Chapter 458: First Battle of Savo Island:
The Battle of Savo Island, also known as the First Battle of Savo Island and, in Japanese sources, as the First Battle of the Solomon Sea (第一次ソロモン海戦 Dai-ichi-ji Soromon Kaisen), and colloquially among Allied Guadalcanal veterans as The Battle of the Five Sitting Ducks, was a naval battle of the Pacific Campaign of the Second Great War between the Imperial Japanese Navy and Allied naval forces. The battle took place on July 8–9, 1942 and was the first major naval engagement of the Guadalcanal campaign, and the first of several naval battles in the straits near the island of Guadalcanal, Tulagi, Gavutu–Tanambogo and Florida. The Imperial Japanese Navy, in response to Allied amphibious landings in the eastern Solomon Islands, mobilized a task force of fourteen cruisers (ten heavy cruisers) and two destroyers under the command of Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa for a quick response, as air raids before had proven not very effective. The task forces sailed from Japanese bases in New Britain (Rabaul) and New Ireland down New Georgia Sound, known as the Slot, with the intention of interrupting the Allied landings by attacking the supporting amphibious fleet, its screening force and the transports itself. The Allied screen consisted of eight cruisers and fifteen destroyers under British Rear Admiral Victor Crutchley VC.
Departing on July 7 1942, Mikawa's force travelled trought the Solomon Island occupied by Japan and the Co-Prosperity Sphere member state of Niugini/Niu Gini (New Guinea) to cover their movements and secure their flanks. During this voyage, a Allied submarine spoted the group and by July 8, Allied scouting planes spotted them again. Mikawa feared his surprise attack was lost, not knowing that problems in the Allied command would delay the information long enough until the Battle was won by the Japanese. However Mikawa received reports from Japanese scout planes and land based spotters, that the American fleet was divided into three different groops, giving him hope to defeat them in detail, each group separately. He launched three scout planes ahead of his fleet to drop flairs on the american ships during the upcoming battle, giving the Japanese an advantage thanks to the finest night binoculars in the world on their ships.
Unknown to Mikawa, he would completely surprise the Allied fleet under the command of Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner (United States Navy) and Admiral Sir Victor Alexander Charles Crutchley (Royal Australian Navy). Their Fleet coul have put up a much better fight, but to cover the landings and transports at Guadalcanal in the South (two australian and one american cruiser under Crutchley) and Tulagi, Gavutu–Tanambogo and Florida in the North (three american cruisers under Turner), that directly defendet the right flank of the landing operations as well as the Eastern Group of two light Cruisers and 2 Destroyers, therefore the Allied forces had been devided in three. Turner heard reports of the Japanese approaching, but the spotters told him of a sea tender, making him believe they would try to build a airbase nearby and not head for his forces directly. Two single destroyers, the Blue and Ralp Talbot had been placed on patrol in the west, with a huge gap of 25 miles between them when they were at their furthest point apart. By pure luck Mikawa's fleet squesed trought at the right moment, undetected. Because Admiral Crutchley had been summoned for a conference, his Flagship the HMAS Australia left the battle eastwards, without informing the northern Allied forces, leaving them without proper command.
The tragic consequences were that Mikawa's fleet with the help of Japanese scout planes, dropping flairs, bombed and torpedoed the southern Allied fleet. In only seven minutes the Southern Force had been defeated and nearly annihilated, turning north Mikawa's fleet split up in two unintentionally. Because of this accident, they approached the northern Allied front from two sides, launching torpedoes and opening their main batteries. Lit up by the Japanese Fleet many Ameircans were still unaware of what had happened with the southern Allied Fleet and were still confused. Shot at from all sides, the only being light damaged in return. One of this hits however penetrated the Chokai's bridge, nearly killing Mikawa and destroying important maps to navigate in this battle zone. The Japanese proved their accuracy and precision during Night Battles. Now Mikawa turned east, aware, hoping at least that after Midway no American Carrier was left in the Area as they would most likely guard Hawaii in fear of a coming Japanese Invasion. Mikawa now planned to turn this tactical victory in a strategic one targeting the now vulnerable Allied transports unloading supplies and further Allied forces in the North at Tulagi, Gavutu–Tanambogo and Florida (5 transports) , as well as in the South at Guadalcanal (13 transports). With still 40% of his ammunition and 50% of his torpedoes left, Mikawa turned back, calculating the risks. In a daring move Mikawa took two hours to reassemble his forces and in early morning of July 9 continued his attack.
Mikawa returned east, splitting his forces up once again in a northern and southern group, that now shelled and bombarded the Allied transports and Marines ashore at the beachheads alike. In this confusion the third Allied Fleet, the eastern Force of two light Cruisers and 2 Destroyers, approached, trieing to defend the transports and landed forces. Mikawa's far superior fleet now dealt with them two from two sides, giving a decicive knock-out blow to the first American offensive in the Pacific and destroying all transports together with the supplies still on the ships. The battle later was seen as one of the worst defeats in the history of the United States Navy. Mikawa's attacks had forced the surviving, remaining Allied warships and the amphibious forces to withdraw, without being able to unload or save the majority of supplies and troops. This way Mikada had not only gained control of the Seas aroung Savo Island to the Imperial Japanese navy, but also given a huge suppor for the Japanese Forces that were now gathered to retake Tulagi, Gavutu–Tanambogo, Florida and Guadalcanal from enemy Allied hands.
Mikawa's daring raid had left the Allied ground forces (primarily United States Marines), which had landed on Guadalcanal and nearby islands only two days before, in a precarious situation, with limited supplies, equipment, and food to hold their beachhead. Without unloading all of the heavy equipment, provisions, and troops from the transports, although most of the divisional artillery was landed, consisting of thirty-two 75 mm and 105 mm howitzers the United States Marines were in a dangerous position, with only five days worth of rations landed and no transports for further rations, reinforcements or a evacuation left in the whole operation. The Marines ashore on Guadalcanal initially concentrated on forming a defense perimeter around the airfield, moving the few landed supplies within the perimeter, and finishing the airfield. Vandegrift placed his 11,000 troops on Guadalcanal in a loose perimeter around the Lunga Point area. In four days of intense effort, the few landed supplies were moved from the landing beach into dispersed dumps within the perimeter. While a few Japanese rations, from the Japanese forces who had flead further inland had been captured, there was only a few days of supplies left, but captured Japanese stock increased the total supply of food to 14 days worth. To conserve the limited food supplies, the Allied troops were limited to two meals per day, later one, dwarfing their ability to fight immensely. Because of this work began on the airfield begann nearly immediately after the Battle of Savo, mainly using captured Japanese equipment. On July 12, the airfield was named Henderson Field after Major Lofton Henderson, a Marine aviator who had been killed at the Battle of Midway. Meanwhile the Japanese reinforcements were already on their way.
With the Allied supply lines in the region crippled, Mikawa's fleet had heavily contributed to the Japanese ability to later recapture the island. At this early critical stage of the campaign, it prevented the weakened Allied forces to entrench and fortify themselves in a strong enough position to successfully defend the area around Henderson Field until additional Allied reinforcements arrived later in the year. The Battle of Savo Island would be the first of five costly, large scale sea and air-sea actions fought in support of the ground battles on Guadalcanal itself, during wich the Japanese managed to counter the American offensive in the Pacific and drive the Allies back again. These sea battles took place every few days, with increasing delays on each side to regroup and refit, until the Americans finally managed to preparing to evacuate their remaining land forces and withdraw from Florida and Guadalcanal months later. Out of their six heavy cruisers, the Allies lost five, with one heavily damaged and later scuttled, their two destroyers were damaged, but with some luck one of them managed to escape. On land and sea the Allies had lost 2,145 soldiers, while on side of the Japanese only five cruisers had been lightly damaged and 215 Japanese inside Mikawa's Fleet had been killed during the operation. Thanks to their dominance at Sea now, the Japanese also landed troops at Savo Island, together with artillary, howitzers and coastal guns to support their ships in the surrounding sea battles in future engagements. For his daring battle and immense victory Mikawa was awarded with the Order of the Rising Sun, from now on nicknamed the Shark of Solomon Sea by the Japanese and Nightmare or Wraith by the Americans, even if the Japanese also called him Yūrei of the Solomon Sea, a faint or dim soul, a nightly spirit or ghost.