Operation Sea Lion (1974 Sandhurst Wargame)

[CV12Hornet]

Ammunition production not required for the invasion of Russia. A Sealion transport campaign needs 40,000 tons of steel per month.

Okay, but how much ammunition production does your "Fight through all of Spain to take Gibraltar" plan require? How much steel is being earmarked towards recapitalizing the German vehicle park for that campaign? And how much steel is being earmarked to make the transportation infrastructure in Spain less shitty?

Traverse time and rate of fire is relative to the firing ship, not just the target ship. A battleship's main guns can and will hit targets, but just like at Samar, they're not going to be any more effective than the lighter calibre weapons, IMO.

I've pointed out why Samar is a bad comparison to this situation before. Don't make me do it again, or I will be very cross with you.

Both sides have gas, don't they? Question on 11 Group - does its job get easier or harder if its bases are being gassed?

Both sides have gas - but one side has an explicit "no first use" policy with gas, and have to carry that gas across in very, very limited transport capacity with very, very limited ability to deliver it. And it's not the Brits.

Also, how the absolute fuck are the Germans getting within artillery range of the 11th Group's airfields? Sector A and RAF Friston aside, and maybe Sector Y, even 11th Group's airfields are too far away from the landing zones for the Germans to plausibly threaten them. That's three, maybe five of the group's eighteen airfields that could be plausibly threatened. Will that limit the group's operations? Yeah, probably. Enough to be decisive? I doubt it.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Why reinforce? In the unlikely event that significant numbers of Germans reach the IoW just pull out, use it as a live-fire range for the RA, keep the RN's boot on the LoC, and wait for the starving occupants of the unofficial PoW camp to decide they'd prefer to be the well-fed occupants of an official PoW camp.

It would disprove certain myths.....

 

[sloreck]

The raw materials needed to make ammunition have very little intersection with the raw materials needed to make Siebel Ferries, river barges etc. Yes, SOME of the "stuff" you need to make ammunition can be used for making ferries, barges, etc but not much. Those 40,000 tons of steel a month are not coming from ammunition not being used for Barbarossa. Steel used for ferries or barges, or other craft is NOT being used to make artillery pieces, tanks, trucks, etc. Each Siebel Ferry uses two aircraft engines, so we can more or less say that each ferry you build is one less twin engine bomber or two less fighter planes, and BTW the fuel used to run these ferries is taken from fuel for aero engines attached to aircraft.

The USA has the industrial capacity to "waste" effort on lots of aircraft designs that went nowhere, as well as building "backups" for successful designs (like the B-32 for the B-29). Unlike Germany, the USA had a rational centralized policy for allocation of resources.

 

[Deleted member 94680]

The anti-Sealion crowd argues out of both sides of its mouth on IOW. One post, they'll insist that Sealion is too costly. In another, when it's IOW where the cost of failure is so much less, (Crete levels), then without skipping a beat the "too costly" argument is dropped and some other argument is adapted, usually, "strategically pointless" or something like that.

Two different arguments can be used against two different proposals you know. Occupying the IoW (which is not exactly a given, to put it mildly) is strategically pointless and Sealion (as in an attempted invasion of the mainland) is too costly, as repeatedly explained.

The idea behind IOW was to draw the RN and RAF into a Channel battle sooner than Sealion could be executed. (ie, July 1940, not September 1940).

This is just a garbage statement.

IOW is 15 miles across, and the LW had nighttime navigation aids. How big is your living room? Night was better than day because of the RAF, which could extract large casualties in daylight, but was fairly useless at night. If you think the navigational hazard at night was worse than the Spitfire hazard in daylight, guess again.

IOW is big enough to be an advanced airfield, astride two major ports, was very poorly defended in July 1940, and large enough to be an airborne target at night.

You realise the ships of the RN can move, right? That the ships used to decimate an invasion convoy heading for the south coast of England can be used to decimate an invasion convoy heading for the IoW? That the RAF’s planes can fly over the IoW as well as the Channel and the south of England, all from the same bases? But you are correct, the IoW is big enough to be a nighttime target for the RAF, seeing as though they could bomb Germany.

 

[Deleted member 94680]

This point was covered earlier - the British army in Britain in September 1940 was not of the quality of the German army in France in June 1944. As time went on, (ie, 1941, 1942) the quality of the British army in the UK improved. But these measures took time.

No, the point was not “covered earlier”, you made a statement that has no bearing on the conversation at hand.

 

[Michele]

But you are correct, the IoW is big enough to be a nighttime target for the RAF, seeing as though they could bomb Germany.

I had promised myself I wouldn't contribute a post here. But this can be a teaching moment on the topic of "how not to be a Sealion delusionist".

If you
a) take a mere fact (the size of the Isle of Wight makes it a sizable target at night), and
b) add a statement based on utter ignorance (the Germans can drop paratroopers on the Isle of Wight at night - the utter ignorance is about the fact that German paratroopers weren't dropped at night), and
c) ignore the detail that the fact that would theoretically provide an advantage to the Germans would then certainly provide a larger advantage to the British (if the Isle of Wight is a sizable target at night, then the British bomber can target it, with the added bonus that their crews, unlike the crews of the Ju 52s were trained for night missions),

then you are a Sealion delusionist.
Avoid the above, and you won't be.

 

[sonofpegasus]

When anyone mentions attacking the Isle of Wight as an alternative oe even as part of the sea-mamal I fall over with mirth, I speak with Knowledge of the IOW (being a Corkhead) and know the coast and seas around it better than the back of my hand. As a site for a realistic assault on the UK it is an absolute no n started. It has been tried before and the French finally gave up in 1545 . Please not that a greatly outnumbered English force just pinned the French on the island, Job Done. I could write several thousand erudite words on the implausibility of the Germans even landing on the IOW. It makes the Friesian Island's invasion plans seem reasonable.
as soon a the Luftwaffe start to bomb the 9.2 coastal guns at Bembridge and the Needles the whole world will know where the landing is goin to be and you just cannot send barges out into the channel tides if those guns are not yet out of action. Needles New Battery used to engage E-boats doing 30Knts or more, just think how they would rub their hands with joy at multiple targets moving at 5knots max!!

 

[TDM]

The anti-Sealion crowd argues out of both sides of its mouth on IOW. One post, they'll insist that Sealion is too costly. In another, when it's IOW where the cost of failure is so much less, (Crete levels), then without skipping a beat the "too costly" argument is dropped and some other argument is adapted, usually, "strategically pointless" or something like that.

The idea behind IOW was to draw the RN and RAF into a Channel battle sooner than Sealion could be executed. (ie, July 1940, not September 1940).

Problem is with the IOW is that all it does is kill and/or bottle up German Paratroopers and their transport (Paratroopers and transport that were needed for Sealion)

What does Germany win from landing paratroopers on the IOW? They can't go anywhere, and they can't establish anything, they can't project force onto the rest of England.

It not even a good distraction in July for a Sealion in Sep, as in 6-8 weeks it will be over and done.

You say it draws the RN and RAF into a channel battle sooner. But how does that help Sealion? The fact that your intimating there will be a battle suggests you think the KM and LW are going to be there to fight them? And that also then assumes that the KM and LW can beat the RAF and RN in the channel (and thus leave Sealion free to go ahead).

Only there's no proof that the LW and KM can remove the RAF and RN from the channel if all four have a battle there.

Moreover it's not going to be a channel wide battle since you just talking about dropping paratroopers on the IOW*, but instead a Battle over and around the IOW. Now since as pointed out the RN can shell the IOW for it moorings in Portsmouth, and in fact can reinforce from Plymouth (and other ports) further out of LW effective reach your basically operating in the RN's lap.

The biggest problem for your plan here is that actually defeating what paratroopers you land on IOW isn't actually going to take much in RAF and RN resources, so doing so and facing of against the LW and KM won't be an issue.

In abstract You are right the potential loses are small compared to sealion in terms of men and machines, but just like in sealion you are only losing, there is no winning so it's loses for no trade off in gain. On top of that what you are losing is hard to replace and you had less of it than other things so actually your losses will be proportionally high in terms of what you are actually losing.




*well unless you also going to try amphibious landings on the IOW in a mini Sealion only as per last thread that a lot further for barges to go than the beaches in Sussex so all the problem of Sealion (particularly inappropriate and/or very finite transport resources) are made worse. And youe distraction/spoiling tactic to make a latter sealion work has really just become a sealion anyway.

 

[Derek Pullem]

Problem is with the IOW is that all it does is kill and/or bottle up German Paratroopers and their transport (Paratroopers and transport that were needed for Sealion)

Can someone enlighten me here. I though 22 Air Landing and 7 Flieger suffered huge losses in the Netherlands in May. Yet they are always mentioned as being available for use in Sealion as early as July.

So are they really green paratroopers?

 

[steamboy]

Can someone enlighten me here. I though 22 Air Landing and 7 Flieger suffered huge losses in the Netherlands in May. Yet they are always mentioned as being available for use in Sealion as early as July.

So are they really green paratroopers?

Those casualties, fake news my friend. Der Ubermensch never suffered casualties and will all be available for Wightlion.

 

[RodentRevolution]

Those casualties, fake news my friend. Der Ubermensch never suffered casualties and will all be available for Wightlion.

Well a wight is a type of undead, so it makes sense.

 

[steamboy]

Well a wight is a type of undead, so it makes sense.

Those diabolical Notzi's! That's their plan! Wightlion will work because of the sorcery of the Society of Thule! The entire island of the Isle of Wight will act as a giant phylactery for the Notzi sturmtruppen!

Or maybe they will claim it for themselves and then establish base there to raise the dead of those who drowned off the coast, binding them to their fucking nazi friendly ways!

 

[DJP]

Please forgive my ignorance with these questions.

If the plan was to beech barges between tides doesn't this present time for the Royal Navy to replenish their ammunition and then move to bombarding the beeches?
Could the R.A.F carpet bomb the invasion beaches? (Possibly not if defenders are close so dependent on the extent of German advance and size of bridgehead)
Or do they have mines to seed the waters around the invasion beaches to hamper the barges leaving the beaches and resupply in general.
What effect does high explosive dropped on shingle have? I have visions of the stones becoming shrapnel like missiles but may be way off the mark.

Is the continuing popularity of sea lion and belief in its feasibly linked to games like Hearts of Iron which by their nature have to sacrifice realism for playability?

With tongue firmly in cheek as the Royal Navy and the lack of an equivalent German force why not just steal it. Rather than dropping paratroopers on to rhe Isle of White launch a daring raid on Scapa Flow? In a daring feat of inter service cooperation paratroopers and a force of E boats and U boats attacked the British Fleet swiftly seizing control before sailing the fleet and their captured crews to Germany. (Preposterous but only slightly more so than some of the suggestions put forward to make Sea Lion work)

 

[Deleted member 94680]

Guys, I've searched online for "German invasion Isle of Wight" and found this absolute gem of an 'article' from the Daily Mail. Moral objections prevent me from linking to it directly, but I've cut and pasted it below. It's a joy...

How the Isle of Wight could have helped Hitler win the war: Nazi leader was talked out of his plans to invade the tiny island

• Adolf Hitler was the first to suggest the plan to occupy the Isle of Wight
• It could have provided his forces with a launch pad to bombard Britain
• Historian believes the British would have struggled to defend the island
• But Hitler was ultimately talked out of the plan to invade the mainland

By Matt Hunter For Mailonline

Published: 16:23, 25 September 2016 | Updated: 18:54, 26 September 2016

Analysis of military records reveal that Hitler was talked out of taking over the Isle of Wight

The course of the Second World War was forever altered after Hitler was talked out of a plot to occupy the Isle of Wight, an author has claimed. Analysis of German military records reveal that Hitler was the first to suggest the plan which, if successful, would have provided his forces with a launch pad from which they could bombard Britain. Military historian Dr Robert Forczyk believes the British would have struggled to defend the island and, in the event of it being occupied, unlikely to have had the resources available to take it back.

This would have given the Germans a base just four miles from shore as well as access to vital civilian airfields, giving a greater possibility of success for their plan to invade the mainland, known as Operation Sea Lion. But Hitler was ultimately talked out of the plan to invade the mainland by his naval commanders who feared the might of British submarines and overestimated the number of British soldiers, a decision the Fuhrer went on to regret. However a smaller invasion of the Isle of Wight to save face following the Luftwaffe's failure to defeat the RAF in the Battle of Britain by November 1940 was not ruled out. And in Dr Forczyk's new book, We March Against England, he claims this could have been a successful 'tactical surprise'.

The Germans had 25 Siebel ferries ready for their planned, later called off, invasion of Britain, known as Operation Sea Lion


Hitler was ultimately talked out of the plan to invade the Isle of Wight by his naval commanders who feared the might of British submarines. He said: 'Since the Isle of Wight was separated from the mainland by the Solent, the risk of strong British counter-attacks was small. 'Thus a relatively modest German force - perhaps two divisions - could be transported from Cherboug and seize the Isle of Wight in a coup de main.
'Holding the Isle of Wight offered considerable advantages that could have increased the feasibility of Operation Sea Lion. 'First, German artillery deployed on the north side of the Isle of Wight could shell the mainland across the Solent and force the Royal Navy to withdraw its cruiser-destroyer forces from the naval base at Portsmouth. 'Second, capture of the island would provide the Luftwaffe with four civilian airfields that were much closer to England, thereby alleviating the problems caused by the limited range of the Bf-109 fighter and providing an emergency landing site for damaged aircraft.' And Dr Forczyk said it was Hitler who personally suggested the Isle of Wight as a target. He said: 'Throughout the planning process we know Hitler kept bringing up the idea and it was incorporated into the Fuhrer Directive No. 16. 'He later said it was a mistake to let his Navy talk him out of the plan.'

This assessment appears to have been correct, with many of the gunners on the island being reservists and only very limited and dated air defences built before World War I in place. The gunning positions the island did have were in open positions, making them vulnerable to air attacks and the single battalion of troops relied on civilian buses and push bikes for transport. Dr Forczyk said the Germans could have had up to 4,000 troops on the island within two days and it is likely, with military commitments elsewhere, that recapturing it would not have been a priority for the British. He added: 'If the operation failed, it could be described as only a raid, not an invasion. If the coup de main succeeded, it would have both propaganda and tactical value for continuing the battle against Britain in 1941.'

Field Marshall Alan Brooke, he said, expressed concerns about the possibility of the Germans invading in his diary and doubts over the capability of his forces to resist. He added: 'In London, Brooke would likely regard the Isle of Wight landing as a diversion and be opposed to committing too many forces onto the island. 'Over the course of several weeks, the British would retreat into the western end of the island while the Germans would content themselves with capturing the port of Cowes in the north. 'In time, the Germans might take the rest of the Isle of Wight by the end of 1940 or simply hold the eastern end of the island as a bargaining chip. 'In any event, the prevailing military factors suggest that the Germans had the capability to seize at least the eastern half of the Isle of Wight in 1940 and there was very little that the British could do to stop this.'

Dr Forczyk's book also examines more widely the Third Reich's plan to occupy the mainland and challenges widely accepted opinions about its failure. The prevailing historical account, one endorsed by Winston Churchill, was that Operation Sea Lion never came to fruition because the Luftwaffe failed to gain air supremacy over the RAF during the Battle of Britain. However Dr Forczyk calls into question whether this really was the end of the plan and claims the Nazis could have launched an attack at a later date when the British thought the threat was over. He said: 'When all was said and done, at the end of September 1940 Hitler decided what was going to come next, not Churchill. 'Hitler had allies, Churchill had refugees. Without powerful allies or significant offensive capabilities, Great Britain had no potential to achieve its war aims on its own, whereas Hitler had multiple options to try to pressure Great Britain into a negotiated peace. Despite the RAF's impressive defence of Britain's airspace, Hitler still held the strategic initiative going into 1941, not Churchill.'


I included the photo of the Siebel, because it's a good one to show how little room there is on board one when it has mighty 88s fitted. The other publicity shots of grofaz and various Übermensch I've cut out because there's no need for it. The article has also been rearranged a little to avoid the daily hail's terrible one sentence paragraph layout.

But otherwise, I mean, the mind absolutely boggles. Perhaps it's not as hard to be a published Historian as I thought...

 

[Derek Pullem]

But otherwise, I mean, the mind absolutely boggles. Perhaps it's not as hard to be a published Historian as I thought...

Calling Dr Forczyk a Historian is a bit off. He writes about history but never trained as a historian. His doctorate is in International Relations, his first degree is political science and he has a background in the intelligence community. And he drove a tank for the US Army.

Picky - maybe. But you see an awful lot of journalists caliming to be historians when they are not and I generally believe that you need the scepticism of a historian and a devotion to multiple sources to write good history. Losing the political bias helps too but thats rare in any historical writing.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Guys, I've searched online for "German invasion Isle of Wight" and found this absolute gem of an 'article' from the Daily Mail. Moral objections prevent me from linking to it directly, but I've cut and pasted it below. It's a joy...

How the Isle of Wight could have helped Hitler win the war: Nazi leader was talked out of his plans to invade the tiny island

• Adolf Hitler was the first to suggest the plan to occupy the Isle of Wight
• It could have provided his forces with a launch pad to bombard Britain
• Historian believes the British would have struggled to defend the island
• But Hitler was ultimately talked out of the plan to invade the mainland

By Matt Hunter For Mailonline

Published: 16:23, 25 September 2016 | Updated: 18:54, 26 September 2016

Analysis of military records reveal that Hitler was talked out of taking over the Isle of Wight

The course of the Second World War was forever altered after Hitler was talked out of a plot to occupy the Isle of Wight, an author has claimed. Analysis of German military records reveal that Hitler was the first to suggest the plan which, if successful, would have provided his forces with a launch pad from which they could bombard Britain. Military historian Dr Robert Forczyk believes the British would have struggled to defend the island and, in the event of it being occupied, unlikely to have had the resources available to take it back.

This would have given the Germans a base just four miles from shore as well as access to vital civilian airfields, giving a greater possibility of success for their plan to invade the mainland, known as Operation Sea Lion. But Hitler was ultimately talked out of the plan to invade the mainland by his naval commanders who feared the might of British submarines and overestimated the number of British soldiers, a decision the Fuhrer went on to regret. However a smaller invasion of the Isle of Wight to save face following the Luftwaffe's failure to defeat the RAF in the Battle of Britain by November 1940 was not ruled out. And in Dr Forczyk's new book, We March Against England, he claims this could have been a successful 'tactical surprise'.

The Germans had 25 Siebel ferries ready for their planned, later called off, invasion of Britain, known as Operation Sea Lion


Hitler was ultimately talked out of the plan to invade the Isle of Wight by his naval commanders who feared the might of British submarines. He said: 'Since the Isle of Wight was separated from the mainland by the Solent, the risk of strong British counter-attacks was small. 'Thus a relatively modest German force - perhaps two divisions - could be transported from Cherboug and seize the Isle of Wight in a coup de main.
'Holding the Isle of Wight offered considerable advantages that could have increased the feasibility of Operation Sea Lion. 'First, German artillery deployed on the north side of the Isle of Wight could shell the mainland across the Solent and force the Royal Navy to withdraw its cruiser-destroyer forces from the naval base at Portsmouth. 'Second, capture of the island would provide the Luftwaffe with four civilian airfields that were much closer to England, thereby alleviating the problems caused by the limited range of the Bf-109 fighter and providing an emergency landing site for damaged aircraft.' And Dr Forczyk said it was Hitler who personally suggested the Isle of Wight as a target. He said: 'Throughout the planning process we know Hitler kept bringing up the idea and it was incorporated into the Fuhrer Directive No. 16. 'He later said it was a mistake to let his Navy talk him out of the plan.'

This assessment appears to have been correct, with many of the gunners on the island being reservists and only very limited and dated air defences built before World War I in place. The gunning positions the island did have were in open positions, making them vulnerable to air attacks and the single battalion of troops relied on civilian buses and push bikes for transport. Dr Forczyk said the Germans could have had up to 4,000 troops on the island within two days and it is likely, with military commitments elsewhere, that recapturing it would not have been a priority for the British. He added: 'If the operation failed, it could be described as only a raid, not an invasion. If the coup de main succeeded, it would have both propaganda and tactical value for continuing the battle against Britain in 1941.'

Field Marshall Alan Brooke, he said, expressed concerns about the possibility of the Germans invading in his diary and doubts over the capability of his forces to resist. He added: 'In London, Brooke would likely regard the Isle of Wight landing as a diversion and be opposed to committing too many forces onto the island. 'Over the course of several weeks, the British would retreat into the western end of the island while the Germans would content themselves with capturing the port of Cowes in the north. 'In time, the Germans might take the rest of the Isle of Wight by the end of 1940 or simply hold the eastern end of the island as a bargaining chip. 'In any event, the prevailing military factors suggest that the Germans had the capability to seize at least the eastern half of the Isle of Wight in 1940 and there was very little that the British could do to stop this.'

Dr Forczyk's book also examines more widely the Third Reich's plan to occupy the mainland and challenges widely accepted opinions about its failure. The prevailing historical account, one endorsed by Winston Churchill, was that Operation Sea Lion never came to fruition because the Luftwaffe failed to gain air supremacy over the RAF during the Battle of Britain. However Dr Forczyk calls into question whether this really was the end of the plan and claims the Nazis could have launched an attack at a later date when the British thought the threat was over. He said: 'When all was said and done, at the end of September 1940 Hitler decided what was going to come next, not Churchill. 'Hitler had allies, Churchill had refugees. Without powerful allies or significant offensive capabilities, Great Britain had no potential to achieve its war aims on its own, whereas Hitler had multiple options to try to pressure Great Britain into a negotiated peace. Despite the RAF's impressive defence of Britain's airspace, Hitler still held the strategic initiative going into 1941, not Churchill.'


I included the photo of the Siebel, because it's a good one to show how little room there is on board one when it has mighty 88s fitted. The other publicity shots of grofaz and various Übermensch I've cut out because there's no need for it. The article has also been rearranged a little to avoid the daily hail's terrible one sentence paragraph layout.

But otherwise, I mean, the mind absolutely boggles. Perhaps it's not as hard to be a published Historian as I thought...

Ahhhh the Daily Mail aka the Daily Hate aka the Daily Moral Panic

The only thing in 1940 that hated the British people more than the Nazi's LOL

 

[TDM]

Can someone enlighten me here. I though 22 Air Landing and 7 Flieger suffered huge losses in the Netherlands in May. Yet they are always mentioned as being available for use in Sealion as early as July.

So are they really green paratroopers?

I image we'll be told that obviously some alternative to those previous actions will happen just long enough to address that point but then forgotten and certainly the wider ramifications of that change in any context other than how it helps Sealion will be ignored

 

[Deleted member 94680]

Ahhhh the Daily Mail aka the Daily Hate aka the Daily Moral Panic

The only thing in 1940 that hated the British people more than the Nazis

Err, I think you’ll find they simply wanted “new methods and new men” to “take over responsibility for [British] national affairs”.

Spoiler

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Can someone enlighten me here. I though 22 Air Landing and 7 Flieger suffered huge losses in the Netherlands in May. Yet they are always mentioned as being available for use in Sealion as early as July.

So are they really green paratroopers?

It was the loss of 125 Destroyed transport aircraft with a further 47 damaged in the Hague operation alone that probably impacted them the most

They had also been heavily used in other ops such as the Norway operation

The 3000 odd Paras used in the Hague op suffered exstensive losses - over 2000 KIA/WIA and POW (about 1200 of the POWs were sent to the UK before the Dutch surrendered)

The rest of the Division was used as 'Normal Infantry' during the rest of the French campaign - not sure what losses they suffered but German losses were relatively light

Its possible that the losses were made good by Sept 1940 but the losses in Transport aircraft were not so while both units might have been available its unlikely that much of it could be delivered in one go and then supplied via an airhead.

 

[Uniquelyequal]

Err, I think you’ll find they simply wanted “new methods and new men” to “take over responsibility for [British] national affairs”.

Spoiler

Ah, my favorite case of "They did what? Why the fuck are they still around?"