The Sun, The Stars and The Sickle: Alt-WWII and a Tripolar Postwar World
- Thread starter WaterproofPotatoes
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ITTL "Man in the High Castle". China dominates Siberia, Central Asia, India, SE Asia and Oceania. Germany dominates Europe, Middle East and Africa.
Did Emperor Hirohito actually publish works (Or is that just ITTL?)
IOTL, yes, but postwar. I guess ITTL he published his research on marine life before the war.
OTL (and TTL as well, although it would come to the forefront more), he founded the Imperial Biological Research Institute, which published papers. Although Hirohito did not publish under his own name directly, he nonetheless gathered specimens, performed analysis and compiled data for other scientists- and it was absolutely professional quality work. Because the IBRI was an Imperial Household agency, its research would have been published in the Emperor's name.
Akihito did even more research, and was published in several journals.
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Sweet. Any idea what papers? I would totally be interested in reading them
Here's a selection of scientific publications, courtesy of Wikipedia.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hirohito#Scientific_publications
I'm sure it's probably floating around the internet if you wish to search for them. But he was very passionate in the field of marine biology, as was his son, the now Emperor Emeritus Akihito. (It is said that both a species of goby, Exrias akihito, and a genus of gobys native to various streams in Vanuatu were named after the latter.)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hirohito#Scientific_publications
I'm sure it's probably floating around the internet if you wish to search for them. But he was very passionate in the field of marine biology, as was his son, the now Emperor Emeritus Akihito. (It is said that both a species of goby, Exrias akihito, and a genus of gobys native to various streams in Vanuatu were named after the latter.)
For those interested, Emperor Naruhito's field of expertise is in the history of transportation- his thesis was on pre-18th century navigation on the Thames.
The split is already in the works: the US wants its place in the Sun and unlike IOTL, it isn't in a position to break down the Empires and ensure its hegemony, which is a requirement for its goals of security, AKA being the undisputed ruler of the seas, which are the only access routes to its lands. Well, that and the whole economic warfare stuff it's been doing since the second half of the 20th century to replace UK as the trade hegemon. Add to this the increasing cultural shifts that will follow the war, with UK/FR/JPN getting ever closer ties (IOTL, Japan had pretty close ties to UK and France, and while it kept OTL its cultural ties with France that are strong to this day, it shifted from UK to US for obvious reasons) while the US will not have the opportunity to push its cultural values as well as OTL.
Hey now, I've gotten through 1922-1939 and half of WWII in just about 9 months, and this while running a small business!
However, the goings on here all play a part in what's to come, and why what happens, happens.
There's also a more direct rivalry about China, and who gets most influence there. And finally, the Imperial Bloc and the USA might have very different ideas on how to rebuild Germany after the war, and this time, the USA won't be in position to force their agenda outright.
Have I ever told you that you have a Beautiful way with words.
It speaks Wonders of your writing capability that I'm starting to believe this TimeLine actually happened instead of ours!
Thank you! I'm honoured that I could give you that experience. There are some TLs ("Our Struggle" in particular but there are many) where that hapoens to me, and it's a great experience, almost having to go back and check to make sure what you just read didn't actually happen!
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Sorry the next update(s) are taking so long. Some pressing OTL obligations, plus I have some extra homework, to make sure I haven't done anything wildly implausible.
In order to hold myself to it, instead of going off about secondary gun positions on light cruisers (that comes after!), the order for the next updates will be:
1. The long-time-coming update on Brazil
2. The equally long-time-coming update on Indonesia
3. Gandhi, Subhas Chandra Bose and the wartime Indian independence movement
4. The Defence of Rangoon
5. Eastern China, Summer 1942
In order to hold myself to it, instead of going off about secondary gun positions on light cruisers (that comes after!), the order for the next updates will be:
1. The long-time-coming update on Brazil
2. The equally long-time-coming update on Indonesia
3. Gandhi, Subhas Chandra Bose and the wartime Indian independence movement
4. The Defence of Rangoon
5. Eastern China, Summer 1942
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Whatever the question, the answer is of course, yes.
Looking forward to it! No rush.
Brazil: The Birth of a Relationship
Excerpts from "The New New World: Post-Colonial Foreign Policy in South America pre-1960" By: Miller, Richard; and Santos, Jõao. The Journal of Pan-American Affairs, September 1986
Vargas (L) and Roosevelt at a state dinner, 1936
THE United States, in the wake of Anglo-Japanese rapprochement, sought out strong allies which lacked competing goals. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, President of the United States, was acutely aware of this problem, and eagerly sought to reverse the United States' isolationism. The problem, however, became which nation would be the first to become a junior partner, but one which held power or the potential for it in its own right.
Brazil proved to be such an ally. Brazil, even then, was a large, resource-rich country, and a country with considerable wealth, although much of this wealth was concentrated in the south of the country.
Anglo-Japanese rapprochment in the early 1930s had an array of effects on US foreign policy, and was regarded as a change that was neither entirely beneficial or detrimental. Rapprochement was also not a foregone conclusion. It had not been forgotten that Canadian Prime Minister Arthur Meighen and his Australian counterpart, Billy Hughes, opposed extending the Anglo-Japanese Alliance beyond 1922. In Meighen's case, it was largely due to the tensions that it caused between the British Empire and the United States, and if there should be any sort of conflict, let alone armed conflict, Canada would inevitably be caught between the two, or be put in the uncomfortable position of being forced to choose between the two. For Hughes, it seemed obvious that Australia should be Britain's chief ally in the Pacific, rather than the Empire of Japan, which had her own ambitions.
The first palpable effect of rapprochement on the United States was inseparably connected to the effect it had on the two largest Dominions. By bringing Japan into the fold once more, it greatly reduced Japan's capacity for aggressive actions in the Pacific; for if she did, Britain would be forced to fall in line with the American position, given how much stronger American forces in the Pacific were, let alone the economic connection. Japan, with her large fleet taking up so much of her budget, desperately needed foreign trade to generate cash, agument her strategic resources, and to buy the oil needed to fuel the fleet. With the radical militarists marginalized by 1933-34, aggression that would provoke either the United States or Britain was deemed out of the question. The Imperial Japanese Army thus shifted its attention northwards, while the Navy's primary responsibilities shifted to trade protection, patrols of the Chinese coast, and monitoring the Soviet Union. The Dominions were no longer in the uncomfortable position of having to choose between displeasing the United States or Britain, began to trade in earnest with a resource-hungry Japan. A new export market also eased some of the pains caused by the Great Depression, particularly in agricultural products before Manchukuo was fully able to realize her agricultural potential.
While the China Lobby in the United States was not particularly pleased by the Japanese takeover in Manchuria, surprisingly little protest was registered. It was a starkly factual matter that Chiang Kai-Shek's southern China based Kuomintang has a tenuous hold at best over the levers of power in Manchuria. Furthermore, a potent external threat also gave Chiang a convenient case and means with which to consolidate power. It was also a matter of great relief that the Japanese regarded the Communists as a bigger threat than Chiang; all but dismissing the Generalissimo as just another warlord. For a brief while, it appeared that China could serve as the counterweight to the new Anglo-Japanese cooperation, but these hopes were severly compromised when Chiang renewed the Sino-German Pact in 1935, souring Sino-American relations and strengthening the relationship between Britain and Japan, both islands now increasingly concerned about threats on their respective neighbouring continents.
This left the United States in the uncomfortable position of not having a strong, reliable ally within her sphere of influence. Mexico had too long a history of acrimony with the United States and was still too underdeveloped. Argentina and Chile were too woven into the British system and too small respectively. Brazil appeared to be the natural choice.
The relationship between Brazil and the United States was able to develop in no small part to the affinity the leaders of the two countries had for their national counterparts. Roosevelt paid far more attention to Brazil than his predecessors, while Vargas was reliably pro-American in his policies.
Brazil's President, Getúlio Vargas proved to be exceptionally ideologically flexible throughout his long political career, freely adopting aspects of syndicalism, Integralism and liberalism whenever they proved most expedient, but the one unifying theme in his policies was "economic nationalism".
Brazil had been hit particularly hard by the Great Depression. Her gold and foreign currency reserves were depleted by 1930, in no small part due to an export-driven economy, and the wealthy planter class that dominated Brazil's politics in the last days of the First Republic's reliance on government subsidies. Profound dissatisfaction, especially among the urban poor in Brazil's southeast and peasantry in the northeast coup that year, which cleared the path for Vargas' rise to power. He consolidated power quickly and defeated several coup attempts, often simply co-opting aspects of opponents' ideology which had made them popular. In 1937, Vargas proclaimed the Estado Novo (Portuguese for "New State"), and assumed dictatorial powers. However, for a United States looking for allies, this would not prove to be a great impediment.
Brazil needed a market for her abundant natural riches, chiefly but by no means exclusively rubber and coffee. A military ally, which would help modernize and enlarge Brazil's army to discourage, or if necessary, repulse an attack from the South was also desired. Neither Germany nor any other European nation would be able to fill these requirements as well as the United States.
Starting in 1936, Roosevelt and Vargas began regular communication. Much ado was made of the shared republican heritage of the two countries, and the notion that both were former colonies which had since all but eclipsed their former colonizers. Of great interest to Roosevelt was securing a strategic reserve of rubber, should tensions with Britain and Japan escalate, thus making purchasing rubber from Ceylon inconvenient. Trade between the United States and Brazil increased rapidly in the late 1930s, and upon the outbreak of war in 1939, a cadre of American military advisors was sent to Brazil to help train the Army and Navy.
Any remaining goodwill between Brazil and Germany also evaporated in 1939. That October, Brazil registered diplomatic protest when German U-Boats sunk a Brazilian merchant ship sailing for Britain, and was rebuffed. Brazilian diplomats maintained that Brazil, as a neutral nation, had the right to trade with Britain. In response, Germany reduced diplomatic recognition to charge d'affaires level, leading Brazil to sever diplomatic ties in early December. As merchant losses mounted, Roosevelt granted permission for Brazilian ships to sail in American convoys. Admirals Nimitz and Halsey did not protest, considering that this now meant that Brazilian ships would now join the effort, reducing pressures on their own crews. In response, Vargas pledged to increase exports of rubber, timber and other wares which the American rearmament was bolstered by- made easier by having a larger number of merchant ships available.
No contribution, however, would prove as important as the 1940 agreement signed by Brazil, which pledged her forces to join those of the United States should any American nation come under attack. While the Sack of Shanghai was only tenuously an attack on American territory (the American portion of the International Settlement were deemed such in the United States' Declaration of War against Germany), it was enough to draw Brazil in.
At the outset of the war in China, Brazil was not yet ready to dispatch a force to China, but the ever-calculating Vargas saw that a contribution, any contribution, could potentially strengthen ties, and therefore his position. Furthermore, a successful, if not outright glorious mission would increase the esteem he held in the military, and greatly reduce the chances of a military coup usurping his power. Thus, on April 14th, 1942, the decision was made. A Brazilian corps would be dispatched to China, hopefully arriving in time to topple Nanking.
Vargas (L) and Roosevelt at a state dinner, 1936
THE United States, in the wake of Anglo-Japanese rapprochement, sought out strong allies which lacked competing goals. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, President of the United States, was acutely aware of this problem, and eagerly sought to reverse the United States' isolationism. The problem, however, became which nation would be the first to become a junior partner, but one which held power or the potential for it in its own right.
Brazil proved to be such an ally. Brazil, even then, was a large, resource-rich country, and a country with considerable wealth, although much of this wealth was concentrated in the south of the country.
Anglo-Japanese rapprochment in the early 1930s had an array of effects on US foreign policy, and was regarded as a change that was neither entirely beneficial or detrimental. Rapprochement was also not a foregone conclusion. It had not been forgotten that Canadian Prime Minister Arthur Meighen and his Australian counterpart, Billy Hughes, opposed extending the Anglo-Japanese Alliance beyond 1922. In Meighen's case, it was largely due to the tensions that it caused between the British Empire and the United States, and if there should be any sort of conflict, let alone armed conflict, Canada would inevitably be caught between the two, or be put in the uncomfortable position of being forced to choose between the two. For Hughes, it seemed obvious that Australia should be Britain's chief ally in the Pacific, rather than the Empire of Japan, which had her own ambitions.
The first palpable effect of rapprochement on the United States was inseparably connected to the effect it had on the two largest Dominions. By bringing Japan into the fold once more, it greatly reduced Japan's capacity for aggressive actions in the Pacific; for if she did, Britain would be forced to fall in line with the American position, given how much stronger American forces in the Pacific were, let alone the economic connection. Japan, with her large fleet taking up so much of her budget, desperately needed foreign trade to generate cash, agument her strategic resources, and to buy the oil needed to fuel the fleet. With the radical militarists marginalized by 1933-34, aggression that would provoke either the United States or Britain was deemed out of the question. The Imperial Japanese Army thus shifted its attention northwards, while the Navy's primary responsibilities shifted to trade protection, patrols of the Chinese coast, and monitoring the Soviet Union. The Dominions were no longer in the uncomfortable position of having to choose between displeasing the United States or Britain, began to trade in earnest with a resource-hungry Japan. A new export market also eased some of the pains caused by the Great Depression, particularly in agricultural products before Manchukuo was fully able to realize her agricultural potential.
While the China Lobby in the United States was not particularly pleased by the Japanese takeover in Manchuria, surprisingly little protest was registered. It was a starkly factual matter that Chiang Kai-Shek's southern China based Kuomintang has a tenuous hold at best over the levers of power in Manchuria. Furthermore, a potent external threat also gave Chiang a convenient case and means with which to consolidate power. It was also a matter of great relief that the Japanese regarded the Communists as a bigger threat than Chiang; all but dismissing the Generalissimo as just another warlord. For a brief while, it appeared that China could serve as the counterweight to the new Anglo-Japanese cooperation, but these hopes were severly compromised when Chiang renewed the Sino-German Pact in 1935, souring Sino-American relations and strengthening the relationship between Britain and Japan, both islands now increasingly concerned about threats on their respective neighbouring continents.
This left the United States in the uncomfortable position of not having a strong, reliable ally within her sphere of influence. Mexico had too long a history of acrimony with the United States and was still too underdeveloped. Argentina and Chile were too woven into the British system and too small respectively. Brazil appeared to be the natural choice.
The relationship between Brazil and the United States was able to develop in no small part to the affinity the leaders of the two countries had for their national counterparts. Roosevelt paid far more attention to Brazil than his predecessors, while Vargas was reliably pro-American in his policies.
Brazil's President, Getúlio Vargas proved to be exceptionally ideologically flexible throughout his long political career, freely adopting aspects of syndicalism, Integralism and liberalism whenever they proved most expedient, but the one unifying theme in his policies was "economic nationalism".
Brazil had been hit particularly hard by the Great Depression. Her gold and foreign currency reserves were depleted by 1930, in no small part due to an export-driven economy, and the wealthy planter class that dominated Brazil's politics in the last days of the First Republic's reliance on government subsidies. Profound dissatisfaction, especially among the urban poor in Brazil's southeast and peasantry in the northeast coup that year, which cleared the path for Vargas' rise to power. He consolidated power quickly and defeated several coup attempts, often simply co-opting aspects of opponents' ideology which had made them popular. In 1937, Vargas proclaimed the Estado Novo (Portuguese for "New State"), and assumed dictatorial powers. However, for a United States looking for allies, this would not prove to be a great impediment.
Brazil needed a market for her abundant natural riches, chiefly but by no means exclusively rubber and coffee. A military ally, which would help modernize and enlarge Brazil's army to discourage, or if necessary, repulse an attack from the South was also desired. Neither Germany nor any other European nation would be able to fill these requirements as well as the United States.
Starting in 1936, Roosevelt and Vargas began regular communication. Much ado was made of the shared republican heritage of the two countries, and the notion that both were former colonies which had since all but eclipsed their former colonizers. Of great interest to Roosevelt was securing a strategic reserve of rubber, should tensions with Britain and Japan escalate, thus making purchasing rubber from Ceylon inconvenient. Trade between the United States and Brazil increased rapidly in the late 1930s, and upon the outbreak of war in 1939, a cadre of American military advisors was sent to Brazil to help train the Army and Navy.
Any remaining goodwill between Brazil and Germany also evaporated in 1939. That October, Brazil registered diplomatic protest when German U-Boats sunk a Brazilian merchant ship sailing for Britain, and was rebuffed. Brazilian diplomats maintained that Brazil, as a neutral nation, had the right to trade with Britain. In response, Germany reduced diplomatic recognition to charge d'affaires level, leading Brazil to sever diplomatic ties in early December. As merchant losses mounted, Roosevelt granted permission for Brazilian ships to sail in American convoys. Admirals Nimitz and Halsey did not protest, considering that this now meant that Brazilian ships would now join the effort, reducing pressures on their own crews. In response, Vargas pledged to increase exports of rubber, timber and other wares which the American rearmament was bolstered by- made easier by having a larger number of merchant ships available.
No contribution, however, would prove as important as the 1940 agreement signed by Brazil, which pledged her forces to join those of the United States should any American nation come under attack. While the Sack of Shanghai was only tenuously an attack on American territory (the American portion of the International Settlement were deemed such in the United States' Declaration of War against Germany), it was enough to draw Brazil in.
At the outset of the war in China, Brazil was not yet ready to dispatch a force to China, but the ever-calculating Vargas saw that a contribution, any contribution, could potentially strengthen ties, and therefore his position. Furthermore, a successful, if not outright glorious mission would increase the esteem he held in the military, and greatly reduce the chances of a military coup usurping his power. Thus, on April 14th, 1942, the decision was made. A Brazilian corps would be dispatched to China, hopefully arriving in time to topple Nanking.
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