Was Gavin to blame for the failure of Market Garden?


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You kriegspiel (wargame) with real troops and weather effects and logistics and you cross your fingers in peacetime and see who does what and how well.

From twenty+ years experience I can say that has some hard limits. Modern methods of the 1970s & 80s gave us few useful clues. During just the mobilization for Desert Shield I watched previously successful and top 10% officers crash and burn. Fear had or has unpredictable effects on people.

Sure a Fredendall or a Brereton gets through, but Kasserine Pass and Clark Field means you yank those yahoos and put in another guy, preferably a subordinate who was trying his best, while those "gentlemen" fubared.

In the context of what I understand of those events that statement makes little sense. For a start both those men were 'yanked out'.
 

McPherson

Banned
From twenty+ years experience I can say that has some hard limits. Modern methods of the 1970s & 80s gave us few useful clues. During just the mobilization for Desert Shield I watched previously successful and top 10% officers crash and burn. Fear had or has unpredictable effects on people.

Yeah, but at least Marshal tried which is more than the British or the Russians did.

In the context of what I understand of those events that statement makes little sense. For a start both those men were 'yanked out'.

Brereton was not. He should have served jail time for some of his Southwest Pacific Ocean Area air force mistakes and idiocies. His incompetence in setting up the base force during the Australian period of the FEAAF would have got him shot in another "army".^1

^1 Russians, for example.
 
Bereton was like his peers. He was very good at planning and organizing. During the previous 22 years the US Army had not been in combat, & had no really good way to judge anyone's fitness under that condition. During those decades the up and coming officers were constantly tested in their ability to plan, organize, & train. Those talents could be tested, judged and validated. Bereton was actually very good at it. If you needed a Air Force stood up with all the base infrastructure and ground support Bereton was your man.

When the US mobilization started 1940 Marshal was faced with the problem of turning 420,000 Army and Nantional Guards into a 4,000,000+ Army and air Force (8,000,000 as it turned out.). He needed leaders with brilliant track records organizing and training. It was pretty pointless to make wild guesses who would be the Lee, Sheridan, Stuart. Marshal went for a well organized army which the battlefield commanders needed.

Marshall's greatest move was to fire or side line every general when he took over the top job the week France threw in the towel. Edit: WRONG - as has been pointed out he took the job the week Poland was invaded.

He had seen the hide bound nature of long term older officers in the US Army when he was Pershing's Adjantant when the AEF when to Europe in WW1 and saw that Pershing was obliged to ultimately fire every divisional and Corps commander and replace them with younger men who would absorb the hard learned lessons of their allies and apply them.

In 1940 he decided to simply save time, and almost certainly saving untold US lives by doing it before the US Army fired its first shot in anger.

It certainly was not perfect and the US Army still had men who turned out to be terrible leaders.
 
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Marshall's greatest move was to fire or side line every general when he took over the top job the week France threw in the towel.

He had seen the hide bound nature of long term older officers in the US Army when he was Pershing's Adjantant when the AEF when to Europe in WW1 and saw that Pershing was obliged to ultimately fire every divisional and Corps commander and replace them with younger men who would absorb the hard learned lessons of their allies and apply them.

In 1940 he decided to simply save time, and almost certainly saving untold US lives by doing it before the US Army fired its first shot in anger.

It certainly was not perfect and the US Army still had men who turned out to be terrible leaders.
I'm quite the admirer of Marshall, and it sounds sooooo wrong to me to even say it, but, too "baby-with-the-bathwater-ish", don't you think?
 

McPherson

Banned
I'm quite the admirer of Marshall, and it sounds sooooo wrong to me to even say it, but, too "baby-with-the-bathwater-ish", don't you think?

Yeah, but in retrospect, Marshal's method worked most of the time, because it was really needed. He didn't just fire Regular Army overaged and resistant to change officers. He tried to bring the same reforms to the American national guard. Most of the NG units were "reformed" but not the 27th Inf USNG. Murphy, that outfit was goofed up.

Summary: the outfit was not tied into the Marines on its left and right and the unit dispositions along its frontage were not the best. Artillery was misused, tank infantry coordination was poor and it had "the slows". Whether it was Ralph Smith's fault or his staff, does not matter. Failure to move, handcuffed 5th Fleet and the Marines. It made the fighting harder because it prolonged the campaign by two weeks. YMMV. I believe Holland Smith was correct.

Things are NTG when field grade granddads and middle aged machine gunners are wining CMHs left and right, to retrieve their higher ups' mistakes.
 

Dave Shoup

Banned
Marshall's greatest move was to fire or side line every general when he took over the top job the week France threw in the towel. He had seen the hide bound nature of long term older officers in the US Army when he was Pershing's Adjantant when the AEF when to Europe in WW1 and saw that Pershing was obliged to ultimately fire every divisional and Corps commander and replace them with younger men who would absorb the hard learned lessons of their allies and apply them. In 1940 he decided to simply save time, and almost certainly saving untold US lives by doing it before the US Army fired its first shot in anger. It certainly was not perfect and the US Army still had men who turned out to be terrible leaders.

No sure what you mean by this. Marshall was named Army chief of staff in September, 1939, which predated the fall of France by 10 months. If the June 22 armistice is defined as "the week France threw in the towel" than are you suggesting that every US Army general officer (brigadier general on up) was simultaneously relieved in June, 1940? Because that is not true, obviously, as follows:

1st Army - Hugh Drum served as CG from 1938 to 1943;
2nd Army - SF Ford, 1938 to October, 1940;
3rd Army - Stanley Embick, 1938 to September 1940;
4th Army - JL DeWitt, 1939-1943;
 

Dave Shoup

Banned
Yeah, but in retrospect, Marshal's method worked most of the time, because it was really needed. He didn't just fire Regular Army overaged and resistant to change officers. He tried to bring the same reforms to the American national guard. Most of the NG units were "reformed" but not the 27th Inf USNG. Murphy, that outfit was goofed up. Summary: the outfit was not tied into the Marines on its left and right and the unit dispositions along its frontage were not the best. Artillery was misused, tank infantry coordination was poor and it had "the slows". Whether it was Ralph Smith's fault or his staff, does not matter. Failure to move, handcuffed 5th Fleet and the Marines. It made the fighting harder because it prolonged the campaign by two weeks. YMMV. I believe Holland Smith was correct. Things are NTG when field grade granddads and middle aged machine gunners are wining CMHs left and right, to retrieve their higher ups' mistakes.

If you mean William J. O'Brien and Thomas Baker, O'Brien was a 45-year-old O-5 battalion commander and Baker was a 28-year-old E-1 infantryman, both of the 105th Infantry Regiment, 27th Infantry Division. Both men certainly deserved the MOH, but their assignments - as opposed to what they did above and beyond their assignments - were't really out of spec. Baker was old for an infantry private, but wouldn't think 28 is "middle-aged," even in 1944.

The other 105th MOH, Ben Salomon, was a 30-year-old dental corps captain (0-3), volunteering as a surgeon ... who died fighting as a rifleman and machine gunner.

http://www.cmohs.org/recipient-detail/2981/salomon-ben-l.php
 
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Dave Shoup

Banned
https://www.uslearning.net/1940-census.html Croak by 60, if you are lucky. (mean average which means half croaked younger.) 28 is just about the middle. :winkytongue:

I'll give you that, but even so, I imagine the average 28-year-old rifleman was in pretty good shape. Baker had served with the NYNG from 1935-38, enlisting right after high school, apparently; he then re-enlisted in 1940, presumably being able to see the writing on the wall. It does seem odd he was not promoted to NCO until posthumously, although he may have been one of those soldiers who is content as a rifleman, not a squad leader or above.

O'Brien enlisted in the State Guard (the home defense force) in 1917, and then in the NYNG in 1920, served as an enlisted man until OCS in 1926, and continued as a guardsman until federalization in 1940; he was promoted captain in 1939, so presumably was a platoon and company commander or battalion staff officer in the 105th for more than a decade - kind of the definition of a traditional Guard officer, actually.

From what I can tell, O'Brien and Baker were both mobilized when the 105th was federalized in 1940, which suggests that whatever the issues the 27th's divisional leadership may or may not have had, the prewar NG officers and men included some good cadre. Likewise, Salomon, who was drafted in 1940 and trained as a rifleman and machine gunner despite being a USC graduate (BS and DDS) and ISTR made it to platoon sergeant before being sent to OCS, makes it equally clear the draftees in 1940-41 included some pretty impressive individuals.

The 27th Division, all in all, was more sinned against than sinner, I'd say... it's challenging to understand exactly who failed who, but in a conflict defined by coalition warfare and joint and combined operations, HM Smith was not exactly sterling, to my mind.

It's worth mentioning that Ralph Smith (born in Nebraska 1893) was as much a regular (commissioned as such in 1916) as HM Smith, (born in Alabama 1882, was commissioned in 1905) and Ralph Smith had seen active service as an infantry officer in Mexico in 1916-17 and in France in 1917-18 with the 1st and 4th divisions, where he won the Silver Star with OLC and was WIA in the Meuse-Argonne, and then remained in the RA until WW 2. Ralph Smith was not a Guardsman in 1940, and had not been one since 1916, which given the comments HM Smith makes about "militia-itis" in Coral and Brass, presumably should be pointed out.

On the other hand, in WW I, HM Smith served as a staff officer, beginning in the 2nd Division, and never led troops in combat in France. Not exactly a combat commander.

It's also unclear to me how HM Smith qualified for the Purple Heart, since it doesn't appear, according to Coral and Brass, he was ever wounded in action; possibly as a recipient for merit, since the DSM - at the time - generally was in recognition of more senior assignments, with much more significant levels of responsibility.

https://www.nationalguard.mil/News/...-soldiers-remember-medal-of-honor-recipients/

and

https://books.google.com/books?id=i... and rensselaer polytechnic institute&f=false

and

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USMC/Coral&Brass/index.html#index
 
No sure what you mean by this. Marshall was named Army chief of staff in September, 1939, which predated the fall of France by 10 months. If the June 22 armistice is defined as "the week France threw in the towel" than are you suggesting that every US Army general officer (brigadier general on up) was simultaneously relieved in June, 1940? Because that is not true, obviously, as follows:

1st Army - Hugh Drum served as CG from 1938 to 1943;
2nd Army - SF Ford, 1938 to October, 1940;
3rd Army - Stanley Embick, 1938 to September 1940;
4th Army - JL DeWitt, 1939-1943;

Drum reached mandatory retirement age in 1943, & was suffering emerging health problems. In 1942 he shot himself in the foot by turning
down the post as US representative & advisor to China, thinking he'd take command of US forces in Europe. Roosevelt thought not. Stilwell
who was preparing a US corps for Op GYMNAST got the China post.
Ford hit his mandatory retirement age in 1941
Embick was 64 when retired 1940
DeWitt developed health problems but was retained as chief of the Army War College until retirement in 1946

Those four did well during the early mobilization. Like most of the 63 General officers Marshal was jumped over in his appointment to CoS in 1939 they were 'old'. Not everyone was retired at the manditory age, but emerging health problems ensured most of the men turning 60 could not keep up. A large number of those in their forties & fifties fell along the way for health reasons. Few people past age 35 can keep up with the sort of 16 hour work days necessary during the mobilization period 1940-1942, fewer past age fifty can. At age sixty its a rare bird who can retain clear judgement after staying on his feet all day.

Patton was one retained through the war, was only 55 in 1940.
Krueger was another of the handful of pre 1940 Generals who served overseas, commanding 6th Army

Doolittle is a extreme contrast. Aged 53 in 1940 & a Major in the Army reserve, he rocketed to Major General and command of the 12th AF in two years.
 

McPherson

Banned
Doolittle is a extreme contrast. Aged 53 in 1940 & a Major in the Army reserve, he rocketed to Major General and command of the 12th AF in two years.

Kruger was a Murphy send. He was an unsung miracle worker with US 6th Army despite his "slowness" which often exasperated the USN. I think Eichelberger, Kenney, Kincaid and he made MacArthur's reputation.

As for Doolittle, did any other air force have anyone like him? Give him an impossible task and what did he do? On time, on budget with far fewer casualties than anyone could reasonably expect is what he did routinely. Dowding can be compared to him; maybe Chennault, maybe Fitch, maybe Kammhuber, but nobody I think had his organizational talent and skill to go from zero to air force in just 6 months... three times.
 
Dolittles reputation was set while still a Lt Col. In 1941. He used his previous decade of experience in the oil industry, & his degree in aeronautical engineering to assist a number of midwestern manufactors, like Ford to organize production for the 40,000 air frames of 1942. In this he was one of several, but that he did well got attention all the way to the top. He'd also been involved in the argument with the Quartermaster Corps over the grades of fuel to be provided.
 

Dave Shoup

Banned
Drum reached mandatory retirement age in 1943, & was suffering emerging health problems. In 1942 he shot himself in the foot by turning down the post as US representative & advisor to China, thinking he'd take command of US forces in Europe. Roosevelt thought not. Stilwell who was preparing a US corps for Op GYMNAST got the China post. Ford hit his mandatory retirement age in 1941. Embick was 64 when retired 1940. DeWitt developed health problems but was retained as chief of the Army War College until retirement in 1946. Those four did well during the early mobilization. Like most of the 63 General officers Marshal was jumped over in his appointment to CoS in 1939 they were 'old'. Not everyone was retired at the manditory age, but emerging health problems ensured most of the men turning 60 could not keep up. A large number of those in their forties & fifties fell along the way for health reasons. Few people past age 35 can keep up with the sort of 16 hour work days necessary during the mobilization period 1940-1942, fewer past age fifty can. At age sixty its a rare bird who can retain clear judgement after staying on his feet all day. Patton was one retained through the war, was only 55 in 1940. Krueger was another of the handful of pre 1940 Generals who served overseas, commanding 6th Army Doolittle is a extreme contrast. Aged 53 in 1940 & a Major in the Army reserve, he rocketed to Major General and command of the 12th AF in two years.

True enough re the 1940 army commanders; my point was simply that the statement made above Marshall had purged every general officer in June, 1940, is obviously incorrect.

True enough re Doolittle's promotions in war time, but it's worth noting he held a MS and Sc.D in aeronautics from MIT, which was pretty uncommon at the time. Combine that with an aviation career that included the Schneider, Bendix, MacKay, and Thompson trophies, at a period in history when airmanship was what made the difference between life and death out on the edge of the envelope, and it's hard to imagine any mobilization where Doolittle would not have ended up a general officer.
 
Unlike the ongoing officer purge in the Soviet military. Marshals or Roosevelt's purge was kind to the officers retired or dismissed. Many sat on FederalFederal production or procurement boards. Others went to industry. So the residual ability was not entirely wasted in a Gulag
 
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Unlike the ongoing officer purge in the Soviet military. Marshals or Roosevelt's purge was kind to the officers retired or dismissed. Many sat on FederalFederal production or procurement boards. Others went to industry. So the residual ability was not entirely wasted in a Gulag
Indeed so. Many were not without ability, simply no longer up to the tempo of actual staff war work for the latter half of the war.
 

McPherson

Banned
Unlike the ongoing officer purge in the Soviet military. Marshals or Roosevelt's purge was kind to the officers retired or dismissed. Many sat on FederalFederal production or procurement boards. Others went to industry. So the residual ability was not entirely wasted in a Gulag

Unless you were Miles Browning, Richard Sutherland, Charles Willoughby, Charles Pownall, Marc Mitscher, Lewis Brereton, (and even in their cases); I think using a trained officer in some capacity after a reverse, (like managing stores or running an administrative assignment with no impact on operations, planning OR POLITICS (MacArthur) ) is the hallmark of a good professionally managed and competent military. Maybe that is why the British deserve high marks for "rehabilitating" Percy Hobart (Come on, he did screw up badly with his "all tanks all the time" nonsense in the early desert war.) and Neil Ritchie (Gazala?). Put them back in when they had figured things out.
 
Unless you were Miles Browning, Richard Sutherland, Charles Willoughby, Charles Pownall, Marc Mitscher, Lewis Brereton, (and even in their cases); I think using a trained officer in some capacity after a reverse, (like managing stores or running an administrative assignment with no impact on operations, planning OR POLITICS (MacArthur) ) is the hallmark of a good professionally managed and competent military. Maybe that is why the British deserve high marks for "rehabilitating" Percy Hobart (Come on, he did screw up badly with his "all tanks all the time" nonsense in the early desert war.) and Neil Ritchie (Gazala?). Put them back in when they had figured things out.
Known fact that I'm not a big fan of specialized formations. Think that, after D-Day, the Wallies had too many airborne and mountain divisions and far too much talent tied up in special ops type smaller formations, specially when manpower shortages were considered. But, I must admit to a soft spot for Hobart's 79th Armored. Really think they represented more of a force multiplier than a manpower waste when the number of river crossings, Dragon's Teeth, and other fortified areas is taken into consideration. Always thought a WI thread could have been built around a fully prepared 79th "leading" Horrocks' drive to Arnhem, or clearing the approaches to Antwerp.
 

Dave Shoup

Banned
Known fact that I'm not a big fan of specialized formations. Think that, after D-Day, the Wallies had too many airborne and mountain divisions and far too much talent tied up in special ops type smaller formations, specially when manpower shortages were considered. But, I must admit to a soft spot for Hobart's 79th Armored. Really think they represented more of a force multiplier than a manpower waste when the number of river crossings, Dragon's Teeth, and other fortified areas is taken into consideration. Always thought a WI thread could have been built around a fully prepared 79th "leading" Horrocks' drive to Arnhem, or clearing the approaches to Antwerp.

Combat engineers with tank-based CEVs, etc., would have been a better decision. As it was, one of the 79th's three brigades in Normandy was made up of armoured engineers, which makes more sense than combat arms units.

If the personnel that went into the 79th's two armored brigades (1st Tank and 30th Armoured) had simply been equipped with Churchills or Shermans, the British would have had enough separate armored brigades (1st Tank, 6th Guards, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 21st, 23rd, 25th, 27th, 30th, 31st, 33rd, and 34th) to permanently attach one to each of the 14 British infantry divisions (1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 15th, 43rd, 46th, 49th, 50th, 51st, 53rd, 56th, 59th, 78th) they historically deployed into Europe in 1943-45, with all the advantages that would have brought. (1st and 6th Airborne and 52nd Mountain/Airlanding set aside).
 
Canadians need help.

McPherson

Banned
Combat engineers with tank-based CEVs, etc., would have been a better decision. As it was, one of the 79th's three brigades in Normandy was made up of armoured engineers, which makes more sense than combat arms units.

The Bocage was an unforeseen that was clearly an intelligence failure. Makes one wonder if a siege train might have been something the allies should have purchased to handle little problems like Caen and the ports.

If the personnel that went into the 79th's two armored brigades (1st Tank and 30th Armoured) had simply been equipped with Churchills or Shermans, the British would have had enough separate armored brigades (1st Tank, 6th Guards, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 21st, 23rd, 25th, 27th, 30th, 31st, 33rd, and 34th) to permanently attach one to each of the 14 British infantry divisions (1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 15th, 43rd, 46th, 49th, 50th, 51st, 53rd, 56th, 59th, 78th) they historically deployed into Europe in 1943-45, with all the advantages that would have brought. (1st and 6th Airborne and 52nd Mountain/Airlanding set aside).

I'm not sure what is argued here? Make Hobarts engineer's into regular independent tank brigades and dispense with their specialist functions altogether? What really fouled up MG on the ground was the lack of specialist assault troops. (MARINES). A couple of regiments of Marines and 30 Corps might have made across the river assaults. when they were held up by the unsecured bridge at Nijmegen for example. I imagine an alligator battalion would have come in handy here and there?

Of course I know where I would have sent any spare Marines if there were any to spare in the Allied OOB in the Atlantic. But I digress. The argument about how to get the troops across at Nijmegen and Arnhem never really addresses, though we have stabbed at it: "What do we do now, Monty, that we've punched a 70 km salient in the German lines and we're out of supplies?"

What are the Germans going to do?
 

Dave Shoup

Banned
The Bocage was an unforeseen that was clearly an intelligence failure. Makes one wonder if a siege train might have been something the allies should have purchased to handle little problems like Caen and the ports.

Yes, but in terms of specialized armor, that was dealt with the Culin Rhino/prong device, which didn't require a modified chassis or any sort of special training or organization for the armored battalions.

I'm not sure what is argued here? Make Hobarts engineer's into regular independent tank brigades and dispense with their specialist functions altogether? What really fouled up MG on the ground was the lack of specialist assault troops. (MARINES). A couple of regiments of Marines and 30 Corps might have made across the river assaults. when they were held up by the unsecured bridge at Nijmegen for example. I imagine an alligator battalion would have come in handy here and there? Of course I know where I would have sent any spare Marines if there were any to spare in the Allied OOB in the Atlantic. But I digress. The argument about how to get the troops across at Nijmegen and Arnhem never really addresses, though we have stabbed at it: "What do we do now, Monty, that we've punched a 70 km salient in the German lines and we're out of supplies?" What are the Germans going to do?

Converting an entire armoured divisions (which is what the 79th was originally raised and trained as) to armoured engineers was a waste of combat arms troops - which the British and Canadians didn't have anywhere near enough to sustain two field armies in action (much less three, if one includes the 8th Army in Italy).

MG, at it's most successful, would have yielded a salient that would have accomplished nothing significant in terms of taking the Ruhr, much less breaking into the north German plain. The entire operation was pointless.
 
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