Operation Sea Lion (1974 Sandhurst Wargame)

Because what you're describing doesn't win battles. It loses them. It was called, "fangs out, hair on fire" in WW1 fighter pilot lingo. Those guys tended to die fast and stupid, and term was highly derogatory. So, the more "fangs out, hair on fire" the RN and RAF, the more they will make stupid decisions and suffer the consequences for it. Put another way, do you think Spruance and Nimitz were the best admirals in the Pacific War because they were hot blooded? No. They were the best because they were ice cold.

The good news for the Royal Navy is that they can't lose the battle. The Germans are quite literally outnumbered by dozens to one. The Germans were unable to defeat the RAF over southern England IOTL in 1940 and everything you want to do just makes the RAF's job easier. The RAF were willing to lose literally entire squadrons of bombers in attacks against utterly irrelevant targets in Denmark but you don't think they will against German forces occupying British land three miles from Portsmouth?
 
I do agree with you in the Hitler offers a peace treaty being the best possible strategy for the Nazis. The problem with that being that this is summer 1940 less than two years after the "This (the Sudetes) is my last territorial ambition in Europe" and nobody (even less in Belgium the Netherlands Norway Poland Tcheckoslovakia or France) believe him anymore...

Well, the saving grace of making this "promise" to Britain is that unlike all the continental powers, nobody has to trust anybody this time. The geography and the balance of naval forces are effectively the collateral. As I say, if you step back from the emotions running high at the time, and if you get away from the drama of an unprecedented air war, the reality is that in late summer 1940 there is essentially a strategic stalemate with no military solution. The only way to break that impasse is either a diplomatic solution or to change the math by widening the war to include other powers. Germany very helpfully went out and did that for Britain, not once but twice.

Which is why I'm a little reluctant to even make this kind of speculation, because a high-risk and subtle diplomatic strategy is probably well beyond the capacity of a regime that made such cataclysmic strategic miscalculations as the Nazis did in 1939 and 1941 (twice - USSR and US). But just sticking to the realm of the hypothetical, I don't see that they have any other better way out.
 
What forces were present on the Isle of Wight to justify your assertions that the air landings would be defeated at the drop zones?

Ah either you are missing the point or do not understand the entire situation. The Garrison on Wight does not have to defeat anyone by itself, it merely needs to hold until relieved. It is the Fallschirmjäger who must win or book their holidays in Canada.
 
Ah either you are missing the point or do not understand the entire situation. The Garrison on Wight does not have to defeat anyone by itself, it merely needs to hold until relieved. It is the Fallschirmjäger who must win or book their holidays in Canada.
Actually I believe that the British Empire planned to both book and pay for those holidays -- very sporting, good chaps...
 
Ah either you are missing the point or do not understand the entire situation. The Garrison on Wight does not have to defeat anyone by itself, it merely needs to hold until relieved. It is the Fallschirmjäger who must win or book their holidays in Canada.
a nice holiday resort on the shores of lake superior await complete with rustic cabins a lovely beach and woodlands.
 

Coulsdon Eagle

Monthly Donor
In honour of Glenn's recent posts, where the poster opining an invasion can be made demands everyone else supplies information on why it can't succeed, but ignores all responses that actually support said failure, I state the following: -

The only way this plan can work is is a massive TROLL is able to relocate the IOW from it's usual spot just south of one of Britain's premier heavily defended naval basses, to somewhere around Zossen, where an army of TROLLS can flatten the earth until it is flat enough to land an aircraft on it under guaranteed air superiority.

This tactic is guaranteed to work.
Reconnaissance not required.
Only problem would be in Glenn insisted upon untrained TROLLS being thriwn out of aircraft.
Locating them would be difficult but if you can't spot a TROLL
London would sue for peace in an instant.
 
Ah either you are missing the point or do not understand the entire situation. The Garrison on Wight does not have to defeat anyone by itself, it merely needs to hold until relieved. It is the Fallschirmjäger who must win or book their holidays in Canada.
If the garrison can't hold the points where reinforcement would arrive, which would be the points the German attackers would move to secure as quickly as possible, they can't be relieved. They still have to fight. It doesn't matter if the garrison is running around the interior if the Germans are able to set up coastal defenses on the shoreline.
 
In honour of Glenn's recent posts, where the poster opining an invasion can be made demands everyone else supplies information on why it can't succeed, but ignores all responses that actually support said failure, I state the following: -

The only way this plan can work is is a massive TROLL is able to relocate the IOW from it's usual spot just south of one of Britain's premier heavily defended naval basses, to somewhere around Zossen, where an army of TROLLS can flatten the earth until it is flat enough to land an aircraft on it under guaranteed air superiority.

This tactic is guaranteed to work.
Reconnaissance not required.
Only problem would be in Glenn insisted upon untrained TROLLS being thriwn out of aircraft.
Locating them would be difficult but if you can't spot a TROLL
London would sue for peace in an instant.
Away with your ASB nonsense.

There is however the Johnson Gambit. If the Germans can pile enough weight on top of the south shore of the Isle of Wight they might be able to tip it over and send all the British garrisons tumbling right off into the sea.

Faced with such a shock attack Churchill would probably have no choice but to surrender lest the same thing happen to England itself.

Edited to add: this is not an attempt to bring in contemporary politics. The link merely goes to an accomplished strategist explaining a theoretical military maneuver.
 
If the garrison can't hold the points where reinforcement would arrive, which would be the points the German attackers would move to secure as quickly as possible, they can't be relieved. They still of to fight. It doesn't matter if the garrison is running around the interior if the Germans are able to set up coastal defenses on the shoreline.
the germans had no means to bring heavy equipment ashore whereas the british had landing craft capable of delivering 16 ton tanks to the many beaches under their guns which did not have cliffs behind them.so relief is available.
 
If the garrison can't hold the points where reinforcement would arrive, which would be the points the German attackers would move to secure as quickly as possible, they can't be relieved. They still of to fight. It doesn't matter if the garrison is running around the interior if the Germans are able to set up coastal defenses on the shoreline.

Well here is the thing, the FJs are light infantry without artillery. It is going to take awhile for them to manage to take any defended position. Worse much of the north of the Isle of Wight is within range of land artillery, the rest can be covered from the sea...you know what else covers the sea? The Royal Navy...these jokes write themselves while the FJs will be writing their WAGs and mummies, "Sorry I cannot make it back, some arsehole kicked me out of an aeroplane over the Isle of Wight."

The defenders know the points of the island they must hold and where they are. The funny thing is paratroopers landing in the dark quite literally won't know where they are,well except for those unfortunate enough to come down in the sea but others might well be in Hampshire for all they know...oh damn they are, well that is a bit of a blow.
 

Ian_W

Banned
The only thing that actually matters for the purpose of this discussion is that there were beaches on IOW accessible from the south that were viable for assault between about July 10 and July 30th. .

Also, your dates are wrong.

Some bloke or other called Glenn239 claimed a precondition for the RN being driven from Portsmouth, so the Luftwaffe also needs to time drive the RN away from Portsmouth (and Southampton and every other port within ~3 hours steaming of the IoW).

While I wanked the FJs to take the whole island in the initial rush in July, if you require the RN to be neutralised push the date out to Septmeber at least (and that means leaving the UK's aircraft industry and radar infrastructure intact while the Luftwaffe operates against the RN).
 

hipper

Banned
If the garrison can't hold the points where reinforcement would arrive, which would be the points the German attackers would move to secure as quickly as possible, they can't be relieved. They still have to fight. It doesn't matter if the garrison is running around the interior if the Germans are able to set up coastal defenses on the shoreline.

i'm fascinated what kind of costal defences you can parachute out of a JU52 that will stop a destroyer coming alongside the quay at Cowes and unloading a company of marines.
 
I'm fascinated what kind of coastal defenses you can parachute out of a JU52 that will stop a destroyer coming alongside the quay at Cowes and unloading a company of marines.

And there's the crux of the problem, the FJ won't have much in the way of heavy weapons - some MG's and mortars and maybe a few light AT guns or very light artillery. And getting more ammo is going to be an issue along with food, water and other supplies...
 
Would the Germans have not been able to use gliders or air landing forces with heavier equipment? There are two extant airports in the Isle of Wight; how quickly would the British on the mainland begin bombarding airfields to deny them to the Germans? The same argument about the Royal Navy could have been made at Crete; is the Luftwaffe not as good at bombing ships in 1940 compared to 1941, and why? Would the defenders have been able to effectively coordinate artillery support from the mainland? Does anyone know how many defenders there were and where they were entrenched?
 

Ian_W

Banned
Insufficient information to sketch out an air operations plan to that level of detail. But generally, as much as possible at night to limit casualties in the air transport forces. Exceptions would be during the air operations phase in the initial attack, (first 24 or 48 hours) and for daylight supply cannister drops by bomber formations. Day ops would have to be heavily escorted. Air landings during the day could be tested, but losses might be too heavy to sustain regularily. Sea operations would be night landing in the initial assault. Troops would move by fast ship at night. Supply would be both day and night - in the daytime inviting the RN and RAF into the Channel for a massed air sea battle with the LW in the SLOC.



For IOW, I'd be looking at the airfields first, suitable fields second, roads and fields with hedges that have to be removed third. Beaches, not even on the list - they must have been truly without options.



Insufficient information on air landing conditions on IOW during July 1940.



Insufficient information to draw up an air landing plan. Generally speaking, Cowes would be a high-priority objective in order to cut off the island from the mainland - you know all that yapping about the Germans not having a port for heavy equipment? Works both ways, don't it, if they take Cowes and whatever other piers are on the north shore? Towards the center, capture of all airfields and any locations intended to be used as airfields. In the south, capture of the radar station intact and moving on the assault beaches from the rear. That's major ops in several different directions. The available initial drop force might be in the order of 7,000 or 8,000 troops, of which the effective fighting forces would be half due to night time dispersion and confusion. the sea landing is 3,000-5,000 depending on what ships are available. The second air wave goes in during the morning heavily escorted, also of about 7,000 troops, but this time it will lose a slice of paratroopers to RAF fighters. The third wave would presumably be after dark if the second wave encountered serious RAF resistance, late afternoon if for some reason attrition was not too serious.

Air transport at night is what forces with air inferiority do. If the Luftwaffe cannot control the airspace over the Isle of Wight during the day, the British are going to both bomb and photograph the FJs excessively. The wisdom of a para assault on a position where the Luftwaffe is hiding from the RAF during the day is questionable.

The RN is a far greater threat to ships than the RAF. If we cannot provide sufficient air escorts during the day to allow fast transports to go the 64 nautical miles from Cherbourg to the Isle of Wight, then we will face great difficulties in controlling the air space above the Isle of Wight.

Night resupply runs will be at serious risk from British destroyers and other light forces. Over the beach supply may also be bombed from the air, and at night the Luftwaffe can do little to prevent this.

There are no RAF airfields on the Isle of Wight in 1940. The civilian airfield would be able to support a Storch aircraft, but not a JU-52. It is also expected to be a priority target for RN bombardment.

If there is insufficient information on landing conditions on the IOW, then the wisdom of an air-based assault must be questioned.

The British can emplace long-range guns on the other side of the Solent and use them in the battle of the Isle of Wight. We

The Heer does not have 7-8000 FJs in July 1940. This number might be available by September, but some will be needed for Operation Sealion itself.

We are concerned about the time needed to force the RN from Portsmouth and other ports within range. What is your estimate of how long this will take ?

The operation will, of course, be delayed until this happens, yes ?
 
Last edited:
Would the Germans have not been able to use gliders or air landing forces with heavier equipment? There are two extant airports in the Isle of Wight; how quickly would the British on the mainland begin bombarding airfields to deny them to the Germans? The same argument about the Royal Navy could have been made at Crete; is the Luftwaffe not as good at bombing ships in 1940 compared to 1941, and why? Would the defenders have been able to effectively coordinate artillery support from the mainland? Does anyone know how many defenders there were and where they were entrenched?


You know I should not be annoyed at your refusal to read the thread above but I am. The heavier equipment that can be brought by the gliders available in 1940 amounts to same kinds of equipment: heavy machineguns, mortars and infantry/mountain guns that sees the defending brigade derisively referred to as light infantry by some. Anything heavier is a no. This is not Crete, air cover for the allies is twenty five fold stronger in single engine fighters alone (some 300 in range as opposed to 12) and now they can call upon 500 light twin and single engine bombers which they did not have at Crete. The Royal Navy is massively stronger, an order of magnitude just counting units in the local area, even not counting Portsmouth bases such as Plymouth and Harwich are much closer than Limassol was to Crete.

The Luftwaffe is not as good at bombing ships but they were not that good in 1941 either, not that it matters because the air forces opposing them are massively stronger while their own presence is only about 5 fold increased as to what it was over Crete in terms of fighters and level bombers and only double the number of Stukas… Stukas do not operate well in air space inhabited by enemy fighters.

The Royal Navy can start firing on the one operational air field by the next night if not before, though the before is rather redundant due to the fact the RAF has 300 single engine fighters in range. The Royal artillery might take longer (that said there is the little matter of the RA gunnery school actually on the island), some of the best sites for firing on the Isle of Wight require preparation but still it ought to be quickly enough. Earlier Royal Navy and possibly RA fire support can be provided to the defenders of the northern ports much sooner. The FJs will need several hours to form up into coherent units.

Note no one is relying on a plucky local commander simply sweeping up the attackers on their drop zones, the defenders do not have to.
 
Would the Germans have not been able to use gliders or air landing forces with heavier equipment? There are two extant airports in the Isle of Wight; how quickly would the British on the mainland begin bombarding airfields to deny them to the Germans? The same argument about the Royal Navy could have been made at Crete; is the Luftwaffe not as good at bombing ships in 1940 compared to 1941, and why? Would the defenders have been able to effectively coordinate artillery support from the mainland? Does anyone know how many defenders there were and where they were entrenched?
The Royal Navy did disrupt the German naval operation off Crete, for as long as it mattered anyway.

As for whether they can take the Isle of Wight via paratroop assault, I can't speak for everyone here but my perspective is that it hardly matters, because even if the Germans can take the island by paratroop assault, they probably still wouldn't be able to hold it, and even if they could hold it, they wouldn't be able to use it as a jumping-off point to go anywhere else.

Best-case scenario is it is a dead end. You'll utterly devastate the airborne to take an island of marginal strategic consequence, and you won't be able to take Crete.
 

Errolwi

Monthly Donor
Would the Germans have not been able to use gliders or air landing forces with heavier equipment? There are two extant airports in the Isle of Wight; how quickly would the British on the mainland begin bombarding airfields to deny them to the Germans? The same argument about the Royal Navy could have been made at Crete; is the Luftwaffe not as good at bombing ships in 1940 compared to 1941, and why? Would the defenders have been able to effectively coordinate artillery support from the mainland? Does anyone know how many defenders there were and where they were entrenched?

What on earth do you mean? The Axis had air superiority around Crete, and the Allies were desperately short of supplies to send (a dozen working radios would have made a huge difference, for instance). Completely different situation.
 
What on earth do you mean? The Axis had air superiority around Crete, and the Allies were desperately short of supplies to send (a dozen working radios would have made a huge difference, for instance). Completely different situation.
Not completely different. I have no doubt that the Royal Navy would disrupt the amphibious dimension of this Isle of Wight assault just as thoroughly as they disrupted the naval dimension of the invasion of Crete. Even more thoroughly, in fact.

But then, instead of successfully withdrawing the remains of the British forces as they did in Crete, they will doubtless remain in situ and turn their guns on the paratroopers. Perhaps Glenn could furnish us with the appropriate statistics for what happens when light infantry fight destroyers.
 
Top