Improve the Singapore Strategy

[Zheng He]

The posts regarding the viability of the Singapore Strategy when it was make good points, however, as the 1930s gave way to the 1940s the British should have started making some changes:

1. In 1938 when it was clear the Germans were getting aggressive and the Japanese were already aggressive, they should have started thinking hard about alternatives.
2. In 1939 after the war in Europe started they should have thought harder about alternatives.
3. In 1940 after France fell they should have started some serious worst case scenario planning.
4. In 1940 after the Japanese occupied FIC, they should have started implementing some worst case scenario plans because now all of the factors that made the Singapore Strategy a sound strategy are gone.

 

[Spencersj345.346]

It was an utter betrayal of his men, and in almost any other army of the day he'd have been shot.

Sadly he only left when given direct Presidential order to do so, so his neck be would be fine in any sensible nation, his career not so much

 

[Peg Leg Pom]

That was MacArthur. Gordon Bennet deserted in the face of the enemy. His effect on the Malaya campaign is irrelevant, that was down to Percival and Wavell for not relieving him, what he did was unforgivable.

 

[MatthewB]

Of course a big problem for them was the fact that the Netherlands was incapable of building heavy cruisers or battleships themselves. Right before the German invasion the Dutch government was was about to order a couple of 'cruiser-killers' from....Germany!

Full sized battleships are way overkill for the Dutch. The 2,000 men and 40,000 tons of materials for just one battleship are much better spread over a larger number of more heavier cruisers. I wonder how Doorman would have done at Java Sea with trio of Deutschland pocket battleships.

 

[Spencersj345.346]

That was MacArthur. Gordon Bennet deserted in the face of the enemy. His effect on the Malaya campaign is irrelevant, that was down to Percival and Wavell for not relieving him, what he did was unforgivable.

Ah sorry wrong bad general.

 

[Riain]

That was MacArthur. Gordon Bennet deserted in the face of the enemy. His effect on the Malaya campaign is irrelevant, that was down to Percival and Wavell for not relieving him, what he did was unforgivable.

Ah, no.

Bennett was not only responsible to the British command, as the senior Australian officer he was also dually responsible to the Australian government. They and they aline will decide what to do with him. In the dark days of 1942 his escape was appreciated and he was given command of a Corps.

This isn't to say Bennett was a good bloke, he was a well known arsehole. But I don't buy the scapegoating onto a subordinate by a bunch of incompetents. Its only outside of Australia (by the people who failed us and need an excuse) that his actions are seen as cut and dry bad.

 

[Zheng He]

A few thoughts, I generally favor simple PODs in the not too distant past so this does not involve any changes in 1930s or the war up to that point. It is about making better use of available resources. Note, many of these are not my ideas, I am stealing them from others like Cryhavoc01 and we've hashed a number of these out on various threads and are generally things the British can begin putting in motion beginning in late 1940 after FIC is occupied in September. I am also keeping in mind force availability and the fact that Singapore is still at peace in 1940 and 1941 and therefore will not get the best stuff so there is a lot of make do with what you have in here:

Airpower - you need fighters, reconnaissance aircraft, and attack aircraft capable of sinking ships:
- Release four squadrons of Spitfires from the Home Islands for duty on Malta, permitting four Hurricane squadrons (No. 242, No. 249, No. 126, No. 185) for duty in Malaya. These are in addition to the five Brewster Buffalo squadrons sent to Malaya (No. 21, No. 243, No. 453, No. 67, No. 488/RNZAF).
- For a 10th fighter squadron, get the SAAF to cough of one of its P-36 squadrons (No. 3 or No. 4) for duty in Malaya.
- Instead of using the 50 Vought Vindicator dive bombers imported from the US as trainers, send them to Malaya to be land based dive bombers manned by FAA crews, this is enough for two squadrons plus spares.
- The Blackburn Skua was removed from the carriers in 1941, form two land based squadrons in Malaya as dive bomber squadrons, not fighter squadrons.
- There were still four operational Fairey Battle Squadrons into 1941 (No. 88, No. 98, No. 226, and No. 11/SAAF), the three RAF squadrons were all with Coastal Command serving in Ireland and Iceland, so stand up a couple of Battle Squadrons in Malaya for maritime patrol and anti-shipping missions.
- You still have your four Blenheim squadrons and two Hudson squadrons plus your small number of PBYs.
- The two Vickers Vildebeest squadrons (No. 36 and No. 100) are used as source of trained crews to round out the new squadrons standing up.
- Send the Vickers Wellesley equipped No. 47 Squadron from East Africa to Malaya for long range maritime patrol (a job it did in the Mediterranean for a good chunk of 1942).
- Logistics, logistics, logistics, an effort needs to be made throughout 1941 to acquire spare parts, tools, and other necessary components for keeping an air force in fighting shape.
- Get an experienced and qualified commander, my vote is Air Vice Marshal Quinton Brand, a South African who commanded No. 10 Group in the Battle of Britain and was a disciple of Dowding and Park, his main task of course will be to organize an air defense system for the peninsula.

Ground Forces - you need some better troops and armor, I appreciate other suggestions as well:
- Pull the British, Canadian, and Indian troops in Hong Kong out of that colony and send them to Malaya, this is a no brainer.
- As others have suggested, send whatever second or third rate tanks you can scrape up to Malaya to form an armored brigade (or two).
- Get a commander who will make do with what he has, train the snot out of his troops, and not give a lick about hurting the feelings of pompous colonial officials, yeah probably Montgomery here.
- Build fortifications on the island, you just might have to retreat to there.
- Other than the units on Hong Kong, I'm not sure what other ground forces might be available to send to Singapore at this time, maybe the third brigade of the 8th Australian Division?

I'll get you some other things and naval stuff in another post, I have to divert to making dinner now. Again, none of these things by themselves are war winners and some of what I am suggesting involves aircraft that are not world beaters by any stretch but are a damn sight better than what they had OTL and certainly a damn sight better than nothing.

 

[Zheng He]

Note the above details an Air Force of 24 squadrons with ten fighter squadrons (Buffalo, Hurricane, Mohawk), six light attack squadrons (Battle, Skua, Vindicator), four medium bomber squadrons (Blenheim), and four patrol squadrons (Hudson, Catalina, Wellesley). TO&E for the fighter, light attack, and medium bomber squadrons is 16 operational aircraft and for the patrol squadrons is 12 aircraft for a total operational strength of 368 aircraft, this does not include spares for attrition and training as well as hangar queens.

 

[Colonel Grubb]

Airpower - you need fighters, reconnaissance aircraft, and attack aircraft capable of sinking ships:

Would it be possible to throw into the mix additional Wirraways (Australian or New Zealand crewed) based out of Singapore for general purpose and bombing work if stripping back the aircraft allocated to training in Australia?

 

[Look More Closely Later]

The posts regarding the viability of the Singapore Strategy when it was make good points, however, as the 1930s gave way to the 1940s the British should have started making some changes:

1. In 1938 when it was clear the Germans were getting aggressive and the Japanese were already aggressive, they should have started thinking hard about alternatives.
2. In 1939 after the war in Europe started they should have thought harder about alternatives.
3. In 1940 after France fell they should have started some serious worst case scenario planning.
4. In 1940 after the Japanese occupied FIC, they should have started implementing some worst case scenario plans because now all of the factors that made the Singapore Strategy a sound strategy are gone.

In Churchill's memoirs:
4th October, 1940 - Churchill invites Roosevelt to send an American squadron '...the bigger the better, to pay a friendly visit to Singapore...' ('Mr. Eden's Mission', The Second World War, Volume 2)
8th December, 1940 - Churchill writes to Roosevelt that he hears the Japanese are '...preparing five good divisions for possible use as an overseas expeditionary force. We have to-day no forces in the Far East capable of dealing with this situation should it develop...' ('Lend-Lease', The Second World War, Volume 2)
7th January, 1941 - Churchill wrote to General Ismay that '...If Japan goes to war with us there is not the slightest chance of holding Hong Kong or relieving it. It is most unwise to increase the loss we shall suffer there...' but Churchill notes that '... Later on it will be seen that I allowed myself to be drawn from this position...' ('The Japanese Envoy', The Second World War, Volume 3)
15th February, 1941 - Churchill wrote to Roosevelt '...Many drifting straws seem to indicate Japanese intention to make war on us or do something that would force us to make war on them in the next few weeks or months... ...the weight of the Japanese Navy, if thrown against us, would confront us with situations beyond the scope of our naval resources... Everything that you can do to inspire the Japanese with the fear of a double war may avert the danger...' ('The Japanese Envoy', The Second World War, Volume 3)
20th February, 1941 - Churchill wrote to Roosevelt '...I have better news about Japan... ...If Japanese attack which seemed imminent is now postponed, this is largely due to fear of the United States. The more these fears can be played upon the better...' ('The Japanese Envoy', The Second World War, Volume 3)
24th February, 1941 - A record of a meeting between Churchill and the Japanese Ambassador notes that: '...The Ambassador said that Japan had no intention for attacking us or the United States, and had no desire to become involved in a war with either Power. They would not attempt to attack Singapore or Australia, and he repeated several times that they would not attempt to gain a footing or make encroachments in the Dutch East Indies. The only complaint which Japan had, he said, was our attitude to China...' ('The Japanese Envoy', The Second World War, Volume 3)
4th March, 1941 - Churchill noted in a minute, after another meeting with the Japanese Ambassador that '...I do not think Japan is likely to attack us unless and until she is sure we are going to be defeated...' ('The Japanese Envoy', The Second World War, Volume 3)
28th May, 1941 - Churchill, as an aside regarding the consequences of the sinking of the Bismarck and the pressure that that took of the Royal Navy noted to Roosevelt that '...The effect upon the Japanese will be highly beneficial. I expect they are doing all their sums again...' ('The Fate of the "Bismarck"', The Second World War, Volume 3)
20 October, 1941 - Churchill indicated in a long letter to Roosevelt about several matters '...I have not referred to the Japanese menace, which has seemed to grow so much sharper in the last few days, nor to the splendid help which you are giving us in the Atlantic, because we discussed these great matters so fully at our meeting, and events are telling their own tale in accordance with our anticipations. I still think however that the stronger the action of the United States towards Japan the greater the chance of preserving peace...' ('The Path Ahead', The Second World War, Volume 3)
5 November, 1941 - Churchill indicated to Roosevelt that '...No independent action by ourselves will deter Japan, because we are so much tied up elsewhere. But of course we will stand with you and do our utmost to back you in whatever course you choose. I think myself that Japan is more likely to drift into war than to plunge in. Please let me know what you think...' ('Japan', The Second World War, Volume 3)

There's a lot more (and a limit to how much copy-typing of quotes I can do in one sitting!), but I get the impression that up until February of 1941, Churchill was seriously worried about Japan, then he seemed to believe that the United States had managed to contain the situation, and that at least until October, 1941, his policy was relying upon the United States to keep Japan quiet.

(edited to correct a couple of typing errors)

 

[Dorknought]

Full sized battleships are way overkill for the Dutch.

But that’s the point. A capital ship requires the enemy to commit their capital ships. This was behind Dutch plans from pre WW1.

 

[Peg Leg Pom]

Would it be possible to throw into the mix additional Wirraways (Australian or New Zealand crewed) based out of Singapore for general purpose and bombing work if stripping back the aircraft allocated to training in Australia?

Why send trainers to pretend to be bombers when there are something like 300 Battles in Australia pretending to be trainers?

 

[Cryhavoc101]

His stupidity isn't the day he sortied, its the track he took and his attitude to air cover. I wouldn't mind if he took up station closer to Singapore and the coast ready to move on good intel. But he aimlessly wandered about right up to Vietnam, risking his unbalanced force with no air cover or intelligence while being spotted by the enemy on numerous occasions. He even contacted an IJN heavy cruiser group, but fucked that up, he might have done well in a night battle with heavy cruisers.

Sooooo he is told that there is a landing taking place at Singora - so is that not 'good intel'

Neither surface force was aware of each other even though they apparently came within 5 NMs of each other in the dark although POWs Radar detected nothing so I am a bit skeptical

The Japanese who were supposedly trying to find Force Z after having a Flare dropped on them by a IJ Aircraft (who thought they had found POW) - decided to bugger off North East - effectively abandoning their mission

Force Z having seen the same flare thought it had been for them so having hoped to throw off any shadowers now believed themselves to have been detected again and so abandoned the op and turned Force Z for Singapore

There was no contact between the surface forces - so not sure how he fucked it up!

But yes it would have been interesting.

 

[Zheng He]

Why send trainers to pretend to be bombers when there are something like 300 Battles in Australia pretending to be trainers?

I don't know, the Wirraway proved its worth in New Guinea as an Army Cooperation Aircraft. I could see a squadron in this role in Malaya. They could prove valuable if people use them the way they should be used.

 

[Barry Bull]

That’s fine. You don’t put Britain’s ships into suicidal positions in order to save your own career and reputation.

No, what I mean is the ships and Philip are damned one way or another. The difference are just that whether the people who manned the ship would be killed physically or suffered disgrace from the hostile population.

 

[Barry Bull]

While the Singapore strategy was totally rational during the '30s we shouldn't act as if that means there was no other option by the time the 1940s arrives. The biggest obstacle to that is imperial hubris however. The UK had a couple of obligations in East Asia that had to be met.

1. Defense of Australia/New Zealand.
2. Defense of Malaya.
3. Posing a threat against Japanese ambitions.

To do all this they put all their cards on Singapore. For good reasons ofcourse. Singapore was the perfect base of operations against Japan and had received a lot of investments. However, by politically building up Singapore to be the end all be all of the British Empire in the eastern part of Asia, they left themselves little to no room for failure. If Singapore would fall, so would the entire war effort. So when the defense of Malaya turned out to be in more trouble than expected, the UK send in more troops. When the defense of Malaya was broken, the UK send in more troops. Even when Singapore was (about to be) besieged, they send in more troops. Simply because there was no other choice.

No choice at that time anyway. The best way to improve the Singapore strategy is for there simply not be a Singapore strategy. This isn't simply a case of retreating to Ceylon though. Though it might be the best solution from a military perspective, it would not fulfill the three British obligations. In fact, it might even force the movement of ANZAC forces from North Africa to Australia. Instead of that I propose the Surubaya, or Java strategy. Java is right in the middle of the Malaya Barrier. It is not in immediate danger of a Japanese attack as the approaches are in Allied hands. Just like Singapore before the invasion of French Indochina. It is also closer to Australia and it's approaches. Now I am not proposing that the Allies abandon Malaya, far from it. Indeed, the Allies would fare a lot better with Singapore as a base of operations. But by not going all in for Malaya, the Allies keep their options open. It means that at least 30,000 soldiers can be send to places where they actually have a chance of a succesful defense.

For the Surubaya-strategy to be put in place we do require a bit of a leap from the Foreign Office though. What we need is the UK to guarentee the Dutch East Indies in 1940, prefferably when French Indochina gets taken. Doing this will allow a proto-ABDA (or ADA) to be set up before the fighting breaks out. This means that the naval forces will be able to train together and the Combined Strike Force will be more effective. The Australian forces dispatched to Ambon and Timor will be able to move there long before the hostilities started and have time to dig in properly. Lastly, ABDACOM wouldn't be totally focussed on the fighting on Malaya and spend more time on the defense of the rest of the Malaya Barrier.

The problem is that the Java strategy require the cooperation of the Dutch and USA, which is not exactly forthcoming. Also, there is the issue of maintaining imperial reputation to keep the natives pacified, thus the Singapore Base served another important political purpose.

At the end of the day, the Singapore strategy is a grand strategy issue. All the tactical and operational discussions in the thread failed touch upon the crux of the matter.

 

[Barry Bull]

If the game was chess this would have been a great move. Basically only having pawns, a knight and a rook against a full set up and still getting a draw. Unfortunately, this is not chess.

If you look at what happened OTL, you see that any scorched earth operations were only launched if the enemy was at the doorstep. This happened at Tarakan, where demolition only began when a flying boat spotted the Japanese invasion fleet. At Balikpapan it started only four days in advance of the invasion fleet. The Pladjoe refinery at Palembang was captured intact by paratroopers. Only after a counterattack were the oiltanks set ablaze. So even with the war in full swing the Dutch were very much hesistant to go the extra mile to make sure the oil installations didn't fall in Japanese hands intact. Now why was that? The reason is twofold.

The first part is imperial hubris. The Dutch Navy (or better said: the cruiser-lobby) had spend the better part of the '30s arguing that surface units (in concert with the RN and MN) would be able to parry the Japanese attacks far away from Java and keep not only Java safe, but also the Outer Regions which had increased in economic value during the Interbellum. When that plan went belly up, there mindset wasn't fit to the occassion. There was also fear that scorched earth policies would cause (possibly) unnecessary fear with the colonials and losing face with the natives.

The second part is that we are talking about a HUGE loss of resources and, frankly, money. You are asking the colonial government and companies like Shell to blow up millions and millions of investments and possible profit without the Japanese even near them? What constitutes an aggressive move anyway? Troop movements? Or only a DoW? The only way you are getting the Dutch to even consider such a scheme requires at least a formal guarentee from the UK. If that happens, victory is almost guarenteed anyway right? Seems such a waste...

To be fair to the Dutch Navy and the allies, the technology change between 1930 and 1940s is nothing short of astonishing. What looked great in 1930 become idiotic in 1940. And most of the technology happened in aviation. Naval tech and doctrine, while also moving forward, was moving at a much slower pace.

We should really avoid looking at history with hindsight. The threat projected by Japan also changed rapidly in the 30-40 decade.

Planning takes time, thus the OOB which is a result of planning, would get affected, which then affect the actual building of ships.

 

[Barry Bull]

The posts regarding the viability of the Singapore Strategy when it was make good points, however, as the 1930s gave way to the 1940s the British should have started making some changes:

1. In 1938 when it was clear the Germans were getting aggressive and the Japanese were already aggressive, they should have started thinking hard about alternatives.
2. In 1939 after the war in Europe started they should have thought harder about alternatives.
3. In 1940 after France fell they should have started some serious worst case scenario planning.
4. In 1940 after the Japanese occupied FIC, they should have started implementing some worst case scenario plans because now all of the factors that made the Singapore Strategy a sound strategy are gone.

2 years are very short time as ship-building, as guided by war planning, need some leap time. By 1938, British ship building would be in progress as guided by the rearmament plans. Sudden changes to planning may actually delayed ship building further.

 

[MatthewB]

Putting Ceylon, India and Burma aside, what alternative Pacific locations for the RN’s base? Britain has many large territories between Malaya and Australia, including Sarawak (Brooke family will protest), PNG and the Solomons.

 

[Peg Leg Pom]

The Best bet would be Darwin.