Chapter 559: Second Battle of Savo Island
Chapter 559: Second Battle of Savo Island
The Second Battle of Savo Island, also known as the Battle of Cape Esperance, in Japanese sources, as the Sea Battle of Savo Island (サボ島沖海戦 ), took place on 11–12 Sepember 1942. It was a result of the Japanese encountering strong American presence in Guadalcanal, as well as their nearby fleets. Before the Allied forces had landed in Guadalcanal, Tulagi and Florida Island of the Solomon Islands, in a attempt to deny them as Japanese bases and to isolate the Japanese on Guadalcanal from their major base at Rabaul. In response to that, the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters ordered Lieutenant-General Harukichi Hyakutake and his 17th Army (a corps-sized formation) to drive the Americans from Guadalcanal. However the Americans remained a threat, mainly thanks to the Allied aircraft from Henderson Fiels and because their transports were large but slow, the Japanese instead started to use their warships, mainly light cruisers and destroyers to transport their troops more securely, however they lacked the ability to transport most of the heavy equipment and supplies, such as heavy artillery, vehicles, and much food and ammunition. To avoid risking these ships by Allied airplanes, these transports and convoys to Guadalcanal often used the cover of night and were soon known as “Rabaul Express” by the Allies, while the Japanese called them “Rat Transporation” because of the crowded, tiny spaces the average soldier only had during these trips. Due to the heavier concentration of Japanese surface combat vessels and their well-positioned logistical base at Simpson Harbor, Rabaul, and their victories at the Battle of Savo Island and the Battle if the Eastern Solomon Islands earlier, the Japanese had established operational control over the waters around Guadalcanal at night. However, any Japanese ship remaining within range (about 200 mi, 170 nmi, 320 km) of American aircraft at Henderson Field, during the daylight hours, was in danger of damaging air attacks. This and the presence of Admiral Scott's task force at Cape Esperance represented the U.S. Navy's first major attempt to wrest night time operational control of waters around Guadalcanal away from the Japanese.
The first attempt by the Japanese Army to recapture Henderson Field both failed, but the Americans knew that their enemy was steadily building up his numbers and chances for the next upcoming battle. The Japanese set their next major attempt to recapture Henderson Field for 20 September and moved most of the 2nd and 38th infantry divisions, totalling 17,500 troops, from the Dutch East Indies to Rabaul in preparation for delivering them to Guadalcanal. From 14 August to 9 September, numerous Tokyo Express runs delivered troops from the Japanese 2nd Infantry Division as well as Hyakutake to Guadalcanal. In addition to cruisers and destroyers, some of these runs included the seaplane carrier Nisshin, which delivered heavy equipment to the island including vehicles and heavy artillery other warships could not carry because of space limitations. The Japanese Navy promised to support the Army's planned offensive by delivering the necessary troops, equipment, and supplies to the island, and by stepping up air attacks on Henderson Field and sending warships to bombard the airfield. In the meantime, Major General Millard F. Harmon (commander of United States Army forces in the South Pacific) convinced Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley (overall commander of Allied forces in the South Pacific) that the marines on Guadalcanal needed to be reinforced immediately if the Allies were to successfully defend the island from the next expected Japanese offensive. Thus, on 8 September, the 2,837 men of the 164th Infantry Regiment from the U.S. Army's Americal Division boarded ships at New Caledonia for the trip to Guadalcanal with a projected arrival date of 13 September. To protect the transports carrying the 164th to Guadalcanal, Ghormley ordered Task Force 64 (TF 64), consisting of four cruisers (San Francisco, Boise, Salt Lake City, and Helena) and five destroyers (Farenholt, Duncan, Buchanan, McCalla, and Laffey) under U.S. Rear Admiral Norman Scott, to intercept and combat any Japanese ships approaching Guadalcanal and threatening the convoy. Scott conducted one night battle practice with his ships on 8 October, then took station south of Guadalcanal near Rennell Island on 9 September, to await word of any Japanese naval movement toward the southern Solomons.
Continuing with preparations for the September offensive, Japanese Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa's Eighth Fleet staff, headquartered at Rabaul, scheduled a large and important Tokyo Express supply run for the night of 11 September. Nisshin would be joined by the seaplane carrier Chitose to deliver 1,456 soldiers, four large howitzers, two field guns, one anti-aircraft gun, and a large assortment of ammunition and other equipment from the Japanese naval bases in the Shortland Islands and at Buin, Bougainville, to Guadalcanal. Twelve destroyers, ten of them carrying troops, would accompany Nisshin and Chitose. The supply convoy, called the "Reinforcement Group" by the Japanese, was under the command of Rear Admiral Takatsugu Jojima. At the same time but in a separate operation, the six heavy cruisers of Cruiser Division 6 (CruDiv6) under the command of Rear Admiral Aritomo Gotō, were to bombard Henderson Field with special explosive shells with the object of destroying the CAF and the airfield's facilities. Four screening destroyers accompanied CruDiv6. Since U.S. Navy warships had yet to attempt to interdict any Rabaul Express missions to Guadalcanal, the Japanese were not expecting any opposition from U.S. naval surface forces that night.
At 08:00, on 11 September, Jojima's reinforcement group departed the Shortland Islands anchorage to begin their 250 mi (220 nmi; 400 km) run down the Slot to Guadalcanal. Gotō departed the Shortland Islands for Guadalcanal at 14:00 the same day. To protect the reinforcement group's approach to Guadalcanal from the CAF, the Japanese 11th Air Fleet, based at Rabaul, Kavieng, and Buin, planned two air strikes on Henderson Field for 11 September. A "fighter sweep" of 16 Mitsubishi A6M3 Zero fighters swept over Henderson Field just after mid-day but failed to engage any U.S. aircraft. Forty-five minutes later, the second wave, 46 Mitsubishi G4M2 "Betty" bombers and 30 Zeros arrived over Henderson Field. In an ensuing air battle with the CAF, two G4M and four U.S. fighters were downed. Although the Japanese attacks failed to inflict significant damage, they did prevent CAF bombers from finding and attacking the reinforcement group. As the reinforcement group transited the Slot, relays of 11th Air Fleet Zeros from Buin provided escort. Emphasizing the importance of this convoy for Japanese plans, the last flight of the day was ordered to remain on station over the convoy until darkness, then ditch their aircraft and await pickup by the reinforcement group's destroyers. All six Zeros ditched; only one pilot was recovered. Allied reconnaissance aircraft sighted Jojima's supply convoy 210 mi (180 nmi; 340 km) from Guadalcanal between Kolombangara and Choiseul in the Slot at 14:45 on the same day, and reported it as three "cruisers" and eight destroyers. Gotō's force, following the convoy, was not sighted. In response to the sighting of Jojima's force, at 16:07 Scott turned toward Guadalcanal for an interception.
Scott crafted a simple battle plan for the expected engagement. His ships would steam in column with his destroyers at the front and rear of his cruiser column, searching across a 300 degree arc with SG surface radar in an effort to gain positional advantage on the approaching enemy force. The destroyers were to illuminate any targets with searchlights and discharge torpedoes while the cruisers were to open fire at any available targets without awaiting orders. The cruiser's float aircraft, launched in advance, were to find and illuminate the Japanese warships with flares. Although Helena and Boise carried the new, greatly improved SG radar, Scott chose San Francisco as his flagship. At 22:00, as Scott's ships neared Cape Hunter at the northwest end of Guadalcanal, three of Scott's cruisers launched floatplanes. One crashed on takeoff, but the other two patrolled over Savo Island, Guadalcanal, and Ironbottom Sound. As the floatplanes were launched, Jojima's force was just passing around the mountainous northwestern shoulder of Guadalcanal, and neither force sighted each other. At 22:20, Jojima radioed Gotō and told him that no U.S. ships were in the vicinity. Although Jojima's force later heard Scott's floatplanes overhead while unloading along the north shore of Guadalcanal, they failed to report this to Gotō. At 22:33, just after passing Cape Esperance, Scott's ships assumed battle formation. The column was led by Farenholt, Duncan, and Laffey, and followed by San Francisco, Boise, Salt Lake City, and Helena. Buchanan and McCalla brought up the rear. The distance between each ship ranged from 500 to 700 yd (460 to 640 m). Visibility was poor because the moon had already set, leaving no ambient light and no visible sea horizon.
Gotō's force passed through several rain squalls as they approached Guadalcanal at 30 kn (35 mph; 56 km/h). Gotō's flagship Aoba led the Japanese cruisers in column, followed by the rest of their fleet starboard and port. At 23:30, Gotō's ships emerged from the last rain squall and began appearing on the radar scopes of Helena and Salt Lake City. The Japanese, because their warships were also equipped with radar, became aware of Scott's presence right then too. At 23:00, the San Francisco aircraft spotted Jojima's force off Guadalcanal and reported it to Scott. Scott, believing that more Japanese ships were likely still on the way, continued his course towards the west side of Savo Island. At 23:33, Scott ordered his column to turn towards the southwest to a heading of 230°. All of Scott's ships understood the order as a column movement except Scott's own ship, San Francisco. As the three lead U.S. destroyers executed the column movement, San Francisco turned simultaneously. Boise, following immediately behind, followed San Francisco, thereby throwing the three van destroyers out of formation. At 23:32, Helena's radar showed the Japanese warships to be about 27,700 yd (25,300 m) away. At 23:35, Boise's and Duncan's radars also detected Gotō's ships. Between 23:42 and 23:44, Helena and Boise reported their contacts to Scott on San Francisco who mistakenly believed that the two cruisers were actually tracking the three U.S. destroyers that were thrown out of formation during the column turn. Scott radioed Farenholt to ask if the destroyer was attempting to resume its station at the front of the column. Farenholt replied, "Affirmative, coming up on your starboard side," further confirming Scott's belief that the radar contacts were his own destroyers. To prevent his fleet from continuing their course towards the Americans directly, Gotō was unsure about the true strenght of the American fleet and ordered his forces to turn north, to bypass Savo Islands, where the Japanese had before installed coastal guns to defend the surrounding area from the Allies. At 23:45, Farenholt and Laffey, still unaware of Gotō's approaching warships, increased speed to resume their stations at the front of the U.S. column. Duncan's crew, however, thinking that Farenholt and Laffey were commencing an attack on the Japanese warships, increased speed to launch a solitary torpedo attack on Gotō's force without telling Scott what they were doing. San Francisco's radar registered the Japanese ships, but Scott was not informed of the sighting. By 23:45, Gotō's ships were only 5,000 yd (4,600 m) away from Scott's formation and visible to Helena's and Salt Lake City's lookouts. The U.S. formation at this point was not in position to cross the T of the Japanese formation, as the Japanese had turned north, robbing them from their tactical advantage, as both fleets now stood beside . At 23:46, still assuming that Scott was aware of the rapidly approaching Japanese warships, Helena radioed for permission to open fire, using the general procedure request, "Interrogatory Roger" (meaning, basically, "Are we clear to act?"). Scott answered with, "Roger", only meaning that the message was received, not that he was confirming the request to act. Upon receipt of Scott's "Roger", Helena, thinking they now had permission, opened fire, quickly followed by Boise, Salt Lake City, and to Scott's further surprise, San Francisco.
Not taken by surprise, Gotō's force had prepared their own guns and thanks to their superior night vision, clearly spottet the Americans by now. At 23:43, just shortly before the Americans, the Japanese had started to fire with their forward ships and soon the first salvo's smashed into each other, leaving the Aoba heavily hit by up to 40 shells from Helena, Salt Lake City, San Francisco, Farenholt, and Laffey. The shell hits heavily damaged Aoba's communications systems and demolished two of her main gun turrets as well as her main gun director. Several large-caliber projectiles passed through Aoba's flag bridge without exploding, but the force of their passage killed many men and mortally wounded Gotō. Scott, still unsure who his ships were firing at, and afraid that they might be firing on his own destroyers, ordered a ceasefire at 23:47, although not every ship complied. Scott ordered Farenholt to flash her recognition signals and upon observing that Farenholt was close to his formation, he ordered the fire resumed at 23:51. By this time, the Japanese had the opportunity to reload their next salvo a little faster then the Americans, who had ordered some of their ships to stop fireing by now. The first american ships (Farenhold, Duncan and Laffey) were hit by he Japanese, forcing them and the rest of the Task Force to tunr further east to Savo Island. The Japanese ship Aoba, also continuing to receive damaging hits, turned to portside to head away northwards from Scott's formation to get protection from the remaining Japanese ships, while beginning to make a smoke screen which led most of the Americans to believe that she was sinking, but also prevented the Americans and Japanese from seeing parts of their remaining fleets directly. Scott's ships shifted their fire to Furutaka, which was following behind Aoba. At 23:49, Furutaka was hit in her torpedo tubes, igniting a large fire that attracted even more shellfire from the US ships. At 23:53 Farenheit was directly hit in one of her turrets, killing some gunners and preventing it from moving for the rest of the battle. At 23:58, a torpedo from Buchanan hit Furutaka in her forward engine room, causing severe damage, while Laffey was hit just below the water line. By then Farenhold were already heavily damaged and Duncan was medium damaged, by the incoming Japanese shells. During this time, San Francisco and Boise sighted Fubuki about 1,400 yd (1,300 m) away and raked her with shellfire, joined soon by most of the rest of Scott's formation. The forward Japanese and American ships now were all fireing upon each other, as Farenhold was turning southwards to escape. Heavily damaged, Farenhold and Fubuki began to sink, while Kinugasa and Hatsuyuki now shelled the American ships too. During the exchange of gunfire, Farenholt had received several damaging hits from both the Japanese and American ships, killing several men. She escaped from the crossfire by crossing ahead of San Francisco and passing to the disengaged side of Scott's column to the south. Duncan, still engaged in her solitary torpedo attack on the Japanese formation, had also been hit by gunfire from both sides, was by now set afire, and looped away south in her own effort to escape the crossfire. Both Duncan and Farenhold however, unaware of the Japanese positions on Savo Island now came closer to their doom, by 00:02, as the Japanese Naval Guns positioned there, who were aiming for the American fleet's back, now had them at close fire and finished both ships off with their own barrages.
As Gotō's ships continued to battle Scott's ships, who tightened their formation to open up even more fire on the Japanese. At 00:06, two torpedoes from Kinugasa barely missed Boise. Boise and Salt Lake City turned on their searchlights to help target the Japanese ships, giving Kinugasa's gunners clear targets. At 00:10, two shells from Kinugasa exploded in Boise's main ammunition magazine between turrets one and two. The resulting explosion killed almost 100 men and threatened to blow the ship apart. Seawater rushed in through rents in her hull opened by the explosion and helped quench the fire before it could explode the ship's powder magazines. Boise immediately sheered out of the column and retreated from the action down south, only to be targeted by the Japanese guns of Savo Islands too. Kinugasa and Salt Lake City exchanged fire with each other, each hitting the other several times, causing minor damage to Kinugasa and damaging one of Salt Lake City's boilers, reducing her speed and letting her get hit by more Japanese shells. At 00:16, Scott ordered his ships to turn to a heading south in an attempt to prevent being wedged between Savo island in the east and the Japanese fleet in the North. Scott's ships, quickly lost sight of Gotō's ships this way, and all firing between both fleets ceased by 00:20. The American formation was beginning to scatter, so Scott ordered a turn generally south to disengage. This however put his remaining fleet now under full fire from the Japanese guns at Savo Island, getting a few more hits, while returning fire, wrongly believing they were off from their former course and now surrounded by the Japanese.
During the battle between Scott's and Gotō's ships, Jojima's reinforcement group completed unloading at Guadalcanal and began its return journey unseen by Scott's warships, using a route that passed south of the Russell Islands and New Georgia. Despite extensive damage, Aoba was able to join Kinugasa in retirement to the north through the Slot. Furutaka's damage caused her to lose power around 00:50, and she sank at 02:28, 22 mi (19 nmi; 35 km) northwest of Savo Island. Hatsuyuki picked up Furutaka's survivors and joined the retreat northward. Boise extinguished her fires by 02:40 and at 03:05 rejoined Scott's formation. Duncan, on fire and sinking, was abandoned by her crew at 00:29 and the damaged, sinking Farenhold six minuts before at 00:23. Unaware of Duncan's, Farenhold's and Boise (not to heavily damaged or sinking) fate, Scott detached McCalla to search for them and retired with the rest of his ships towards Nouméa, arriving in the afternoon of 13 October. McCalla located the burning, abandoned Duncan about 03:00, and several members of McCalla's crew made an attempt to keep her from sinking. By 12:00, however, they had to abandon the effort as bulkheads within Duncan collapsed causing the ship to finally sink west of Savo Island. American servicemen in boats from Guadalcanal as well as McCalla picked up Duncan's and Farenhold's scattered survivors from the sea around Savo, while Laffey was heavily damaged. In total, 175 Duncan sailors survived; 68 did not. As they rescued Duncan's crew, the Americans came across the more than 100 Fubuki survivors, floating in the same general area. The Japanese initially refused all rescue attempts and some tried to reach Savo Island by swimming, a day later the rest of them allowed themselves to be picked up and taken prisoner.
Jojima, learning of the bombardment force's engangement, detached four destroyers to assist Furutaka or her survivors and four others to rendezvous with Jojima's ships, to cover the withdrawal of. At 07:00, five CAF Douglas SBD-3 Dauntless dive bombers attacked the Japanese fleet's ships, but inflicted no damage. At 08:20, 11 more SBDs found and attacked Shirayuki and Murakumo. Although they scored no direct hits, a near miss caused Murakumo to begin leaking oil, marking a trail for other CAF aircraft to follow. A short time later, seven more CAF SBDs plus six Grumman TBF-1 Avenger torpedo bombers, accompanied by 14 Grumman F4F-4 Wildcats, found the four Japanese destroyers 170 mi (150 nmi; 270 km) from Guadalcanal. In the ensuing attack, Murakumo was hit by a torpedo in her engineering spaces, leaving her without power. In the meantime, the Japanese remaining fleet had bypassed Savo island and turned southeast again, not northwards to the Japanese base in the Shortland Islands, as the Americans had believed after the battle. They started to bombard the airfield and destroy many surrounding facilities, as well as the American airplanes stationed there, before the Japanese forces returned northwest to reach their base in the Shortland Islands at 14:00. The Americans managed to get a few more hits on the Japanese ships during this time, damaging a few of them lightly and the Murakumo as well as the Asagumo medium, while the Natsugumo was heavily damaged. The Americans lost 13 CAF SBDs, 11 TBFs and 12 fighters at 15:45. An SBD placed its bomb almost directly amidships on Natsugumo while two more near misses contributed to her severe damage. After Asagumo took off her survivors, Natsugumo sank at 16:27. The CAF aircraft also scored several more hits on the stationary Murakumo, setting her afire. After her crew abandoned ship, Shirayuki scuttled her with a torpedo, picked up her survivors, and joined the rest of the Japanese warships for the remainder of their return to their ships on the Shortland Islands.
Captain Kikunori Kijima, Gotō's chief of staff and commander of the bombardment force during bombardment of Henderson Field and the return trip to the Shortland Islands after Gotō's death in battle, claimed that his force had sunk four American cruisers and two destroyer, while in reality he sank two destroyers, one cruiser and damaged a few more quit heavily. Furutaka's captain, who survived the sinking of his ship, blamed the loss of his cruiser on bad air reconnaissance and poor leadership from the 8th fleet staff under Admiral Mikawa. Gotō's bombardment mission was another Japanese victory, further more Jojima's reinforcement convoy was successful in delivering the crucial men and equipment to Guadalcanal. Aoba journeyed to Kure, Japan, for repairs that were completed on January 15, 1943. The Americans under Scott meanwhile claimed that his force sank three Japanese cruisers and four destroyers. Many of the American ships would be under repair for the next months in America. While a tactical victory for the Japanese for now, the strategic vitory of this mission only came, when just two days later on the night of 13 September, the Japanese battleships Kongō and Haruna bombarded and destroyed what was left (or at least hastily repaired till then) from Henderson Field. One day after that, a large Japanese convoy even successfully delivered 4,500 more troops and equipment to the island. These troops and equipment helped complete Japanese preparations for the large land offensive scheduled to begin on 23 September. By then the Japanese naval assaults had put Henderson Field out of the ability to operate aircraft from there and the Americans knew that fighting fot the area with the now superior Japanese numbers was a lost cause. So the U.S. Army started to evacuated their base on Henderson Field on 21 September further east on prepared defensive positions, while completely destroying what little remained of Henderson Field to not let it fall into Japanese hands for their use. On 13 September more U.S. Army troops had reached Guadalcanal and were key in the Battle of Henderson Field that would take place during the ongoing American evacuation by ships and over land to the east. As a result of the Battle, the Americans would bomb the Japanese positions on Savo Island, damaging their guns and fortifications there severely, rendering most of them useless in one of the last operations from Henderson Field before returning to other american bases further south and east. Thanks to the Battle of Cape Esperance, the Americans were shockingly aware of the Japanese tactics and skills in naval fighting, bhe U.S. was still unaware of the range and power of Japanese torpedoes, the effectiveness of Japanese night optics, and the skilled fighting ability of most Japanese destroyer and cruiser commanders. Incorrectly applying the perceived lessons learned from this battle, U.S. commanders in future naval night battles in the Solomons consistently tried to prove that American naval gunfire was more effective than Japanese torpedo attacks. This belief was severely tested just two months later during the Battle of Tassafaronga.
The Second Battle of Savo Island, also known as the Battle of Cape Esperance, in Japanese sources, as the Sea Battle of Savo Island (サボ島沖海戦 ), took place on 11–12 Sepember 1942. It was a result of the Japanese encountering strong American presence in Guadalcanal, as well as their nearby fleets. Before the Allied forces had landed in Guadalcanal, Tulagi and Florida Island of the Solomon Islands, in a attempt to deny them as Japanese bases and to isolate the Japanese on Guadalcanal from their major base at Rabaul. In response to that, the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters ordered Lieutenant-General Harukichi Hyakutake and his 17th Army (a corps-sized formation) to drive the Americans from Guadalcanal. However the Americans remained a threat, mainly thanks to the Allied aircraft from Henderson Fiels and because their transports were large but slow, the Japanese instead started to use their warships, mainly light cruisers and destroyers to transport their troops more securely, however they lacked the ability to transport most of the heavy equipment and supplies, such as heavy artillery, vehicles, and much food and ammunition. To avoid risking these ships by Allied airplanes, these transports and convoys to Guadalcanal often used the cover of night and were soon known as “Rabaul Express” by the Allies, while the Japanese called them “Rat Transporation” because of the crowded, tiny spaces the average soldier only had during these trips. Due to the heavier concentration of Japanese surface combat vessels and their well-positioned logistical base at Simpson Harbor, Rabaul, and their victories at the Battle of Savo Island and the Battle if the Eastern Solomon Islands earlier, the Japanese had established operational control over the waters around Guadalcanal at night. However, any Japanese ship remaining within range (about 200 mi, 170 nmi, 320 km) of American aircraft at Henderson Field, during the daylight hours, was in danger of damaging air attacks. This and the presence of Admiral Scott's task force at Cape Esperance represented the U.S. Navy's first major attempt to wrest night time operational control of waters around Guadalcanal away from the Japanese.
The first attempt by the Japanese Army to recapture Henderson Field both failed, but the Americans knew that their enemy was steadily building up his numbers and chances for the next upcoming battle. The Japanese set their next major attempt to recapture Henderson Field for 20 September and moved most of the 2nd and 38th infantry divisions, totalling 17,500 troops, from the Dutch East Indies to Rabaul in preparation for delivering them to Guadalcanal. From 14 August to 9 September, numerous Tokyo Express runs delivered troops from the Japanese 2nd Infantry Division as well as Hyakutake to Guadalcanal. In addition to cruisers and destroyers, some of these runs included the seaplane carrier Nisshin, which delivered heavy equipment to the island including vehicles and heavy artillery other warships could not carry because of space limitations. The Japanese Navy promised to support the Army's planned offensive by delivering the necessary troops, equipment, and supplies to the island, and by stepping up air attacks on Henderson Field and sending warships to bombard the airfield. In the meantime, Major General Millard F. Harmon (commander of United States Army forces in the South Pacific) convinced Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley (overall commander of Allied forces in the South Pacific) that the marines on Guadalcanal needed to be reinforced immediately if the Allies were to successfully defend the island from the next expected Japanese offensive. Thus, on 8 September, the 2,837 men of the 164th Infantry Regiment from the U.S. Army's Americal Division boarded ships at New Caledonia for the trip to Guadalcanal with a projected arrival date of 13 September. To protect the transports carrying the 164th to Guadalcanal, Ghormley ordered Task Force 64 (TF 64), consisting of four cruisers (San Francisco, Boise, Salt Lake City, and Helena) and five destroyers (Farenholt, Duncan, Buchanan, McCalla, and Laffey) under U.S. Rear Admiral Norman Scott, to intercept and combat any Japanese ships approaching Guadalcanal and threatening the convoy. Scott conducted one night battle practice with his ships on 8 October, then took station south of Guadalcanal near Rennell Island on 9 September, to await word of any Japanese naval movement toward the southern Solomons.
Continuing with preparations for the September offensive, Japanese Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa's Eighth Fleet staff, headquartered at Rabaul, scheduled a large and important Tokyo Express supply run for the night of 11 September. Nisshin would be joined by the seaplane carrier Chitose to deliver 1,456 soldiers, four large howitzers, two field guns, one anti-aircraft gun, and a large assortment of ammunition and other equipment from the Japanese naval bases in the Shortland Islands and at Buin, Bougainville, to Guadalcanal. Twelve destroyers, ten of them carrying troops, would accompany Nisshin and Chitose. The supply convoy, called the "Reinforcement Group" by the Japanese, was under the command of Rear Admiral Takatsugu Jojima. At the same time but in a separate operation, the six heavy cruisers of Cruiser Division 6 (CruDiv6) under the command of Rear Admiral Aritomo Gotō, were to bombard Henderson Field with special explosive shells with the object of destroying the CAF and the airfield's facilities. Four screening destroyers accompanied CruDiv6. Since U.S. Navy warships had yet to attempt to interdict any Rabaul Express missions to Guadalcanal, the Japanese were not expecting any opposition from U.S. naval surface forces that night.
At 08:00, on 11 September, Jojima's reinforcement group departed the Shortland Islands anchorage to begin their 250 mi (220 nmi; 400 km) run down the Slot to Guadalcanal. Gotō departed the Shortland Islands for Guadalcanal at 14:00 the same day. To protect the reinforcement group's approach to Guadalcanal from the CAF, the Japanese 11th Air Fleet, based at Rabaul, Kavieng, and Buin, planned two air strikes on Henderson Field for 11 September. A "fighter sweep" of 16 Mitsubishi A6M3 Zero fighters swept over Henderson Field just after mid-day but failed to engage any U.S. aircraft. Forty-five minutes later, the second wave, 46 Mitsubishi G4M2 "Betty" bombers and 30 Zeros arrived over Henderson Field. In an ensuing air battle with the CAF, two G4M and four U.S. fighters were downed. Although the Japanese attacks failed to inflict significant damage, they did prevent CAF bombers from finding and attacking the reinforcement group. As the reinforcement group transited the Slot, relays of 11th Air Fleet Zeros from Buin provided escort. Emphasizing the importance of this convoy for Japanese plans, the last flight of the day was ordered to remain on station over the convoy until darkness, then ditch their aircraft and await pickup by the reinforcement group's destroyers. All six Zeros ditched; only one pilot was recovered. Allied reconnaissance aircraft sighted Jojima's supply convoy 210 mi (180 nmi; 340 km) from Guadalcanal between Kolombangara and Choiseul in the Slot at 14:45 on the same day, and reported it as three "cruisers" and eight destroyers. Gotō's force, following the convoy, was not sighted. In response to the sighting of Jojima's force, at 16:07 Scott turned toward Guadalcanal for an interception.
Scott crafted a simple battle plan for the expected engagement. His ships would steam in column with his destroyers at the front and rear of his cruiser column, searching across a 300 degree arc with SG surface radar in an effort to gain positional advantage on the approaching enemy force. The destroyers were to illuminate any targets with searchlights and discharge torpedoes while the cruisers were to open fire at any available targets without awaiting orders. The cruiser's float aircraft, launched in advance, were to find and illuminate the Japanese warships with flares. Although Helena and Boise carried the new, greatly improved SG radar, Scott chose San Francisco as his flagship. At 22:00, as Scott's ships neared Cape Hunter at the northwest end of Guadalcanal, three of Scott's cruisers launched floatplanes. One crashed on takeoff, but the other two patrolled over Savo Island, Guadalcanal, and Ironbottom Sound. As the floatplanes were launched, Jojima's force was just passing around the mountainous northwestern shoulder of Guadalcanal, and neither force sighted each other. At 22:20, Jojima radioed Gotō and told him that no U.S. ships were in the vicinity. Although Jojima's force later heard Scott's floatplanes overhead while unloading along the north shore of Guadalcanal, they failed to report this to Gotō. At 22:33, just after passing Cape Esperance, Scott's ships assumed battle formation. The column was led by Farenholt, Duncan, and Laffey, and followed by San Francisco, Boise, Salt Lake City, and Helena. Buchanan and McCalla brought up the rear. The distance between each ship ranged from 500 to 700 yd (460 to 640 m). Visibility was poor because the moon had already set, leaving no ambient light and no visible sea horizon.
Gotō's force passed through several rain squalls as they approached Guadalcanal at 30 kn (35 mph; 56 km/h). Gotō's flagship Aoba led the Japanese cruisers in column, followed by the rest of their fleet starboard and port. At 23:30, Gotō's ships emerged from the last rain squall and began appearing on the radar scopes of Helena and Salt Lake City. The Japanese, because their warships were also equipped with radar, became aware of Scott's presence right then too. At 23:00, the San Francisco aircraft spotted Jojima's force off Guadalcanal and reported it to Scott. Scott, believing that more Japanese ships were likely still on the way, continued his course towards the west side of Savo Island. At 23:33, Scott ordered his column to turn towards the southwest to a heading of 230°. All of Scott's ships understood the order as a column movement except Scott's own ship, San Francisco. As the three lead U.S. destroyers executed the column movement, San Francisco turned simultaneously. Boise, following immediately behind, followed San Francisco, thereby throwing the three van destroyers out of formation. At 23:32, Helena's radar showed the Japanese warships to be about 27,700 yd (25,300 m) away. At 23:35, Boise's and Duncan's radars also detected Gotō's ships. Between 23:42 and 23:44, Helena and Boise reported their contacts to Scott on San Francisco who mistakenly believed that the two cruisers were actually tracking the three U.S. destroyers that were thrown out of formation during the column turn. Scott radioed Farenholt to ask if the destroyer was attempting to resume its station at the front of the column. Farenholt replied, "Affirmative, coming up on your starboard side," further confirming Scott's belief that the radar contacts were his own destroyers. To prevent his fleet from continuing their course towards the Americans directly, Gotō was unsure about the true strenght of the American fleet and ordered his forces to turn north, to bypass Savo Islands, where the Japanese had before installed coastal guns to defend the surrounding area from the Allies. At 23:45, Farenholt and Laffey, still unaware of Gotō's approaching warships, increased speed to resume their stations at the front of the U.S. column. Duncan's crew, however, thinking that Farenholt and Laffey were commencing an attack on the Japanese warships, increased speed to launch a solitary torpedo attack on Gotō's force without telling Scott what they were doing. San Francisco's radar registered the Japanese ships, but Scott was not informed of the sighting. By 23:45, Gotō's ships were only 5,000 yd (4,600 m) away from Scott's formation and visible to Helena's and Salt Lake City's lookouts. The U.S. formation at this point was not in position to cross the T of the Japanese formation, as the Japanese had turned north, robbing them from their tactical advantage, as both fleets now stood beside . At 23:46, still assuming that Scott was aware of the rapidly approaching Japanese warships, Helena radioed for permission to open fire, using the general procedure request, "Interrogatory Roger" (meaning, basically, "Are we clear to act?"). Scott answered with, "Roger", only meaning that the message was received, not that he was confirming the request to act. Upon receipt of Scott's "Roger", Helena, thinking they now had permission, opened fire, quickly followed by Boise, Salt Lake City, and to Scott's further surprise, San Francisco.
Not taken by surprise, Gotō's force had prepared their own guns and thanks to their superior night vision, clearly spottet the Americans by now. At 23:43, just shortly before the Americans, the Japanese had started to fire with their forward ships and soon the first salvo's smashed into each other, leaving the Aoba heavily hit by up to 40 shells from Helena, Salt Lake City, San Francisco, Farenholt, and Laffey. The shell hits heavily damaged Aoba's communications systems and demolished two of her main gun turrets as well as her main gun director. Several large-caliber projectiles passed through Aoba's flag bridge without exploding, but the force of their passage killed many men and mortally wounded Gotō. Scott, still unsure who his ships were firing at, and afraid that they might be firing on his own destroyers, ordered a ceasefire at 23:47, although not every ship complied. Scott ordered Farenholt to flash her recognition signals and upon observing that Farenholt was close to his formation, he ordered the fire resumed at 23:51. By this time, the Japanese had the opportunity to reload their next salvo a little faster then the Americans, who had ordered some of their ships to stop fireing by now. The first american ships (Farenhold, Duncan and Laffey) were hit by he Japanese, forcing them and the rest of the Task Force to tunr further east to Savo Island. The Japanese ship Aoba, also continuing to receive damaging hits, turned to portside to head away northwards from Scott's formation to get protection from the remaining Japanese ships, while beginning to make a smoke screen which led most of the Americans to believe that she was sinking, but also prevented the Americans and Japanese from seeing parts of their remaining fleets directly. Scott's ships shifted their fire to Furutaka, which was following behind Aoba. At 23:49, Furutaka was hit in her torpedo tubes, igniting a large fire that attracted even more shellfire from the US ships. At 23:53 Farenheit was directly hit in one of her turrets, killing some gunners and preventing it from moving for the rest of the battle. At 23:58, a torpedo from Buchanan hit Furutaka in her forward engine room, causing severe damage, while Laffey was hit just below the water line. By then Farenhold were already heavily damaged and Duncan was medium damaged, by the incoming Japanese shells. During this time, San Francisco and Boise sighted Fubuki about 1,400 yd (1,300 m) away and raked her with shellfire, joined soon by most of the rest of Scott's formation. The forward Japanese and American ships now were all fireing upon each other, as Farenhold was turning southwards to escape. Heavily damaged, Farenhold and Fubuki began to sink, while Kinugasa and Hatsuyuki now shelled the American ships too. During the exchange of gunfire, Farenholt had received several damaging hits from both the Japanese and American ships, killing several men. She escaped from the crossfire by crossing ahead of San Francisco and passing to the disengaged side of Scott's column to the south. Duncan, still engaged in her solitary torpedo attack on the Japanese formation, had also been hit by gunfire from both sides, was by now set afire, and looped away south in her own effort to escape the crossfire. Both Duncan and Farenhold however, unaware of the Japanese positions on Savo Island now came closer to their doom, by 00:02, as the Japanese Naval Guns positioned there, who were aiming for the American fleet's back, now had them at close fire and finished both ships off with their own barrages.
As Gotō's ships continued to battle Scott's ships, who tightened their formation to open up even more fire on the Japanese. At 00:06, two torpedoes from Kinugasa barely missed Boise. Boise and Salt Lake City turned on their searchlights to help target the Japanese ships, giving Kinugasa's gunners clear targets. At 00:10, two shells from Kinugasa exploded in Boise's main ammunition magazine between turrets one and two. The resulting explosion killed almost 100 men and threatened to blow the ship apart. Seawater rushed in through rents in her hull opened by the explosion and helped quench the fire before it could explode the ship's powder magazines. Boise immediately sheered out of the column and retreated from the action down south, only to be targeted by the Japanese guns of Savo Islands too. Kinugasa and Salt Lake City exchanged fire with each other, each hitting the other several times, causing minor damage to Kinugasa and damaging one of Salt Lake City's boilers, reducing her speed and letting her get hit by more Japanese shells. At 00:16, Scott ordered his ships to turn to a heading south in an attempt to prevent being wedged between Savo island in the east and the Japanese fleet in the North. Scott's ships, quickly lost sight of Gotō's ships this way, and all firing between both fleets ceased by 00:20. The American formation was beginning to scatter, so Scott ordered a turn generally south to disengage. This however put his remaining fleet now under full fire from the Japanese guns at Savo Island, getting a few more hits, while returning fire, wrongly believing they were off from their former course and now surrounded by the Japanese.
During the battle between Scott's and Gotō's ships, Jojima's reinforcement group completed unloading at Guadalcanal and began its return journey unseen by Scott's warships, using a route that passed south of the Russell Islands and New Georgia. Despite extensive damage, Aoba was able to join Kinugasa in retirement to the north through the Slot. Furutaka's damage caused her to lose power around 00:50, and she sank at 02:28, 22 mi (19 nmi; 35 km) northwest of Savo Island. Hatsuyuki picked up Furutaka's survivors and joined the retreat northward. Boise extinguished her fires by 02:40 and at 03:05 rejoined Scott's formation. Duncan, on fire and sinking, was abandoned by her crew at 00:29 and the damaged, sinking Farenhold six minuts before at 00:23. Unaware of Duncan's, Farenhold's and Boise (not to heavily damaged or sinking) fate, Scott detached McCalla to search for them and retired with the rest of his ships towards Nouméa, arriving in the afternoon of 13 October. McCalla located the burning, abandoned Duncan about 03:00, and several members of McCalla's crew made an attempt to keep her from sinking. By 12:00, however, they had to abandon the effort as bulkheads within Duncan collapsed causing the ship to finally sink west of Savo Island. American servicemen in boats from Guadalcanal as well as McCalla picked up Duncan's and Farenhold's scattered survivors from the sea around Savo, while Laffey was heavily damaged. In total, 175 Duncan sailors survived; 68 did not. As they rescued Duncan's crew, the Americans came across the more than 100 Fubuki survivors, floating in the same general area. The Japanese initially refused all rescue attempts and some tried to reach Savo Island by swimming, a day later the rest of them allowed themselves to be picked up and taken prisoner.
Jojima, learning of the bombardment force's engangement, detached four destroyers to assist Furutaka or her survivors and four others to rendezvous with Jojima's ships, to cover the withdrawal of. At 07:00, five CAF Douglas SBD-3 Dauntless dive bombers attacked the Japanese fleet's ships, but inflicted no damage. At 08:20, 11 more SBDs found and attacked Shirayuki and Murakumo. Although they scored no direct hits, a near miss caused Murakumo to begin leaking oil, marking a trail for other CAF aircraft to follow. A short time later, seven more CAF SBDs plus six Grumman TBF-1 Avenger torpedo bombers, accompanied by 14 Grumman F4F-4 Wildcats, found the four Japanese destroyers 170 mi (150 nmi; 270 km) from Guadalcanal. In the ensuing attack, Murakumo was hit by a torpedo in her engineering spaces, leaving her without power. In the meantime, the Japanese remaining fleet had bypassed Savo island and turned southeast again, not northwards to the Japanese base in the Shortland Islands, as the Americans had believed after the battle. They started to bombard the airfield and destroy many surrounding facilities, as well as the American airplanes stationed there, before the Japanese forces returned northwest to reach their base in the Shortland Islands at 14:00. The Americans managed to get a few more hits on the Japanese ships during this time, damaging a few of them lightly and the Murakumo as well as the Asagumo medium, while the Natsugumo was heavily damaged. The Americans lost 13 CAF SBDs, 11 TBFs and 12 fighters at 15:45. An SBD placed its bomb almost directly amidships on Natsugumo while two more near misses contributed to her severe damage. After Asagumo took off her survivors, Natsugumo sank at 16:27. The CAF aircraft also scored several more hits on the stationary Murakumo, setting her afire. After her crew abandoned ship, Shirayuki scuttled her with a torpedo, picked up her survivors, and joined the rest of the Japanese warships for the remainder of their return to their ships on the Shortland Islands.
Captain Kikunori Kijima, Gotō's chief of staff and commander of the bombardment force during bombardment of Henderson Field and the return trip to the Shortland Islands after Gotō's death in battle, claimed that his force had sunk four American cruisers and two destroyer, while in reality he sank two destroyers, one cruiser and damaged a few more quit heavily. Furutaka's captain, who survived the sinking of his ship, blamed the loss of his cruiser on bad air reconnaissance and poor leadership from the 8th fleet staff under Admiral Mikawa. Gotō's bombardment mission was another Japanese victory, further more Jojima's reinforcement convoy was successful in delivering the crucial men and equipment to Guadalcanal. Aoba journeyed to Kure, Japan, for repairs that were completed on January 15, 1943. The Americans under Scott meanwhile claimed that his force sank three Japanese cruisers and four destroyers. Many of the American ships would be under repair for the next months in America. While a tactical victory for the Japanese for now, the strategic vitory of this mission only came, when just two days later on the night of 13 September, the Japanese battleships Kongō and Haruna bombarded and destroyed what was left (or at least hastily repaired till then) from Henderson Field. One day after that, a large Japanese convoy even successfully delivered 4,500 more troops and equipment to the island. These troops and equipment helped complete Japanese preparations for the large land offensive scheduled to begin on 23 September. By then the Japanese naval assaults had put Henderson Field out of the ability to operate aircraft from there and the Americans knew that fighting fot the area with the now superior Japanese numbers was a lost cause. So the U.S. Army started to evacuated their base on Henderson Field on 21 September further east on prepared defensive positions, while completely destroying what little remained of Henderson Field to not let it fall into Japanese hands for their use. On 13 September more U.S. Army troops had reached Guadalcanal and were key in the Battle of Henderson Field that would take place during the ongoing American evacuation by ships and over land to the east. As a result of the Battle, the Americans would bomb the Japanese positions on Savo Island, damaging their guns and fortifications there severely, rendering most of them useless in one of the last operations from Henderson Field before returning to other american bases further south and east. Thanks to the Battle of Cape Esperance, the Americans were shockingly aware of the Japanese tactics and skills in naval fighting, bhe U.S. was still unaware of the range and power of Japanese torpedoes, the effectiveness of Japanese night optics, and the skilled fighting ability of most Japanese destroyer and cruiser commanders. Incorrectly applying the perceived lessons learned from this battle, U.S. commanders in future naval night battles in the Solomons consistently tried to prove that American naval gunfire was more effective than Japanese torpedo attacks. This belief was severely tested just two months later during the Battle of Tassafaronga.
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Sadly never played part 3, maybe I should soon then. ^^
