"
The guarantee of integrity alone need not be held to prevent one of the guaranteeing powers from temporarily occupying Norwegian territory without any intention of retaining it."
Foreign Office clerk Eyre Crowe, 1905.
A joint naval demonstration was ultimately viewed as a necessary first step for forcing the warring Nordic states to a truce. The war was front-page news in Europe, as the international news agencies of Wolff's Telegraphisches Bureau, Agente Havas and Reuters Telegram Company were all sending constant stream of news from the battlefields.
Headlines all over Europe wondered whether the international naval action would succeed in eliminating the growing possibility of a wider European war. Frustrated by the snail-paced diplomacy, First Sea Lord Fisher ordered the Channel Fleet to descend to the Norwegian coast, where they were told to wait for the arrival of other contingents. After initial hesitation, the German Navy send the I. Geschwader to join the British-led force, and the French, Italians and Austrians followed suit with a token few ships.
Russia sanctioned the actions of the demonstration, but Admiral Alekseyev wanted to use the Russian Baltic Fleet for a separate, simultaneous demonstration at the outskirts of Stockholm archipelago and Gotland. The Powers then shortly debated the scope of the blockade, with the French and other arguing for a more restricted zone around Kristianiafjord. Ultimately the operation was limited to the area between Kristianiafjord and the Swedish border, effectively preventing any further Swedish naval troop transportation.
The ambassadors showed unusual harmony in their insistence that "the will of Europe had to be enforced." They advised the Norwegian government to ask for an armistice without delay. The British government did not believe that the situation warranted immediate military action, and hoped that a financial lure could eventually induce Swedes to withdraw from the occupied territories. Meanwhile the Powers termed their joint naval blockade "pacific", emphasizing that the international squadron had strict orders to remain neutral vis-a-vis the Swedo-Norwergian war, and to fire only if fired upon.
The British admiralty stated that the blockade
"does not imply any kind of warlike action such as the occupation of places." Ultimately Elgin was also privately willing to agree for "
one or more of the Powers taking measures to implement conference decisions in which Britain had joined." British diplomats assured the Swedes that "
reasonable compensations" would be in order in a case the Swedes accepted the terms agreed upon by the Powers; and in a case of further Swedish intransigence Britain might have to be forced to leave Stockholm to the mercy of Russians, at least as far as the status of Åland was concerned.
The Russian government, unwilling to admit that Admiral Alekseyev had acted without orders from the Supreme Autocrat, now insisted on abrogation of the ‘Åland servitude’ of 1856, and stated their intent of refortifying and occupying the islands. The British reacted by stating that the treaties of 1855 and 1856 would then have to be revised at the same time. Russia favoured the permanent neutralization of Denmark, to be guaranteed jointly by Germany and itself, with the obvious intent of using this as a mean of keeping a hostile naval power (Britain) out of the Baltic. For Britain, this was totally unacceptable.
The British main concern was to ensure the right of belligerent vessels to use the Straits. This could be achieved by two means: merging the two old treaties to one new treaty, or by adding a specific reference to the Danish Straits to a renegotiated treaty. By merging the Treaties of 1855 and 1856 Britain could continue to have a voice in Baltic affairs, alongside with France. But this course of action might enable Germany and Russia to demand the inclusion of the Straits of Dover and the Channel as an entrance to the North Sea - since if France and Britain were to be treated as Baltic powers, what stopped Russia from demanding herself to be treated as a North Sea power?
So the Åland convention held special importance. The British cabinet ultimately opted to go with the reference to the Straits in an old treaty, with a statement that specified the borders of Baltic and North Sea. With Denmark increasingly written off as a German client state in a case of war, Sweden was now seen as the only reliable guarantor of the free navigation of the Straits.
The German foreign office, with Holstein and Chancellor Eulenburg in a rare agreement on this course of action, was especially sensitive to British policies, and offered an arrangement of a North Sea status quo treaty as a possible compensation for Britain. Britain, hardly expecting to prevent closure of the Baltic by herself, thus opted to support the German views of a status quo convention. Britain then sought to France in to the North Sea convention, and through that to the assurance of Sweden against possible future Russian expansion, playing the two Contintental allied Powers against one another in Scandinavia. Germany was thus suddenly in a whole new situation, being courted by both Britain and Russia regarding her future choices in Scandinavia. For his part, the Russian Foreign Minister Muraviev aimed to "
Éliminer toute influence éntrangère de la mer Baltique" in a fashion of Catherine the Great’s Neutrality League of 1780. Meanwhile Britain knew that Åland Question was a point of contention between Germany and Russia, and hoped to use this issue as a wedge to keep Wilhelm II from realizing his grandiose schemes of a new continental alliance. Swedish adherence to the Russo-German entente seemed imminent. The French, from their part, were especially alarmed by the evidence of Russo-German cooperation and by the fact that Russia had disputed the Åland issue without consulting the French government beforehand.
But Russia was not the only Power suffering from out-of-step, self-contradicting diplomacy. The German diplomatic corps were cautious to avoid too close a relationship with Russia if the cost would be the alienation of Britain, that was markedly nervous about a possibility of a German-Russian combination in the Baltic. Holstein was firmly aware that a revision of the status of Åland would mean an ultimate exclusion of Britain from a position of influence in the Baltic region. Meanwhile Chancellor Eulenburg was firm in his conviction that Germany should to avoid entaglements in any such policy offensives towards Britain, Russia or France at such a volatile international situation. This left Wilhelm II and his personal royal diplomacy as a problem to be managed. Holstein proceeded with his usual tactics, leaving the actual work of cajoling and distracting the
Oberster Kriegsherr to Eulenburg. He merely supporting the Chancellor with a memorandum that assured Wilhelm II that while the planned post-war guarantees from three Great Powers were something on paper, in reality the planned post-war status quo would made Sweden depended upon German support and goodwill in her future foreign policy.
Meanwhile Elgin’s warnings, international isolation, and the threat of a Russian presence in Åland strained the Swedish government to a breaking point. With the fatally ill Oscar II no longer seen in public, it was left to the Crown Prince to guide the realm towards an uncertain future. The beginning of the international blockade had led to a general strike in Stockholm and rest of Sweden, paralyzing the economy and society of the country and threatening the supply efforts of the frontlines. In the face of bitter opposition of the war faction, the government had to concede that Sweden would have to cease her offensive to Kristiania, submit to the "will of Europe", and ask for a ceasefire in order to secure a settlement that would not seem like a total humiliation.
Meanwhile Norwegians were kindly informed that the Powers, led by Britain and Germany, would now proceed to jointly occupy Kristiania and "
possibly other southern ports that are necessary for the supply and operations of the international fleet." The collective note from the conference at London stated that the king’s action was "a real contribution to general peace and is in the true interest of Sweden." Simultaneously, the admirals of the international fleet were instructed to prepare for the occupation of Kristiania as soon as they could gain Norwegian maritime pilots to safely guide them through the minefields of the fjord. The state-sanctioned part of the war in Scandinavia was seemingly drawing to a close.