The Paulinerkirche of Leipzig, where in March 1578 the Estates General of Saxony, the body into which would develop the present Estates General of the German Empire, met for the first time.
German Constitutional Democracy: Its Origins and Contexts by Uwe Mentzer
The same theatricality and ease with dissimulation that served the Elector Friedrich IV so well in other areas eased his dealings with the Estates of Saxony, both during the period he dealt exclusively with the Estates of Ernestine Saxony, and during the time thereafter in which the Estates of the Ernestine and Albertine realms sat together. Though much of his military expenses was paid by his famous subsidy from Henry VIII, and Friedrich was expert at the blackmails and larcenies necessary to wring funds from the locales through which his army passed under cover of "free gifts", he occasionally had recourse to the Saxon estates for the extraordinary amounts his campaigns required.
Of course, in this he was assisted by the nature of the crisis: every precedent in the history of the Saxon Estates since it first met as such in 1438 made clear they were the recourse primarily for dire and extraordinary fiscal emergencies, most particularly those arising from military necessity. And within those instances, external invasion and the threat of conquest were clearly the most compelling circumstances imaginable. If the source of the danger was unusual, Charles V being the very Emperor to whom the entire political order owed allegiance, any uncertainty was driven away not just by the threat to the new religious feeling, but by the dynamics of sixteenth-century warfare. One did not have to be an enthusiastic Lutheran to understand that the Imperial armies threatening Saxony would need provision and seek depredation. And all knew that there was no way the violence consequent to a Habsburg victory and conquest could be limited to one ruling house or one religious community. When Friedrich IV rang the alarm of the Saxon Estates in 1542, and three subsequent times over the next decade, he made clear the threat was to the general polity.
All that said, however, Friedrich approached the matter of persuading the Estates to fund his campaigns with panache. He called his first request for a beer tax from the estates the martingebuehr, and pitched it as literally money for the protection of Martin Luther. Luther himself recorded in his letters before his death his irritation that the elector had assigned his name to a duty on his favorite drink. Luther refused however to appear in person before the Estates appealing for the approval of the tax, together with his wife and small children. Later, after Luther's death, Katarina von Bora was prevailed upon to go before the Estates begging on the Elector's behalf, once Friedrich made clear certain pensions and privileges she had received from the state might be otherwise withdrawn. Also pressed into service was the Duke Alexander, who at the age of two was brought to the Estates wearing a tiny suit of armor, so that his uncle Johann could declaim the necessity of providing assistance to preserve the boy's patrimony. On other occasions Friedrich flattered his Estates with grandiose displays, gifting their leading members with Spanish armor and finery looted from the camp of Charles V at Kreuzberg.
The result of this was that, for whatever other problems he may have had, Friedrich reached the end of his crisis years with his Estates not merely compliant but enthusiastic in their good wishes. For his part, Friedrich, despite worries over the state of the army with the English subsidy ended following the accession of Mary I, chose not to bother his Estates further for additional grants or taxes, and let a good many of those that had been voted to him during the Spanish War expire. This only improved his standing, as he felt the reputation for fiscal prudence would help him should pressing needs ever arise again.
Thus Alexander, in addition to everything else, could count among his inheritance from his father in 1562 the unabashed good will of the Saxon Estates. Moreover, the guiding principles of Alexander's policy at first was itself a balm to the usual worry of the feudal estates: by maintaining close relations with the Habsburgs who were the primary external threat, and showing no sign of bellicose tendencies otherwise, it seemed supremely unlikely he would require extraordinary grants to fund war-making, whether offensive or defensive. Moreover, the skill with which he and Julius of Braunschweig were handling the Electorate's ordinary fiscal revenues made it seem even less likely he would have to at some point impose upon the Estates.
This long period in which Alexander and Julius's perceived expertise, their lack of any need for extraordinary tax revenue, and burgeoning trade all ultimately worked to contribute to the eventual shock when, in the financial crisis following the effort to procure the Polish crown for the Emperor Maximilian II, Alexander did ask for money. From his perspective, he had more than proved the probity of his management and had earned the Estates' deference. However, from the Estates' perspective, the nature of the crisis Alexander approached them with was as novel and unprecedented in the worst possible definitions of those terms as his father's had been otherwise. The Estates had been extraordinarily patient in supporting (mostly) defensive wars with the overarching goal of protecting the realm's religious identity. Arguments about the solvency of state-run enterprises, and more particularly about the attendant well-being of the private lenders who a mere generation before would not have been able to conduct such business legally, found appalled silence.
But what it also met were several other factors, including the slowly building resistance to the liberal religious policy inaugurated by Friedrich. So long as the elector's public stance was seen as necessary to maintain German Protestant unity in the face of an aggressive Habsburg menace, it was if not popular, excusable. Less understandable to ordinary Saxons, or even the nobility, were policies which permitted the Jews to live among Christians virtually without restriction, which invited French-speaking Sacramentarians to occupy Saxon farmland, or which, most bizarrely in the eyes of Saxon society even though it was a necessary term to any peaceful coexistence with the Emperor, allowed Roman Catholics to worship in the old way even in Wittenberg itself. Members of the Johannine House had agitated against these irregularities virtually from their inception, and championed the norm of a single Christian Church coextant with the Saxon polity. But in this they had been effectively checked by the tremendous power held by the Holy Prince over the Saxon imagination. That was, until the Johann Sylvan affair, when Alexander not merely bungled the execution of his plan to extend his protection to an endangered Lutheran theologian, but gave the impression that he was willing not just to permit the free practice of other leading evangelical teachings with Saxony, but tolerate the promulgation of even the most outre religious ideas as freely as he did Luther's gospel.
Of course, not even this mix of factors could have produced the same result without the active machinations of the Johannine House of Wettin, which leveraged the age and superior experience of its dukes, its wealth and vast lands, and its deep connections to the lower levels of the Saxon nobility to promote its interests at the expense of Alexander, who in their telling was a misplaced Habsburg with little sympathy for the Lutheran Church and little interest beyond his own wealth. To some extent, Alexander had availed himself of some of this critique: the days of his wearing of silver armor, and other ostentatious displays, and those of his anguished cries for fiscal deliverance from his debts by the Estates were a little too close together to win their sympathy. One can blame the Johannines however much one wants, yet the fact remains that generations of easy political success with the Estates had made the elector complacent, and now his overconfidence was due to be corrected.
Even the understandings of each party of the intentions of the other were deeply flawed. What Alexander asked the Estates of Saxony for was a loan, and he prided himself that he had as yet never defaulted an obligation outright--in fact, in the truest sense, every aspect of what he was now doing he was doing to in fact preserve this reputation. Yet the Estates of Saxony quite rightly viewed the long, torturous history of subjects' loans to their sovereigns as something of a mere pretext for expropriation. However much Alexander intended to repay, the Estates viewed his promises to do so with the deepest cynicism. For its part, the Estates loaded their response to his request for a loan with terms intended to dissuade him from the loan and to encourage him to seek the funds elsewhere, which nonetheless if not him, then many at his court took instead as a direct challenge to his authority.
Thus in the winter of 1577-8 the relationship turned venomous. First, the Estates met, and in the famous Letter of Obeisance to Alexander conditioned their assistance on the expulsion of the Jews from Saxony and the confiscation of their property; the recognition of the Lutheran Church as the only one permissible in Saxony; a new usury law limiting interest to 8 percent per year on all loans; a re-trial of the Duke Johann Heinrich, supervised by the Estates, for his alleged conspiracy against the Elector; and perhaps most provocatively, the Estates' oversight of the education of Alexander's two sons.
Alexander's response, the Letter of Princely Care, dismissed many of the demands of the Estates peremptorily, especially those infringing directly upon his family or advancing the interests of the Johannines. As to the more general, less noxious conditions, Alexander demurred from stating a direct position in order to raise questions of legality, for example stating that the Estates of Saxony had no authority to make demands on his authority as to the appended realms where he ruled as prince-defender, like Magdeburg. Of course, there was nothing stopping Alexander from replying specifically as to the question of the Jews of Saxony, but instead he proceeded to propose a new body of the Estates that would represent all the territories in which his authority extended in whatever capacity. For its part, the Estates took Alexander's bait and began negotiating in earnest the organization of the new body.
The appended realms of imperial cities, former ecclesiastical territories, and small princely lands that had been acquired by Friedrich IV but kept separate from the combined patrimony of Albertine and Ernestine Saxony, had a more ambivalent relationship to the notion of being folded into the larger territory than one might think. Friedrich for his part had done the most to further the integration of his territories with the abolition of internal tolls and duties late in his reign, a measure that had disproportionately benefited the merchants of Magdeburg. Magdeburg, one of the greatest commercial centers of the north of the empire, had since then seen its lucrative trading relationship with the Saxon towns grow immensely. Not without reason, the city fathers of Magdeburg could fancy the entity into which they would be folded less a greater Saxony than a greater Magdeburg, as the prosperous town would also henceforth have much more extensive military resources to protect its commerce and territories.
What Magdeburg's council, and those of similar tracts like Jueterbog and Eisenach, feared was first, that with the withdrawal of the boundary between themselves and Saxony proper they could still be subject to some prejudicial legislation that would privilege the trade of Saxon commercial trading centers (in the case of Magdeburg, Leipzig with its great fair was the particular object of worry). But they also feared the loss of guarantees of rights and privileges enshrined in local laws. And especially in the case of Magdeburg, this meant the town's fabled jury system, which allowed the town's more respected citizens to sit in judgment of their neighbors in criminal trials. So what would have to ensue would be delicate two-sided negotiations, one with the appended territories, the other with the Saxon estates proper who had developed such suddenly grandiose notions of their authority.
In the first situation, Alexander acting through Julius was easily able to reach an accommodation: the borders of the various appended realms, created mostly by imperial grants sometimes centuries old, would have to be preserved now just as they had been when the Holy Prince snatched them from the jaws of the Habsburgs. And they would not make the crucial concession of their authority that would be sending delegates to sit in the existing Saxon estates. However, they would permit their nobles and representatives to sit alongside the Saxon estates in a new body comprised of all the realms in which Alexander exercised princely authority. Moreover, they insisted the first business of this new body be the recognition of their existing grants and privileges, most especially Magdeburg's jury trials. Magdeburg, Erfurt, and some of the other appended principalities, eager now to perhaps steal a march on their commercial and civic rivals within Saxony proper, then took the additional step of sending Alexander a much-needed advance on the requested sum.
The more difficult negotiation, by far, was between the Saxon elector and his nobles and mayors. Alexander's response to the Letter of Obeisance had left little doubt he believed they had overstepped their prerogatives, especially in the matter of his sons. And as Saxony's economic crisis gradually ripened into civic violence, with zweitemaenner hunted down and publicly executed in Leipzig in August and Plauen in October, and anti-Jewish riots in Wittenberg marring the celebrations of the anniversary of the 95 Theses on October 31, Alexander had chosen to take a hard and repressive line, eschewing mercy in favor of exemplary justice for those responsible. Including the numbers from small towns and villages, 331 had been executed for public disorders, assaults and murders relating to debts and frauds associated with the crisis by January 1, 1578. Alexander had made a show of publicly passing sentence on the guilty and witnessing the executions, making certain no one could mistake his liberality for weakness.
Moreover, he now chose to make extensive use of his influence within Saxony's Lutheran Church: Luther's teachings on the Jews and Calvinists were actively suppressed in the pulpit, but his admonitions to respect the worldly authority of the prince were now given great emphasis. Rumors that Alexander was raising an army against either the Estates or the Johannines were everywhere, and Alexander for his part did nothing to squash them, so that when negotiations in February 1578 began with a delegation from the Saxon Estates in earnest it was in circumstances of abject fear, just as he wanted them. He now officially proposed the creation of a new Estates General: whereas classically this phrase meant the various Estates meeting in one body, in the Saxon context it would mean the lateral combination of the various territorial estates, with the division between the estates proper (nobility in one chamber, mayors and other commons in another) preserved.
But more grandiosely, Alexander made another proposal. To move matters along and begin the process of collecting the needed funds, he would sell the right to sit in the estates to those who did not presently have the right to do so. This would mean that the nobles, mayors and others who presently had the right to meet as the Estates would be unaffected, and could go on doing so, but with the Lower Estate joined by people who had essentially bought their seats. Alexander knew he was playing with fire here: the pivotal insistence of any body of feudal Estates anywhere it met in the Empire was the protection of its ancient prerogatives. Even if that was not threatened with a direct removal of the right to attend meetings of the body, it was threatened with dilution, as the power to set policy as part of the Estates would be fractured with the new attendees of middling and low birth.
Alexander's answer to this objection, which he had anticipated, was that if the power was diminished, so was the burden the Estates was expected to shoulder. In short, Alexander was offering to offset his demand for revenue through this other means, which he thought the Estates would happily support since its whole political mission was limiting the impositions of the elector's taxation. The Estates moved to accept his proposal, subject once more to its own conditions, which it now felt he could not avoid. If the Estates accepted the authority of this new Estates General, with the various appended realms represented and with the inclusion in the lower house of those who had bought their place there outright, the Elector would have to accept this Estates General's decisions as final, with respect to those matters broached in the Letter of Obeisance.
Quickly this notion became subject to further qualification: the Estates General would not consider matters of the Elector's family, or of his household, or reopen legal cases already settled by the application of the Elector's justice. And Alexander made clear he would not accept any and all terms set by the body that had yet to meet, however he promised he would accept the specific religious settlements, and the reform of the law concerning lending for interests, proposed by the Saxon Estates in the Letter of Obeisance, as well as the protection of Madgeburg's jury trials, if they were all approved by the new Estates General.
Clearly, each side was making wagers on the nature of the new body, the meeting of which was now set for Leipzig in March. The Saxon Estates for its part bet that there would be no greater appetite in the Appended Realms for the Fredericine religious settlement than there was in Saxony, whereas Alexander hoped to exploit the possibility provided by permitting those "who would furnish funds to the betterment of the realm, gratis" to take seats alongside the great and good of Saxony, who had been long plied by the Johannines and their allies, to have their say. In one final exchange of conditions, the two sides, Saxon Elector and Saxon Estates, agreed to forbid the new seats to people born outside those realms held by Alexander, non-Lutherans, debtors, pardoned felons, and those of low moral character. Thus the Saxon Estates thought they had seen off the possibility of Jews, French Huguenots, or even some number of Alexander's English cousins, from coming to his rescue.