Insufficient information to sketch out an air operations plan to that level of detail. But generally, as much as possible at night to limit casualties in the air transport forces. Exceptions would be during the air operations phase in the initial attack, (first 24 or 48 hours) and for daylight supply cannister drops by bomber formations. Day ops would have to be heavily escorted. Air landings during the day could be tested, but losses might be too heavy to sustain regularily. Sea operations would be night landing in the initial assault. Troops would move by fast ship at night. Supply would be both day and night - in the daytime inviting the RN and RAF into the Channel for a massed air sea battle with the LW in the SLOC.
For IOW, I'd be looking at the airfields first, suitable fields second, roads and fields with hedges that have to be removed third. Beaches, not even on the list - they must have been truly without options.
Insufficient information on air landing conditions on IOW during July 1940.
Insufficient information to draw up an air landing plan. Generally speaking, Cowes would be a high-priority objective in order to cut off the island from the mainland - you know all that yapping about the Germans not having a port for heavy equipment? Works both ways, don't it, if they take Cowes and whatever other piers are on the north shore? Towards the center, capture of all airfields and any locations intended to be used as airfields. In the south, capture of the radar station intact and moving on the assault beaches from the rear. That's major ops in several different directions. The available initial drop force might be in the order of 7,000 or 8,000 troops, of which the effective fighting forces would be half due to night time dispersion and confusion. the sea landing is 3,000-5,000 depending on what ships are available. The second air wave goes in during the morning heavily escorted, also of about 7,000 troops, but this time it will lose a slice of paratroopers to RAF fighters. The third wave would presumably be after dark if the second wave encountered serious RAF resistance, late afternoon if for some reason attrition was not too serious.