Motel Rwanda: An African AH
- Thread starter Big Tex
- Start date
Motel Rwanda
How the Rwandan Genocide was Averted
How the Rwandan Genocide was Averted
Part I
We Were Peacekeepers
Lt. Colonel Romeo Dallaire had commanded brigades in Cambodia and Bosnia, but he had never led a UN peacekeeping mission. Now he had just been given command of the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR). However Dallaire’s excitement soon paved way to some questions, most notably where was Rwanda and what needed to be done there?We Were Peacekeepers
So over the next few months of late 1993, while Dallaire began to coordinate his command, he did some personal research on the country and his mission. If he was going to be going to Rwanda, then dammit he was going to understand Rwanda. He quickly learned from geography books that Rwanda was a small hilly green country in East Africa. It had been a Belgian colony, taken over from the pre-WWI German colonies. Most interestingly the Belgians had given favorable status to the minority Tutsi tribe until Rwandan independence in 1962. After independence the majority Hutu tribe took control and three decades of oppressive rule by the Hutus against the Tutsi began. He also learned that just a few years ago in 1990, armed Tutsi exiles created the Rwandan Patriotic Front and waged a largely unsuccessful rebellion against the Hutu. Earlier this year Tanzania brokered peace between the two sides, not wanting to see its northeastern neighbor descend into the characteristic decade long African style civil war. The peace agreement was a power-sharing deal known as the Arusha Accords. The Hutu government would share power with the Tutsi minority, and UN peacekeepers led by Dallaire were to go in assist in the demilitarization of the country and basically help keeps things moving. As far as Dallaire knew there wasn’t any true danger of major conflict, it all seemed pretty cut and dry. A pre-deployment visit to the country in August of 93’ cemented his faith that his mission would be relatively peaceful.
However in late 1993, several thousand Rwandan Tutsi were killed and nearly 9,000 were detained. Shipments of weapons were coming in to the Hutu government by the ton. Thankfully UN and other non-governmental Human Rights watch groups in Rwanda noticed these proceedings. While the UN group filed its report to collect dust in some New York file cabinet, Amnesty International however was used to playing this game with the lackadaisical west. Instead of filing a typical report to go no-where they went straight to the source, calling Dallaire on his home phone and warning him about the increasingly ominous situation [1].
With this information Dallaire lobbied to increase his mission. Earlier in 1993 he had asked for 5,000 peacekeepers but the US, unwilling to foot another peacekeeping bill especially so soon after the incidents in Somalia, made him cut his force to a lean 2,500. Now armed with facts that Rwanda could be a potential flash point, Dallaire asked for the original 5,000 troops. Again he was rejected, given only an extra few thousand dollars to procure supplies. At least Dallaire was successful in obtaining 300 vehicles from the UN mission in Cambodia.
Dallaire arrived in Rwanda in October of 1993. Thankfully everything continued to be stable; this was however more due to lack of information than anything else. Dallaire lacked manpower, money, intelligence, reliable international support. Of the 300 vehicles from Cambodia that arrived, only 80 were reliably usable. Even of his 2,500 troops, only a scant few were worth anything as soldiers, namely his largest Belgian contingent. Many however were from poorer countries that lacked the NATO equipment of some of their western allies.
Dallaire was soon playing catch up. The majority of his time was spent squabbling with New York for more supplies. This would turn out to be fruitless; luckily his other strategy of intelligence gathering was much better.
The most important factor in all of this was a Hutu informant named simply “Jean-Pierre”. Jean-Pierre had told Dallaire that the Hutu government was arming militias, registering Tutsi, figuring out how to deal with UNAMIR (including a planned attack on the Belgians to force their withdraw ala the US in Somalia) and he suspected “preparing for an extermination”. In response to this information, which in Dallaire’s mind at least confirmed a larger Hutu conspiracy to kill the Tutsi, Dallaire sent a fax to New York [2] relaying this information and asking for permission to assault Hutu arms caches, he was rejected. Instead they told Dallaire to take the informants claims up with the moderate Rwandan government (including Rwandan president Juvenal Habyarimana), the diplomatic ambassadors of the peacekeepers countries, and the US. Basically they anted Dallaire to jump through months of governmental hoops to stop a genocide that could begin tomorrow and on top of that they wanted him to go to the US for approval which was a guaranteed no as the US had made it explicitly clear it would not support “aggressive peacekeeping”.
Dallaire did go to the US looking for approval and as expected he received his “no”. However Dallaire came up with a backup plan. He spread his forces around Kigali, the Rwandan capital, creating “safe zones”. Every day contingents of 40-50 armed troops would arrive at a spot in the capital and sit for all the world to see. Without speaking a word or getting involved they let the Rwandans know that if they were to be a victim, this would be where to go and if they were to be an aggressor, this would be where to avoid. In addition to the establishment of the “safe zones”, Dallaire stationed small contingents of soldiers with moderate Rwandan government officials and their families, including president Habyarimana and Prime Minster Agathe Uwilingiyimana. The soldiers were told not to turn over their guns or give in to enemy demands as the Hutu’s would be looking to purposely kill soldiers to get their home nations to withdraw them. Due to the specific mention by Jean-Pierre that the Belgians would be targeted, Belgians had to travel in minimum groups of 25 when not on patrol or in a secure area.
Needless to say these actions frustrated the Hutu extremists; still they had the numbers and the confidence that this UNAMIR force would be shattered. Even if the Tutsi of Kigali managed to find their way to the safe zones, it would only be a matter of time before the peacekeepers governments ordered their withdraw and the slaughter could begin.
On April 6, 1994 Kigali was shaken by an explosion in the sky marking the beginning of the Rwandan Genocide.
[1]: This is the POD; in OTL Dallaire never received any prior report that Rwanda’s Hutu government was plotting genocide.
[2]: OTL’s infamous “Dallaire Fax”
Part II
The Battle of Kigali
Many Rwandans not in the loop were unsure of what to make of the situation, their president had just been killed, a curfew had just been ordered, and many roadblocks and Rwandan soldiers were being stationed throughout the city. Thankfully for many of the would be victims however, Dallaire had a pretty good hunch as to what was occurring.
He immediately sent soldiers, as armed to the teeth as possible, to the “safe zones”. Immediately Tutsi began to flee to those zones. Prime Minister Uwilingiyimana and her family were transported to UNAMIR headquarters as were many more Rwandan higher ups that wished to see the Arusha Accords carried out. To the Hutu’s immense frustration their careful plans to systematically target and eliminate the moderate government were being foiled again and again by UNAMIR. And even though the Hutu had many of the edges, an outright attack on the UNAMIR mission would be their doom, all they could do was bear with everything and proceed with their plan.
While UNAMIR had managed to protect many of the Hutu’s most important and obvious targets, hundreds more were unable to reach a safe zone or receive a peacekeeper escort. These sadly were the first victims of the genocide.
The first night of the genocide was easily the most important. Thousands of Rwandans were saved by the established safe zones, including the most important moderate Rwandans in the government. In addition while Dallaire had a limited and very stretched force of peacekeepers that could not directly attack the Hutu extremists (thanks to their strict UN Chapter VI rules of engagement), the Rwandan Patriotic Front grabbed their guns and began to wage war on the Hutu again. While Dallaire was technically not supposed to take a side in this matter, he did help RPF leadership under the table with intelligence and some loaned vehicles.
Also a few hours after the plane was shot down, the international phones began to ring off the hook at UNAMIR headquarters. While Dallaire had made sure to secure safe zones and as many Rwandans as possible in the opening hours of the genocide, a large and very influential group of people were left to fend for themselves, the international diplomats to Rwanda. Technically Dallaire’s first task in the crisis was supposed to be the securing of these people before helping the Rwandans, Dallaire would later be court martialed for failure to follow orders and several other offenses.
With the demands pouring in to get diplomats and foreigners to safety, Dallaire was forced to send his escort parties to them instead of the Rwandans who were in danger. Dallaire later testified that the hardest part of the mission in those opening days was sending escorts to secure those foreigners who were never truly in danger (in fact before the first UNAMIR escorts arrived no foreigner had been killed) while he listened to Radio Millie Collines [1] broadcast names and information on Rwandans marked for death and confirm kills.
It was during one of these missions to secure and escort diplomats to safety that the first shots were fired between UNAMIR forces and the Hutu extremists. A group of 15 Belgians, five Ghanaians, and five Pakistanis were escorting UN Development Program workers to UNAMIR headquarters when they were encountered by several dozen Hutu. Upon identifying the Belgians as Belgians and secretly confirming via radio to capture then kill them in secret, the Hutu demanded the group lay down their weapons and follow them to a secure location for their own safety. They explicitly said no one was to be hurt. Following Dallaire’s orders the UNAMIR forces refused to budge much less lay down their weapons. The encounter quickly became a shouting match and some nervous trigger happy Hutu ended up shooting one of the Belgians, before the Hutu knew what hit them the UNAMIR force had opened fire on them and eliminated them. The Belgian who was shot required medical treatment on his shoulder but survived the encounter. Three other UNAMIR members were wounded in the firefight.
Back at UNAMIR headquarters, Dallaire knew the strict Chapter VI rules of engagement were now obsolete so he personally set the rules at more aggressive Chapter VII, against orders. This order probably had little effect as the Hutu were more concerned about killing Tutsi and moderates than engaging UNAMIR, but it did probably save some UNAMIR forces lives.
The morning of the 7th, about ten hours after the explosion that marked the beginning of the genocide; Dallaire began appealing to the UN for reinforcements and assistance. Unfortunately for Dallaire the UN and the US were dragging their feet. Few outside of the Rwandan and African departments knew the scope and scale of what was happening. To those who knew, this was just another African civil war to avoid, and for the vast majority, they didn’t even know. Every time Dallaire requested supplies, or assistance, or anything he received the same message, “secure foreigners and wait for instructions”.
Dallaire was soon plagued by two problems, supplies and time were quickly running out, and the one government that could do something about it was almost purposely ignoring the situation.
[1]: Radio Millie Collines was the key to the Hutu killings. The extremist radio station broadcast names, addresses, information, even license plate numbers to Hutu killers in regards to those Rwandans marked for death. It was common during the OTL genocide for a typical Hutu extremist to carry a machete in one hand and a radio in the other while he did his deadly work.
Dr. Strangelove
Banned
This is very interesting, I will be following it.
Also, points for originality in using a scenario, a continent and a decade so underused in AH.
Also, points for originality in using a scenario, a continent and a decade so underused in AH.
Maybe someone can hire some private contractors to bolster the peacekeeping force?
Think of it, ex-apartheid Afrikaaner tough guys fighting Hutu genociders! The irony!
Think of it, ex-apartheid Afrikaaner tough guys fighting Hutu genociders! The irony!
Well in OTL it was all about the cash. The trick here is to get the world's powers including the US to give a damn about Rwanda but still mainting a sense of reality to the situation with penny pinching, feet dragging, etc.
Besides why hire mercanaries when the RPF will do it for free?!
I know a friend's girlfriend who was a Rwandan, half Hutu, half Tutsi girl who fled to Spain in '94 after seeing and suffering absolutely horrible things. I'm glad to see that somebody still reminds that tragedy and tries to avert it to some extent, if only in fiction.
Glad she got alive, we were learning about it along with Darfur and other human rights stuff. Not pretty at all and led to all kinds of butterflies that plague central Africa to this day.
Still we got so much information on it how could I not make a timeline and try to educate the Euro-Amero centric board on Africa?!
This is very interesting, I will be following it.
Also, points for originality in using a scenario, a continent and a decade so underused in AH.
Gracias por favors, hope you like it!
Part III
Politics
A temporary solution was set up by communicating with the Rwandans in the safe zones. Many owned shops and stores of supplies and gladly gave directions to them. UNAMIR teams that had been focusing on escorting Rwandans and foreigners found themselves locating and securing these stores of food and water. It would be enough to get the safe zones by for a few days, but there was no way Dallaire could sustain this forever.
This was where Dallaire’s other biggest problem came into play, the US government. The UN would only send supplies and reinforcements if the US gave the ok and of course footed the bill. Unfortunately President Clinton was already dragging his feet and Congress had no intention to send more American troops to die in some African hell hole or at least send sums of taxpayer money down another African black hole. Even if they wanted to, the US didn’t have a clue what the real situation was. For many it was just “fighting in Africa, like always”. The situation seemed hopeless until one of the Rwandans in the safe zones began asking for a way to talk to Clinton himself.
This bold Rwandan was Monique Mujawamariya, a noted Human Rights activist who had actually met President Clinton before and impressed him with her courage at a meeting in December of 1993. Working the phones almost the entire second day of the genocide while gunshots erupted in the city around them, Mujawamariya and Dallaire somehow managed to get a hold of President Clinton on an international line on the early morning of the third day. For the first time since he was briefly told “There is a crisis in Rwanda”, Clinton learned the true scope of what was happening, the courage and brilliant work already done by UNAMIR, and the danger so many Rwandans and foreigners were in. It was during this conversation that Clinton suddenly gained a vested personal interest in Rwanda and made the decision to not let this country turn into “another African failure”.
At a press conference on April 10, Clinton announced to the world the full scope of the genocide currently underway [1] and his commitment to expand the UNAMIR mission (which against all odds had somehow managed to act brilliantly) to get the situation under control. He also made it perfectly clear that the US would not be sending in any soldiers but only provide equipment and support for an increase in international peacekeeping in the country.
Later that day Clinton called a meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and some military advisors as well as Dallaire on the phone. The US decided to immediately dispatch a food drop to assist Dallaire in feeding the Rwandans in the safe zones as well as resupply Dallaire’s troops themselves. In addition the US would fly a jamming plane known as “Commando Solo” over Rwandan air space in order to jam the deadly broadcasts of Radio Millie Collines. These tactics would slow the high rate of killing as well as ensure the survival of the tens of thousands of Rwandans in Kigali. While these plans played out the US would confront the Security Council about expanding UNAMIR.
[1]: In OTL it was a battle to get the Clinton administration to even use the term genocide. On May 21, six weeks after the killing began; US diplomats began using the word “genocide”. This pretty much sums up the political feet dragging involved which effectivley doomed the country to the worst genocide since the Holocaust.
burmafrd
Banned
Its interesting that many of the so called human rights groups and so called experts that now make so much noise about Iraq were very quiet for a long time about Rwanda. And how so many Liberal politicians made so little effort about it. And what happened and still is happening in Darfur also gets very little attention from them. Its because most of them and those groups really do not care about people; they are just after the attention and power and money they can get. And there is very little of that to be had from anything going on in Africa. Also witness how little they care about the current happenings in Zimbadwe.
I agree with you that there is a double standard when it comes to human rights issues. Groups will scream and cry about situations in Iraq, Afghanistan, China, etc. when there are larger scale and much worse violations in Africa. However this could also be attributed to the media.
I wouldn't say though that they are purposley keeping quite about some situations so they can concentrate on areas for their own gain. You cna make the arugment that if these groups hadn't said anything or hadn't cared people wouldn't even know something was happening in Darfur or Zimbabwe. Granted most people don't know the details but I think a good chunk do know something bad is happening in those places.
I think the HR groups care and try to an extent but trying to get western governments and those who can help to care about places in Africa, etc. is an uphill battle, so they focus there efforts in places where they can make a difference because people are watching such as Iraq and China. I honestly don't think those in charge of these Human rights non-governmental orginizations aren't making calculated decisions like that because their isn't much to gain. Most of these organizations are non-profit and are run by people that are passionate and give a damn, those who wish to act selfishly on an international level tend to go to into politics and diplomacy, not NGO's and HR organizations.
Barry Bull
Donor
This is a brilliant AH! There is so few African AHs on the board and you've done a remarkable service!
While I do agree that the killing can minimized by adequate authorization from UN and timely arrival of reinforcement, perhaps you can also address the more difficult to resolve causes of action, such as economy and resource distribution? The following passages are copied from one of my own work and I hope it will be useful:
Rwanda, one of the most densely populated states in Africa22. Its population density is ten times of its neighbour, Tanzania and it ranks third in the number of death in genocide around the world23.
Most of the attempts to interpret the eruption of internal unrest are based on the history of ethnic division and conflict between the two ethnic groups, Hutu and Tutsi. These two ethnic groups shared a history of cyclic oppression by the other group. In the colonial era, the colonial authority used Tutsi as intermediary agents and introduced identity cards, measures that seeded Tutsi domination and Hutu grievances. Ethnic tensions and violence continued on small scale after independence in 1962, as the Hutu and Tutsi engaged in endless struggles for political power in both Rwanda and neighbouring Burundi. Numerous Rwandans of both ethnicities fled into exile in neighbouring states, which led to constant insurgency in the border region. In 1973, a Hutu general, Juvenal Habyarimana claimed power in a coup and the political scene calmed down for 15 years as internal suppression of Tutsi ceased under his governance25.
However, internal unrest surged back against in 1990 as the global price of Rwanda’s primary export products, coffee and tea decrease abruptly, leading to country-wide financial hardship and World Bank intervention. In order to secure his power, Habyarimana used Tutsi insurgent attacks across the border from neighbouring states as an excuse to start oppression against Tutsi again. Even though a peace agreement between all factions was signed in 1993, situation did not improve as Hutus feared the dilution of their power as a result of the peace agreement. The combination of historical legacies of ethnic divisions, insurgencies from both groups and Hutu-Tutsi conflict in neighbouring Burundi created a condition rife for violence and unrest26, 27. The final trigger of the violence was the assassination of Habyarimana on April 6, 1994 as his plane was shot down with missiles. In the aftermath of the assassination, killing of moderate Hutus and all of the Tutsi started among almost immediately28.
After a brief review of the history of internal violence in Rwanda, I argue against the traditional interpretation of the conflict which is based on ethnic and political causes. The history of ethnic tensions in Rwanda should not disguise the fact that there is also a history of ethnic integration between the two major ethnic groups. Intermarriages were common and the society was not segregated between the ethnic groups in the sense of America South in the 1960s29. However, social mobilization of Hutus for killing was highly successful even after more than fifteen years of co-existence between the two ethnic groups.
Furthermore, mass killing is not necessarily based on ethnic grounds as mass killing also occurred in communities that have a Hutu-dominated population structure. One example would be that 5% of the population was also killed in a community that only have one Tutsi resident, indicating that mass killing among Hutus themselves30. Therefore, we need to look for other causes, such as economic factors in order to understand why internal violence erupted after many years of peace and at such massive scale and . The pathway of grievance generation in Rwanda is primarily economical due to resource scarcity and the problem was exacerbated by inequality in resource distribution. Economic grievances were subsequently translated in ethnic terms thus the conflict escalated to genocide of one ethnic group by the other group.
As mentioned in the beginning of the section, Rwanda is one of the most densely populated African countries with a population growth rate of 2.5- 3 %31. The land is fertile in the beginning, reflected by the 22% increase of the caloric production per capita between 1965-1967 and 1980-198232. However, this improvement in food production proved to be short term, as the level of production dropped back to 1960s’ level in the following decade33. The reason behind such temporary improvement was the increase in arable land available after the massive emigration of Tutsi due to political oppression and chronic ethnic violence during the early years of independence. Population became diffused all across the state, taking the advantage of new free land which helped to mitigate the demand for access to arable land.
Population continued to increase in the 1970s and 1980s, creating substantial pressure on the environment for more resources. As most of the land reserves were used up already, deprivation started to emerge as the capability to sustain the population from the land continue to decrease. Continued increases in population led to more over-exploitation of the environment, which created a vicious cycle of deprivation of the population due to over-exploitation of natural resources and overpopulation34. Homer-Dixon has argued that such situation is conducive to the generation of grievance, and the remaining part of this section would illustrate the role of inequality played in the generation of grievance that promote internal unrest35.
In Rwanda, 84% of the population is Hutu and 15% is Tutsi, with 1% of a minority group called Twa36. As Tutsi enjoyed advantages in the society thanks to the colonial legacy, a sense of unequal treatment to Hutu existed for long which culminates into the relatively small scale internecine violence before 1994. However, the ethnic version of inequality needs to be substituted by a more generalized interpretation of inequality in distribution of natural resources in order to allow us to have a proper grasp of the source of widespread grievance. Most of the Hutu were peasants that rely on agriculture as primary means of subsistence. As population continued to increase and land reserves dried up, inequality in resource distributions developed in two aspects, i.e. intergenerational access to land and non-agriculture income, the social fabric of agricultural Rwandan society started to dissolve37, 38.
As supply of arable land decreased, land disputes became more frequent and led to the development of grievances in the community. As observed by Andre and Platteau in a study of the Kanama region of Rwanda, most of the access to resources, such as non- agriculture income, concentrated on people with large land holdings, contributing to the increase in division between the haves and have-nots in the previously relatively egalitarian Rwanda39. However, even the richer landowners is too poor to help the poorer relatives and friends, resulting in the break down of traditional communal support system and creation of grievances due to perceived inequality40.
Following the above statement, a more problematic development resulting from the widespread of inequality in resources distribution and the increase of degree of inequality is the ‘conflict with in the family core’. Andre and Platteau stated in their report that,
Without any doubt, the most disquieting and socially disruptive land disputes occurring in N [Kanama] are those which oppose father and sons, and thereby strike deep at the heart of family life41.
In Rwanda tradition, the inheritance of land is ‘patrilineal’. The eldest son would become the manager of the family holdings after death of father and responsible for provision of livelihoods for the other children. The decrease in land availability led to change in such practise, land are distributed among the son earlier in order avoid subsequent internal conflict after the death of the father.
However, such arrangement led to the development of inequality and grievances as land scarcity means no one would get a large holding for subsistence and social function such as marriage even if the land is distributed fairly. Unequal or biased distribution of land among the sons would intensifies domestic grievances further. At the same time, a father might not want to distribute his land at all in order to secure his welfare in old age, creating a bleak future for the sons 42. As the number of deprived and frustrated people increase, Tutsi’s colonial legacy and contemporary economic grievances proved to a very lethal combination for the whole state. The result of domestic inequality is the core component of a functioning society, family was removed and the Rwandan society began to disintegrate.
All of the economic problems listed out above do not mean that genocide in Rwanda is entirely caused by relative deprivation and inequality, as the killing are triggered by political figures who manipulated the force of ethnic tensions for their own interest. However, economic problems created the necessary background conditions that escalate ethnic violence into a state-wide genocide. Such conclusion matched Gurr’ and Davies’ conception on the generation of grievances from economic factors and subsequent eruption of political violence43, 44. Without prevalent economic problems, the Hutu population would not be so eagerly and massively mobilized in mass killing against their Tutsi neighbours after co-existence for nearly fifteen years.
22 CIA - The World Factbook – Rwanda, accessed September 2005. [http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/rw.html]
23. Jared Diamond, ‘Chapter 10: Malthus in Africa: Rwanda’s Genocide’ in Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Survive, (London: Penguin Books, 2005), p. 313.
24. ibid, p. 317.
25. ibid, p. 314- 315.
26. Peter Uvin, ‘Tragedy in Rwanda: The Political Ecology ofConflict’ in Environment, April 1996,Vol. 38 (3), p. 11.
27. Jared Diamond, ‘Chapter 10: Malthus in Africa: Rwanda’s Genocide’ in Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Survive, (London: Penguin Books, 2005), pp. 315- 316.
28. Frontline, PBS: Ghosts of Rwanda: Interviews: General Romeo Dallaire, accessed September 2005. [http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/dallaire.html]
29. Jared Diamond, ‘Chapter 10: Malthus in Africa: Rwanda’s Genocide’ in Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Survive, (London: Penguin Books, 2005), p. 318.
30. ibid, 319.
31. CIA - The World Factbook – Rwanda, accessed September 2005. [http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/rw.html]
32. Peter Uvin, ‘Tragedy in Rwanda: The Political Ecology ofConflict’ in Environment, April 1996,Vol. 38 (3), p. 10.
33. Catherine Andre and Jean-Philippe Platteau, ‘Land Relations under Unbearable Stress: Rwanda Caught in the Malthusian Trap’ in Journal of Economic Behaviour & Organization, 1998, Vol. 34 (1), p. 3.
34. Peter Uvin, ‘Tragedy in Rwanda: The Political Ecology ofConflict’ in Environment, April 1996,Vol. 38 (3), p. 10.
35. Thomas Homer- Dixon, ‘Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases’ in Michael Brown, Owen Cote Jr., Sean Lynn- Jonesand Steven Miller (eds.), New Global Dangers: Changing Dimensions of International Security, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004), pp. 265- 300.
36. CIA - The World Factbook – Rwanda, accessed September 2005. [http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/rw.html]
37. Catherine Andre and Jean-Philippe Platteau, ‘Land Relations under Unbearable Stress: Rwanda Caught in the Malthusian Trap’ in Journal of Economic Behaviour & Organization, 1998, Vol. 34 (1), pp. 14-17.
38. ibid, pp. 27-28.
39. ibid, pp. 14-17.
40. Jared Diamond, ‘Chapter 10: Malthus in Africa: Rwanda’s Genocide’ in Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Survive, (London: Penguin Books, 2005), pp. 322- 323.
41. Catherine Andre and Jean-Philippe Platteau, ‘Land Relations under Unbearable Stress: Rwanda Caught in the Malthusian Trap’ in Journal of Economic Behaviour & Organization, 1998, Vol. 34 (1), pp. 34-37.
42. Jared Diamond, ‘Chapter 10: Malthus in Africa: Rwanda’s Genocide’ in Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Survive, (London: Penguin Books, 2005), pp. 324.
43. Ted Gurr, Why Men Rebel, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).
44. James Davies, ‘Toward a Theory of Revolution’ in American Sociological Review, Vol. 27 (1).
While I do agree that the killing can minimized by adequate authorization from UN and timely arrival of reinforcement, perhaps you can also address the more difficult to resolve causes of action, such as economy and resource distribution? The following passages are copied from one of my own work and I hope it will be useful:
Rwanda, one of the most densely populated states in Africa22. Its population density is ten times of its neighbour, Tanzania and it ranks third in the number of death in genocide around the world23.
Most of the attempts to interpret the eruption of internal unrest are based on the history of ethnic division and conflict between the two ethnic groups, Hutu and Tutsi. These two ethnic groups shared a history of cyclic oppression by the other group. In the colonial era, the colonial authority used Tutsi as intermediary agents and introduced identity cards, measures that seeded Tutsi domination and Hutu grievances. Ethnic tensions and violence continued on small scale after independence in 1962, as the Hutu and Tutsi engaged in endless struggles for political power in both Rwanda and neighbouring Burundi. Numerous Rwandans of both ethnicities fled into exile in neighbouring states, which led to constant insurgency in the border region. In 1973, a Hutu general, Juvenal Habyarimana claimed power in a coup and the political scene calmed down for 15 years as internal suppression of Tutsi ceased under his governance25.
However, internal unrest surged back against in 1990 as the global price of Rwanda’s primary export products, coffee and tea decrease abruptly, leading to country-wide financial hardship and World Bank intervention. In order to secure his power, Habyarimana used Tutsi insurgent attacks across the border from neighbouring states as an excuse to start oppression against Tutsi again. Even though a peace agreement between all factions was signed in 1993, situation did not improve as Hutus feared the dilution of their power as a result of the peace agreement. The combination of historical legacies of ethnic divisions, insurgencies from both groups and Hutu-Tutsi conflict in neighbouring Burundi created a condition rife for violence and unrest26, 27. The final trigger of the violence was the assassination of Habyarimana on April 6, 1994 as his plane was shot down with missiles. In the aftermath of the assassination, killing of moderate Hutus and all of the Tutsi started among almost immediately28.
After a brief review of the history of internal violence in Rwanda, I argue against the traditional interpretation of the conflict which is based on ethnic and political causes. The history of ethnic tensions in Rwanda should not disguise the fact that there is also a history of ethnic integration between the two major ethnic groups. Intermarriages were common and the society was not segregated between the ethnic groups in the sense of America South in the 1960s29. However, social mobilization of Hutus for killing was highly successful even after more than fifteen years of co-existence between the two ethnic groups.
Furthermore, mass killing is not necessarily based on ethnic grounds as mass killing also occurred in communities that have a Hutu-dominated population structure. One example would be that 5% of the population was also killed in a community that only have one Tutsi resident, indicating that mass killing among Hutus themselves30. Therefore, we need to look for other causes, such as economic factors in order to understand why internal violence erupted after many years of peace and at such massive scale and . The pathway of grievance generation in Rwanda is primarily economical due to resource scarcity and the problem was exacerbated by inequality in resource distribution. Economic grievances were subsequently translated in ethnic terms thus the conflict escalated to genocide of one ethnic group by the other group.
As mentioned in the beginning of the section, Rwanda is one of the most densely populated African countries with a population growth rate of 2.5- 3 %31. The land is fertile in the beginning, reflected by the 22% increase of the caloric production per capita between 1965-1967 and 1980-198232. However, this improvement in food production proved to be short term, as the level of production dropped back to 1960s’ level in the following decade33. The reason behind such temporary improvement was the increase in arable land available after the massive emigration of Tutsi due to political oppression and chronic ethnic violence during the early years of independence. Population became diffused all across the state, taking the advantage of new free land which helped to mitigate the demand for access to arable land.
Population continued to increase in the 1970s and 1980s, creating substantial pressure on the environment for more resources. As most of the land reserves were used up already, deprivation started to emerge as the capability to sustain the population from the land continue to decrease. Continued increases in population led to more over-exploitation of the environment, which created a vicious cycle of deprivation of the population due to over-exploitation of natural resources and overpopulation34. Homer-Dixon has argued that such situation is conducive to the generation of grievance, and the remaining part of this section would illustrate the role of inequality played in the generation of grievance that promote internal unrest35.
In Rwanda, 84% of the population is Hutu and 15% is Tutsi, with 1% of a minority group called Twa36. As Tutsi enjoyed advantages in the society thanks to the colonial legacy, a sense of unequal treatment to Hutu existed for long which culminates into the relatively small scale internecine violence before 1994. However, the ethnic version of inequality needs to be substituted by a more generalized interpretation of inequality in distribution of natural resources in order to allow us to have a proper grasp of the source of widespread grievance. Most of the Hutu were peasants that rely on agriculture as primary means of subsistence. As population continued to increase and land reserves dried up, inequality in resource distributions developed in two aspects, i.e. intergenerational access to land and non-agriculture income, the social fabric of agricultural Rwandan society started to dissolve37, 38.
As supply of arable land decreased, land disputes became more frequent and led to the development of grievances in the community. As observed by Andre and Platteau in a study of the Kanama region of Rwanda, most of the access to resources, such as non- agriculture income, concentrated on people with large land holdings, contributing to the increase in division between the haves and have-nots in the previously relatively egalitarian Rwanda39. However, even the richer landowners is too poor to help the poorer relatives and friends, resulting in the break down of traditional communal support system and creation of grievances due to perceived inequality40.
Following the above statement, a more problematic development resulting from the widespread of inequality in resources distribution and the increase of degree of inequality is the ‘conflict with in the family core’. Andre and Platteau stated in their report that,
Without any doubt, the most disquieting and socially disruptive land disputes occurring in N [Kanama] are those which oppose father and sons, and thereby strike deep at the heart of family life41.
In Rwanda tradition, the inheritance of land is ‘patrilineal’. The eldest son would become the manager of the family holdings after death of father and responsible for provision of livelihoods for the other children. The decrease in land availability led to change in such practise, land are distributed among the son earlier in order avoid subsequent internal conflict after the death of the father.
However, such arrangement led to the development of inequality and grievances as land scarcity means no one would get a large holding for subsistence and social function such as marriage even if the land is distributed fairly. Unequal or biased distribution of land among the sons would intensifies domestic grievances further. At the same time, a father might not want to distribute his land at all in order to secure his welfare in old age, creating a bleak future for the sons 42. As the number of deprived and frustrated people increase, Tutsi’s colonial legacy and contemporary economic grievances proved to a very lethal combination for the whole state. The result of domestic inequality is the core component of a functioning society, family was removed and the Rwandan society began to disintegrate.
All of the economic problems listed out above do not mean that genocide in Rwanda is entirely caused by relative deprivation and inequality, as the killing are triggered by political figures who manipulated the force of ethnic tensions for their own interest. However, economic problems created the necessary background conditions that escalate ethnic violence into a state-wide genocide. Such conclusion matched Gurr’ and Davies’ conception on the generation of grievances from economic factors and subsequent eruption of political violence43, 44. Without prevalent economic problems, the Hutu population would not be so eagerly and massively mobilized in mass killing against their Tutsi neighbours after co-existence for nearly fifteen years.
22 CIA - The World Factbook – Rwanda, accessed September 2005. [http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/rw.html]
23. Jared Diamond, ‘Chapter 10: Malthus in Africa: Rwanda’s Genocide’ in Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Survive, (London: Penguin Books, 2005), p. 313.
24. ibid, p. 317.
25. ibid, p. 314- 315.
26. Peter Uvin, ‘Tragedy in Rwanda: The Political Ecology ofConflict’ in Environment, April 1996,Vol. 38 (3), p. 11.
27. Jared Diamond, ‘Chapter 10: Malthus in Africa: Rwanda’s Genocide’ in Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Survive, (London: Penguin Books, 2005), pp. 315- 316.
28. Frontline, PBS: Ghosts of Rwanda: Interviews: General Romeo Dallaire, accessed September 2005. [http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/dallaire.html]
29. Jared Diamond, ‘Chapter 10: Malthus in Africa: Rwanda’s Genocide’ in Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Survive, (London: Penguin Books, 2005), p. 318.
30. ibid, 319.
31. CIA - The World Factbook – Rwanda, accessed September 2005. [http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/rw.html]
32. Peter Uvin, ‘Tragedy in Rwanda: The Political Ecology ofConflict’ in Environment, April 1996,Vol. 38 (3), p. 10.
33. Catherine Andre and Jean-Philippe Platteau, ‘Land Relations under Unbearable Stress: Rwanda Caught in the Malthusian Trap’ in Journal of Economic Behaviour & Organization, 1998, Vol. 34 (1), p. 3.
34. Peter Uvin, ‘Tragedy in Rwanda: The Political Ecology ofConflict’ in Environment, April 1996,Vol. 38 (3), p. 10.
35. Thomas Homer- Dixon, ‘Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases’ in Michael Brown, Owen Cote Jr., Sean Lynn- Jonesand Steven Miller (eds.), New Global Dangers: Changing Dimensions of International Security, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004), pp. 265- 300.
36. CIA - The World Factbook – Rwanda, accessed September 2005. [http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/rw.html]
37. Catherine Andre and Jean-Philippe Platteau, ‘Land Relations under Unbearable Stress: Rwanda Caught in the Malthusian Trap’ in Journal of Economic Behaviour & Organization, 1998, Vol. 34 (1), pp. 14-17.
38. ibid, pp. 27-28.
39. ibid, pp. 14-17.
40. Jared Diamond, ‘Chapter 10: Malthus in Africa: Rwanda’s Genocide’ in Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Survive, (London: Penguin Books, 2005), pp. 322- 323.
41. Catherine Andre and Jean-Philippe Platteau, ‘Land Relations under Unbearable Stress: Rwanda Caught in the Malthusian Trap’ in Journal of Economic Behaviour & Organization, 1998, Vol. 34 (1), pp. 34-37.
42. Jared Diamond, ‘Chapter 10: Malthus in Africa: Rwanda’s Genocide’ in Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Survive, (London: Penguin Books, 2005), pp. 324.
43. Ted Gurr, Why Men Rebel, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).
44. James Davies, ‘Toward a Theory of Revolution’ in American Sociological Review, Vol. 27 (1).
I guess Gen Dallaire's military career comes to a rather different sort of crashing halt due to Rwanda and the events of 1994. IOTL he got PTSD, went insane, and damned near killed himself over this. (He went walkabout and was found a few days later half-drowned in the Rideau Canal) Here it seems that he'll be court-martialed, and won't make General, or even full Colonel as he disobeyed many direct orders. Well, at least the UN, the US, the rest of the civilized world, and all his superiors will come out of it rightly covered in shit. Maybe there will be some serious reforms at the UN, to make it viable, rather than a gathering of dictators. Barring that, maybe the UN will implode.
Part IV
Aftermath
In addition the Security Council had voted to expand the UNAMIR mission to 7,000 peacekeepers but was now bickering over equipment. Clinton had pledged his support to Rwanda but that didn’t mean Congress did. It was only by a narrow margin that Congress authorized Commando Solo to fly over Rwanda and jam Radio Millie Collines [1] and Operation Support Hope [2]. Transporting UN forces and allowing them vehicles like APC’s and other equipment, that was completely different.
It would take nearly a week and a half of Congressional debate but by a narrow margin the UNAMIR Expansion Bill passed, giving Clinton permission to transport UN reinforcements and access to some older but still useful equipment.
On May 13 of 1994, little more than a month after the killing began the first aircraft landed at Kigali airfield with supplies and reinforcements. It was at this time that two things occurred.
First UNAMIR could finally take and hold territory in Kigali, thus linking the safe zones and making large areas secure for those civilians who had been living in squalid confined safe zones for a month [3].
Second the Hutu’s knew that their plan was about to fall. Everything had hinged on speed and getting the west to withdraw ala Somalia or Vietnam. None in the Hutu government had foreseen UNAMIR being so foresighted and such a success as well as the US leading the campaign to expand UN involvement in Rwanda. This led to some soldiers and leaders (especially those who would be in line for crimes against humanity and trial) openly fighting UNAMIR for the first time. Many more Rwandans simply put their machetes and guns down and blended back into the city and countryside, defeated but alive.
The UN Security Council had made it official that UNAMIR’s Rules of Engagement would be expanded to Chapter VII. With that being said it was much easier to get the new forces to secure the city, openly battling any Hutu extremists that got in the way. Kigali was pretty much secure in a week with the assistance of RPF. With that being done, UNAMIR and the RPF fanned out into the countryside [4].
Because so many of the Hutu had simply walked away and the heaviest fighting had already been finished in Kigali where the Hutu leaders were operating from, the countryside was relatively easy. In fact all of Rwanda was secure by the second week of June, just as the first APC’s were arriving in Kigali.
Throughout June the world lauded UNAMIR, the US, and the UN for its quick work in ending a very real genocidal threat. Rwandan casualties were estimated at around 150,000. The shockingly high number in such a short amount of time, with UNAMIR and the US working against them, before the reinforcements even arrived made it perfectly clear that had the relief been stalled or the genocide completely unchecked, Rwandan casualties would have been around 800,000 to 1,000,000.
Immediately following the end of the conflict, trials were held for the few Hutu leaders that hadn’t gone down fighting and were captured. Vice President of the opposition party Democratic Republican Movement Jean Kambanda (the man who would have been vice president had Uwilingiyimana been assassinated as planned), and General Augustin Bizimungu were the top two Hutu extremists captured and tried. They are serving life sentences in The Hague.
However it was not only Hutu’s who were tried. In an extremely unpopular move, brought about mainly because he decided to secure Rwandan lives before foreign lives, Lt. Col. Romeo Dallaire was court martialed for insubordination and several other offenses related to his strong handling of the situation and lack of seeking approval from his superiors. While the evidence was clearly against Dallaire, he had gotten the job done and almost the entire population of the world called for his acquittal. As a result Dallaire was given a token fine but did lose his Rwandan command and his military career as a commander. He would later write a New York Times bestseller about the Rwandan Crisis and transferred his battlefield success to the political arena in his native Canada. It should be noted though that because of Dallaire’s quick actions and decision to command without regard for the laid out rules and seeking approval, UNAMIR was ultimately successful. Seeking to turn around some of the other stalled and failing UN missions, the UN Security Council would later vote to give mission commanders much more relaxed rules and give them the authority they needed to do to do their job. Dallaire’s career was over, but he was in fact the martyr for desperately needed UN peacekeeping reform.
In the aftermath of the crisis UNAMIR’s mission was reduced to 4,000 soldiers with much better equipment and Rwanda began to rebuild itself under the Arusha Accords once more. The presence of UN peacekeepers and the relative success of the Moderate Arusha Accords government coaxed the Hutu of Rwanda to stay for the most part. Only 300,000 Hutu left Rwanda, most directly involved with the genocide and fearing some kind of reprisal or act of vengeance by the Tutsi [4].
[1]: ITL Commando Solo’s radio jamming proves instrumental to slowing the killings, especially in the countryside.
[2]: OTL support to refugees outside Rwanda. ITL it provides food and supplies relief to those refugees and permits food drops in Kigali for the safe zones.
[3]: The safe zones were a catch-22 for many Rwandans. They were the only places in the city where those marked for death could escape their murderers. The conditions in the confined areas though were far from good. Food and water were hard to come by, medicine was virtually non-existent, and human waste became a serious problem in some camps before the first week was over. The crowded conditions ensured the rapid spread of disease and thousands died with the UNAMIR troops helpless to do more than watch. US food and water drops were the only thing keeping the safe zones from becoming death camps. While the safe zone tactic was eventually lauded as a success, it should be noted that nearly 15,000 Rwandans died in them, mostly young children and elderly from disease.
[4]: In OTL Dallaire’s plan to work from the inside out (i.e. Kigali to the Countryside) was rejected in favor of an outside in strategy that ultimately led to more stalling. By the time the APC’s and troops arrived to Rwanda en masse, the RPF had ended the genocide by itself.
[5]: This is the polar opposite of the 2 Million Hutu who fled Rwanda after the RPF took control of the country in the aftermath of the Genocide. No mass migration of Hutu means no Great Lakes Refugee Crisis from 1994 until 1996. This also means Zaire president Mobuto doesn’t back the Hutu in his eastern provinces that are openly attacking Rwandan Tutsi from their Zaire camps. Because he doesn’t get involved this means no First Congo War to overthrow him (which over course means no Second Congo War/Great African War). The Butterflies at this point become way too strong to predict any further. For all Intents and purposes I would say Rwanda is slightly better off unless the UN peacekeepers leave or the moderate government fails and the state collapses into a Second Rwandan Civil War. I would also say the Democratic Republic of the Congo is still Zaire unless the Mobuto regime (which was crumbling anyways) falls which leads to a whole new set of butterflies. The outside world probably remains the same (with the exception of possibly some more willing aid to African nations since Rwanda proved it is possible to have success stories in Africa) but that’s only because even in our modern world Africa has very little impact on the rest of the world. In Africa however the negation of the genocide completely turns around politics and recent history.