Operation Sea Lion (1974 Sandhurst Wargame)

Wow... something needs to be done about this thread.

I'm pretty sure everyone can see Glenn is a troll, so why don't we all stop engaging him?

Oh sadly human I am afraid. Just that he has been steeped in the propaganda and mythology of a successful Sealion...indeed multiple forms of Axis victory through the Triumph of the Will for too long. Still, while there is no saving Glenn, because as numerous psychological studies have shown mere facts cannot shift a person's views once they have reached a certain point we can prevent others becoming so divorced from the evidence. For every Glenn there are a hundred, maybe even a thousand casual readers whom he hopes to influence by getting a post through unrebutted. Demonstrating the evidence points to certain facts and those facts preclude the viability of Sealion is thus worth doing in an age where misinformation is spawning like a toxic malady.
 

Ian_W

Banned
Oh sadly human I am afraid. Just that he has been steeped in the propaganda and mythology of a successful Sealion...indeed multiple forms of Axis victory through the Triumph of the Will for too long. Still, while there is no saving Glenn, because as numerous psychological studies have shown mere facts cannot shift a person's views once they have reached a certain point we can prevent others becoming so divorced from the evidence. For every Glenn there are a hundred, maybe even a thousand casual readers whom he hopes to influence by getting a post through unrebutted. Demonstrating the evidence points to certain facts and those facts preclude the viability of Sealion is thus worth doing in an age where misinformation is spawning like a toxic malady.

Also, some of us saw enough pics of the Isle of Wight that we went 'I want to sail my boat there'.
 
Semi seriously...

With all those mountains Norway has to have a serious coastal fleet because it is easier than blasting rail lines. Assuming it is easier let Norway starve than the Ruhr, what can be requisitioned?
 
Semi seriously...

With all those mountains Norway has to have a serious coastal fleet because it is easier than blasting rail lines. Assuming it is easier let Norway starve than the Ruhr, what can be requisitioned?
How much has already run to England?
How much do they need to garrison Norway?

Does cutting transport links actually starve Norway or do they grow food in most of the small isolated communities that might now be cut off from German occupation? Does this make raiding by GB/free Norwegen forces much easier?
 
Semi seriously...

With all those mountains Norway has to have a serious coastal fleet because it is easier than blasting rail lines. Assuming it is easier let Norway starve than the Ruhr, what can be requisitioned?

The thing is the mass majority of Norway's very large merchant Marines had sailed to Britain and with the Norwegian Government in exile's permission effectively became part of Britain's merchant marine.

So the answer is 'very little' can be requisitioned!
 
The thing is the mass majority of Norway's very large merchant Marines had sailed to Britain and with the Norwegian Government in exile's permission effectively became part of Britain's merchant marine.

So the answer is 'very little' can be requisitioned!

I knew most of the merchant marine had run off. But are those the ships doing the tramp work up and down the coast? I don't know if they are or if the ships used are different. Not oceanic. For all I know they are off doing the coast runs off Britain.
 
How are they gonna lose the war over a counterattack at Wight? It doesn't need to be a fullscale invasion a la Overlord, or even Dieppe. Unless the germans totally overrun the island within a day, which is very unikely. The british will hold the port at the northern part of the island and will be able to reinforce.

Underlined part. So, after I pointed it out, we've all now realised the importance of Cowes and why any attack on IOW needs to take it immediately to prevent reinforcements from shoreside? Good to know. On a related note, did you know that many military disasters are caused by arrogant assumptions that overlook key details - say like the importance of Cowes - until it is too late? It's called Victory Disease. Grab a Ouija board and ask Yamamoto about it. He'll probably tell you that this thread is choked with the stuff.

You ask how IOW might stand a small chance of snowballing into losing the war. Something like this -

Step 1 - Germany takes IOW an a massive surprise air/sea assault. Surprise is achieved, the local defenses are overwelmed, and reserves fail to act due to a series of small, diversionary landings elsewhere that absorb attention in the key 24 hour period.
Step 2 - The RN and RAF attempt, but fail, to interdict the LOC to Isle of Wight over the next 1.5 months. (A series of small expendable convoys run in daylight under massive LW cover, causing a meat grinder effect for the RAF and RN in the Channel between Cherbourg and IOW).
Step 3 - The British government, increasingly concerned that IOW is becoming an offensive springboard to seize Portsmouth and Southhampton, orders the British army to retake IOW by storm.
Step 4 - The British army strips a large chunk of its invasion reserves to retake IOW in September.
Step 5 - Sealion lands in the Dover area with British reserves diverted westwards. The landing is not contained due to lack of available reserves to contain it, and breaks out.

Steps 1 and 2 were possible, (posters that suppose the RN, even with RAF cover, can go up against the LW in the Channel day after day are talking complete nonsense). Steps 3-6 would require the British to make a serious error - taking their eye off the ball. I wouldn't think they'd do that, that the risks would outweigh the gains. Why not just wait until the weather turns after October to launch a counterattack?
 
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Underlined part. So, after I pointed it out, we've all now realised the importance of Cowes and why any attack on IOW needs to take it immediately to prevent reinforcements from shoreside? Good to know. On a related note, did you know that many military disasters are caused by arrogant assumptions that overlook key details - say like the importance of Cowes - until it is too late? Show me where any poster anywhere at any time, other than me, realised the importance of this port?

You ask how IOW might stand a small chance of snowballing into losing the war. Something like this -

Step 1 - Germany takes IOW an a massive surprise air/sea assault. Surprise is achieved, the local defenses are overwelmed, and reserves fail to act due to a series of small, diversionary landings elsewhere that absorb attention in the key 24 hour period.
Step 2 - The RN and RAF attempt, but fail, to interdict the LOC to Isle of Wight over the next 1.5 months. (A series of small expendable convoys run in daylight under massive LW cover, causing a meat grinder effect for the RAF and RN in the Channel between Cherbourg and IOW).
Step 3 - The British government, increasingly concerned that IOW is becoming an offensive springboard to seize Portsmouth and Southhampton, orders the British army to retake IOW by storm.
Step 4 - The British army strips a large chunk of its invasion reserves to retake IOW in September.
Step 5 - Sealion lands in the Dover area with British reserves diverted westwards. The landing is not contained due to lack of available reserves to contain it, and breaks out.

Steps 1 and 2 were possible, (posters that suppose the RN, even with RAF cover, can go up against the LW in the Channel day after day are talking complete nonsense). Steps 3-6 would require the British to make a serious error - taking their eye off the ball. I wouldn't think they'd do that, that the risks would outweigh the gains. Why not just wait until the weather turns after October to launch a counterattack?
Glenn, thank you for bringing a concise plan, but I need to ask where you’ve got the ships from and the end plane cover, they will be exposed to massive rates of attrition and you will lack the naval lift to make any such landing in Dover, much less get past the beaches as they have been mined and have their own dedicated garrisons that will not be moved. Furthermore I suspect said garrisons will be reinforced due to a fear of raiders launching from the IoW. This is not to say I agree that such a capture of the IoW could occur due to radar warning putting the garrison on alert and the possible drift of the Fallshrimjägers over such a small area leaving them with too few combat capable troops.
 
In past threads I've suggested the obvious exit strategy for Germany in 1940 is to declare a unilateral ceasefire and wait for the British to come to their senses.

The problem with unilateral ceasefires is the 'unilateral' part - the British would simply ignore it and ramp up their bomber campaign. The only useful purpose to such a course would be in American neutral opinion - it would have absolutely no effect on Britain's place in the war. A peace offensive was better than Barbarossa though. Hands down, better.

Once you strip away the drama and the emotions and the sense of crisis, the reality is that in summer to fall 1940 there is a strategic stalemate. Nobody is in a position to be extracting concessions from anyone.

But the situation was not a stalemate, for you have somehow forgotten about the United States of America. Churchill would argue in cabinet that American support for Britain was increasing all the time, and that with this new and completely incomprehensible German decision to go over to the defensive in the west, that British victory was now inevitable - they merely had to wait until 1942, or 1943, or whenever the US finally declared war on Germany.
 
Given that any German force worth gassing has to arrive by sea (we'll suspend the disbelief on the German ability to actually achieve that for a second) meaning that the British civilians on the islands probably have better NBC protection than the German troops by virtue of having actual working gas masks, why not take that risk to destroy a large German force?

I don't think using gas is within Britain's interests because their key defense bases, (RAF, RN) can be degraded more effectively by gas attacks than conventional ones, and the prize for that boat anchor (the fate of a brigade sized invasion force) is comparatively trivial.
 
Underlined part. So, after I pointed it out, we've all now realised the importance of Cowes and why any attack on IOW needs to take it immediately to prevent reinforcements from shoreside? Good to know.
You may have missed this post: https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...ndhurst-wargame.463526/page-154#post-19008934
It's not that easy to do a surprise-attack at Cowes. You're gonna get in the range of several coastal artillery batteries.
On a related note, did you know that many military disasters are caused by arrogant assumptions that overlook key details - say like the importance of Cowes - until it is too late? It's called Victory Disease. Grab a Ouija board and ask Yamamoto about it. He'll probably tell you that this thread is choked with the stuff.
Yeah, the germans had loads of it too.
You ask how IOW might stand a small chance of snowballing into losing the war. Something like this -

Step 1 - Germany takes IOW an a massive surprise air/sea assault. Surprise is achieved, the local defenses are overwelmed, and reserves fail to act due to a series of small, diversionary landings elsewhere that absorb attention in the key 24 hour period.
You do realise that the IOW had a radar station which was part of Chaine Home Defence? Even if they wouldn't expect an airborne attack on the Island, the airdefence batteries would be alerted, simply because shooting at planes flying over, is kinda what they are for. It would soon become obvious what was happening.

As for seaborne surprise: the RN didn't just sit back and relax, but was actively patrolling the channel, so they would be on alert, and not just sleeping at their watches. To attack Cowes harbour with surprise: you need to get through a narrow seaway. The chances of getting there unseen are slim.
Step 2 - The RN and RAF attempt, but fail, to interdict the LOC to Isle of Wight over the next 1.5 months. (A series of small expendable convoys run in daylight under massive LW cover, causing a meat grinder effect for the RAF and RN in the Channel between Cherbourg and IOW).
A meat grinder is not the best option for the germans, since the RN outnumbers the KM with aboout 10:1 in anything, and in some stuff lots more.
The RAF and LW have parity. The LW couldn't win the BoB, what makes you think it can win the battle of IOW. Also remember that in the BoB the LW could always choose when to attack, and the RAF had to react, while on the IOW the RAF can choose the moent of attack, and the LW has to react. And they won't have early warning, and their fighters will be mostly stationed in France, so with that reaction time, the RAF-bombers are already back on their base by the time the fighters arrive. To do a constant CAP they don't have the fighters.
Step 3 - The British government, increasingly concerned that IOW is becoming an offensive springboard to seize Portsmouth and Southhampton, orders the British army to retake IOW by storm.
OK.
Step 4 - The British army strips a large chunk of its invasion reserves to retake IOW in September.
Nah, they don't need a large chunk of their reserves. It was already pointed out to you that at the hight of the invasion scare, the British army send an armoured division to Egypt. They can send that instead to IOW.
Step 5 - Sealion lands in the Dover area with British reserves diverted westwards. The landing is not contained due to lack of available reserves to contain it, and breaks out.
After the meatgrinder around Wight, what escorts do the germans have left? They started the operation with less than 10 destroyers.
But I guess you think that the barges will selfprotect them. I'm afraid you're ridden with the victory disease.

Steps 1 and 2 were possible, (posters that suppose the RN, even with RAF cover, can go up against the LW in the Channel day after day are talking complete nonsense). Steps 3-6 would require the British to make a serious error - taking their eye off the ball. I wouldn't think they'd do that, that the risks would outweigh the gains. Why not just wait until the weather turns after October to launch a counterattack?
Even step 1 and 2 require serious error by the British. You're not gonna gain anything with a suicide attack on Wight.

The LW will be quite busy with supplying the IOW, protecting the shipping and planes doing that. Probably also needing to suppres coastal and regular artillery opposite of the IOW, and to make sure the RN doesn't interfere.

BTW. Earlier you said that step 1 was to get the RN to abandon Portsmouth. You seem to have left that out now. Don't you think that a month of bombarding Portsmouth would be some kind of signal that something is about to happen there? Unless of course if they bomb al the ports, but with what planes?
 
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You mean you didn't think this was likely despite the number of times you've been told that the British sent large numbers of troops and tanks to the Middle East at the height of the invasion scare? But I suppose like so many inconvenient facts you've chosen to forget about that.

The size of reinforcements diverted to the Middle East that you mention were only a fraction of the forces necessary to counterattack. Unless you're proposing a Dakar scale debacle, we're talking 100,000 of the best British troops available with weeks of preparation. Second, if the decision to counterattack is made, then no reinforcements at all can go to the Middle East - they're all tied down with that decision instead, for the duration of the IOW offensive.
 
The size of reinforcements diverted to the Middle East that you mention were only a fraction of the forces necessary to counterattack. Unless you're proposing a Dakar scale debacle, we're talking 100,000 of the best British troops available with weeks of preparation. Second, if the decision to counterattack is made, then no reinforcements at all can go to the Middle East - they're all tied down with that decision instead, for the duration of the IOW offensive.

Except the Germans have no anti tank weapons heavier then 37mm, that being the heaviest armament they can reasonably carry aboard the only assets they have that can reasonably be expected to maybe get to the Island. A Matilda II Battalion with some infantry support courtesy of the Royal Marines and artillery courtesy of an R-class Battleship and a bunch of cruisers and destroyers would be enough to roll up the entire German garrison.
 
meanwhile back at the club the calcutta light horse are planning to steam the ss whatever happens to be lying around into each of the long narrow channels that lead into every harbour on the isle of wight and sink them the morning after.end of heavy supply.
 
Dead-horse.jpg
 
What happens when unsupported Fallschirmjager attack -
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Dombås

And when small convoys in the Channel meet coastal forces
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exercise_Tiger

On the day after the first practice assaults, early on the morning of 28 April, the exercise was blighted when Convoy T-4, consisting of eight LSTs carrying vehicles and combat engineers of the 1st Engineer Special Brigade, was attacked by nine German E-boats under the command of Korvettenkapitan Bernd Klug, in Lyme Bay.
  • LST-289 was set on fire but eventually made it back to shore with the loss of 123 Navy personnel.
  • LST-507 was torpedoed and sunk with the loss of 202 US Army/US Navy personnel.
  • LST-511 was damaged by friendly fire.
  • LST-531 sank within six minutes of being torpedoed with the loss of 424 Army and Navy personnel.
The remaining ships and their escort fired back and the E-boats made no more attacks. In total, 749 servicemen (551 United States Army and 198 United States Navy) were killed during Exercise Tiger. Many servicemen drowned or died of hypothermia in the cold sea while waiting to be rescued

What makes you think the Royal Navy would be any less succesful than the Kriegsmarine?
 
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No, let’s have you explain in realistic terms exactly how this fantasy situation would come about.

Oh, Stenz, no doubt that 4,000 defenders of mixed quality strung out all over a 150 square mile island can defeat 20,000 attackers landed in the first 24 hours, with 10,000 more per day coming in after that. How could they not possibly win against that tempo?

Why would it “collapse” in the face of scattered FJ drops with no form of support, heavy weapons, vehicles or reinforcements apparent?

The advantage of numbers, elite troops, and masses of Luftwaffe close air support, obviously.
 
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