AHC: Carter saves the U.S. Steel Industry

Recently while reading some old articles on the American steel industry, I came across this rather interesting tidbit:

Tata Steel has sent the British government scurrying into action after the Indian firm put its UK assets up for sale and left more than 15,000 jobs at risk. Debate has centred on whether the state should provide incentives to potential buyers, and how it should respond if no buyer can be found. The temptation is to protect the industry from “unfair” competition, but to intervene as little as possible so that markets can find some balance and the industry can rescue itself.

However, the experience of the US steel industry in the economic doldrums of the 1970s and 1980s shows what a painful path that can be.

From 1974 to 1986, the American steel industry was mired in a deep depression. The primary cause was the ten-year economic downturn sparked by the OPEC oil embargo and the Iranian revolution. During these recessions consumer markets contracted significantly and demand for steel weakened considerably. With markets for steel shrinking, America’s integrated steel manufacturers were forced to cut their production and sell steel at unprofitable prices.

Clearly, these conditions were not conducive to turning a profit and America’s steel firms lost a large amount of money on every tonne of steel that they sold for much of this period (in 1982 alone these losses amounted to US$3 billion)

As they sought to reduce their enormous losses America’s eight largest steel firms laid off large numbers of their workers and permanently closed a number of steel mills. The figures themselves are staggering. Between 1979 and 1982 more than 150,000 steelworkers were made redundant and hundreds of steel facilities were closed. Convinced that something needed to be done to ease their economic woes, steel producers also asked the government to impose trade restrictions and to take action to prevent foreign dumping.

Restrictions
In an era supposedly defined by growing belief in the sanctity of the free market, the US government proved pragmatic. In 1977 and again in 1979 President Jimmy Carter’s administration established minimum prices at which foreign-produced steel could be sold. In 1984, when it seemed as if the whole industry was on the brink of extinction the Reagan administration tightened America’s trade policies further by negotiating quotas with foreign countries.

Although both Reagan and Carter took steps to protect domestic steel producers from foreign competition, they ruled out much more interventionist and costly schemes that would have transformed the industry. The Carter administration, for example, refused to provide financial support to a group of community leaders in Youngstown, Ohio who were attempting to buy mills that America’s largest steel corporations had abandoned. Convinced that plant shutdowns were inevitable and that the nation’s largest steel corporations needed to tackle their own problems Carter also dismissed a US$10 billion publicly funded modernisation plan that was suggested by a government taskforce.

Adopting a similar hands-off approach, the Reagan administration also refused to bail out the steel industry, allowed two of America’s largest steel makers to declare bankruptcy and rejected calls for further protection from imports.

Unable to count on the government for direct financial support America’s largest steel producers were left with no choice but to resolve their economic woes and competitive problems on their own. Setting about saving the companies that they led, steel executives closed factories that they regarded as uncompetitive or too expensive to modernise, slashed their workforces, and demanded that their remaining workers take wage and benefits cuts.

The massive restructuring campaigns that America’s largest steel producers undertook in the 1980s proved successful, at least from the perspective of the business community. Companies that had spent most of the 1980s struggling survived the deep industrial depression of the late 1970s and early 1980s. Indeed, in 1987 the largest steel producers even reported profits and business analysts started to study the industry’s remarkable rebirth.

Yet, the steel industry’s rejuvenation was not a straightforward story of success. The reality of the US steel industry’s reinvention was that employment and production were slashed dramatically. In total, nearly 300,000 steelworkers lost their jobs between 1976 and 1986. In places like Youngstown, and Gary, Indiana, whole communities were left devastated by plant closures. As such, while the US steel industry did survive the crises of the 1970s and 1980s it did not do so unscathed.

Source

So, what would be needed to back the publicly funded modernization plan for the steel industry at the least as well as the financing for the Youngstown plant too? If both are done, in particular the modernization plan since that has industry wide implications, would it be enough to prevent the American decline in that sector?
 
It might have helped a little but not that much in the long run. The main problems were twofold and were related to the fact it was not 1952 anymore 1) The various European and Japanese economies were no longer recovering from being bombed to hell and back, they were already recovered. For a long time US industries were artificially strong because its competitors were either rubble or still recovering from being rubble just a short time before. 2) Material substitutions which were basically replacing steel with modern plastic.

The two things that might have helped somewhat is changes in the tax code and high tariffs against countries that had high steel subsidies. The US government should have raised the tariff on steel to double the extent it was subsidized by said country. If a country subsidized steel production by 20% slap a 40% tariff on it. This would have greatly discouraged foreign subsidies. I don't think it would have eliminated it but it would have mitigated it. Even with this, I think steelworkers probably would have still had to take a pretty steep pay cut. Germany and Japan were no longer a mess.
 
It might have helped a little but not that much in the long run. The main problems were twofold and were related to the fact it was not 1952 anymore 1) The various European and Japanese economies were no longer recovering from being bombed to hell and back, they were already recovered. For a long time US industries were artificially strong because its competitors were either rubble or still recovering from being rubble just a short time before. 2) Material substitutions which were basically replacing steel with modern plastic.

The two things that might have helped somewhat is changes in the tax code and high tariffs against countries that had high steel subsidies. The US government should have raised the tariff on steel to double the extent it was subsidized by said country. If a country subsidized steel production by 20% slap a 40% tariff on it. This would have greatly discouraged foreign subsidies. I don't think it would have eliminated it but it would have mitigated it. Even with this, I think steelworkers probably would have still had to take a pretty steep pay cut. Germany and Japan were no longer a mess.

Carter and Reagan both tried measures, such as minimum pricing and quotas, which failed. Having done some more research, it definitely seems like the proposed modernization plan was the way forward:
At the end of World War II, American steel had no real challengers. It produced nearly three quarters of the world’s steel, and the factories of its biggest competition -- Japan and Germany -- lay in ruins. Giants like U.S. Steel looked poised to dominate the world for the foreseeable future. Instead, the industry was lapped by foreign producers -- and unfair trade practices were simply not a factor. Instead, the blame lies with U.S. manufacturers who held onto the so-called “open hearth” method of steel production decades after its expiration date. Europeans, though, had no such attachment to the past, perhaps because many factories had been destroyed in the war. Moreover, they had started experimenting with the idea of turning iron into steel by blasting pure oxygen onto the molten metal. This method, which became known as the basic-oxygen process, first entered trial use in 1948 at a factory in Linz, Austria, owned by the small steel firm VOEST. The company soon built a full-scale commercial facility that went online in 1952.

Linz became something of an industrial mecca in the succeeding years, as steelmakers the world over visited to see this new process firsthand. Most became immediate converts, and with good reason: The cost of building steel mills using the basic-oxygen furnaces was 40 to 50 percent lower than conventional open-hearth factories; operating costs were 25 percent lower, though some studies suggested even greater cost savings. But it was the productivity gains associated with the new process that should have really raised eyebrows. One factory that made the shift could produce 40 tons of steel per hour using the open-hearth process, but after installing basic-oxygen equipment, it managed to quadruple that figure.

Unfortunately, Big Steel was too proud to notice Europe gaining ground. In a typical advertisement from the era, U.S. Steel claimed it was a company “where the big idea is innovation.” But this claim -- much like so many of the braggadocios claims of today -- could not hide a more disturbing reality. Indeed, throughout the 1950s, as Europe’s steelmakers built new factories around the basic-oxygen process and simultaneously demolished its remaining open-hearth furnaces, Big Steel made endless excuses. Representatives of the Big Three -- Bethlehem, U.S. Steel, and Republic -- repeatedly claimed that the jury was out on the new method, all evidence to the contrary. By 1957, even Congress realized that something was amiss, and it summoned steel industry executives to testify. In one particularly cringe-worthy performance, a U.S. Steel representative told a committee: “The distinguishing characteristic of the American steel industry is its tremendous productiveness, a quality which other countries have been unable to emulate so far,” later adding that the company had examined the methods popular in Europe but found them wanting.

This was madness. While Big Steel fiddled, basic-oxygen furnaces burned ever brighter around the world. So, too, did yet another method of making steel that was even more revolutionary: the electric-arc method. This technique used electricity to recycle iron scrap, turning it into steel. Unlike conventional steel mills, electric arc mills are small-scale enterprises that are easy to establish and cheap to build, even if they can’t produce anywhere near the scale of a conventional integrated mill. The Europeans began building these, too, en masse. As these two methods continued to take off in Europe, and then in Japan and elsewhere in Asia, American companies continued to add completely inefficient open-hearth furnaces to their shop floors, doubling down on an obsolescent technology. By the 1960s, Big Steel began building basic-oxygen plants, grudgingly. It was too late. The steel industry had squandered its supremacy.

It could have gone differently: Economists who have run counterfactual scenarios -- where Big Steel made the necessary capital improvements to stay competitive -- suggest that the American companies could have stayed on top, and reaped even greater profits than it did by postponing the inevitable upgrades. But there’s a final twist to this tale that highlights the absurdity of Trump’s strategy. In the 1960s, a man named Ken Iverson took over a conglomerate that acquired a stake in the steel business that became Nucor. Iverson then bet the firm’s future on making steel using the electric arc process, building the first American facility in 1969. It began growing at an exponential rate, competing rather effectively with foreign producers, to say nothing of other American producers.
 
Too late imo. Someone on SHWI once mused about truman breaking up us steel in the late 40s.

In terms of staying globally dominant, yeah 1978/1979 was too late; the question here is more a matter of preventing such a steep decline with associated loss of jobs that we saw IOTL.

Nationalize them and put Deming in charge?

Truman tried that in 1951 during Korea and it got shot down by the Courts; add the contemporary issues in Britain as an example and I don't see it as likely. Carter did IOTL do a bailout of sorts for Chrysler in 1979, so doing a public financing of some form for a modernization plan seems possible.
 
Truman tried that in 1951 during Korea and it got shot down by the Courts; add the contemporary issues in Britain as an example and I don't see it as likely. Carter did IOTL do a bailout of sorts for Chrysler in 1979, so doing a public financing of some form for a modernization plan seems possible.

Public financing would also be far less politically problematical than out and out nationalization. A large portion of the US public really hates that idea. There is a reason the government sold off its GM stock fairly quickly.
 
Better leadership of steel companies that invests in more modern technologies, strategies, and techniques to gain comparative advantage would help. In addition, more domestic and regional (Latin America & Carribean) demand would make US steel mroe cost-competitive with lower shipping costs.

Essentially, have US Steel be better at its job.

Don't know how Carter would help with this, but this would have the most direct positive impact.
 
Better leadership of steel companies that invests in more modern technologies, strategies, and techniques to gain comparative advantage would help. In addition, more domestic and regional (Latin America & Carribean) demand would make US steel mroe cost-competitive with lower shipping costs.

Essentially, have US Steel be better at its job.

Don't know how Carter would help with this, but this would have the most direct positive impact.

However, modernisation would likely reduce the need of manpower, reducing the job creation effect.
 

GeographyDude

Gone Fishin'
https://beltmag.com/40th-anniversary-youngstowns-black-monday-oral-history/

Dickey and Lynd led an effort with a group called the Ecumenical Coalition, made up of religious and community leaders, for employees to buy the steel mill and reopen it.


Lynd: The government had a loan guarantee for the steel industry, but that fund, if I remember correctly, was $100 million, and it didn’t take into account a mill that needed to replace its entire steelmaking capacity, either with basic oxygen or electric furnaces. So we calculated that we needed something like $200 million, $225 million to do an adequate job, and the government didn’t have the loan guarantees. And it was very hard to put together an imaginary management team for something that hadn’t been approved.

Ungaro: I give the Ecumenical Council a lot of credit for trying. But the mills weren’t productive economically. Nobody wanted to buy them. Eventually, we tried to redevelop the land, and we had to tear the mills down. It was like losing your soul.
This is about Youngstown, Ohio, in the late 1970s. And as this points out, you have to both buy and modernize, and you can’t do it on the cheap.

But Wow, a community coalition which includes religious leaders, it would be exotic to say the least! :)
 
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GeographyDude

Gone Fishin'
http://theconversation.com/lessons-from-the-steel-crisis-of-the-1980s-57751

' . . . Between 1979 and 1982 more than 150,000 steelworkers [in the U.S.] were made redundant [lay offs] . . . '

' . . . Although both Reagan and Carter took steps to protect domestic steel producers from foreign competition, they ruled out much more interventionist and costly schemes that would have transformed the industry. The Carter administration, for example, refused to provide financial support to a group of community leaders in Youngstown, Ohio who were attempting to buy mills that America’s largest steel corporations had abandoned. Convinced that plant shutdowns were inevitable and that the nation’s largest steel corporations needed to tackle their own problems Carter also dismissed a US$10 billion publicly funded modernisation plan that was suggested by a government taskforce.

'Adopting a similar hands-off approach, the Reagan administration also refused to bail out the steel industry, allowed two of America’s largest steel makers to declare bankruptcy and rejected calls for further protection from imports. . . '
The smell of betrayal in the air.

And/or being abandoned, which if anything is even worse! It's one thing being stabbed in the back, but in some ways that's preferable to being on the receiving end of a person you thought you could count on and finding out that they just don't particularly give a shit one way or the other. These are our elected officials, and they're not finding a way to be there. At best, they're choosing ideology in rather clunky fashion, instead of the real, live human beings right before them.
 
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The smell of betrayal in the air.

And/or being abandoned, which if anything is even worse! It's one thing being stabbed in the back, but in some ways that's preferable to a person just not giving a shit about us one way or the other. These are our elected officials, and they're not finding a way to be there. At best, they're choosing ideology in rather clunky fashion, rather than real, live people right before them.


Was there anything realistic they could do except kick the can down the road for a few years? Also if you bail out the steel industry every industry will want you to bail them out when they have hard times. Even the US can't bail out every industry that makes stupid mistakes or an industry that is no longer needed. It was probably too late to save the steel industry by the 1970s. More likely than not the government would have poured in money, it would have gone broke a few years later anyway and all you wind up with is more government debt.
 
The smell of betrayal in the air.

And/or being abandoned, which if anything is even worse! It's one thing being stabbed in the back, but in some ways that's preferable to being on the receiving end of a person you thought you could count on and finding out that they just don't particularly give a shit one way or the other. These are our elected officials, and they're not finding a way to be there. At best, they're choosing ideology in rather clunky fashion, instead of the real, live human beings right before them.

They needed over $200 million to buy and refurb the mills, that wasn't exactly chump change in those days.
 
A large portion of the US public really hates that idea. There is a reason the government sold off its GM stock fairly quickly.
My Republican father was all for the government keeping the GM stock.

Maybe emphasize that the American people own the steel industry now, and give every citizen some dividend returning stock to make their ownership a direct benefit and something they can relate to.
 
My Republican father was all for the government keeping the GM stock.

Maybe emphasize that the American people own the steel industry now, and give every citizen some dividend returning stock to make their ownership a direct benefit and something they can relate to.

The "Government Motors" moniker hurt by all polls taken. Like I said there is a reason why it was dumped.

The other problem with the US government nationalizing the steel industry is that it now owns it. I have little doubt it would add 5 layers of bureaucracy, pad the rolls enormously, drive down efficiency and have its subsidies go up every year. The only way that the US public is getting a dividend out of it is if it comes out of the General Treasury.
 

GeographyDude

Gone Fishin'
. . . Even the US can't bail out every industry that makes stupid mistakes or an industry that is no longer needed. . .
They needed over $200 million to buy and refurb the mills, that wasn't exactly chump change in those days.
Not chump change at all! And from the above, the $200 plus million is just for one mill (although hopefully, a pretty big mill!)

Well, you do what you can. The federal government provided loan guarantees for Lockheed in the early '70s, for Chrysler in the late '70s, and steel's pretty important. Not to overplay the card, but it is involved with national security and we should be matter-of-fact about that.
 
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