US annexes all of Mexico in 1848: what does the US look like today?

[Mr_Fanboy]

Not entirely true, in this situation Oregon and California are going to be akin more to Puerto Rico than to Florida. There is no Anglo population in these territories to assimilate the spanish speakers, and it is easier to get Mexicans than Anglos there.

Wait, why wouldn’t there be Anglo settlers in the newly-annexed territory?

 

[Lusitania]

The thing is like Chinese Americans majority speak good English and learned English in school but their everyday home language even after few generations is Chinese. So too if we have large population of Latinos be they Mexicans or others who migrate into Us they have very high change of maintaining their language and culture. More so if they are ostracized and segregated.

 

[Diego]

Wait, why wouldn’t there be Anglo settlers in the newly-annexed territory?

Uh... Sorry, sorry... I expressed myself incorrectly, didn't mean no anglo population at all, just not enough anglo population to drown the hispanos like OTL. What I mean is that if there is freedom of movement more mexicans than anglos are going to the west coast, because it is easier to go by sea from the Mexican Core than by trail from the east coast, that would be the effect of an Acapulco-Manzanillo-Mazatlán-San Diego-San Francisco-Astoria sea lane.

 

[Fiver]

Support also does not seem to have been limited to the Puros, as General Winfield Scott recorded:

[34] However, two years later, after the treaty of peace was signed at Guadaloupe on Feb. 2, 1848, and sixteen days later, after he was superceded in the command of the army by Butler, he could write, "Two fifths of the Mexican population, including more than half of the Congress, were desirous of annexation to the US, and, as a stepping stone, wished to make me president ad interim.'"

The United States Army in Mexico City, by Edward S. Wallace (Military Affairs, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Autumn, 1949), pp. 158-166) also states a desire for annexation among the well off of Mexico City, and goes into detail about the relationships cultivated between American soldiers and Mexican civilians.

Even if Scott isn't being overly optimistic or being told things he wanted to hear, that says nearly half of the Mexican Congress and the majority of the Mexican population were opposed to US annexation. With plenty of existing leadership and at least 4 to 5 million Mexicans who don't want to be part of the US. Suppressing that would probably require at least 3 to 5 years and at least a couple hundred thousand US troops.

 

[Fiver]

To give the United States a Latino majority, the country would have needed to annex the entirety of Central America and the Caribbean, as well as a substantial portion of South America. Not impossible, but not exactly likely.

OTOH, annexation of all of Mexico makes Latinos a majority in the western US. Total US population west of the Mississippi River was about 1.8 million. OTL's Mexican cessation added about 100,000 people. Adding the northern tier of Mexican states (Baja, Sonora, Coahuila, Neuvo Leon, Tamaulipas) raises that to about 700,000, so about 1/3rd of all American west of the Mississippi would be former Mexicans. Adding the next tier of Mexican states (Sinaloa, Durango, Zacatecas, San Luis Potosi) raises that to 2.2 million former Mexicans, or the majority living in US territory west of the Mississippi. All Mexico would be adding about 6.9 million former Mexicans, making them 80% of the population west of the Mississpipi.

 

[Lusitania]

Even if Scott isn't being overly optimistic or being told things he wanted to hear, that says nearly half of the Mexican Congress and the majority of the Mexican population were opposed to US annexation. With plenty of existing leadership and at least 4 to 5 million Mexicans who don't want to be part of the US. Suppressing that would probably require at least 3 to 5 years and at least a couple hundred thousand US troops.

which bring us to the issue with this whole thread, the US did not have the means to leave 100,000 troops in mexico to maintain semblance of control. No matter how many troops it commits it cannot force love and desire to stay part of the US. There will always be some hero or patriot to make any American gringo regret coming south of the Rio Grande.

 

[Lost the game]

I'm imagining the South adopting a sharecropper/hacienda system similar to Mexico. I'm also imagining that Mexican senators would block any attempt at labor laws or progressive reforms.

Now I'm imagining a triumvirate of Eugene V Debs, W.E.B DuBois, and Alvaro Obregon leading a revolution that overthrows the 1789 Constitution and establishes a more centralized, socialist-leaning state.

 

[VaultJumper]

Annexing Mexico will either give the US indigestion and the US will be trying to figure out how to untangle itself from the mess and costly occupation, pacification and trying to Americanize or it will wet its appetite for greater power and more territory

and that last option is probably one of the most terrify outcomes for the Americas and the Pacific

 

[History Learner]

You lean fairly heavily on Fuller. David T has already dealt with Fuller and with All-Mexico in general.

The post in question relies heavily on Merk; if it's a sin for me to rely on Fuller, is not equally so in this case?

Even most expansionists didn't want all of Mexico. In OTL, Jefferson Davis tried to have the treaty amended to add "the greater part of Tamaulipas and Nuevo Leon, the whole of Coahuila and a large part of Chihuahua". The attempt failed by a vote of 44 to 11, with the "definite expansionist" Cass voting against it.

Which was in the context of Trist having already negotiated what became the historical Treaty and which had already been presented into Congress; attempting to compare that to a situation where Trist does not is non-starter. Fuller states that the Treaty arrived too early in the growing process of "All Mexico". in that it killed it in its infantile stage.

Even if Scott isn't being overly optimistic or being told things he wanted to hear, that says nearly half of the Mexican Congress and the majority of the Mexican population were opposed to US annexation. With plenty of existing leadership and at least 4 to 5 million Mexicans who don't want to be part of the US. Suppressing that would probably require at least 3 to 5 years and at least a couple hundred thousand US troops.

Scott could fully well have been overly optimistic but the overall point is that there was indeed a sizeable minority within Mexico that was at least partial to annexation, whether among the Puros or the upper classes. And no, it would've required nowhere near that number or stress; U.S. Army Campaigns of the Mexican War-The Occupation of Mexico, May 1846-July 1848 by Stephen A. Carney notes that there was little popular support in Mexico, outside of the Northeast areas along the border, for an insurgency. While the irregulars IOTL did present quite a burden on the U.S. occupation of Mexico City and overall advance to the same, it (the insurgency) was dependent on the support of the remainder of the Mexican Government. In the event of annexation, the former would be dispersed and regardless would be stripped of most of its ability to supply the insurgents. Without civilian support, I'd imagine most bands would rapidly collapse or devolve to brigands at best, thereby further pushing the population away from them.

 

[History Learner]

The Whigs and Calhounites and at least some moderate Democrats would not have accepted All Mexico and they certainly had enough votes in the House to stop it. And even if there was no Mexican government willing to make territorial concessions satisfactory to the US, there is an obvious alternative to All Mexico (suggested indeed by Calhoun): the US should simply withdraw to an easily defensible line instead of trying to occupy all of Mexico. The line thus unilaterally drawn would give the US the Rio Grande border in Texas and would also give it NM and California and maybe Baja California as well. It would not matter whether Mexico recognized this border because it simply could not reconquer the lost territories. True, there might still be scattered guerrilla resistance but there would be far more guerrilla resistance to All Mexico...

Without a formal treaty, the U.S. gains are always in danger of causing another war further down the line since they are not finalized and Mexico has not recognized. While the U.S. could rest assured Mexico would not be much of a threat, they could not rely on that always being the case, particularly if Mexico were to acquire a European partner...

As for the Congressional balance, most Whigs for the duration of the conflict were opposed to annexations of any sort; we saw how well that worked out IOTL. Indeed, fitting Fuller's assertions is that you were indeed starting to see bubbles outside of Central Atlantic in support of all Mexico, such as in the various papers you cite from Illinois or elsewhere along the Mississippi. Yes, there was the proviso of many of them, including the National Era, wanting Mexico to request it, but in the context of the 19th Century and especially in the case of Mexico, what does that mean? Scott believed at least half of their congress and 40% of the population was behind such. Now, Scott certainly could've been overly optimistic in this regards, I will not contest that, but if a sufficient number of Mexican citizens of standing, or just a large enough body overall did make such a formal call, would that not be enough to satisfy many in the United States?

But it's really unlikely that either of these two alternatives would be necessary. Indeed, Daniel Walker Howe suggests that Polk may secretly have wanted to give Trist a chance:

"Historians have overwhelmingly concluded that Trist made a courageous and justified decision in defying his orders and remaining to secure a peace treaty. Even Justin Smith, Polk’s strongest defender among historians, called Trist’s decision the right one, and “a truly noble act.”38 There is a strong parallel (though one not often remarked) between Polk’s resolution of the Oregon Question and that of the U.S.-Mexican War. In both cases the president made extravagant demands but unhesitatingly accepted a realistic and advantageous solution when offered it. In the case of Oregon, he probably had planned the outcome all along; probably not in the case of Mexico. Yet it is interesting that Polk waited twelve days after receiving news of Trist’s defiance before sending an order off to Mexico to abort whatever negotiations he might have under way. Perhaps the president secretly felt willing to give Trist a chance, provided the administration did not bear responsibility for the negotiations.39 Indeed, Polk had earlier confided to his diary the thought that he would not mind if Moses Beach exceeded his instructions and obtained a peace treaty. “Should he do so, and it is a good one, I will waive his authority to make it, and submit it to the Senate.”40

"Even though the treaty represented the work of a man who defied him, it embodied the objectives for which Polk had gone to war..." https://books.google.com/books?id=jewRDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA808

Polk by most accounts was unhappy with the Treaty as is but considered it satisfactory enough. If events had forced his hand though, I don't see this as an obstacle in of itself, particularly given how this killed Trist's career; if the headwinds were so against All Mexico and if Polk was not genuinely irritated with Trist, that seems a strange fate for the man.

 

[David T]

As for the Congressional balance, most Whigs for the duration of the conflict were opposed to annexations of any sort; we saw how well that worked out IOTL.

They reluctantly accepted limited annexations to end the war and end the possibility of further annexations. The notion that they would have accepted All Mexico is to say the least a non sequitur.

 

[History Learner]

They reluctantly accepted limited annexations to end the war and end the possibility of further annexations. The notion that they would have accepted All Mexico is to say the least a non sequitur.

I'm not entirely convinced, given that "We will not accept further annexations!" sounds rather hollow after they caved on allowing annexations at all. This is not to say they will all get behind it, but I wouldn't be surprised if you did see a coalition of strange bedfellows, such as as Southern Whigs and Abolitionists types coming around to it. Merk's dismissal of The National Whig in particular here seems odd, given that it was essentially the campaign paper for Taylor, who would go on to win the election that very year of 1848 as the Whig candidate.

 

[David T]

I'm not entirely convinced, given that "We will not accept further annexations!" sounds rather hollow after they caved on allowing annexations at all. This is not to say they will all get behind it, but I wouldn't be surprised if you did see a coalition of strange bedfellows, such as as Southern Whigs and Abolitionists types coming around to it. Merk's dismissal of The National Whig in particular here seems odd, given that it was essentially the campaign paper for Taylor, who would go on to win the election that very year of 1848 as the Whig candidate.

The National Whig was not only an ephemeral paper but it didn't even speak for Taylor on this issue. Taylor was emphatically not an all-Mexico man; he thought that "the best settlement of the war would be to fix the Rio Grande River as the border of Texas and take no additional territory south of 36°30'." https://books.google.com/books?id=5aGyVFn3VnMC&pg=PA275

 

[David T]

Which was in the context of Trist having already negotiated what became the historical Treaty and which had already been presented into Congress; attempting to compare that to a situation where Trist does not is non-starter. Fuller states that the Treaty arrived too early in the growing process of "All Mexico". in that it killed it in its infantile stage.

Davis had already denied in the US Senate that he favored "All Mexico" on February 8, eleven days before Trist's treaty reached Washington.

Mr. MILLER said it would appear that this reference was made to justify the annexation of all Mexico.
Mr. JEFFERSON DAVIS hoped not. He was opposed to the annexation of all Mexico.

https://books.google.com/books?id=9ZbhCyRXgjMC&pg=PA321
https://books.google.com/books?id=RBaeAgAAQBAJ&pg=PT372

 

[Deleted member 92195]

@Masked Grizzly. I have posted your question of who would be the best president to annex that farthest south line in Mexico on this forum post because the topic seemed more accurate. This post asks about annexing all of Mexico and I do also address that. Here is that invaluable source again of the farthest line south: http://dsl.richmond.edu/historicalatlas/94/a/?sidebar=text&legend=hidden&view=plate (I love them maps)

Martin Van Buren – did not want the annexation of Texas in 1845.

Lewis Cass – “a leading spokesman for the Doctrine of Popular Sovereignty, which held that the people in each territory should decide whether to permit slavery”

Richard M. Johnson -Johnson was the Democratic nominee for vice-president on a ticket with Martin Van Buren in 1836. He would have been 65 in 1845, died in 1850.

James Buchanan – would later serve as president and be completely incompetent. If elected as president in 1844 he could fail in making a deal with Mexico despite Mexico’s collapse. Would not likely pick Nicholas Trist who was the real person who negotiated the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848.

John C. Calhoun – did not want war with Mexico

Levi Woodbury - thought slavery was wrong but that it was written in the constitution

The darkest of dark horse Presidential candidates: More blacker than black

Sam Houston who drew that farthest line south in is a really interesting character out of all of the above.

• Elected Governor of Tennessee from 1827-1829
• He strongly supported Jackson's presidential candidacies
• He was elected as the 1st and 3rd President of the Republic of Texas from 1836-38 and 1841-44
• He later served as a senator for Texas from 1846–1859 and Governor of Texas 1859–1861 (He is the only US politician to serve two different governorships)

Sam Houston obviously had a talent for politics, legislation and governing and the only way that line is going to be drawn is if it’s someone from Texas. All presidential candidates for the Democratic nomination were from the original 13 colonies and wanted less territory. Many Democratic Party members did not want to annex areas with Mexican populations in them. The minimum they wanted was Lower California and Sonora (Northern Mexico) and that was it. Houston represents a toned-down version of the Golden Circle. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Golden_Circle_(proposed_country)) If Houston becomes president and annexes that line expect all of the proposed territories for the Golden Circle to be a real possibility. Houston will fill his cabinet with more hard-core expansionists than he is and with people who want to accomplish this, frankly insane policy.

This Golden Circle proposed state originates from “Knights of the Golden Circle”. The likes of John Wilkes Booth and Jesse Woodson James are some of its alleged members. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Knights_of_the_Golden_Circle

Houston was an unsuccessful candidate for the presidential nomination of the American Party in the 1856 presidential election and the Constitutional Union Party in the 1860 presidential election.

His running of the 'American Party' and 'Constitutional Union Party' is really interesting and intriguing. The American party was an "anti-Catholic, xenophobic, and hostile to immigration, starting originally as a secret society". Whereas the Constitutional Union Party "wanted to avoid secession over the slavery issue and refused to join either the Republican Party or the Democratic Party". It sought to "recognize no political principle other than the Constitution of the country, the Union of the states, and the Enforcement of the Laws".

• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Know_Nothing
• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitutional_Union_Party_(United_States)

This simply clarifies that he supported the American Party before he realised the actions that James K. Polk, Franklin Pierce and James Buchanan caused. He then moved to a politically impartial paralysis of the slavery issue and that the country came first and not the slaves.

Why Houston did not run for President:

The issue is timing. Texas was admitted into the union on 29 December 1845 but the Democratic nomination took place between May 27–29, 1844, which leaves Houston as President of Texas. Although what is peculiar is that Houston was Governor of Tennessee from 1827-1829 which means he was allowed to run for governor despite being Texan or 'foreign' to the United States at that point.

It would have been bold and probably euphoric if he attends the Democratic nomination as the President of Texas. Or he could have resigned his post as President in which case he would have definitely been able to take part.

One thing is sure despite this niggle. He would have run for President of United States in 1844 if he was either very bold or freely available without a shadow of a doubt in my mind.

 

[NegusNegast]

The thing is like Chinese Americans majority speak good English and learned English in school but their everyday home language even after few generations is Chinese. So too if we have large population of Latinos be they Mexicans or others who migrate into Us they have very high change of maintaining their language and culture. More so if they are ostracized and segregated.

This is a common perception, but in fact Chinese Americans stop speaking Chinese after the third generation, the same as any other immigrant group. And the third generation usually knows a few words or has a passive understanding at best. The reason it seems as if Chinese Americans retain the language is because there's currently a huge amount of first and second generation Chinese Americans that came over relatively recently, which provides selection bias. IIRC the few examples of stable non-English language transmission in the US after 3 generations are the Cajuns, Amish, and Mennonites; possibly a few more but in any case Chinese aren't on the list.

 

[Lusitania]

This is a common perception, but in fact Chinese Americans stop speaking Chinese after the third generation, the same as any other immigrant group. And the third generation usually knows a few words or has a passive understanding at best. The reason it seems as if Chinese Americans retain the language is because there's currently a huge amount of first and second generation Chinese Americans that came over relatively recently, which provides selection bias. IIRC the few examples of stable non-English language transmission in the US after 3 generations are the Cajuns, Amish, and Mennonites; possibly a few more but in any case Chinese aren't on the list.

Being Portuguese myself the idea that we loose our language is all based on wether we marry other 2nd or 3rd generation Portuguese or say Chinese or if we marry another person recently from the old country or even go there to marry. Then language and culture stay very 1st generation. The last part is size of community for a large Chinese population or Italian retains its language and culture longer. I know Portuguese who are 3-5th generation but live in large Portuguese communities with Portuguese schools and cultural activities. So they complete bilingual.

So large Latino communities will continue attracting people from south and they will renew their language.

PS I do know a few Chinese who were born in Canada who are 2nd and 3rd generation and their language skills is dependent on the size of community they grew up.

 

[Masked Grizzly]

@Masked Grizzly. I have posted your question of who would be the best president to annex that farthest south line in Mexico on this forum post because the topic seemed more accurate. This post asks about annexing all of Mexico and I do also address that. Here is that invaluable source again of the farthest line south: http://dsl.richmond.edu/historicalatlas/94/a/?sidebar=text&legend=hidden&view=plate (I love them maps)

Martin Van Buren – did not want the annexation of Texas in 1845.

Lewis Cass – “a leading spokesman for the Doctrine of Popular Sovereignty, which held that the people in each territory should decide whether to permit slavery”

Richard M. Johnson -Johnson was the Democratic nominee for vice-president on a ticket with Martin Van Buren in 1836. He would have been 65 in 1845, died in 1850.

James Buchanan – would later serve as president and be completely incompetent. If elected as president in 1844 he could fail in making a deal with Mexico despite Mexico’s collapse. Would not likely pick Nicholas Trist who was the real person who negotiated the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848.

John C. Calhoun – did not want war with Mexico

Levi Woodbury - thought slavery was wrong but that it was written in the constitution

The darkest of dark horse Presidential candidates: More blacker than black

Sam Houston who drew that farthest line south in is a really interesting character out of all of the above.

• Elected Governor of Tennessee from 1827-1829
• He strongly supported Jackson's presidential candidacies
• He was elected as the 1st and 3rd President of the Republic of Texas from 1836-38 and 1841-44
• He later served as a senator for Texas from 1846–1859 and Governor of Texas 1859–1861 (He is the only US politician to serve two different governorships)

Sam Houston obviously had a talent for politics, legislation and governing and the only way that line is going to be drawn is if it’s someone from Texas. All presidential candidates for the Democratic nomination were from the original 13 colonies and wanted less territory. Many Democratic Party members did not want to annex areas with Mexican populations in them. The minimum they wanted was Lower California and Sonora (Northern Mexico) and that was it. Houston represents a toned-down version of the Golden Circle. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Golden_Circle_(proposed_country)) If Houston becomes president and annexes that line expect all of the proposed territories for the Golden Circle to be a real possibility. Houston will fill his cabinet with more hard-core expansionists than he is and with people who want to accomplish this, frankly insane policy.

This Golden Circle proposed state originates from “Knights of the Golden Circle”. The likes of John Wilkes Booth and Jesse Woodson James are some of its alleged members. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Knights_of_the_Golden_Circle

Houston was an unsuccessful candidate for the presidential nomination of the American Party in the 1856 presidential election and the Constitutional Union Party in the 1860 presidential election.

His running of the 'American Party' and 'Constitutional Union Party' is really interesting and intriguing. The American party was an "anti-Catholic, xenophobic, and hostile to immigration, starting originally as a secret society". Whereas the Constitutional Union Party "wanted to avoid secession over the slavery issue and refused to join either the Republican Party or the Democratic Party". It sought to "recognize no political principle other than the Constitution of the country, the Union of the states, and the Enforcement of the Laws".

• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Know_Nothing
• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitutional_Union_Party_(United_States)

This simply clarifies that he supported the American Party before he realised the actions that James K. Polk, Franklin Pierce and James Buchanan caused. He then moved to a politically impartial paralysis of the slavery issue and that the country came first and not the slaves.

Why Houston did not run for President:

The issue is timing. Texas was admitted into the union on 29 December 1845 but the Democratic nomination took place between May 27–29, 1844, which leaves Houston as President of Texas. Although what is peculiar is that Houston was Governor of Tennessee from 1827-1829 which means he was allowed to run for governor despite being Texan or 'foreign' to the United States at that point.

It would have been bold and probably euphoric if he attends the Democratic nomination as the President of Texas. Or he could have resigned his post as President in which case he would have definitely been able to take part.

One thing is sure despite this niggle. He would have run for President of United States in 1844 if he was either very bold or freely available without a shadow of a doubt in my mind.

Had Texas been admitted into the Union slightly earlier, would a 1844 Houston Presidency (followed later by a possible Polk Presidency) have allowed the Houston Line to be established whilst still laying the groundwork for some form of American Civil War to happen?

 

[Deleted member 92195]

Had Texas been admitted into the Union slightly earlier, would a 1844 Houston Presidency (followed later by a possible Polk Presidency) have allowed the Houston Line to be established whilst still laying the groundwork for some form of American Civil War to happen?

I think Houston would be looking to run for two terms. (1845-1853) This can be seen in that he ran for the President of Texas twice in two no consecutive terms. It demonstrates his ambitiousness and ability to achieve becoming president of a country.

In relation to the Democratic nomination it really depends on how dark the democratic members want to go between Polk and Houston. Polk is much lighter than Houston in every way. Polk would not go to war with Spain over Cuba, expect Houston to go to war without provocation.

I think Polk could have a presidency but one might expect in eight years of Houston government, darker candidates to come along in replacement of Polk. If he does have a presidency it will be replacing Franklin Pierce or James Buchanan governments.

Expect the civil war to be longer and it might be fast forwarded. Definitely expect Houston to be the president of the confederate states. I thought about putting Polk in that scenario but he was a very sickly person from exhaustion and there is a chance he would die before 1861. Not impossible but 50/50.

Houston on other hand is completely different. He’s ambitious, hardcore slavery and falls in line with confederate values. He died in 1863 having been elected as governor of Texas and participated in the civil war. If he’s becomes president of he US he’ll have a lot of power and live a very luxurious life post presidency. To become Confederate president was a lot easier to become US president. They just installed Jefferson Davis.

The confederates are going to install someone who conducted a war with Mexico and agreed the Mexican concession whether it was the farthest line south or treaty of Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. Plus there is the Oregon dispute, Cuba, canals in Central America.

One intriguing consequence of Houston becoming President. Expect him to draw Texas larger within US than it is today upon being admitted.

The inscription on Houston's tomb reads:

A Brave Soldier. A Fearless Statesman.
A Great Orator—A Pure Patriot.
A Faithful Friend, A Loyal Citizen.
A Devoted Husband and Father.
A Consistent Christian—An Honest Man.

 

[History Learner]

The National Whig was not only an ephemeral paper but it didn't even speak for Taylor on this issue. Taylor was emphatically not an all-Mexico man; he thought that "the best settlement of the war would be to fix the Rio Grande River as the border of Texas and take no additional territory south of 36°30'." https://books.google.com/books?id=5aGyVFn3VnMC&pg=PA275

But that it was his paper does suggest it was speaking to some constituency within the Whigs. On the wider point of this, however, having re-read my copy of Fuller's Movement to Acquire Mexico and having read through some of Merk's work, I'm definitely getting the strong sense Merk is engaging in a strawman of Fuller; The National Whig actually isn't even cited by Fuller within his article. Indeed, having refreshed myself on his writings, he doesn't actually even argue that a purely partisan alliance had formed, so much as it was one more based on the inclination of the Anti-Slavery forces starting to find common cause with expansionist Democrats. For example, Fuller cites the correspondence of George Hatcher, an Anti-Slavery northern clergyman, to Calhoun on January 5th of 1848:

From what I can gather I think I am safe in asserting that the project of an extensive acquisition of Mexican Territory is fast gaining ground among anti-Slavery men at the North. Familiar as I am with political and religious factions at the North I was not a little surprised to see how rapidly this idea is making a favorable lodgement in the public mind. . . I refer now not simply to nominal Abolitionists but to that large portion of anti-Slavery men at the North who do not belong to Abolition organizations technically so called. It is this class of men and to the South the most formidable class who are fast be- coming converts to the idea of extensive annexation. In their view the more extensive the better. Whether Slavery be extended over this territory or not they think its annexation will ultimately overthrow the institution. Mind you, however, they connect this effect with extensive annexation. They are coming to adopt this ground -" Territory without slavery if they can, but with it rather than not have the territory." On the supposition that large territory be acquired and slavery extended over it they reason thus: "In proportion as you extend slavery over a greater area in that proportion you weaken it."

Fuller details the transformation of the National Era into a Pro-Annexation paper to illustrate this change to which Hatcher speaks of:

Much more important as evidence of the beginning of an anti-slavery demand for all Mexico was an editorial in the National Era of February 3, the substance of which was as follows; six months earlier the National Era had proposed a tentative plan for the union of Mexico and the United States; what had then appeared extravagant was now "seriously entertained by many sober, reflecting minds"; the change in public sentiment had induced Calhoun to warn his southern friends that the annexation of Mexico would be disastrous in its effects on slavery; annexation would perhaps, not disturb slavery in its present haunts., but would "erect a perpetual bar to its extension"; this was because Mexico would come into the Union as free territory, being unsuited to slave labor and already thickly populated with a people hostile to slavery. "With such views," continued the editor, "we must be pardoned for dwelling with plea-sure upon the extension of our territory and the expansion of our population. ' 50

This editorial registered a great change in the attitude of the National Era. The story as told by the editor during 1847 was the familiar one about, the "pro-slavery conspiracy." In January, 1847, the "power and treasure of the republic" was being used for the extension of slave territory; in February, the ex- tension of slave territory meant an increase in the strength of slavery since "'slavery lives by expansion" ; in April, Calhoun intended to make "the extension of slavery a great party issue, and himself the Presidential candidate of the South"; in October, the war had been "precipitated by the propagandists of slavery" and its termination by an honorable acquisition of territory was prevented "by their ruthless resolve to bring that territory under the blasting power of slavery." 51 Between October, 1847, and the following February the theme of the story under went considerable alteration. By the latter date, as noted above, the National Era was advocating the absorption of Mexico, insisting that it would be free territory, and citing along with other evidence, Calhoun's opposition to annexation as proof that the anti-slavery interests had nothing to fear from extensive territorial acquisitions. In other words, the National Era was convinced that if there had been a "pro-slavery conspiracy" to acquire all Mexico, it could not realize its ends even though the whole country were annexed. This conviction seems to have come largely as a result of the propaganda, which was streaming from the northern expansionist press and the opposition of Calhoun. The editor probably reasoned that since Calhoun was opposing absorption the expansionists at the North must be correct. If the main body of the anti-slavery forces could be converted to this point of view, the movement for absorption which was growing rapidly at the time would doubtless become very strong indeed.

The New York Herald also at this time that "The abolitionists will scarcely offer it a serious opposition. Mexico will all be free, and consequently the North will have no interest in opposing her annexation." Outside of the realm of the papers, in more concrete political terms Senator J. M. Niles, anti-slavery Democrat from Connecticut, wrote to Van Buren on January 20, in which he stated "that probably every Democrat, in the Senate except Calhoun and his friends would favor the removal of Mexico from the list of independent nations". Niles also stated that he and Dix would "undoubtedly fall in with the scheme and go along with the current." While Fuller holds that Whig anti-slavery champions such as Giddings, Hale, Tuck, Palfrey, and Sumner were probably sincere in their opposition, he likewise notes there is some reason to doubt the overall sincerity of the Northern Whigs:

Democratic expansionist organs at the North charged that the Whig "cant" about slavery in Mexican territory was insincere. By recalling the opposition of northern Whigs to the acquisition of all of Oregon, and pointing out the fact that even pro-slavery leaders were aware that slavery had no chance in Mexico, the at- tempt was made to prove that partisanship rather than slavery was at the bottom of the Whig opposition. Boston Post, March 13, 1847; Detroit Free Press, March 22, 23, 1847.

There is some evidence which seems to show that northern Whigs were not so concerned about slave territory as appearances would indicate. No man was more extreme in his protests against the extension of slavery than Joshua R. Giddings of Ohio. Giddings seems to have thought that nothing could put a stop to conquests in Mexico. His chief concern, however, appears to have been not the slavery problem but the fact that if the Whig party became identified with the supporters of the war it would mean political disaster. Giddings to Greeley, September 7, 1847, George W. Julian, The Life of Joshua R. Giddings (Chicago, 1892), 215-16. It is possible that Giddings used the slavery club to hold northern Whigs in the straight and narrow path that would lead to political safety.

Senator John M. Clayton, of Delaware, declared on the floor of the Senate that if all Mexico were annexed, slavery would be "voted down" as a result. Cong. Globe, 30 Cong., 1 Sess., 162. Although Clayton represented a slave state he was identified with the northern Whig element.