Operation Sea Lion (1974 Sandhurst Wargame)

[Post]

Experience of other air landings at night during this period right up to the very well organized D-Day landings all had one thing in common - in most examples only about 10% of the troops landed where they were supposed to and it took days sometime for units to regroup to their approx call sign strength.

Not to mention that with landing a few miles off target* at the Island of Wight, there's a good chance you won't land on the island at all. With the D-day drops, most were still on land and caused confusion among the defenders. Paradrops in the Channel won't cause a lot confusion.

*and the target being the ports

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Ill take that back

As late as '2003' - 173d Airborne Brigade made a night drop to capture Bashur Airfield in Northern Iraq

With all the advantages of modern comms, well trained elite troops, GPS, Night vision and decades of experience the unit still managed to spread its 1000 odd troops across 10,000 meters despite the C17 aircraft involved all dropping the Paras within a minute.

It took 36 hours for the unit to regroup.

Edit: 15 hours not 36 but still....

No. Any such night assault on the IoW in July of 1940 would have been a disaster

 

[steamboy]

Ill take that back

As late as '2003' - 173d Airborne Brigade made a night drop to capture Bashur Airfield in Northern Iraq

With all the advantages of modern comms, well trained elite troops, GPS, Night vision and decades of experience the unit still managed to spread its 1000 odd troops across 10,000 meters despite the C17 aircraft involved all dropping the Paras within a minute.

It took 36 hours for the unit to regroup.

No. Any such night assault on the IoW in July of 1940 would have been a disaster

Were these German troops? NEIN! There is your answer!

But in all seriousness, its absurd, the thought that you could air drop the guys at night with no training in such a thing and considering that most of Der UberTroopers are going to be Heer infantrymen that are given a parachute and shoved out of planes...

 

[Ian_W]

Any such night assault on the IoW in July of 1940 would have been a disaster

Any assault on the IoW in July 1940 would be a disaster, as the troops don't go anywhere militarily useful and all the ports are under British guns on the other side of the Solent so they can't get off ...

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Any assault on the IoW in July 1940 would be a disaster, as the troops don't go anywhere militarily useful and all the ports are under British guns on the other side of the Solent so they can't get off ...

Well yes - that the Elephant (painted in neon colors and flashing lights) in the room regarding this idea

 

[alfredtuomi]

for the lack of anything better to do..........by my calculations heading do north at the widest part of the isle and travelling at 72 mph you travel for ten minutes over land.heading do east/west you spend 17 minutes over land.Now consider the land is rather skinny where you wish(forced) to jump being a few degrees off course puts you in the water.A southern approach to yarmouth ferry gives you about 3.5 minutes over land.You either make the drop far inland or plan on half your troops drowning.

 

[sloreck]

Assuming the Germans take the IoW, then what? If they say "ve haff your citizens hostage", well sucks for the Brits trapped but that did not cause any issues for the UK when the Channel islands were occupied. Sure, the FJ can be resupplied by air, look how well the Luftwaffe managed that for the troops at Stalingrad, cause there aren't going to be any meaningful supply runs by ships. IF the Germans could resupply freely, and IF they could bring in heavy artillery that could reach Portsmouth, IF those artillery sites could be protected against counterbattery fire and air attack, and IF the supply of heavy shells was flowing freely, then maybe they could make life difficult for the RN in Portsmouth. Sounds like a plan to me, what could go werong.

 

[Finbarr the Fair]

You're right that there are serious reasons to think this strategy would fail. On the flip side, there are risks to any approach. The only three that anyone has credibly floated for Germany in 1940 are, so far as I can see, Sea Lion, Barbarossa, or a unilateral ceasefire. Maybe you can do the first two together, and maybe you can do the second two together. You certainly can't have all three.

Now Glenn has made a valiant effort at making a case for the first of those, but has failed utterly.

The real world has pronounced its judgement on the second.

Which leaves a diplomatic route. Cue the howls of protests that I am being unrealistic, no doubt, but if someone wants a credible answer to "how does Germany win the war in 1940," I think that's the best one there is.

You are probably right or at least it's a better bet than the USM. Where failure boosts British morale and dents the Nazi economy.

There is a fourth option, postponement of Barbarossa until the UK has sued for peace. Then pursuing the Atlantic plus Mediterranean strategy. Ramp up the U-boat production line and that of long range recce aircraft. Use the Airborne troops against Malta and try to take Suez. Or force Turkey to join the war and attack through the Levant.

Logistics bedevil the Mediterranean thrust and the Battle of the Atlantic will be slow and uncertain. If Lend-lease is available as OTL there is little chance of German victory before 1943 or later. And that assumes no Pearl Harbour dragging the US into the war as an active participant.

Without Lend-lease the Germans may well be able to force the UK to make peace eventually. But better rationing of USD assets, skimping on Bomber Command build up, etc mean this could be later than many think, well into 1942 or even 1943. Hello, Pearl Harbour again (?). Not to mention the USSR has an extra two to three years to restructure and build up its armed forces.

It is probable that given the economic disparity between the Germans and each of the main Allies alone that Germany simply can't afford a long war. Even just against the British Empire.

 

[hopper2cool]

I think the critique is bang on - posters seem to react to the idea of Sealion way too much for the actual content of the subject matter. To me it doesn't even rise to the level of Tunisia in terms of Axis risk.

Glenn I am picking up a strong "Choose Your Own Adventure" vibe from you. That you the reader know that Barbarossa is unwinable so you go back to the "Sea Lion branch" but not sure where to go from there. Which is why you have so many mutually exclusive ideas.
Or to put it another way I feel that you are the one with a Dogmatic Belief. You believe Barbarossa is unwinable. I would say that's probably true. But why is Sea Lion the only other option Nazi Germany has? Why fight the UK in the way they are strongest (aka on water) where they are the strongest (aka Great Britain) unless you believe in Sea Lion?

 

[Paul_Sussex]

Flogging a dead horse, but -
The west Solent entry is about a mile or so between Hurst Castle and the Isle of Wight.
The east Solent is guarded by sea forts with, certainly at Horse Sands Fort, 6"BL guns. It was also partly closed off by the Submarine Barrier, although this may have been after 1940.
There are no viable ports on the south of the Isle and approaches to those on the north would be protected and under direct fire from mainland artillery and naval gunfire.
The topography of the Isle is such that there is no chance of clearing impromptu airstrips capable of handling transport aircraft; in any event, these would soon be located by aeriel recconaisance, pinpointed on maps and subjected to shelling and bombing.
The only way of supplying any invading force will be over beaches, probably only at Sandown Bay, using rowing boats from freighters anchored offshore.
These will be subjected to air attack and attack by Coastal Forces, destroyers and possibly cruisers (no need for battleships), whilst relying for protection on the few remaining Kreigsmarine warships and, during the day, what Luftwaffe fighters can be spared from escort duties.
If supply runs are limited to night hours, there is a smaller window to cross the channel, anchor, tranship cargo and land it. And the Royal Navy will still be out there with RADAR, starshells and an assortment of guns from .303 to 6".
Against this (and whatever troops are already based on the Isle) you have a mix of trained and green FJ, jumping at night, armed only with pistols and grenades until they find their canisters in the dark and in unfamiliar terrain.
Hmmmmmm...

 

[Deleted member 94680]

There is a fourth option, postponement of Barbarossa until the UK has sued for peace. Then pursuing the Atlantic plus Mediterranean strategy. Ramp up the U-boat production line and that of long range recce aircraft. Use the Airborne troops against Malta and try to take Suez. Or force Turkey to join the war and attack through the Levant.

I would argue the fourth option is offer the British peace. There is no reason for the British to pack up and go home as long as your only methods of forcing them to the table are bombing and the Battle of the Atlantic. These are both methods the British will believe they can win and as such will only harden their will to fight.

By making peace with the “fellow Saxons” - and it must be a genuine peace, with no territorial adjustments and France left unoccupied - there is a chance (admittedly slim) that the British will allow eventual aggression against the USSR. IMHO a large part of the driver for the alliance with the USSR against Nazi Germany was the fact the Nazis were at war with the WAllies as well. Enemy of my enemy and all that. If the threat of WAllied-Nazi War is removed, there is a chance that conservative, reactionary voices in the West would allow the Nazis to deal with the Soviet Menace on their own. This then possibly allows for Japanese aggression against Moscow as well and even the possibility of supplies coming to Japan, provided there is no attempt for a Co-Prosperity Sphere.

But, it is a slim chance. There's every chance voices in the West will view Nazi aggression as Nazi aggression, regardless of who it is targeted at, as a threat to be dealt with.

 

[Not James Stockdale]

How would an attack on the Isle of Wight compare to the air desant on Crete?

 

[Alanith]

How would an attack on the Isle of Wight compare to the air desant on Crete?

I think the word I want is “Tragi-comically.”

 

[Glenn239]

After the night drop, they will also send in reinforcements at night? And land and unload at night? Really?

Insufficient information to sketch out an air operations plan to that level of detail. But generally, as much as possible at night to limit casualties in the air transport forces. Exceptions would be during the air operations phase in the initial attack, (first 24 or 48 hours) and for daylight supply cannister drops by bomber formations. Day ops would have to be heavily escorted. Air landings during the day could be tested, but losses might be too heavy to sustain regularily. Sea operations would be night landing in the initial assault. Troops would move by fast ship at night. Supply would be both day and night - in the daytime inviting the RN and RAF into the Channel for a massed air sea battle with the LW in the SLOC.

A lot of the Ju-52 landed at the beaches and the highway. Which were not soggy.

For IOW, I'd be looking at the airfields first, suitable fields second, roads and fields with hedges that have to be removed third. Beaches, not even on the list - they must have been truly without options.

A big problem with the attack was that the airfields were soon littered with destroyed aircraft. So most landed on any piece of flat ground. Of which there's a lot more in the Netherlands than on Wight.

Insufficient information on air landing conditions on IOW during July 1940.

They're a lot closer than the germans, and have the benefit of having access to a harbour.

Insufficient information to draw up an air landing plan. Generally speaking, Cowes would be a high-priority objective in order to cut off the island from the mainland - you know all that yapping about the Germans not having a port for heavy equipment? Works both ways, don't it, if they take Cowes and whatever other piers are on the north shore? Towards the center, capture of all airfields and any locations intended to be used as airfields. In the south, capture of the radar station intact and moving on the assault beaches from the rear. That's major ops in several different directions. The available initial drop force might be in the order of 7,000 or 8,000 troops, of which the effective fighting forces would be half due to night time dispersion and confusion. the sea landing is 3,000-5,000 depending on what ships are available. The second air wave goes in during the morning heavily escorted, also of about 7,000 troops, but this time it will lose a slice of paratroopers to RAF fighters. The third wave would presumably be after dark if the second wave encountered serious RAF resistance, late afternoon if for some reason attrition was not too serious.

Do you think that could be done? How? And when would they be able to drive it away? It sure as hell won't be july or august 1940, becuse the LW is busy with other things at that time.

This isn't the historical scenario where the Germans idled around for a month deciding what to do - in this sketch the decision to invade IOW as the prelimary to Sealion is made much earlier, in early or mid June, before the surrender of France. There is no Kanalkampf in July. There is no sustained assault on RAF 11 Group in August. The LW needs to rapidly establish the single-engine bases up on the coast, and the bases for air landing operations as close as possible to the target. Twin engine bomber bases can be further back, especially for those units flying at night - the target is the British ports. Training of Stuka and ME-110 units for ship attack in preparation for the battle of the SLOC. The Knickebein system needs a transmitter as close as possible to IOW by mid-July. Coordination with the Italians on their role in the offensive. On the Mediterreanean front, the objectives of Malta and Egypt are on hold into 1941. The immediate drive in July is into Spain for Gibraltar, with primarily Italian airpower. That's the sketch.

 

[Glenn239]

It's almost as if... and I know this is craaaazy, but stay with me... as if, I don't know, they were aware there was a risk of invasion and spotting flotillas being mustered was a early warning sign of it?

Gee, so invading across the Channel at night in 1940 with strong RN forces in the vicinity was risky, even if the invasion force was small and fast? Thanks for the info - I'll file it under, "Things We All Knew Already"

 

[Glenn239]

If there's so much as a single living German on UK soil the RN and RAF will literally accept any casualties it takes to kill them. I have no idea why Glenn just can't accept this simple fact.

Because what you're describing doesn't win battles. It loses them. It was called, "fangs out, hair on fire" in WW1 fighter pilot lingo. Those guys tended to die fast and stupid, and term was highly derogatory. So, the more "fangs out, hair on fire" the RN and RAF, the more they will make stupid decisions and suffer the consequences for it. Put another way, do you think Spruance and Nimitz were the best admirals in the Pacific War because they were hot blooded? No. They were the best because they were ice cold.

 

[mudhead]

Gee, so invading across the Channel at night in 1940 with strong RN forces in the vicinity was risky, even if the invasion force was small and fast? Thanks for the info - I'll file it under, "Things We All Knew Already"

Next to:

Agreed, but once the invasion is at sea, the RN is by far and away the primary danger. If the RN wasn't a factor, if the RN didn't exist, and the defenses were the RAF and British army only, the chances for Sealion would have been much, much higher.

 

[Glenn239]

well strangely enough you need either a port in working order when your fast transports arrive(better be doing 20+ knots if you want to unload at night)or landing craft(barges).

You don't need a port for an assault. You need a beach and the correct tide and weather conditions.

 

[DaveBC]

I would argue the fourth option is offer the British peace. There is no reason for the British to pack up and go home as long as your only methods of forcing them to the table are bombing and the Battle of the Atlantic. These are both methods the British will believe they can win and as such will only harden their will to fight.

By making peace with the “fellow Saxons” - and it must be a genuine peace, with no territorial adjustments and France left unoccupied - there is a chance (admittedly slim) that the British will allow eventual aggression against the USSR. IMHO a large part of the driver for the alliance with the USSR against Nazi Germany was the fact the Nazis were at war with the WAllies as well. Enemy of my enemy and all that. If the threat of WAllied-Nazi War is removed, there is a chance that conservative, reactionary voices in the West would allow the Nazis to deal with the Soviet Menace on their own. This then possibly allows for Japanese aggression against Moscow as well and even the possibility of supplies coming to Japan, provided there is no attempt for a Co-Prosperity Sphere.

But, it is a slim chance. There's every chance voices in the West will view Nazi aggression as Nazi aggression, regardless of who it is targeted at, as a threat to be dealt with.

Speaking as one of the people who initially speculated this course of action, I would say peace can only be offered, not negotiated. Even if Churchill was not in charge, once the panic subsides, I really can't see there being any complex terms that both sides would find acceptable. The trust level on the British side is effectively nil, and despite the Hess adventure, I have to think the German government is not going to be in the mood to offer sweeping concessions straight after their dramatic victory against France. This is not auspicious for negotiations.

Consequently the only way out of this I can see is if Germany intentionally and from the outset draws a very hard and clear line at the English Channel, does not take the Channel Islands, and explicitly says, "Look, this is the new border: the ocean. We are a land power and we now have the land. Britain, it is up to you to accept this new border or not to accept it, but take it or leave it, we are done fighting. As far as we are concerned, this is now over." And then it is simply a matter of waiting until the British government accepts that reality.

Not a risk-free scenario by any means, nor, I would point out, is it the sort of diplomatic alternative that the Nazi leadership is likely to see as remotely feasible. But Glenn is attempting to maneuver us here into the same position as every other thread where I have read his work, which is that Barbarossa was clearly impossible and therefore Sea Lion should have been considered. Well, Sea Lion is impossible too. That leaves my route, because at least it isn't impossible, merely unlikely.

 

[Glenn239]

It doesn’t, the USN proved that in the Pacific. However, sea assault requires ‘sea control’, the USN proved that in the Pacific.

Assaulting an island just miles from the worlds most powerful navy’s largest base is ‘courageous’.

The RN has to be driven from Portsmouth as a pre-requisite. Pre-requisites are not 'courageous', they're a checklist. (No doubt you'll now inform me that the LW cannot drive the RN out of Portsmouth in a month of bombing).