April 1942 Alternate Indian Ocean
- Thread starter Zheng He
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One can dream that the author change the plans and have my namesake serve as a convoy escort and get sunk in some way (preferably in an epic surface action) no pressure Zheng lol.
Yep, hell we can probably roll on wet grass.She's a four stacker. Normal waves are bad enough.
0800 Hours, 24 November 1942, Port Blair, Andaman Islands – The four surviving supply ships escorted by the light cruiser Tama, the destroyers Hokaze, Mikazuki, and Yukaze, and the Italian sloop Eritrea departed Port Blair for a run straight across the Andaman Sea and then a course down the coast of Malaya for Singapore. Two Pete floatplanes were overhead keeping an eye out for submarines. The mission was partially successful. The convoy had lost four supply ships and the Italian merchant cruiser Ramb II, but most of the cargo from two of the ships sunk in Port Blair by the enemy air attack had been salvaged. In Singapore Eritrea, Tuma, and Yukaze would all receive repairs for damage incurred during the air attack.
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0900 Hours, 24 November 1942, Dili, Timor – The light cruiser Kiso, the destroyers Minazuki, Wakaba, and Nagatzuki, the second line destroyers Sanae, and Kuratake, the minelayer Magane Maru and the seaplane tender Sanyo Maru had assembled in Dili with eight troop ships. They were convoying the 65th Infantry Brigade to Burma with a stop in Batavia to pick up additional escorts and supply ships and to give the unit a brief chance to rest and take on reinforcements. The convoy was not due to sail for another two days and the ships’ captains nervously scanned the skies, watching the Oscars from the 59th Sentai patrolling overhead, ready to pounce on any Allied bombers that decided to pay a visit to the port.
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1200 Hours, 24 November 1942, Chittagong Airfield, India – A spell of bad weather was keeping both Allied and Japanese planes on the ground for the time being and Air Vice Marshal Brand was taking the opportunity to talk with several of his staff officers about what they could do to improve the air defense arrangements in the region.
Several things were clear – specifically that Akyab was likely going to be the primary target for the Japanese and Chittagong was too far north to add depth to the exposed port’s defenses. This meant they would need to move an additional fighter squadron up to Akyab. In order to prevent Chittagong from being over exposed given its importance to Allied efforts in the area, Brand planned to send the No. 25 Squadron of the RAAF to Calcutta in exchange for a Hurricane squadron. Politics necessitated keeping six fighter squadrons around the major population centers of Calcutta and Dacca but Brand had leeway in choosing his units and since No. 25 Squadron was designated for escort duties and not contributing to the air defenses of the Arakan and eastern Bengal, Brand was moving it further back under the assumption that it could stage forward when it was needed to escort a raid. Brand also planned to base the FAA Fulmar squadron that he was getting near Calcutta for the same reason and that would allow him to move an additional Hurricane or Mohawk squadron to Chittagong or Cox’s Bazar. Another gap in their posture was sea-based warning. Brand wanted better integration with Eastern Fleet units in the area and he planned to request through his chain of command that the fleet assign at least one modern cruiser to the northern Bay of Bengal. The older cruisers currently operating in the area either did not have radar or were equipped with older short-range sets that did not provide much in the way of additional coverage over the water. He felt that one or two cruisers with modern radars could have made a difference in providing warning of the previous day’s attack that saw four ships sunk, including a valuable RFA.
Several things were clear – specifically that Akyab was likely going to be the primary target for the Japanese and Chittagong was too far north to add depth to the exposed port’s defenses. This meant they would need to move an additional fighter squadron up to Akyab. In order to prevent Chittagong from being over exposed given its importance to Allied efforts in the area, Brand planned to send the No. 25 Squadron of the RAAF to Calcutta in exchange for a Hurricane squadron. Politics necessitated keeping six fighter squadrons around the major population centers of Calcutta and Dacca but Brand had leeway in choosing his units and since No. 25 Squadron was designated for escort duties and not contributing to the air defenses of the Arakan and eastern Bengal, Brand was moving it further back under the assumption that it could stage forward when it was needed to escort a raid. Brand also planned to base the FAA Fulmar squadron that he was getting near Calcutta for the same reason and that would allow him to move an additional Hurricane or Mohawk squadron to Chittagong or Cox’s Bazar. Another gap in their posture was sea-based warning. Brand wanted better integration with Eastern Fleet units in the area and he planned to request through his chain of command that the fleet assign at least one modern cruiser to the northern Bay of Bengal. The older cruisers currently operating in the area either did not have radar or were equipped with older short-range sets that did not provide much in the way of additional coverage over the water. He felt that one or two cruisers with modern radars could have made a difference in providing warning of the previous day’s attack that saw four ships sunk, including a valuable RFA.
1800 Hours, 24 November 1942, Port C, Indian Ocean – The destroyer transports USS McKean and USS Talbot and the merchant cruiser HMS Alaunia arrived at Port C after their supply run to Christmas Island. The destroyers needed to replenish from the RFA Appleleaf and all three ships were also taking on board personnel rotating back to Australia as well as several bags of mail.
Yes, they will primarily join the patrols in the Andaman Sea along with performing the occasional special mission.
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