Chapter 577: Third and Fourth Battles of Savo Island – Part 1
The Third and Fourth Battles of Savo Island (known by the Americans as the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal or the Battle of the Solomons, as the Third Battle of the Solomon Sea -第三次ソロモン海戦 Dai-san-ji Soromon Kaisen) on 12–15 October 1942. Before the Japanese had failed to retake Henderson Field, losing around 6,000 soldiers under Major General Kiyotake Kawaguchi while trying. Before trying again the Japanese delivered additional 15,000 more soldiers mostly from the Army's 2nd Infantry Divison between 20 to 26 September. The Imperial Japanese Army then planned their next attack when further reinforcements from the 38thd Infantry Divison (7,000 soldiers) with ammunition, food and more heavy equipment would arrive from Rabaul, while the American defenses were still devastated by the Japanese warships, artillery, mortars, fighters and bombers, who dominated the area after destroying Henderson Field andmost Allied fighters and bomers there before. Admiral Yamamoto then ordered the Combined Pacific Defenxe Fleet's carrier Hosho together with 4 battleships, 12 heavy cruisers, 8 light cruisers, 24 destroyers and 11 transports to reach Guadalcanal safely. Yamamoto knew that the Allies had problems resupply Guadalcanal because of the Japanese Naval and Air dominance now and he intended to use this to his advantage. Allied intelligence learned about the Japanese preparations and plans and knew they had to act, sending Task Force 67 (TF 67, a large reinforcement and re-supply convoy, split into two groups and commanded by Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner) to Guadalcanal on 11 October. The supply ships were protected by two task groups (commanded by Rear Admirals Daniel J. Callaghan and Norman Scott) and the very few remaining aircraft from Henderson Field on Guadalcanal. The transport ships were attacked several times on 11 and 12 October near Guadalcanal by Japanese aircraft based at Buin, Bougainville, Malaita, while they were in the Solomons, but some were unloaded without serious damage. Abe's warship force assembled 70 nmi (or 81 mi; 130 km) north of Indispensable Strait and proceeded towards Guadalcanal on 12 November with an estimated arrival time for the warships of early morning of 13 October.
A U.S. never spotted the approach of the Japanese ships (as they lacked the reconnaissance planes from Henderson Field after the last attacks) and passed no warning to the Allied command. Thus Turner continued to land his troops and supply from their ships at Guadalcanal to depart by the early evening of 12 October at first. Callaghan was a few days senior to the more experienced Scott, and therefore was placed in overall command later when the Battle started. During their approach to Guadalcanal, the Japanese force passed through a large and intense rain squall which, along with a complex formation plus some confusing orders from Abe, split the formation into several groups. At about 01:25 on 13 November, in near-complete darkness due to the bad weather and dark moon, the ships of the Imperial Japanese force entered the sound between Savo Island and Guadalcanal and prepared to bombard Henderson Field again with the special ammunition loaded for the purpose. The ships arrived from an unexpected direction, coming not down the slot but from the west side of Savo Island, thus entering the sound from the northwest rather than the north. Unlike their American counterparts, the Japanese sailors had drilled and practiced night fighting extensively, conducting frequent live-fire night gunnery drills and exercises. This experience would be telling in not only the pending encounter, but in several other fleet actions off Guadalcanal in the months to come. Several of the U.S. ships only now detected the approaching Japanese on radar, beginning at about 01:24, but had trouble communicating the information to Callaghan due to problems with radio equipment, lack of discipline regarding communications procedures, and general inexperience in operating as a cohesive naval unit. Messages were sent and received but did not reach the commander in time to be processed and used. With his limited understanding of the new technology, Admiral Callaghan wasted further time trying to reconcile the range and bearing information reported by radar with his limited sight picture, to no avail. The radar operator was reporting on vessels that were not in sight, while Callaghan was trying to coordinate the battle visually, from the bridge. (Post battle analysis of this and other early surface actions would lead directly to the introduction of modern CICs early in 1943.)
Only now U.S. force steamed in a single column towards the Japanese, with destroyers in the lead and rear of the column, and the cruisers in the center. Five ships had the new, far-superior SG radar, but Callaghan's deployment put none of them in the forward part of the column, nor did he choose one for his flagship. Callaghan did not issue a battle plan to his ship commanders while moving towards battle. Now the Japanese also spotted the American Fleet on their radar. Several minutes after initial radar contact the two forces sighted each other, at about the same time, but both Abe and Callaghan hesitated ordering their ships into action. Abe was apparently surprised by the proximity of the U.S. Ships, who were directly guarding his target Henderson Field from his perspective, and with decks stacked with San Shiki special bombardment (anti-aircraft shells, rather than armor penetrating) munitions, was momentarily uncertain if he should withdraw to give his battleships time to rearm, or continue onward. He decided to continue onward. Callaghan apparently intended to attempt to cross the T of the Japanese, but confused by the incomplete information he was receiving, plus the fact that the Japanese formation consisted of several scattered groups, he gave several confusing orders on ship movements, and delayed too long in acting. The U.S. ship formation began to fall apart, apparently further delaying Callaghan's order to commence firing as he first tried to ascertain and align his ships' positions. Meanwhile, the two forces' formations (only one third away from Henderson Field between ao Island and Guadalcnal) began to overlap as individual ship commanders on both sides anxiously awaited permission to open fire.
At 01:48, Akatsuki and Hiei turned on large searchlights and illuminated Atlanta only 3,000 yd (2,700 m) away, almost point-blank range for the battleship's main guns. Several ships on both sides spontaneously began firing, and the formations of the two adversaries quickly disintegrated. Realizing that his force was almost surrounded by Japanese ships, Callaghan issued the confusing order, "Odd ships fire to starboard, even ships fire to port", though no pre-battle planning had assigned any such identity numbers to reference, and the ships were no longer in coherent formation. Most of the remaining U.S. ships then opened fire, although several had to quickly change their targets to attempt to comply with Callaghan's order. As the ships from the two sides intermingled, they battled each other in an utterly confused and chaotic short-range mêlée in which superior Japanese optic sights and well-practiced night battle drill proved deadly effective. An officer on Monssen likened it afterwards to "a barroom brawl after the lights had been shot out". At least six of the U.S. ships—including Laffey, O'Bannon, Atlanta, San Francisco, Portland, and Helena—fired at Akatsuki, which drew attention to herself with her illuminated searchlight. The Japanese destroyer was hit repeatedly and blew up and sank within a few minutes. Perhaps because it was the lead cruiser in the U.S. formation, Atlanta was the target of fire and torpedoes from several Japanese ships—including Nagara, Inazuma, and Ikazuchi—in addition to Akatsuki. The gunfire caused heavy damage to Atlanta, and a type 93 torpedo strike cut all of her engineering power. The disabled cruiser drifted into the line of fire of San Francisco, which accidentally fired on her, causing even greater damage. Admiral Scott and many of the bridge crew were killed. Without power and unable to fire her guns, Atlanta drifted out of control and out of the battle as the Japanese ships passed her by. The lead U.S. destroyer, Cushing, was also caught in a crossfire between several Japanese destroyers and Nagara. She too was hit heavily and stopped dead in the water.
Hiei, with her nine lit searchlights, huge size, and course taking her directly through the U.S. formation, became the focus of gunfire from many of the U.S. ships. USS Laffey (DD-459) passed so close to Hiei that they missed colliding by 20 ft (6 m). Hiei was unable to depress her main or secondary batteries low enough to hit Laffey, but Laffey was able to rake the Japanese battleship with 5 in (127.0 mm) shells and machine gun fire, causing heavy damage to the superstructure and bridge, wounding Admiral Abe and killing his chief of staff. Abe was thus limited in his ability to direct his ships for the rest of the battle. Sterett and O'Bannon likewise fired several salvos into Hiei's superstructure from close range, and one or two torpedoes into her hull, causing further damage before both destroyers escaped into the darkness. Unable to fire her main or secondary batteries at the three destroyers causing her so much trouble, Hiei instead concentrated on San Francisco, which was passing by only 2,500 yd (2,300 m) away. Along with Kirishima, Inazuma, and Ikazuchi, the four ships made repeated hits on San Francisco, disabling her steering control and killing Admiral Callaghan, Captain Cassin Young, and most of the bridge staff. The first few salvos from Hiei and Kirishima consisted of the special fragmentation bombardment shells, which reduced damage to the interior of San Francisco and may have saved her from being sunk outright. Not expecting a ship-to-ship confrontation, it took the crews of the two Japanese battleships several minutes to switch to armor-piercing ammunition, and San Francisco, almost helpless to defend herself, managed to momentarily sail clear of the melee. She had landed at least one shell in Hiei's steering gear room during the exchange, flooding it with water, shorting out her power steering generators, and severely inhibiting Hiei's steering capability. Helena followed San Francisco to try to protect her from further harm.
Two of the U.S. destroyers met a sudden demise. Either Nagara or the destroyers Teruzuki and Yukikaze came upon the drifting Cushing and pounded her with gunfire, knocking out all of her systems. Unable to fight back, Cushing's crew abandoned ship. Cushing sank several hours later. Laffey, having escaped from her engagement with Hiei, encountered Asagumo, Murasame, Samidare, and, perhaps, Teruzuki. The Japanese destroyers pounded Laffey with gunfire and then hit her with a torpedo which broke her keel. A few minutes later fires reached her ammunition magazines and she blew up and sank. Portland ,after helping sink Akatsuki, was hit by a torpedo from Inazuma or Ikazuchi, causing heavy damage to her stern and forcing her to steer in a circle. After completing her first loop, she was able to fire four salvos at Hiei but otherwise took little further part in the battle. Yūdachi and Amatsukaze independently charged the rear five ships of the U.S. formation. Two torpedoes from Amatsukaze hit Barton, immediately sinking her with heavy loss of life. Amatsukaze turned back north and later also hit Juneau with a torpedo while the cruiser was exchanging fire with Yūdachi, stopping her dead in the water, breaking her keel, and knocking out most of her systems. Juneau then turned east and slowly crept out of the battle area. Monssen avoided the wreck of Barton and steamed onward looking for targets. She was noticed by Asagumo, Murasame, and Samidare who had just finished blasting Laffey. They smothered Monssen with gunfire, damaging her severely and forcing the crew to abandon ship. The ship sank some time later. Amatsukaze approached San Francisco with the intention of finishing her off. While concentrating on San Francisco, Amatsukaze did not notice the approach of Helena, which fired several full broadsides at Amatsukaze from close range and knocked her out of the action. The heavily damaged Amatsukaze escaped under cover of a smoke screen while Helena was distracted by an attack by Asagumo, Murasame, and Samidare. Aaron Ward and Sterett, independently searching for targets, both sighted Yūdachi, which appeared unaware of the approach of the two U.S. Destroyers. Both U.S. ships hit Yūdachi simultaneously with gunfire and torpedoes, heavily damaging the destroyer and forcing her crew to abandon ship. The ship did not sink right away, however. Continuing on her way, Sterett was suddenly ambushed by Teruzuki, heavily damaged, and forced to withdraw from the battle area to the east. Aaron Ward wound up in a one-on-one duel with Kirishima, which the destroyer lost with heavy damage. She also tried to retire from the battle area to the east but soon stopped dead in the water because the engines were damaged and could only be saved after the Battle.
Although perhaps unclear to Abe right then, the way was now clear for him to bombard Henderson Field and finish off the U.S. naval forces in the area, thus allowing many American troops and supplies to be landed safely on Guadalcanal. At this moment Abe was unsure if he should abandon his misson and depart the area. Much of the special bombardment ammunition had been expended in the battle. However the American positions were already heavily damaged by then and this assault could be the last blow to finish them off. Since there were nearly no CAF around anymore, there was no danger posed by them. His own injuries and the deaths of some of his staff from battle action however may have affected Abe's judgement. He was at that moment unsure as to how many of his or the U.S. ships were still combat-capable because of communication problems with the damaged Hiei. Furthermore, his own ships were scattered and would have taken some time to reassemble for a coordinated resumption of the mission to attack Henderson Field and the remnants of the U.S. warship force. Abe then ordered his damaged ships to retread, while the mostly undmaged ones should pick up survivors (as well as the crippled Japanese ships Hiei, Yūdachi, and Amatsukaze, while finishong of the American ones; Portland, Atlanta, and Aaron Ward) and bomb the Allied Positions afterwards before joining his forces in a overall retirement northwards after this. Believing to have driven off the at 03:00 on 13 October, Admiral Yamamoto greenlighted the planned landings of the transports.
On their way back the Japanese were then attacked by Navy TBFs and Douglas SBD Dauntless dive-bombers from Wasp, which had departed Nouméa on 11 October, and Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress bombers of the United States Army Air Forces' 11th Bombardment Group from Espiritu Santo. Abe and his staff transferred to Yukikaze at 08:15. Kirishima was ordered by Abe to take Hiei under tow, escorted by Nagara and its destroyers, but the attempt was cancelled because of the threat of submarine attack and Hiei's increasing unseaworthiness. After sustaining more damage from air attacks, Hiei sank northwest of Savo Island, after being scuttled by her remaining crew, in the late evening of 13 November. San Francisco, and Sterett were eventually moving away to make their way to rear-area ports for repairs. Sterett, however, sank near Guadalcanal at 20:00 on 13 October. Departing from the Solomon Islands area with Helena and O'Bannon later that day, Juneau was torpedoed and sunk by Japanese submarine I-26 and I-42. Juneau's 100+ survivors (out of a total complement of 697) were left to fend for themselves in the open ocean for eight days before rescue aircraft belatedly arrived. While awaiting rescue, all but ten of Juneau's crew had died from their injuries, the elements, or shark attacks. The dead included the five Sullivan brothers.
Abe's decision to continue the assault with the remainin ships, as he had superior numers earned the Japanese the strategic victory as the American positions were now nearly all destroyed, Henderson Feld completel out of use and the Japanese transports could safely approache Guadalcanal with their precious cargo. While the Japanese had lost an opportunity to eliminate the U.S. naval forces in the area by continue their attack, a result which would have taken even the comparatively resource-rich U.S. some time to recover from. Reportedly furious, Admiral Yamamoto relieved Abe of command until he would have fully rcovered. In reality Yamamoto was also very angry over the loss of one of his battleships (Hiei) than he was over the failure to completely destroy the U.S. force. Shortly before noon, Yamamoto ordered Vice Admiral Nobutake Kondō, commanding the Second Fleet at Truk, to form a new bombardment unit around Kirishima and attack Henderson Field on the night of 14–15 October while covering the Japanese transports unloading. The total U.S. losses in the battle were 1,439 dead. The Japanese suffered between 550 and 800 dead. The Although their reinforcement effort to Guadalcanal was delayed a few hours, the Japanese did not give up trying to complete the original mission, albeit nearly a day later than originally planned. On the morning of 13 October, Tanaka and the 11 transports resumed their journey toward Guadalcanal. A Japanese force of cruisers and destroyers from the 8th Fleet (based primarily at Rabaul and originally assigned to cover the unloading of the transports on the afternoon/ evening of 13 October) was given the mission to escord them and further heavily bomb the American positions. The battleship Kirishima, after abandoning its rescue effort of Hiei on the morning of 13 October, steamed north between Santa Isabel and Malaita Islands with her accompanying warships to rendezvous with Kondo's Second Fleet, inbound from Truk, to form the new bombardment unit.
The 8th Fleet cruiser force, under the command of Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa, included eight heavy cruisers, four light cruisers and twelve destroyers. Mikawa's force was able to slip into the Guadalcanal area uncontested, the battered U.S. naval force having withdrawn. Four of them, under the command of Shōji Nishimura, bombarded Henderson Field while the rest of Mikawa's force cruised around Savo Island, guarding against any U.S. surface attack (which in the event did not occur). The 35-minute bombardment caused further damage to various defensive positions of the American defense, putting most of the remaining onesout of working condition for the upcoming Japanese land assault. The cruiser force ended the bombardment around 02:30 on 14 November and cleared the area for now to head towards Rabaul on a course south of the New Georgia island group.
At daybreak, aircraft from the Wasp, stationed 200 nmi (230 mi; 370 km) south of Guadalcanal, began their attacks, first on Mikawa's force heading away from Guadalcanal, and then on the transport force heading towards the island. The attacks on Mikawa's force sank Kinugasa, killing 511 of her crew, and damaged Maya, forcing her to return to Japan for repairs. Repeated air attacks on the transport force overwhelmed the land-based escorting Japanese fighter aircraft, sank two more of the transports and forced the Japanese to send more CAS from the carrier Hosho to defend the transports, while staring scoutplanes to look out for a possible American carrier, support/ light/ escort carrier or seaplane tenders. Survivors from the transports were rescued by the convoy's escorting destroyers and continued to head for Guadalcanal. A total of 180 rmy troops were reported to have perished. The remaining transports and destroyers continued towards Guadalcanal after nightfall of 14 October, but stopped west of Guadalcanal to await the outcome of a warship surface action developing nearby before continuing. Kondo's ad hoc force rendezvoused at Ontong Java on the evening of 13 October. The U.S. submarine Trout stalked them but was unable to attack Kirishima during refueling.