percent of US aircraft were out of commission at any given time by 1950 and this was a radical improvement over the earlier years as a result of a overhaul in maintenance practices in 1949, you're probably looking at somewhere below 1/3rd that number actually being available to fly. Never mind those which would be lost attempting to bomb their targets with their inadequately trained crews.

Speaking of which, there was a even grosser shortage of aircrews: during this time, the US only had 12 crews fully certified to fly nuclear strike missions. Yet even the certified crews training left something to be desired: they did not train for navigation over the East European and Russian landmass, they were trained in daylight when they were expected to deliver the weapons at night so as to minimize detection, and their practice with RADAR bombsights was basically as handheld as it get with the practice targets being outfitted with reflectors and the like. When Curtis LeMay took over SAC in late-1948, he proceeded to ask his crews them to perform a practice run in early-1949 against Dayton Ohio under realistic conditions. The results were a total fiasco: not one of the bombers achieved accuracy close enough to the target to even damage it, much less destroy it, with atomic bombs. A number had to abort or never even found the city at all! No wonder LeMay subsequently remarked that not one of his air crews were capable of doing a professional job. What's worse, they'd basically be flying blind: intelligence on what to target was execrable, relying on spotty interviews with German returnees and maps that were outdated when the Tsar was around. About 20% of the planned targets were simply out of range. And then there was the infrastructure problem. Most of the British and all of the Middle Eastern bases that the bombers were supposed to base out of had runways that were too short to support a B-29/50 carrying an atomic bomb, no facilities for the storage and assembly of atomic munition, the aforementioned paltry air defenses which made them vulnerable targets for Soviet counter-air strikes, and so-on. What's more, there was uncertainty whether the Middle Eastern bases could even be held against the expected Soviet ground assault into the Middle East.

And of course, they’ll face resistance. The USSR had established all-weather, 24-hour local air defense of all critical installations and facilities following the wars end and by 1947 the air defense system had grown to a national scale, a point emphasized just a year later when it was removed from the Soviet Artillery Directorate and made a independent branch of the armed forces. US ELINT was badly done (something which even the US itself recognized) and as a result underestimated Soviet radar capabilities in this period in both size and quality, a problem compounded by the fact that shortages of jammers, chaff, chaff dispensers, and electronic maintenance personnel rendered SAC's ECM capabilities only 35-percent effective from requirements. Conversely, the Soviets demonstrated the capability in jamming American navigation aids during the Berlin airlift, which would greatly compound navigation and accuracy issues for American crews already badly trained in such matters. Soviet radar operators were capable of vectoring Soviet fighters so as to achieve intercept at a distance of 70 miles from any given air defense station. Estimates on expected losses to enemy resistance at the time run gamut from 15 to 50%, even the lower ones would be crippling given the limited numbers of aircraft, bombs, and aircrews available. And given the poor training and support outlined above as well as the strength of Soviet air defense forces, it’s liable to be on the higher end as the lower-estimates tended to assume adequately-trained crews operating in sufficient numbers with sufficient support... all of which, as I've established, did not exist. This is without taking into account aircraft which go down or have to abort due to equipment failures: numbers for there usually hover in the 20-25% range.

Given these deficiencies in the US's nuclear arsenal (not enough bombs, lack of crews for all tasks, lack of aircraft, inadequately trained crews, inadequate intelligence, unprepared forward bases), it's no wonder in that Curatola delivers the following judgement in his book: "In all, the ways in which the United States sought to defeat the Soviets by an atomic aerial offensive were poorly funded, ill-conceived, speciously planned, badly organized, and yet relentlessely optimistic." -Pg 134.

The US would be better off refraining from conducting any immediate atomic offensive and instead spend several years building up, retraining, re-equipping, and expanding the nuclear delivery force so as to overwhelm Soviet defenses. If it did attempt an immediate atomic offensive, which unfortunately is what the war plans of the era called for, the US nuclear delivery force's tiny size means even the most optimistic loss estimates would see it functionally destroyed and the US would have to rebuild it from scratch, an even longer process even with American economic power.

Here's a video lecture for those interested in learning more but not willing to shell out for the book:

Given these well-recorded deficiencies, the attack probably fails catastrophically and the Soviets run the US out of Europe in response, if their own allies don't to avoid Soviet retribution. Given the unprovoked nature of this attack, there would be a strong domestic backlash that could heavily energize the dying remnants of the isolationists. The Republicans would argue that the Democrats had gone insane after being in power for so long and Truman is likely drummed out of office in disgrace. The odds of a subsequent peace with the Soviets that leave them in a dominant position of Eurasia are high.
 
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McPherson

Banned
MX-774/Hiroc program

Indeed I have!

Given these well-recorded deficiencies, the attack probably fails catastrophically and the Soviets run the US out of Europe in response, if their own allies don't to avoid Soviet retribution. Given the unprovoked nature of this attack, there would be a strong domestic backlash that could heavily energize the dying remnants of the isolationists. The Republicans would argue that the Democrats had gone insane after being in power for so long and Truman is likely drummed out of office in disgrace. The odds of a subsequent peace with the Soviets that leave them in a dominant position of Eurasia are high.

I agree with everything EXCEPT, the Russians run anyone anywhere. They had just lost 18 million dead, 5 years before, and Stalin was going off into Cloud Cuckoo Land. Manpower losses have a quality all of their own. Figure a draw on the ground in Europe. Potemkin Russia is still a hard fact to believe. I finally believed it after I dug through the casualties in the histories. Incredible that they bluffed the West.
 
I agree with everything EXCEPT, the Russians run anyone anywhere. They had just lost 18 million dead, 5 years before, and Stalin was going off into Cloud Cuckoo Land. Manpower losses have a quality all of their own. Figure a draw on the ground in Europe. Potemkin Russia is still a hard fact to believe. I finally believed it after I dug through the casualties in the histories. Incredible that they bluffed the West.

Citing what the Soviets previously lost in WW2 is far less useful then looking at what they had. Three-four Western divisions going up against a initial force of four Soviet armies is only going to end one way and it won’t be a draw.

In terms of manpower, in addition to the ~9 million men demobilized during 1945-46, another ~9 million men fit for military service came of age in 1945-1947 who had been born in the late-20s. The class of 1930, who would be coming of age in 1948, would be the first class in which the Soviets started to see a serious drop-off in the yearly number of young men becoming available as it was the first class born at the time in which the collectivization program, and it's consequences, had impact on the Soviet population, but the drop off was still only about 20% at this point which leaves the class of 1930 as being about 2.4 million. So, that leaves the Soviets with a unmobilized military manpower reserve of potentially some 20.4 million men. Add on to that the ~3 million man standing military the Soviets had in the late-40s and that's 23.4 million total military manpower. While this figure is smaller then the number of men the Soviet Union who cycled through during the course of WW2 (34,000,000), it's still more then 6 million men larger then the number of men the Germans cycled through during the war and about 3 million more then the total military manpower fielded by the US during the war.

The manpower above is far more then enough to fulfill all of the Red Army's mobilization plans with room to spare for losses. In addition to bringing their standing divisions within the first 20 days of mobilization, the Soviets would also begin to mobilize the 120 Category-D "ghost" mobilization rifle divisions, which normally only exist on paper in peacetime with their equipment in storage and their manpower in the civilian reserves. As the link I posted notes, the first of these would reach strength by M+30 and the last by M+60, with all being at full-combat readiness by M+120. The ability of the Red Army to do this is very much in line with the historical record: in 1941, the Red Army mobilization system managed to generate more then 300 divisions from 5 million men mobilized in the course of 5 months and this was under a series of deficiencies (most notably, the unexpected surprise attack and collapse of the front caused massive disruption and there was a shortage of trained or experienced officers due to the purges) that the late-40s Red Army does not have. Even 1914 Imperial Russia, operating under logistical and material constraints which make the 1941 Red Army (never mind the 1948 one) look like paradise, managed to mobilize a additional 100 divisions on top of bringing their standing army up to full manpower strength in the opening two months of WW1.
 

McPherson

Banned
I’ve already shown how the demographics show otherwise. You’ve supported your assertion with basically fuck all and have just reiterated the arguement. Put up or shut up.

Your demographic assertions have a couple of PROBLEMS.

1. By your logic the Russians should have recovered from their civil war, the Stalin pogroms and the mass depopulations the Germans imposed in WW II when they murdered millions of young teen aged boys. Just a few incidentals that factor into those mythical teenagers coming of age.

2. Here. The "veterans" can be at the front fighting, or they can be trying to put a shattered country back together. They cannot do both and against a West backed by an intact United States, they cannot last. They have no staying power and no reserves. Hence "glass".

Finally,

You’ve supported your assertion with basically fuck all and have just reiterated the arguement. Put up or shut up.

Your case is "not proven".
 

marathag

Banned
Biggest problem would be feeding the Red Army, coming off from disastrous droughts and worsened by Collectivization Policies, that lasted in some areas thru 1948
I image more would starve in 1949 to keep the spearheads fed.

Or it all breaks down and Soviet Troops act like the Germans at the end of WWI during Ludendorff's Offensive
 

SsgtC

Banned
I agree with everything EXCEPT, the Russians run anyone anywhere. They had just lost 18 million dead, 5 years before, and Stalin was going off into Cloud Cuckoo Land. Manpower losses have a quality all of their own. Figure a draw on the ground in Europe. Potemkin Russia is still a hard fact to believe. I finally believed it after I dug through the casualties in the histories. Incredible that they bluffed the West.
The US and our Western allies had demobilized massively by 1949. The Soviets however had maintained far more combat power at wartime levels. It would not be out of the realm of possibilities that the Red Army could chase the Western powers into the Channel.
 

McPherson

Banned
The US and our Western allies had demobilized massively by 1949. The Soviets however had maintained far more combat power at wartime levels. It would not be out of the realm of possibilities that the Red Army could chase the Western powers into the Channel.

I give the odds 40/60. I think the Russians faced with WWIII would just be as horrified as the West is, and that Stalin's life is measured in mere hours while someone sane tries to figure out what he did to piss off Truman and tries to "Make peace you fools!"
 
Your demographic assertions have a couple of PROBLEMS.

1. By your logic the Russians should have recovered from their civil war, the Stalin pogroms and the mass depopulations the Germans imposed in WW II when they murdered millions of young teen aged boys. just a few incidentals.

And they had. The Soviet Union had recovered from the Civil War in 1927, decades beforehand. In economic terms, GDP, GDP-per-capita, and industrial output all returned to pre-WW2 levels by 1948, per Mark Harrison’s works on the subject. Stalin's anti-Jewish pogroms occurred later, nearer his death and don't seem to have reached a scale which hurt economic activity at all. And per Walter Dunn's works on Soviet manpower, the Soviets generally found that the Germans were unsuccessful in denying more then 10% of the occupied regions potential military manpower.

2. Here. The veterans can be at the front fighting, or they can be trying to put a shattered country back together. They cannot do both and against a West backed by an intact United States, they cannot last. They have no staying power and no reserves. Hence "glass".

Nothing in your link contradicts anything I’ve posted and, as the numbers I have posted show, the recruitment of enough men just to bring the Soviet military back to it's WW2 manpower levels would still leave about 3 million more men in the economy then was the case even AFTER the 1945-1947 demobilization. Additionally, it ignores that the manpower the Soviets released after the war actually represented the least capable soldiers available to the Red Army. Per Victor Gobarev's work on the Red Army during the Berlin Blockade, the great bulk of the most experienced, physically fit, and capable Soviet soldiers were retained. This is in contrast to the American demobilization, which largely let their most capable and most experienced soldiers return to the workforce, with deleterious effects on discipline, training, and overall combat readiness that would dog the Army well into the Korean War.

Additionally, after reaching it's nadir in February 1948 at 2.86 million, the size of the Soviet military began to increase as the Cold War intensified. The Soviet Group of Forces Germany alone received 80,000 additional soldiers in the Spring of 1948. By the time of Stalin's death, it was 5.3 million. According to you, the Soviet manpower situation means this build-up should have been impossible without devastating the Soviet economy. Yet not only did the build-up happen, it happened and the Soviet economy would continue to grow well until the 1970s.

I image more would starve in 1949 to keep the spearheads fed.

The Soviets had already demonstrated their ability to maintain and even increase agricultural production while mobilized, as the increase of agricultural production from it’s low point in 1944 from it's low point in 1943 shows. Additionally, as the political circumstances of the proposed war means it likely won’t last longer then a year, it likely wouldn't last long enough to have much negative impact on Soviet agricultural output. Certainly the taking of Western Europe, which would take a few weeks if it doesn't take a few months, wouldn't last long enough to do it.
 
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What if the United States dropped an atomic bomb in a preemptive attack against the Soviet Union before the Russians could get the bomb in 1949? Obviously this starts world war 3. How would the American public react? The world? Could the U.S. push the Soviets out of eastern Europe?
I suppose it depends where the bomb detonated.

Best case for the U.S. might involve the Bomb killing the Soviet leadership, and perhaps whom ever takes over decides to cut a deal with the U.S. I don't see this as a particularly likely outcome but it might happen.

The more likely outcome is a rather annoyed Soviet Union wages war against the west while the US scrambles to drop more bombs on the Soviet Union. Starting a war by dropping a single bomb does seem rather odd.

I don't see the U.S. public or the rest of the world being very happy about this.
 
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I think @ObssesedNuker has a few interesting things to say about the US nuclear capabilities in this period.
Dropping one bomb as per the OP is probably feasible for the U.S. in this time frame :)

Especially if it is delivered as the opening move in a war. The OP did use the phrase pre emptive attack :). I suspect there are ways the U.S. could get a single air craft over at least some likely targets in peace time. I suspect the rest of the world would be rather unimpressed with the U.S.
 
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Dropping one bomb as per the OP is probably feasible for the U.S. in this time frame :)

Especially if it is delivered as the opening move in a war.

Well, in the strictest sense of SAC capabilities it is. There are good odds that a single bomber could be shot down though, which is why SAC warplans at the time called for hundreds of bombers to try and overwhelm the PVO. That SAC at the time didn’t have the infrastructure to put hundreds of atomic-capable bombers over the Soviet was... not taken into account.
 
Well, in the strictest sense of SAC capabilities it is. There are good odds that a single bomber could be shot down though, which is why SAC warplans at the time called for hundreds of bombers to try and overwhelm. That SAC at the time didn’t have the infrastructure to put hundreds of atomic-capable bombers over the Soviet was... not taken into account.
I think there are ways the U.S. might have a reasonable chance of getting a single bomber to its target as the opening move in a pre emptive attack. Nothing would be 100 percent certain however.

I suspect such an attack would have far reaching consequences and our world today would be a much less pleasant one.
 
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