Improve the Singapore Strategy

Without a fleet train, the British did depend on their network of bases, but I wonder how much coal or oil they left in these places. To get to Stanley from Singapore, for example would require vast resources, and there’s a distinct lack of British bases in the southeast pacific once you’re past the Cook Is.

That's why it's best to have your fallback plan in the Indian Ocean - you already have the locations in Colombo, Trincomalee, Port Blair, the Cocos Islands, the Maldives, Diego Garcia, and the Seychelles.

It's interesting that in 1938 there was a review that asked the question, "What happens if Singapore is lost?" and the Admiralty's reply was that it would not happen.
 

Jack Brisco

Banned
Without a fleet train, the British did depend on their network of bases, but I wonder how much coal or oil they left in these places. To get to Stanley from Singapore, for example would require vast resources, and there’s a distinct lack of British bases in the southeast pacific once you’re past the Cook Is.

I want to say the RN and the Royal Australian navy also used US fleet trains in the Pacific, as applicable. Looked at the book on Kindle but hasn't an index. Did see the RAN on a list of acronyms used, so believe at least the RAN was supported. Wouldn't see why the RN wouldn't have been supported, depending where they were operating.
 
I want to say the RN and the Royal Australian navy also used US fleet trains in the Pacific, as applicable. Looked at the book on Kindle but hasn't an index. Did see the RAN on a list of acronyms used, so believe at least the RAN was supported. Wouldn't see why the RN wouldn't have been supported, depending where they were operating.

The BPF developed its own fleet train and the USN shared its logistics capacity with the BPF - against Ernie King's orders. He insisted the BPF had to be self sustaining but on the other side of the world in combat, you don't stiff your allies.
 
While what you describe is the ideal SOP, wherein your own infantry protects your tanks against infantry, I did not consider my suggestion to be half-assed. The 37mm M3 guns used by most US light tanks and towed AT guns were issued with canister rounds.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/37_mm_Gun_M3#Combat_service

"While high-explosive and canister ammunition proved useful in stopping Japanese infantry attacks, against enemy fortifications the M3 was only somewhat effective because of its small high-explosive projectile. Its overall effectiveness and ease of use meant the gun remained in service with the Marine Corps and with some army units in the Pacific until the end of the war."

If it's good enough for the USMC against massed Japanese infantry attacks, it'll serve the British and Commonwealth against the same. Malaya will be close fighting, where tanks won't have clear, open terrain to stand back and engage enemies at a distance. Cannister will be useful in addition to the ridealong infantry. Not half-assed at all, IMO.


The 37 mm canister round apparently was developed in parallel to all other rounds. In contained 122 steel balls. It fired at a velocity slightly less then the HE round.
 
Without a fleet train, the British did depend on their network of bases, but I wonder how much coal or oil they left in these places. To get to Stanley from Singapore, for example would require vast resources, and there’s a distinct lack of British bases in the southeast pacific once you’re past the Cook Is.

Or you just go the other way via South Africa.
 
I have always wondered how hard it would have been to clear a proper defensive line across the peninsula at one or two points, with roads behind to aid in moving reinforcements and supplies.
 
I have always wondered how hard it would have been to clear a proper defensive line across the peninsula at one or two points, with roads behind to aid in moving reinforcements and supplies.
Part of the problem was that Britain did not technically "Own" all of Malaya, and had to negotiate with each of the local Princes to get anything done. Pre-War they were a fractious lot tied together with a series of treaties of varying sovereignty and obligation, the Sultan of Johore, the state across the straits from Singapore, was the most independent of all, but ironically the most co-operatively Pro-British.

Building a defence line, or lines, across the Peninsular would have infringed on more than one Princely State, and they were touchy about that sort of thing. Although historians like to blame the sloth and incompetence of the Colonial Administration for many of the problems, they had genuine issues to deal with.
(As a comparison, it was at least as complicated as trying to wade through the bureaucracy, egos, politics, local laws and special interests of a Modern project that crosses the boundaries of more than one US State.)
 
Um I know everyone is really keen on European style kit and ways of fighting but the Malay campaign was the first jungle fight where high ground was useless and you could only see about 50metres tops. It was closer to night fighting than what European educated military personnel were use to.
https://anzacportal.dva.gov.au/hist...rack/events/jungle-warfare/tactics-jungle-war

Impossible to a lot more difficult to utilize emplacement and kil-zones.

I have always wondered how hard it would have been to clear a proper defensive line across the peninsula at one or two points, with roads behind to aid in moving reinforcements and supplies.

I've wondered that myself, but I'd think it would require a lot heavy equipment like bulldozers and excavators/steam shovels. The thing is, how do those areas get maintained in an environment where the enemy has air superiority?

I mean if the enemy is advancing and your trying to create a KZ in their path, how long before enemy bombers come calling and fighters are strafing the heavy equipment? Or once engage, how long before they bomb the jungle on the opposite side from their troops?

My thoughts,
 
Part of the problem was that Britain did not technically "Own" all of Malaya, and had to negotiate with each of the local Princes to get anything done. Pre-War they were a fractious lot tied together with a series of treaties of varying sovereignty and obligation, the Sultan of Johore, the state across the straits from Singapore, was the most independent of all, but ironically the most co-operatively Pro-British.

Building a defence line, or lines, across the Peninsular would have infringed on more than one Princely State, and they were touchy about that sort of thing. Although historians like to blame the sloth and incompetence of the Colonial Administration for many of the problems, they had genuine issues to deal with.
(As a comparison, it was at least as complicated as trying to wade through the bureaucracy, egos, politics, local laws and special interests of a Modern project that crosses the boundaries of more than one US State.)

That is another reason why we should discuss more politics, less tactics.
 
A few thoughts, I generally favor simple PODs in the not too distant past so this does not involve any changes in 1930s or the war up to that point. It is about making better use of available resources. Note, many of these are not my ideas, I am stealing them from others like Cryhavoc01 and we've hashed a number of these out on various threads and are generally things the British can begin putting in motion beginning in late 1940 after FIC is occupied in September. I am also keeping in mind force availability and the fact that Singapore is still at peace in 1940 and 1941 and therefore will not get the best stuff so there is a lot of make do with what you have in here:

Airpower - you need fighters, reconnaissance aircraft, and attack aircraft capable of sinking ships:
- Release four squadrons of Spitfires from the Home Islands for duty on Malta, permitting four Hurricane squadrons (No. 242, No. 249, No. 126, No. 185) for duty in Malaya. These are in addition to the five Brewster Buffalo squadrons sent to Malaya (No. 21, No. 243, No. 453, No. 67, No. 488/RNZAF).
- For a 10th fighter squadron, get the SAAF to cough of one of its P-36 squadrons (No. 3 or No. 4) for duty in Malaya.
- Instead of using the 50 Vought Vindicator dive bombers imported from the US as trainers, send them to Malaya to be land based dive bombers manned by FAA crews, this is enough for two squadrons plus spares.
- The Blackburn Skua was removed from the carriers in 1941, form two land based squadrons in Malaya as dive bomber squadrons, not fighter squadrons.
- There were still four operational Fairey Battle Squadrons into 1941 (No. 88, No. 98, No. 226, and No. 11/SAAF), the three RAF squadrons were all with Coastal Command serving in Ireland and Iceland, so stand up a couple of Battle Squadrons in Malaya for maritime patrol and anti-shipping missions.
- You still have your four Blenheim squadrons and two Hudson squadrons plus your small number of PBYs.
- The two Vickers Vildebeest squadrons (No. 36 and No. 100) are used as source of trained crews to round out the new squadrons standing up.
- Send the Vickers Wellesley equipped No. 47 Squadron from East Africa to Malaya for long range maritime patrol (a job it did in the Mediterranean for a good chunk of 1942).
- Logistics, logistics, logistics, an effort needs to be made throughout 1941 to acquire spare parts, tools, and other necessary components for keeping an air force in fighting shape.
- Get an experienced and qualified commander, my vote is Air Vice Marshal Quinton Brand, a South African who commanded No. 10 Group in the Battle of Britain and was a disciple of Dowding and Park, his main task of course will be to organize an air defense system for the peninsula.

Ground Forces - you need some better troops and armor, I appreciate other suggestions as well:
- Pull the British, Canadian, and Indian troops in Hong Kong out of that colony and send them to Malaya, this is a no brainer.
- As others have suggested, send whatever second or third rate tanks you can scrape up to Malaya to form an armored brigade (or two).
- Get a commander who will make do with what he has, train the snot out of his troops, and not give a lick about hurting the feelings of pompous colonial officials, yeah probably Montgomery here.
- Build fortifications on the island, you just might have to retreat to there.
- Other than the units on Hong Kong, I'm not sure what other ground forces might be available to send to Singapore at this time, maybe the third brigade of the 8th Australian Division?

I'll get you some other things and naval stuff in another post, I have to divert to making dinner now. Again, none of these things by themselves are war winners and some of what I am suggesting involves aircraft that are not world beaters by any stretch but are a damn sight better than what they had OTL and certainly a damn sight better than nothing.

Okay in the post I did #327, I said the commanders that would have led the forces. Now where would the troops come from? This information was research for the past 3 years and if Ironside would have been in command he would have gotten his ways.
I need time to respond to this with facts. I know because I did research on what military equipment and groups could have been sent. One thing I know is that 2 generals that could have been sent was Field Marshal William Edward Ironside as overall commander then Percival. Lieutenant General Arthur Ernest Percival as commander of Malaya Command and Major General Adrian Carton de Wiart as Deputy commander of the forces. The Air Vice Marshal will still be Conway Walter Heath Pulford and with Ironside will get his air force even though not alot of fighters, but dive bombers and torpedoe planes.

I had to redo this because I found my information since it was well hidden in my computer. The airplanes, tanks, and other equipment will be written in a couple of days. Also the troops that could have been sent by December 3, 1941. Just give me a couple of days to organize my information since it is a lot and work is heavy.
 
Easiest way to prevent the Japanese capture of Singapore is to not reopen the Burma Road on October 18, 1940. No Burma Road means no reason for Japan to invade Burma and Malaysia. It has greater long-term consequences for China, but it doesn't cost the British a single pound.
 
Cryhavoc01 - what specifically were the naval forces in Hong Kong and were there any planes?

@Zheng He here is a list of all ship that was at the time of the battle of Hong Kong. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Hong_Kong

  • Royal Navy
See also: British Forces Overseas Hong Kong


    • HMS Tamar
    • HMS Thracian
    • HMS Thanet
    • HMS Scout
    • HMS Tern
    • HMS Robin
    • HMS Redstart
    • HMS Cicala
    • HMS Moth
HMS Thracian and I think HMS Moth were left behind in Hong Kong while the rest escape. The airforce was this: The RAF station at Hong Kong's Kai Tak Airport (RAF Kai Tak) had only five aeroplanes: two Supermarine Walrusamphibious aircraft and three Vickers Vildebeest torpedo-reconnaissance bombers, flown and serviced by seven officers and 108 airmen. An earlier request for a fighter squadron had been rejected and the nearest fully operational RAF base was in Kota Bharu, Malaya, nearly 2,250 km (1,400 mi) away. Hong Kong also lacked adequate naval defences. Three destroyers were to withdraw to Singapore Naval Base.[55]
 
Easiest way to prevent the Japanese capture of Singapore is to not reopen the Burma Road on October 18, 1940. No Burma Road means no reason for Japan to invade Burma and Malaysia. It has greater long-term consequences for China, but it doesn't cost the British a single pound.

There were reasons to invade Burma and Malaya - tin, rubber, and oil. I realize the DEI was the big prize but Malaya and Burma were still part of the Southern Resource Zone and part of the rotten white imperial edifice that needed to be taken down.
 
@Zheng He here is a list of all ship that was at the time of the battle of Hong Kong. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Hong_Kong

  • Royal Navy
See also: British Forces Overseas Hong Kong


    • HMS Tamar
    • HMS Thracian
    • HMS Thanet
    • HMS Scout
    • HMS Tern
    • HMS Robin
    • HMS Redstart
    • HMS Cicala
    • HMS Moth
HMS Thracian and I think HMS Moth were left behind in Hong Kong while the rest escape. The airforce was this: The RAF station at Hong Kong's Kai Tak Airport (RAF Kai Tak) had only five aeroplanes: two Supermarine Walrusamphibious aircraft and three Vickers Vildebeest torpedo-reconnaissance bombers, flown and serviced by seven officers and 108 airmen. An earlier request for a fighter squadron had been rejected and the nearest fully operational RAF base was in Kota Bharu, Malaya, nearly 2,250 km (1,400 mi) away. Hong Kong also lacked adequate naval defences. Three destroyers were to withdraw to Singapore Naval Base.[55]

HMS Tamar was the base depot ship - scuttled at Hong kong Dec ?? 1941
HMS Thracian, Thanet and Scout were S class Destroyers - Thracian was accidently run aground and then abandoned (reused as a patrol vessel by the IJN) - the other two managed to escape to Singapore
HMS Tern was a River Gun boat with a pair of 3" gun and MMGs - designed for use in Chinese Rivers - Scuttled at Hong Kong 19th December 1941.
HMS Robin was a River gun boat and used as the 'boom' depot ship - Scuttled Hong Kong 25th December 1941 (I have seen pictures of the MTBs tied up along side so may have been their Depot ship as well)
HMS Redstart was a Linnit class Minelayer - Scuttled at Hong Kong 19th December 1941.
HMS Cicala and Moth were Insect class Gunboats - Cicala bombed by the Japanese on the 21st Dec 1941 and Moth was captured and reused.
There was also an MTB squadron of 6 or 8? early MTBs and a number of them managed to get away after Hong Kong Fell

All but Tamar, Tern and Robin (and possibly the 2 river gun boats as they would have been useful on the West coast of Malaya) move to Malaya.

He who tries to defend everywhere defends nowhere
 
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