Many thanks! I hope to have the next section focusing on the northern front in Canada up by sometime in March! Then we'll cover points West!
Wrapped in Flames: The Great American War and Beyond
- Thread starter EnglishCanuck
- Start date
Many thanks! I hope to have the next section focusing on the northern front in Canada up by sometime in March! Then we'll cover points West!
From another thread (original post by Inquisitor Tolkien)
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Doesn't really matter where Britain imports more grain from, for two reasons:
1) Britain and the US are unlikely to be opposed to one another TTL.
2) If they were, cutting off the US' grain revenues would hurt the US quite a lot, while Britain would buy grain from elsewhere.
Theoretically, they could, but where do they source and replace the grain? 1860, 1861, and 1862 saw historic failures in British grain crops (with one year a general European failure), and gigantic bumper American crops, which facilitated major expansion in US exports to Europe. In 1861, Britain imported 32m bushels more Union wheat to make up its 40m shortfall that year, on top of what it already imported (the Union exported ~20m annually before 1861, most of it to Britain). British wheat production in 1861 was 88m bushels (down from the ~130m that they normally produce), which made Union grain quite direly needed.
Russia possibly could make up the shortfall (with a major price spike in grain), but it's a major disruption, notwithstanding the recent Crimean War, and Russia had not embraced mechanization to the extent the US had (which was what drove the gigantic increases in US grain production) at this point which facilitated its surpluses, and has worse ports for shipment in comparison to the US (and much higher transport costs). This also does not include corn, of which was also greatly exported.
Source: Social and Industrial Conditions in the North During the Civil War (free ebook via Google Books)
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Is the lack of grain for the UK being dealt with here?
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Doesn't really matter where Britain imports more grain from, for two reasons:
1) Britain and the US are unlikely to be opposed to one another TTL.
2) If they were, cutting off the US' grain revenues would hurt the US quite a lot, while Britain would buy grain from elsewhere.
Theoretically, they could, but where do they source and replace the grain? 1860, 1861, and 1862 saw historic failures in British grain crops (with one year a general European failure), and gigantic bumper American crops, which facilitated major expansion in US exports to Europe. In 1861, Britain imported 32m bushels more Union wheat to make up its 40m shortfall that year, on top of what it already imported (the Union exported ~20m annually before 1861, most of it to Britain). British wheat production in 1861 was 88m bushels (down from the ~130m that they normally produce), which made Union grain quite direly needed.
Russia possibly could make up the shortfall (with a major price spike in grain), but it's a major disruption, notwithstanding the recent Crimean War, and Russia had not embraced mechanization to the extent the US had (which was what drove the gigantic increases in US grain production) at this point which facilitated its surpluses, and has worse ports for shipment in comparison to the US (and much higher transport costs). This also does not include corn, of which was also greatly exported.
Source: Social and Industrial Conditions in the North During the Civil War (free ebook via Google Books)
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Is the lack of grain for the UK being dealt with here?
RodentRevolution
Banned
As we are importing stuff from other threads, but while in 1862 British wheat imports soared to around double the normal amount in the years before and after the ACW this does not seem to be because there was a particular wheat shortage in the UK. The British seem to have consumed (or possibly re-exported) an unusually large amount of wheat during the Civil War. It may have been a case of "Eat your bread Jimmy it pays for Union soldiers to go battle slavery" or something else.
It is further worth noting that EnglishCanuck argues against the notion of Union collapse despite the fact the British threaten to cut off well over 90% of their supply of gunpowder and possibly 100% at least for the first year of conflict. The notion that the British will keel over because around 20-25% of supply of one food source among several (so not a drop of 20% in calories note) is threatened seems rather fanciful. It is also hard to see from the available evidence that the British would notice a significantly higher than usual price of bread.
As much as is possible. From what I've read, the grain trade in 1862 was high for different reasons. Firstly, the Union seems to have been dumping loads of excess grain on the markets (the 1862 number of tons imported was the highest it would be, it dropped markedly from 1863 onwards) secondly, there seems to have been excess grains on the market which could be wrung from the continental powers. The German states and Russia in particular.
While the price of grain would definitely go up, that would not be the end of the world for the British economy. It would probably have risen as high as it had during the Russian War from 1854-56, (10 shiliings in 1854 vs. a low of 5.3 in 1862, and maybe not even as high as ten) which notably did little to stop that war. I don't think it would be a deciding factor in British calculations. I have yet to read any first hand evidence that it played a crucial role in British food stocks in 1862, and the evidence of it in Parliament shows it was only worth a passing mention, and one which seemed skeptical of its importance.
All in all, from what I've read it would be a small economic factor across the Atlantic. In the US however, it might be problematic in the short term as something has to be done to keep millions of farmers from going destitute. Doubtless it would cause some anxiety in Britain, but the greater anxiety might be felt in the MidWest where the farmers are now cut off from foreign markets.
Well one of the preconceptions I had when starting this TL was that the Union did have the resources to fight on with a British declaration of war, and how I've managed to game it shows they could hang on, even if by their finger nails, but there's lots of long term problems on both sides I can only guess at. Gunpowder could be imported from other European nations (at a higher cost than OTL) and even small supplies of rifles and other necessary materials will probably slip through the blockade in reasonable numbers to supplement what could not be provided by domestic industry.
What I've come to realize is that such a system would not be cheap or easy, but something which the US could conceivably accomplish.
Working on it
it's been lagging thanks to RL issues, but if I can buckle down this weekend I can probably get it out by next week.Working on it
Good luck manRodentRevolution
Banned
Oh I would agree on the powder situation. I too lean towards the US making do. It is just they will be functioning under more constrained supply than OTL, even allowing for the black market supply of finished gunpowder from South America and Europe, plus in due course nitre beds beginning to yield the necessary raw material.
Similarly for gun iron, I strongly suspect the Americans would go back to earlier pattern heavier barrels which could make good use of the inferior metal available to them. The downside for the troops is a weapon that is somewhat more cumbersome and wearing to wield than the Springfield. The downside for the Armory is that they would have to adapt their machinery causing a temporary bottleneck in production.
A quick note on privateering by the Americans, it is entirely possible they may be able to procure and arm steamers for the role. They would struggle to enjoy 1812 levels of success though because while the US does still enjoy one of the largest and most sophisticated commercial sailing fleets, full of vessels eminently convertible to 1812 privateering requirements, they were at this stage less well endowed with steam ships and every steam ship detached to privateering is one less to bring in supplies (though it might capture something useful of course). That said funnily enough the more effective British interdiction the more US privateers we are likely to see.
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One of the small advantages the Union gets here is that since war doesn't break out until 6th of February (and functionally the 19th of February when news reached the Americas) that there were two whole months for the Union to ferry other foreign supplies in weapons and powder across the Atlantic to slightly make up the inevitable shortfall after the British embargo of December.
But the sad reality is that the heavier barrels would probably become a necessity.
Indeed. Commerce raiding, as I have said many times before, is not a war winning strategy. It wasn't in 1775-83 and definitely not in 1812-15. A century later in 1914-18 it didn't even come close to being a strategy which could have brought the Entente to its knees. Expecting anything less in the 1860s would be ludicrous in my opinion. Though, strictly speaking the American vessels aren't privateers, but duly commissioned vessels of the United States Navy. The Declaration of Paris in 1856 would make any American privateers essentially pirates who would be bound to be arrested in whatever port they entered.
The point about commerce raiding and blockade running is well made. While a vessel like Quaker City or the Vanderbilt might be able to mount two or three guns and still successfully run back and forth across the Atlantic, its far more efficient for the ships to be outfitted as one or the other. But, with 3,000 miles of ocean to cross without running into British ships, you have a daunting task ahead of you.
Thank you! I'm glad you've been enjoying it and I hope to have new stuff for you soon!
Chapter 58: In the Footsteps of Burgoyne
Chapter 58: In the Footsteps of Burgoyne
“Come unto me ye heroes
Whose hearts are true and bold,
Who value more your honor,
Than others do their gold;
Give ear unto my story,
And I the truth will tell,
Concerning many a soldier,
Who for his country fell.” – A Song for the Redcoats, 1777 (traditional)
“The Army of Canada, now two corps strong, had been preparing for its southwards movement for four months. The transfer of staffs and officers between Canada East and Canada West had taken place over December and January, while the organization of the army sheltering at St. Jean had been of paramount importance in the early spring months.
Upon his elevation to Field Marshal, Dundas had been swift in reorganizing his forces in the mould London wanted. The army’s five divisions and one cavalry division were concentrated under the command of two overall corps, with a spare division acting as the army reserve. By May 1863 the army had been organized as such:
Field Marshal Henry Dundas
1st Corps: Lt. General Frederick Paulet
1st Division MG Henry Ponsonby
2nd Division MG Brooke Taylor
2nd Corps: Lt. General Patrick Grant
3rd Division MG William Norcott
4th Division MG Charles Warren
Russell’s Division: MG David Russell
Cavalry Division: MG John Lawrenson
Formally, though not actually, attached to this army was the 3rd Corps under Williams who had, until January, commanded the army in Canada East. His appointment to command in Canada West saw the 3rd Corps organized along these lines:
3rd Corps: Lt. General William Fenwick Williams
6th Division MG George T. C. Napier
7th Division MG Randall Rumley
Booker’s Brigade
These troops would in their turn, be responsible for the fighting in Canada West, and ensuring the Americans did not manage to land any blows in Dundas’s rear, allowing the main army to carry an offensive into the heart of American territory.
The campaign of 1863, in rough concert with Milne’s actions with the Confederate army on the Chesapeake, was designed to drive the Americans to the negotiating table on British terms. Its targets were ones which had been objectives for the British since the Revolution and in the campaigns of 1814. Their first goal was to seize control of Rouses Point and sever any American attempt at gaining a foothold on Canadian soil in Canada East. The second target, at Plattsburgh, would serve as a springboard for further invasion down the Hudson River Valley. Overall, it was expected that should the campaign progress well, the British army could drive a dagger into the heart of New York state and seize Albany, paralyzing the American ability to supply and coordinate any campaign in Canada.
Dundas had prepared the army for the campaign to begin in April. However, the brutal winter and cool temperatures of 1862-63 meant that the ice stayed on the St. Lawrence until May 3rd, meaning he could not bring in much needed supplies and gunboats until early May, delaying his movements till the 10th. Even though a trickle had manage to come north via the now British controlled Grand Trunk at Portland, but the long and vulnerable miles were often open to sabotage, which meant the route was not nearly as useful as planners in London had hoped.
Once the river was open to him however, he prepared to move South…” Empire and Blood: British Military Operations in the 19th Century Volume IV.
Ambrose Burnside
“The death of General Sumner from a heart attack on March 18th 1863 was a great blow to the morale and leadership of the army. This forced the elevation of the reluctant General Burnside. Though he had given a good showing operating his division, the general had little confidence in himself, and thus many of his subordinates had little confidence in him as the campaigning season of 1863 opened.
The Army of the Hudson though, was a formidable fighting force. With six divisions, an attached cavalry brigade and artillery, it was as strong as it had been in the spring of 1862. 50,000 men were now prepared for the campaign against Montreal. In Washington, it had been seen as essential that the army be prepared as much as possible for the campaign, and great depots had been constructed at Albany and Plattsburgh over the fall and winter. By spring, Burnside’s army could boast of more supplies than even the Army of the Potomac. It would be able to execute its mission without fear.
Burnside had been quick to accept the proposal laid out by Washington for an attack on Montreal. It was, as was well known, the lynchpin of Canada, and had been the goal of all of the previous years attacks. However, this time Burnside was determined he would do as was best. Though Sumner’s campaigns in June and July had all aimed to either sweep the British aside or go around them, Burnside planned to use the greater flexibility of his two corps to go through the British by forcing them to defend a wide front.
Instead of marching along the line of the Chateauguay, Burnside instead was opting a more streamlined approach. His corps would be concentrated at Rouses Point and Mooers. Richardson’s II Corps at Mooers and Casey’s XIV at Rouses Point. The plan was to follow the railroads north, and converge south of Montreal while the army was supported by Winslow’s squadron which would support the army during the descent of the Richelieu.
Though the British had destroyed the Canahauguay Railroad which normally connected the south bank of the St. Lawrence to Mooers Corners, Richardson was adamant he could still use the roads connecting it with the rest of the province. The two pronged descent on Montreal would force the British to react rather than open their own offensive. To do that, the majority of the cavalry was detached to operate alongside II Corps, while the two regiments of cavalry detailed to support XVI Corps would be left to aid the advance up the Richelieu…” The Union’s Shield: The Army of the Hudson, Donald Cameron, University of New York 1930
“In truth, the campaign had already begun at the end of April. Ever aggressive, Dundas had ordered that the line of supply for the American forces be interdicted as much as possible. On the 21st, the 1st Cavalry Brigade under Col. Low had been ordered to cross the border and attack the Champlain railroad bridge over the Richelieu which connected Rouses Point to Vermont and the rest of New York.
Low’s cavalry had crossed the border, some 800 men in all, and bore down on the bridge near Windmill Point. The Vermont militia were largely concentrated around Alburgh and East Alburgh, the company strength guard was simply overwhelmed. The bridge was burned, and the raiders retreated north. Occasional skirmishing would break out as both sides sought to interfere with the other. This however, deeply cut into the supplies Burnside could draw on quickly, now having to depend on the more circuitous routes running through Ogdensburgh.
Burnside himself, despite the dent in his supply situation, planned on using the river as his highway, but would also concentrate at Mooer’s and move on Montreal. To that end, as April bled into May he moved Foster’s division to Rouses Point and Casey’s to Champlain. Burns’s division was held at Plattsburgh alongside Howard’s from XVI Corps, while the advance brigades of Hancock’s division were moved to Mooers. Blenker’s men were to be billeted at Champlain.
However, the timetable of each general would be frustrated by the weather. The ice remained stubbornly late in the year, with Montreal remaining closed to the 5th of May, and with the railroad bridge burned and under threat, Burnside could not supply his forward movement in time with his men at Mooers. Though both generals had anticipated action by early May, they were trapped by nature itself. By the 10th, the roads remained muddy and stubborn, but Dundas was determined to waste no more time waiting on the weather. He ordered that the advance would begin early on the morning of the 11th.
At 5am, when word had arrived by courier, the 2nd Corps of the Army of Canada began moving southwards. Led by companies of locals from the militia, the two divisions took separate roads to Mooers. The Norcott’s 3rd Division crossed the border at the location of what had been Clayland and Buttler’s stores, which had been abandoned and then repurposed as militia blockhouses. The militia company manning the blockhouse was taken by surprise, and quickly overrun in the dawn hours and passed.
Warren’s 4th Division however, had no such luck. The militia, awakened by sounds unusual in the year, were ready and a sharp skirmish erupted until the artillery was brought up and the men literally blasted from their positions. The sudden thunder of artillery was heard in Mooers, and the men of II Corps were roused rudely from their sleep.
In 1863 Mooers was a sleepy town of just under 4,000 souls. Notable for housing Mooer’s Junction where the Plattsburgh and Montreal Railroad met the Ogdensburgh line, its possession was essential for the Union to supply its forces in northern New York. Grant’s task, was to capture it.
Defending the town in May were the forward elements of II Corps, Winfield Scott Hancock’s Division. They had been bivouacked in and around the village since early April, generally freezing and keeping watch on the border waiting for instructions to move. Joined by Blake’s cavalry, they were crowded inside the little village and had some 8,000 men in the region, supported by an ad hoc brigade of 3rd New York State Militia Division. However, there were fully 18,000 British troops coming directly at them, and they were in a sore position, separated by the Chazy River and their fortifications with the river at their backs.
Hancock’s division had by this point, a reputation against the British. MG Amasa Cobb’s First Brigade in particular was well regarded in the army of the Hudson. Formerly Hancock’s brigade, they had acquitted themselves well at Portland and First Rouses Point, and were considered blooded veterans against the British. So when the bugle called to form ranks, Hancock was quick to muster his regiments. Sent to hold north of the town at the all important junction, Cobb fell in behind pre-prepared breastworks. The memories of the British rifle fire were fresh and horrific in the minds of many veterans.
Stoughton’s Vermont (Second) Brigade formed up alongside, covering the flank and roads into town while the gunners manned their positions along the road. Davidson’s brigade formed the reserve. Blake’s Cavalry, the 4th New York, 8th Illinois, and 19th New York, moved to screen the flanks.
The telegraph hummed, and riders were dispatched to Champlain to bring Blenker’s troops to the action. Smith had to have known it would be far too late for Blenker to change the outcome of the coming fight however.
Norcott’s division would arrive first, shaking out as it turned to face the strong point at the junction. Using the woods as cover, the three brigades worked into line, Garvock’s 1st Brigade and Col. Thomas Kelly’s 2nd Brigade facing in, and Pitt-Rivers 3rd (Canadian) Brigade as the reserve. The artillery formed just north of Branch Creek, and was soon raining shot on the American positions, while the American artillerists responded in a generally futile counter battery duel.
Warren’s division was soon filing in beside Norcott’s with Dunn’s 1st Brigade in the lead, and James Lindsay’s 3rd Brigade supporting while Kelly’s 2nd Brigade was the reserve.
The artillery duel became general at 2pm and lasted until 3pm when the call for the advance sounded. Trusting the artillery to have softened the American positions, Grant hoped that one solid push would unseat the Americans and grant him the town. Garvock and Kelly’s brigades advanced, supported by Dunn’s and Lindsay’s. Skirmishers fired at any head that showed itself, and soon the firing along the line became general as the British advanced to within 200 yards. Though volley after volley was poured into their ranks, the regulars characteristically closed gaps when a man fell and continued onwards. Soon a trail of red clad corpses spread back to the tree line. However, when the British reached 100 yards there was a general volley, and four brigades advanced at a run.
“It was a splendid and terrible sight to behold,” wrote one 5th Vermont private “the mass of redcoats coming at a run, bayonets gleaming in the sun, seeming on the whole unaffected by our volleys. With a terrific HURRAH they were upon us.”
9,000 troops crashed into the breastwork. With the final volleys, the work soon became hand to hand. Dunn was seen leaping the breastworks, laying about with his saber and his brigade was soon surmounting the obstacles behind him. Lindsay’s troops were closing on the flank, and Hancock had no choice but to commit his reserve. Feeding Davidson’s 3rd Brigade into the line, the action became general and the weight of numbers was soon pushing the Vermonters and New Yorkers alike back into the buildings.
However, on the point of advance at the junction, the British advance stalled. Instilled with confidence by their bold commander, Cobb’s men, whether men from Wisconsin, New York, Pennsylvania or Maine, held firm despite the best the British could throw at them. One attack was seen off, then a second. Finally, Norcott sent Pitt-Rivers Canadians into the fray.
The Canadians were eager to prove their mettle, led by their own leaders they moved to turn the junction strong points flanks. Hancock, seeing it coming, moved the 49th Pennsylvania under Col. Irwin to meet them, but it was not enough. With a series of volleys, they were soon pushing the men of Pennsylvania back. In danger of being encircled, Cobb reluctantly ordered his men to draw back, greeted with jeers in English and French along the way.
Fighting spread into the town itself as both sides fought to hang on, house to house fighting became the norm but by 5pm, with the sun waning, and their backs to the river, Hancock ordered his men to retreat. It was a chaotic flight, with Stoughton’s Vermonters forming the rear guard. In the chaotic crossing over 100 men would be drowned in the river as they pushed to withdraw.
Only Cobb and Davidson’s brigades, the cavalry and half the artillery would successfully cross the river. Stoughton, wounded, was captured with over 4/5th of his brigade and made prisoner. Hancock’s division was now moving swiftly back into New York, with Hancock suffering his first taste of defeat, while Grant’s 2nd Corps had just won the first British victory on New York’s soil in over a century…” Empire and Blood: British Military Operations in the 19th Century Volume IV.
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Happy Canada Day all! Pictures for this chapter to follow tomorrow, and then we'll be up to Chapter 60 by the end of the week!
RodentRevolution
Banned
Hurrah good to see this tale restart with a bang, a rattle of musketry and a clash of bayonets!
And with Burnside to oppose them what are the chances of the British Army being in Manhattan by midsummer?
The Canucks Take Manhattan, anyone?
By the way @EnglishCanuck, will we ever see the return of the Fulford family?
Burnside couldn't handle something as large as the Army of the Potomac, but in OTL, he did well with smaller forces. Burnside was good enough to shut down 90% of the North Carolina coast earlier in the war and defeat Longstreet late in the war. Even with the AotP, he stole a march on Lee, arriving at Fredericksburg several days before Lee. The pontoon bridges he needed did not, but if they had Burnside might have been seen as one of the most brilliant generals of the war.
Thank you very much! It's good to be back!
Possibly, the theater of war they've been in has just been pretty static since the summer of 1862, and narrative sections comprising of "they stared across the St. Lawrence for a week, fought off an American raid the next week" would not be very interesting. I may bring them back this year, but if we see them again it'll probably be in 1864, which I'm hoping to get wrapped up by 2020.
Moving the war along more swiftly is my current goal, so the campaigns after 1863 might be a little less in depth.
A fair assessment. I think he has been unfairly maligned for his performance at Antietam and Fredericksburg, but much of Fredericksburg wasn't his fault. He was under immense pressure to attack and with the screw ups in the pontoons he couldn't really catch Lee unawares. In his defence he didn't even want the army command. His commands out West were, like Hooker's, perhaps vindications of his talents as a small scale commander.