AHC: Strong post-war Royal Navy?

[PSL]

A very good site. The basing shows the threat, each Tu22M division covering a different part of the world: NE Atlantic, NW Pacific and Eastern Mediterranean with 40 or so jets with heavy EW support. The further away a CBG is from the bases the less missiles the bombers can carry. These bases would have the specific gear needed to support AVMF planes, including missile loaders as well as the missiles themselves. A redeployment would be no small thing, perhaps a squadron or even a regiment might move from one basing area to another: but the risk of all 3 divisions deploying to say Vietnam in 1985 to put 120 Tu22m against a single RN CVA01 is vanishingly low.

I noticed that there are no Tu95s in those missile divisions, drastically limits the range of the threat until the Tu22m enters service.

Why would they do that?

Their main mission would be to interdict NATO life line from America attacking convoys etc in conjunction with ECHO [later OSCARS] full of missiles plus rocket Kreuzer from the WARPACT fleets.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

IOTL the Australians didn't lay down their first Type 12 until 1957.

Therefore ITTL I think that there's time for the Australian Government to cancel the entire class in favour of the British Olympus-Type COGOG frigate.

However, they then decide to build an enlarged version armed with the Tatar missile fired from a 40-round Mk 13 GMLS with 2 SPG-51 radars to guide it.

This is effectively the Australian Light Destroyer (DDL) project of the 1970s brought forward to the 1960s. The main difference apart from the 1960s electronics would be an American 5in Mk 42 or British twin 4.5" Mk 6 in A position instead of the 5" Mk 45 planned IOTL.

ITTL 9 Light Destroyers were built in place of the 6 Type 12s built in Australia and the 3 Adams class bought from the Americans IOTL. Another 3 would be built in the first half of the 1970s to replace the 3 Australian Darings.

This would give the RAN a homogenous force of 12 Light Destroyers in 1975.

This would butterfly away the 4 Perry class that the RAN bought from the USA. The money spent on them IOTL might be used to buy a replacement for Melbourne or 4 additional Oberon class submarines.

Crews from the OTL RAN Destroyers and Frigates from Jane's Fighting Ships 1969-70.

Conway's 1947-1995 says the OTL Australian Light Destroyer had a crew of 210, which too me is too low.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

The British were very unimpressed with the Tartar's 30 reaction time, Sea Dart had a 12 second reaction time from the get go.

Tatar can be put into service in the early 1960s. Sea Dart cannot be put in service until the early 1970s.

Therefore when selecting Sea Dart in favour of Tatar in the late 1950s Sea Dart has a delay of 315,360,000 seconds.

Especially when Tatar was actually under development in the late 1950s and Sea Dart's development didn't begin until the early 1960s.

Therefore a better comparison in the late 1950s is Seaslug against Tatar.

However, there is nothing to stop the Admiralty selecting Tatar in the late 1950s for its 1960s ships and still developing Sea Dart in the 1960s for its 1970s ships.

 

[Zen9]

There is nothing to stop them using the UK Q-band seeker technology on Tartar and that is more viable from their perspective. That is what they wanted.

 

[PSL]

As long as you don't waste hundreds of millions pounds developing "British" SAM & Torps, since that funding alone can cover a new carrier in the 1950s AND a second carrier in the 1960s.

 

[Riain]

Why would they do that?

Their main mission would be to interdict NATO life line from America attacking convoys etc in conjunction with ECHO [later OSCARS] full of missiles plus rocket Kreuzer from the WARPACT fleets.

They wouldn't and more appropriately they couldn't. This is in response to your assertion back in the thread that the RN situation is hopeless as they needed 48 (?) fighters on a single carriet to deal with the worst case scenario of 50 Tu95s which would be the entire ABMF fleet at the time.

However that website shows that the theat isn't from the entire AVMF fleet but from 4 missile divisions in 3 basing areas. While the squadrons and regiments in these 3 base areas can be moved around there are limits to this so a division is likely to only ever have 3 regiments at the expense of another division. This makes the RNs assumptions like 2 carrers as a tactical unit with 32 fighters, and 4 sea dart escorts plus the missiles on the carrers a valid assessment, and their situation nit hopeless.

 

[MichaelWest]

How much more cooperation in constructing ships can we expect from Canada and/or Australia? Best case they buy new builds from British yards, next they buy British components and build designs in their local yards, and least they buy some British mixed with other suppliers, drifting from supporting the British industry as OTL. Can the hulls that went to the USA be enough to keep British builders competitive? Can this extend to the rest of their economies thus improving the British economy? In other words, just how badly did WW2 drive a wedge into Commonwealth relations and trade linkages? It seems that the RCN and RAN could spread some costs, not a lot, but enough to salvage a few key systems that keeps the UK from becoming so reliant upon the USA long term?

 

[Gunnarnz]

My guess is that they will be more expensive, but not so expensive that a one-to-one substitution would be impossible.

Also given the sheer number of Tatar/Standard MR systems being built the cost might be brought down. IMHO it would certainly be cheaper to build than Seaslug was. E.g. 8 shipfuls of Seaslug = 240 missiles. 50 shipfuls of Tatar/Standard MR = 2,000 missiles.

The licencing agreement would give the UK the right to sell the system in certain territories.

My guess is that the Indians would still buy 2 Whitbys.

The RNZN and SAN would buy 4 and 3 Light Destroyers instead of their Type 12s. However, the South Africans might find it hard to keep the ships in general and the Tatar system in particular operational after the arms embargo comes into force.

I think the Dutch would build 6 Tatar armed ships in their own yards in place of their Leanders, possibly an early version of their Tromp class destroyer.

I think the Americans might block the sale of 2 Standard MR armed destroyers to Chile in place of their Leanders. That is unless it is balanced by sales of Standard armed ships to Argentina and Brazil. However, when the Dutch sold their two cruisers to Peru, they had to remove the Terrier system from the ship that had been so fitted.

Again I think the Americans would stop the British selling Standard MR to India in the 1970s to fit to the ships they would build instead of the Leanders.

I'm not sure you're right. I think the RAN and SAN would probably still be customers, and perhaps the Dutch as well. I don't know much about the other navies, so I won't comment there. However, in the case of the RNZN at least, the extra expense WILL be a problem, because defense funding has been perennially tight. So will the increased demands for technically-skilled personnel to operate these missile systems: the NZ population was less than 3 million in 1970, and there were plenty of other employment options available. Once the ANZUS row kicks off, the presence of major systems which are dependent on US resources is likely to become something of a problem in terms of readiness rates too.

Another issue is that it's not clear how these ships would fit into NZ defence policy. To be fair, that policy swung in all sorts of random directions - one defence review around the same time had the RNZN suggesting it be outfitted solely with submarines as its major vessels! But the two main priorities for NZ have always been securing their SLOC and being the "big fish in a small pond" which is the Pacific island states. It might be possible to spin a few AAW destroyers as being the sort of thing that allies would find useful, and so contribute to the first goal as a sort of exchange for these destroyers being available for out-of-area deployments. That would imply a significant change in how NZ decided to conduct its foreign policy, but it's not impossible given the defence agreements that existed then. However, these ships do not contribute hugely to defending SLOC against the major perceived threat (Soviet attack submarines) - you'll notice that the RNZAF spent a good deal of effort on their P-3 fleet too, and for that exact reason. An ASW frigate is a good investment for that, an AAW destroyer is not. And they're also hardly ideal for showing off to Tonga, Fiji, or any of the other Pacific states. Put bluntly, they're too valuable and expensive to run to use for that sort of thing, and they don't offer any capabilities which are likely to be needed in that area of operations.

Now, NZ defence procurement decisions have got weird at times, so I suppose it still isn't impossible that someone might get over-excited and order one or two. But I can't see a one-for-one replacement of the Leanders for these things. This might not have huge effects on the RN, which is after all what the thread is about. But it does affect the export potential of the proposed design, and it's possible someone in HMG would think about that when they were deciding what hulls to fund.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

I'm not sure you're right. I think the RAN and SAN would probably still be customers, and perhaps the Dutch as well. I don't know much about the other navies, so I won't comment there.

However, in the case of the RNZN at least, the extra expense WILL be a problem, because defense funding has been perennially tight. So will the increased demands for technically-skilled personnel to operate these missile systems: the NZ population was less than 3 million in 1970, and there were plenty of other employment options available. Once the ANZUS row kicks off, the presence of major systems which are dependent on US resources is likely to become something of a problem in terms of readiness rates too.

Another issue is that it's not clear how these ships would fit into NZ defence policy. To be fair, that policy swung in all sorts of random directions - one defence review around the same time had the RNZN suggesting it be outfitted solely with submarines as its major vessels! But the two main priorities for NZ have always been securing their SLOC and being the "big fish in a small pond" which is the Pacific island states. It might be possible to spin a few AAW destroyers as being the sort of thing that allies would find useful, and so contribute to the first goal as a sort of exchange for these destroyers being available for out-of-area deployments. That would imply a significant change in how NZ decided to conduct its foreign policy, but it's not impossible given the defence agreements that existed then. However, these ships do not contribute hugely to defending SLOC against the major perceived threat (Soviet attack submarines) - you'll notice that the RNZAF spent a good deal of effort on their P-3 fleet too, and for that exact reason. An ASW frigate is a good investment for that, an AAW destroyer is not. And they're also hardly ideal for showing off to Tonga, Fiji, or any of the other Pacific states. Put bluntly, they're too valuable and expensive to run to use for that sort of thing, and they don't offer any capabilities which are likely to be needed in that area of operations.

Now, NZ defence procurement decisions have got weird at times, so I suppose it still isn't impossible that someone might get over-excited and order one or two. But I can't see a one-for-one replacement of the Leanders for these things. This might not have huge effects on the RN, which is after all what the thread is about. But it does affect the export potential of the proposed design, and it's possible someone in HMG would think about that when they were deciding what hulls to fund.

For what it's worth I'm not sure that I'm right either.

However, in the late 1950s to middle 1960s (which is when the RNZN bought its 4 Type 12s) NZ defence policy was to contribute to the Commonwealth force in Far East Command.

Or at least AIUI that was NZ defence policy at the time. Again AIUI it wasn't until the British Government decided to with draw from "East of Suez" that NZ defence policy changed.

For example one of NZs 2 infantry battalions was based in Singapore and one of its 2 Canberra squadrons was part of FEAF during the 1960s and both were part of the same policy.

AFAIK the Type 12's were bought because they could form part of the screen of the RN carrier that was permanently deployed East of Suez.

So a Tatar armed light destroyer would fit in with what NZ was trying to do at the time the Type 12s were ordered IOTL. My guess is that the Light Destroyer and Type 12 would have a crew of about the same size because the Light Destroyer's GT machinery needs fewer men. That might compensate for the need for skilled personnel for the Tatar system. Or it might not.

 

[Mike D]

I'm doing a bit of research for a timeline I'm planning where the RN will end up being stronger post war as one of the side affects of the changes I'm thinking about. There's not infinite money to throw around but there will be a bit more which possibly allows a handful of battleships to be kept on post war (personally I wouldn't but the fact is that many senior figures in the RN still believed the battleship had a place so if there is more money then there's likely to be at least one "Battle Squadron" with a couple of KGVs).

What would accompany a "Battle Squadron" in the 1950s? I'm assuming a light cruiser and a handful of destroyers as escorts but would there have been replenishment ships with them in the way that a tankee and a stores ship generally accompany a modern carrier group? Were there tankers and other support ships fast enough to sail with a naval task force (whether it was based around carriers or battleships) in that time or would they have sailed separately and met up when needed?

 

[Riain]

Tatar can be put into service in the early 1960s. Sea Dart cannot be put in service until the early 1970s.

Tarter was mooted on and off through the 60s during the development of the Sea Dart. The Dutch chose the Tartar over the Sea Dart despite the RN plan to use the Type 988.

However, there is nothing to stop the Admiralty selecting Tatar in the late 1950s for its 1960s ships and still developing Sea Dart in the 1960s for its 1970s ships.

Except that its shit and a poor use of scarce US Dollars.

 

[Zen9]

As long as you don't waste hundreds of millions pounds developing "British" SAM & Torps, since that funding alone can cover a new carrier in the 1950s AND a second carrier in the 1960s.

Beyond your deliberate confusion over carrier budgets and missile budgets, such a position is unsustainable at the time.
1. From '45 to '62 trust is not improving.
2. You can't sell what you don't own.
3. Aspects of US requirements are not the same as UK requirements and these are rooted in geographic reality. Consequently the solution systems will differ.
These reasons underpin the UK's development of domestic missiles.

 

[Zen9]

Tarter was mooted on and off through the 60s during the development of the Sea Dart. The Dutch chose the Tartar over the Sea Dart despite the RN plan to use the Type 988.



Except that its shit and a poor use of scarce US Dollars.

Under the right AH scenario the Dutch and Germans would've bought Sea Dart.
Tartar was looked at for Tribals and Leanders, and the Countys.....and each time the RN walked away from it.

Performance wise. This is why Orange Nell Anti-missile-missile is being driven forward through the 50's.
Similarly why PT.428 is as well.

 

[Zen9]

Just an aside.....
Had there been a better rocket then Brakemine GAP, could have been put into service from the mid 40's.

Going to edit in more musing here. ....
Rather than another post...

If Breakmine was further developed and brought into service. This would replace the 3.7" AAA guns on land and likely the 3" to 4" AAA guns in the RN.
There would be less impetus to continue with such calibre guns and more effort on SAMs. So no Green Mace, or the 3"/L70 system.
Also this might suck in the effort on MRS.5 and it's computer, as AAA guns are increasingly abandoned at an earlier period.
Assuming that the improved rockets and improved aerodynamics give it a similar range of 9nm or 19000yards to the 3"/L70.
Not only does this mean not breaking up the missile teams. It could keep the GAP effort in artillery rather than trying to foist it on aviation firms who were not that interested.
It also ought see a lot of feedback and service experience built up over time. That tome being the 50's.
This all would prove highly positive to future developments in missiles.

Anyway, one might envision a twin arm Brakemine launcher, the weapon being 8ft long ought to fit into a vertical magazine that either protrudes the deck or fits in a 9ft high deck completely.

Not Tartar of course, but potential to develop to meet Popsy Mopsy and Orange Nell.
A successor weapon having to fit handling for 8ft long and upto 2ft Diameter.
Potential to be not just retrofitted to existing warships but in further development fitted to Type 81......
And Leanders.

This might presume that LOP/GAP is also brought forward if it can be combined with the land based SAM Stage 1 effort.
Sea Slug but not as we know it.
Instead a single solid booster and liquid rocket motor. Not as good from a handling perspective but earlier to service. Possibly to be named after a serpent considering the main motor is called Lizzie....
MkII replacing the liquid motor with a solid rocket.
MkIII reaching Sea Slug mkII levels.
Replaced by a successor system in the late 60's.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Except that its shit.

That didn't stop the Australians buying 3 Adams class.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

IOTL the earliest British marine gas turbines were the Metropolitan Vickers G.1 and G.2 which were based on their early aircraft gas turbines.

Therefore a Marine F.9 Sapphire would be more logical than a Marine Avon.

Going back to 1946 Rolls Royce was given a contract to produce a marine gas turbine. A pair of RM60 units were fitted to the war-build steam gunboat HMS Grey Goose, which was re-commissioned in 1955. Meanwhile English Electric was developing the EL60 and the plan was to fit it to the American-built Captain class frigate HMS Hotham for trials, but the project was abandoned in 1952. As far as I can tell the 60 in EL60 and RM 60 meant they produced 6,000 shp.

IOTL the practice of developing marine gas turbines from scratch proved to be very expensive so after the G.6 it was decided to revert to the practice of modifying existing aero engines for warship use. The result was the Marine Olympus and Marine Tyne.

ITTL in about 1946 could Metrovick be given a contract to develop a marine version of the Sapphire to compliment the G.2, while Bristol would be awarded contracts to develop marine versions of the Proteus and the BE.10 which would become the Olympus. That way we might get the prototype Marine Sapphire on Grey Goose, the prototype Marine Olympus on Hotham and more Proteus-powered Brave class fast attack craft built instead of the Deltic-diesel powered Dark class.

OTL

Metropolitan Vickers received its first contract for a marine gas turbine in 1943.

MGB2009 was fitted with one Metrovick G.1 Gatric, but it's unclear whether trials began in 1945 or 1947. AFAIK this was based on the Company's F.2 jet engine. According to Navypaedia she now produced 5,200 shp, but it is unclear if that is the G.1 alone or in combination with the 2 Paxman diesels.

Next were the Bold class fast attack craft, Bold Pioneer and Bold Pathfinder. According to Navypaedia, both were laid down in 1950, launched in 1951 and completed in 1953. They initially they had 2 Metrovick G.2 gas turbines and two Mercedes diesels, but the latter were replaced by a pair of Delitcs. AFAIK the G.2 was also based on the Metrovick F.2 gas turbine. According to Navypaedia the G.2 produced 4,500 shp.

Back in 1946 it appears that English Electric and Rolls Royce were both awarded contracts for marine gas turbines. The resulting EL60 and RM60 seem to have been in the 6,000 shp class.

The RM60 was fitted to the steam gunboat Grey Goose and trials seem to have taken place between 1952 and 1956. Although the trials were successful the RM60 did not become an operational engine.

Meanwhile plans to fit the EL60 to the frigate Hotham were abandoned in 1952 because of problems with the prototype ashore.

2 Brave class fast attack craft were launched in 1958 and completed in 1960. They used 3 Bristol Proteus gas turbines producing 3,500 each.

Next we have the 7 Type 81 frigates laid down 1958-60 and completed 1961-64 and the 8 County class destroyers laid down 1959-66 and completed 1962-70. Both had combined steam and gas (COSAG) machinery. The gas was provided by the G.6 gas turbine producing 7,500 shp, but it was built by AEI, not Metrovick.

The Type 14 frigate Exmouth was taken in hand for gas turbine trials in 1966. She was fitted with an Olympus rated at 15,000 shp and two Proteus engines rated at 3,500 shp each. The arrangement was called Combined Gas on Gas (COGOG) because the Olympus and Proteus engines could not be run at the same time. She rejoined the fleet in 1968.

TTL

The trials of the G.1 aboard MGB2009 and the G.2 aboard the Bold class continue as OTL.

However, Metrovick receives a contract to develop a marine version of its F.9 Sapphire engine in 1946 in place of the OTL contract awarded to Rolls Royce. Trials of the Marine Sapphire take place on Grey Goose 1952-56.

In 1946 Bristol receives contracts to develop marine versions of the Proteus and BE.10 Olympus in place of the contract awarded to English Electric.

A pair of fast attack craft fitted with three Proteus engines is ordered from Vosper at the same time as the Bold class for competitive trials. These ships are effectively the Brave class brought forward about 10 years. The two prototype Proteus boats were successful enough for 18 production boats to be built instead of the OTL Dark class, which had Deltic diesels.

HMS Hotham or another suitable ship was fitted with one Olympus and two Proteus engines. Trials began in 1953. These were effectively the Exmouth trials brought forward 15 years.

By about 1955 the results of the trials being conducted by Grey Goose and Hotham were successful enough for the Admiralty to decide to build a fast frigate with COGOG machinery. Full power was to be provided by either two Olympus or Sapphire engines up-rated to about 25,000shp. The cruising engines were to be marine versions of the Bristol Orion (first run 1956) or Rolls Royce Tyne (first run 1955).

The winners were the Bristol Olympus and RR Tyne. The research and development was paid for with the money spent on the G.6 IOTL.

A grand total of 42 Type 20 frigates were built for the Royal Navy in place of the OTL Rothesay, Tribal and Leander classes. Type 20 was effectively a gas turbine powered Leander because it carried the same armament and sensors. All other things being equal 9 would be exported (2 Chile, 3 SAN and RNZN), while the Dutch and Indians would build 6 each in their own yards. However, I'm not sure if the Australians would build 2 in place of their final pair of Type 12s.

The TTL County class would still have COSAG machinery, but the quartet of G.6 gas turbines would be replaced by a pair of Olympus engines.

Note

Some of the OTL dates may not be 100% accurate.

By unpopular demand I've abandoned my proposal for a Tatar armed fast frigate/light destroyer to be built in place of the 1960s destroyers and frigates. Instead I'm going back to the General Purpose Fast Frigate with Olympus Tyne COGOG machinery.

However, instead of Type 20 its the Alternative Type 81 because it's designed at about the same time as the real Type 81 and is a new general purpose warship rather than an evolution of an existing anti-submarine ship.

Compared to the OTL Leander the ship has a second Sea Cat system and the AKE-2 version of Type 965 instead of the AKE-1 version. This is because the Type 81-TTL has a larger hull than the Leander.

 

[Riain]

That didn't stop the Australians buying 3 Adams class.

Australia is not Britain, our needs are considerably different and British ships available by the mid 60s (Counties) did not meet our needs. As in the British case finance did play a big role; while in Britain's case it was a scarcity of US dollars in our case it was generous financial terms allowing us to pay for the first 2 ships over a period of 8 years. I think this was the clincher as much as the capability issues surrounding the Counties, in particular their huge crews.

 

[Grey Wolf]

Late to this lol, but two factors are prominent

1) Money - can the UK afford this?
2) Role - what is the point of this?

The latter could of course create the circumstances for the former becoming available. A more unstable world, with brush fires linked to great powers - but post 1945 you're going to have to wait a bit for this to happen. Once it does, the enemy needs to be a surface fleet capable of menacing British possessions - say if the Russians had cruisers etc off Singapore during the Malaya Emergency etc

 

[PSL]

Beyond your deliberate confusion over carrier budgets and missile budgets, such a position is unsustainable at the time.
1. From '45 to '62 trust is not improving.
2. You can't sell what you don't own.
3. Aspects of US requirements are not the same as UK requirements and these are rooted in geographic reality. Consequently the solution systems will differ.
These reasons underpin the UK's development of domestic missiles.

There is no confusion in the carrier budgets, ALL the figures appeared on Hansard's at one time or another -with or with out various items like missiles or jets , spares etc. The rest doesn't make much sense since we are speaking of buying American- instead of wasting hundreds of millions of pounds on questionable tech/hardware.

 

[PSL]

How much more cooperation in constructing ships can we expect from Canada and/or Australia? Best case they buy new builds from British yards, next they buy British components and build designs in their local yards, and least they buy some British mixed with other suppliers, drifting from supporting the British industry as OTL. Can the hulls that went to the USA be enough to keep British builders competitive? Can this extend to the rest of their economies thus improving the British economy? In other words, just how badly did WW2 drive a wedge into Commonwealth relations and trade linkages? It seems that the RCN and RAN could spread some costs, not a lot, but enough to salvage a few key systems that keeps the UK from becoming so reliant upon the USA long term?

Canada was smart. They held on to old hulls and updated them as long as possible with affordable 'off the shelve' systems from America/Britain/France/Germany . There primary ASW destroyer of the 1970s had a SEAKING helicopter plus ASW Torpedoes networked through NTDS to work with American Battle groups. They had the EW/ECM needed to survive in the group. Each ASW group also had an SAM to provide area air defense for group and convoy.