If you'd wish some meaningful replies, maybe providing some meaningful details...?
You are aware that, given what else was happening around the world in those years, this happening in 1941 is entirely different (and IMHO, wholly incredible) from the same happening by 1942.
Assuming OP happens, then the USSR implodes in 1942-43 and LL might even be withdrawn. Not sure what the Wallies do then, they were pretty serious about keeping the Soviets in the fight to reduce their blood price for victory. Without the USSR I wonder if they then cut a deal to get out of the war.
That’s where you need to start, acquire some info first. And that was Hitler’s problem too, he didn’t know much about Barbarossa either, at least about his opponent. Hitler didn’t know that the Soviets had ten thousand tanks, had the ability to move entire factories eastward, and didn’t appreciate that it can get rather chilly in Russia.I don't know much about Barbarossa.
Then Russia is beaten and Germany has an actual chance of winning the war.
But if they're not in the war, this might lead to a BEF and AEF in the USSR. Because then the western allies wouldn't want the USSR to fall, and if the USSR fights on, Stalin may be persuaded to let the western allies in.OK, let's say this happens by the end of summer of 1942. Anything earlier seems nearly impossible, if you want to include Stalingrad among the end goals.
If that is the case, then Japan is in the war too (they'd move in any case, IMHO, but if Moscow has fallen in November 1941, then they have all the more incentive to go to Pearl). The big question is if the "hot-headed junior officers" of the Rikugun managed to abstain from attacking the Soviets in Manchuria or Mongolia. Given that they see the enemy stumbling and that they never liked the go-South strategy (a Kaigun strategy), my bet is that they do.
That’s where you need to start, acquire some info first. And that was Hitler’s problem too, he didn’t know much about Barbarossa either, at least about his opponent. Hitler didn’t know that the Soviets had ten thousand tanks, had the ability to move entire factories eastward, and didn’t appreciate that it can get rather chilly in Russia.
Military strategy tells all of us that when facing a much larger opponent you concentrate your forces to gain numerical superiority, but Hitler instead diluted his forces across a massive front in three separate campaigns. Clearly the Germans did not understand their opponent.
There’s no reasonable odds of a successful Operation Barbarossa, at least in its historic conception, preparation and execution. Operation Typhoon was even worse.
Hmmm.
The key fact unknown to Hitler (and, to be fair, to his generals and to his intel services) wasn't one of those you list. It was the Soviet capability of mobilizing new divisions. The Germans did know the Soviet population was large. But they did not know that the Krasnaya Armiya might succeed in drafting, training, feeding, clothing, equipping and arming tens and tens of divisions in addition to those that already existed in June 1941 (the number of which, anyway, the Abwehr underestimated).
That said, actually it is not accurate that the Germans did not achieve local numerical superiority in their three thrusts. They did. As to troops on the frontlines, they had more than their more populous enemy, all the more if you mention what most supporters of Barbarossa fail to mention, i.e. that there also were Finnish, Romanian etc. troops in the field. The Soviets were actually outnumbered in the first months of the war, notwithstanding the three German thrusts.
But the problem was that in those first months, the German met, and defeated (which in most cases means, destroyed) a number of divisions equal to that they expected. And the Soviets had more, and were mobilizing and fielding more.
As to the notion that a different conception and execution, presumably with a more concentrated approach, might succeed... maybe. My feeling is that this isn't impossible, but it's not very likely. It's Stolfi's hypothesis.
The problem with that is that it leaves important resources (population centers, factories, fertile farmland and some other raw resources) in the hands of the enemy; and, what's much more dangerous for that one straight thrust, it leaves two lethally exposed flanks North and South of it. The Soviet counterattacks in the first three months were disorganized and unsuccessful, yet they diverted German resources and bought time. Later, they grew more and more obnoxious - until they were finally successful in December. And although that was a success, it was limited - because the Germans were not really overextended and had left no significant frontage bulges.
I wouldn't want to see those long, long exposed flanks attacked all over the place in the fall - and I wouldn't rule out that, Moscow having been surrounded (I don't think the Germans can actually take it on the fly), this ATL's equivalent of OTL winter offensive cuts the long, long German bulge that surrounds Moscow. It would be 1812.
You've practically answered your own question there: After Smolensk.Quite Barbarossa does exactly what it was intended to do, the issue being the other 2/3 of the Red army. Even the German planning such as it was assumed the advances on Moscow Leningrad and beyond would be after the total destruction of the Red Army and basically administrative marches against no organised resistance.
After Smolensk the Germans are in no position to advance to Moscow in strength and the notion that you can ignore the largest concentration of Red army troops sitting behind the southern flank of AGC is Halders delusion.
You've practically answered your own question there: After Smolensk.
Have Guderian make a left turn to close the pocket. It sews it up and puts him in a better defensive position. There'll be something resembling the Yelena offensive, but it won't work as well.
Or just go the lazy way out and posit that the Soviet government panics and allows everything to spiral out of control.
You've practically answered your own question there: After Smolensk.
Have Guderian make a left turn to close the pocket. It sews it up and puts him in a better defensive position. There'll be something resembling the Yelena offensive, but it won't work as well.
Now team G is still pretty tired, but combine this with a (doable) lucky break to give them Leningrad and there's serious trouble coming for the bear.
Or just go the lazy way out and posit that the Soviet government panics and allows everything to spiral out of control.
Especially if LL is cut off the Soviets starve. And that is just the food problem, not the industrial machinery, electricity, or material issues. Even with LL the additional losses of men, cities, industry, etc. will be very crippling, especially if Murmansk also falls. Then there is the morale hit that comes with losing everything and the likely Stalin freakout if Moscow is lost. They might continue to resist in some capacity, but they weren't going to be effective and organizing national resistance won't be sustainable. I'd imagine the Wallies would consider taking over the Soviet part of Iran and advancing into the Caucasus if it looked like the Germans were going to take Baku. But at some point they'd have to consider invading Europe...would they even want to risk it?Yeah, I can pretty much see that Lend-Lease would be withdrawn - the Americans aren't going to go to the effort of backing such an obviously losing horse and the British will be unwilling to keep the convoys running, if they can even get a port to ship to.
Would the USSR "implode" though? Surely they would withdraw, purge a shitload of officers, politicians, "counterrevolutionaries" and look to keep fighting? This might be the end of Stalin, but some figure would rise to keep the revolution fighting.
The WAllies would probably look to redouble their efforts in the Med and Africa - a major drive through Syria, into the Caucasus maybe? They'll have plenty more equipment available, with LL being shut down.
Especially if LL is cut off the Soviets starve. And that is just the food problem, not the industrial machinery, electricity, or material issues. Even with LL the additional losses of men, cities, industry, etc. will be very crippling, especially if Murmansk also falls. Then there is the morale hit that comes with losing everything and the likely Stalin freakout if Moscow is lost. They might continue to resist in some capacity, but they weren't going to be effective and organizing national resistance won't be sustainable. I'd imagine the Wallies would consider taking over the Soviet part of Iran and advancing into the Caucasus if it looked like the Germans were going to take Baku. But at some point they'd have to consider invading Europe...would they even want to risk it?
They don't have many option once behind the Urals due to the lack of arable land and loss of industry. They'd be in survival mode. Look at the scholarship that has been done on the partisan movement recently; they were a LOT less effective than the Soviets claimed officially. Without sufficient external support, the capital lost, industry and resource evaporating and LL perhaps going away, they really won't have the means to continue on. It would be permanent due to how much they would be losing; even IOTL with LL there were major deficits until territory was liberated in late 1942 on and LL ramped up to new heights.I've always felt the "Soviets retreat behind the Urals and sulk" theory to be pretty unlikely, IMHO. Once the Great Patriotic War was begun, I feel there would be resistance of one kind or another until victory or genocide. But a removal of LL will severely cripple their ability to conduct Army-level operations. I don't know about it being permanently, though?
The other thing that has always left me wondering is - what comes next? Do the WAllies simply let the Nazis murder millions across the continent of Europe and shrug? Surely in a '41/'42 Nazis-victorious-over-the-Soviets scenario, WAllied offensives would continue in all other Theatres and plans would be laid to do something about Nazi Europe?
Concentrating their forces in one spot, Schwerpunkt, was exactly the German strategy which only worked effectively in 1939, 1940, and early 1941. The Soviet response to Blitzkrieg which involved more spread out combat along the front was deep operation or Soviet Deep Battle doctrine, which emphasized the need for multiple breakthrough points and reserves to exploit the breach quickly, or if not possible, to engage in a longer siege. The Soviets didn't yet have numerical superiority in Barbarossa, or even the Battle of Moscow.Military strategy tells all of us that when facing a much larger opponent you concentrate your forces to gain numerical superiority, but Hitler instead diluted his forces across a massive front in three separate campaigns. Clearly the Germans did not understand their opponent.