It's very important to your argument because if only three plants are working, then the Siberian plant cannot possibly be online.
Okay, you’ve lost me. Why would whether three German plants working, which aren’t even the plants which were dismantled to provide for the Siberian plant as it’s obvious those wouldn’t be working because
they’ve been dismantled, have any impact on whether the Siberian plant is working?
No idea, although it seems to have been non-military purposes like the British plants.
According to your posted page, it was actually serving both civilian
and military purposes.
Oh, so your either goalpost shifting or have completely failed to comprehend the actual topic at hand. Because here we were talking exclusively about high-octane avgas which is the actual thing the Soviets were supposedly short of, not low-octane avgas of which the Soviets already could produce more then enough of. Even in 1942, the low point of Soviet production of avgas, the Soviets were able to produce 684,000 tons of such fuel. That’s almost twice the average annual consumption of low-octane avgas. Overall the Soviets produced 917,000 tons of all types of Avgas in that year, so if we take that figure, add the million tons the Siberian plant produces and WHAMMO: just shy of 2 million total tons of avgas production annually, about 900,000 tons more then consumed annually and this is before we factor the lend-lease refineries (which didn't start to come online until 1943) or the other German plants the Soviets could choose to restart production with. There's a reason everyone goes "the US supplied the Soviets with 50% of their high-octane avgas!" and not "the US supplied the Soviets with 50% of their total avgas!" when talking about the US contribution to Soviet aviation fuel supplies.
As for those plants in Germany, only two were active and they were not producing military grade products; never mind the fact they'd likely be destroyed before the Soviets could get to them.
Whether they were producing military grade products matters less then the fact they could. As to whether they’d be destroyed by retreating WAllied forces... well, it’s possible. It’s
also possible that the speed and shock of the Soviet assault renders them with not enough time to do it or it might not occur to them to do so until it’s too late. Could go either way.
I have the Osjerski book,
it's available online in PDF format. I checked both "Siberia", "Fuel" and "aviation gasoline" as search terms and the only thing I could find is thus:
Maybe you didn't comprehend what I was saying? I’ll emphasize some keywords you appear to have missed:
I don't have anything which specifically gives the dismantlement of the Blechhammer, Politz, and Auschwitz plant occurred and the subsequent reconstruction at the Siberian plant, but Osjerski in his book indicates the period of major stripping of industry from Eastern Europe in general occurred in 1945-46. Given that the wording is general, it is possible that some specific industries were stripped out later on a smaller scale.
I've already cited that upthread:
I also literally just cited that the Americans were still providing 40% of the food consumed by the Red Army into the Summer of 1945.
Great. But again: not reached pre-war levels of production =! not enough to feed everyone. 40% of the food the Red Army soldiers were consuming came from lend-lease =! 40% of the food needed to not starve to death. In fact, the 40% figure was
a decrease from the previous year, which by your logic apparent appears to mean the Soviets should have been dropping dead (or at least exhibiting signs of starvation) all over the place from this 10% drop in calories.
Taking that at face value, remind he how this ineptness is supposed to be magically handwaved?
Whether they do or do not do so IATL is at best only partially relevant to my point which is that if the Soviets had enough food to feed people who didn't matter to their military-industrial system but through incompetence or malice did not, then clearly it shows they have enough to feed those who do matter and we know they did their best to prioritize feeding those people.
....because the Americans kept the Red Army fed. As for the civilians, mass starvation occurred during the war years, particularly in 1942-1944.
But it was gone by late-1944, as your own sources reveal, despite a decline in lend-lease food availability, as your sources also reveal.
No, I did not admit that at all and you definitely knew that because I put it in both italics and bold:
I specifically say in just the Baltics and Ukraine alone, there was nearly as many Anti-Soviet partisans as the Germans had to face in the entirety of their Soviet conquests. I know English is your first language, so there is no other way besides willful maliciousness or failing to read my post you've could've confused this. As for the Air units, given we've yet to see any evidence the Soviets were self sufficient in AV gas, that alone knocks them out.
Yeah, yeah, your lying through your teeth as anyone can tell reading that line where the wording shows your comparing anti-Soviet partisans in the Baltics and Ukraine to anti-German partisans in the Baltics and Ukraine. Because otherwise, your
particularly lying through your teeth given
the actual figure of the number of partisans the Germans had to face:
With the German supply lines already over-extended, the partisan operations in the rear of the front lines were able to severely disrupt the flow of supplies to the army that acted deep into the Soviet territory. In the second half of the war, major partisan operations were coordinated with Soviet offensives. Upon liberation of parts of the Soviet territory, the corresponding partisan detachments usually joined the regular Army. According to Soviet sources, the partisans were a vital force of the war. From 90,000 men and women by the end of 1941 (including underground) they grew to 220,000 in 1942, and to more than 550,000 in 1943.
And this is without taking into account the hundreds of thousands of partisans who operated against the Germans in Poland and the Balkans...
Then why did you specifically say Bagration? You're also making assumptions about what had been transferred or demobilized out by that Summer.
Because I was using it as a useful catch-all for the Eastern Front in the summer of 1944. Then again, as one who does try to be precise with my terminology I guess I should know better then to use "catch-alls" so casuallies. Sorry about that.
And no, I'm not making assumptions. Multiple books I've read have talked about the intended mass transfer of US airpower to the Pacific by the time of Olympic. They were to provide the basis for air raids as large as 2,000 heavy bombers in one go. As for land forces, existing US Army literature on the subject is quite clear. Plans for Olympic called for the transfer of 2 armored divisions and 13 infantry divisions, while the release of more then 1.1 million men represents the reduction of the equivalent of some 22 divisions, or about 1/3rd of the entire US ground army in Europe. Assuming the Brits demobbed at the same rate, more then half the WAllied armies in Europe would have gone home by November 1945. What’s worse, the effects of demobilization upon these forces combat readiness outpaced the decline in paper strength and was noted to be biting really deep right about at the time the Soviets IATL are supposed to attack.
As demobilization progressed, the decline of combat effectiveness was not in proportion to the reduction in total strength. Rather, it diminished at a progressively faster rate than the members of military personnel decreased. By the Fall and Winter of 1945-1946 the armies and the air forces that had been victorious in Europe and in the Pacific were no longer a closely integrated military machine, but rather had disintegrated to little more than large groups of individual replacements.
Shortly after the surrender of Japan the Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC) of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) made an estimate of American military position as it existed at that time, 9 October 1945, "... a year or more would be required to reconstitute our military position at a fraction of its recent power." The JSSC recommended that the JCS direct the Joint Staff Planners to examine "... our present and prospective capabilities...." The recommendations of the JSSC were informally approved by the JCS on 15 October 1945. The Joint Staff Planners proceeded to prepare on estimate of the military capabilities of the United States armed forces at that time and for the end of the 1946 fiscal year. The Commanding Generals of Army Forces in the Pacific and in Europe were asked to assist in the preparation of the study and submitted their estimates of military capabilities to the War Department.
A memorandum which reflected the views of the Pacific and European Commanders was then prepared for the Army Chief of Staff. This communication revealed the swift and disintegrating effects of World War II demobilization as of 15 November 1945. The European Commander further estimated that in an offensive his troops, ground (including service) and air "could operate in an emergency for a limited period at something less than 50 % normal wartime efficiency." European ground troops could operate somewhat better in a defensive situation but this was not true of air units. General Eisenhower's Chief of Staff was reported as having said that "This estimate is frankly optimistic, based on assumptions themself optimistic, and does not consider morale and fighting spirit, which he . . . [believed to be] lacking.
-History of Personnel Demobilization, Pg 266
At least the German formations in 1944 were coherent military formations and not a mob of replacements! Also, as per the OP, the Soviets are attacking when the US is engaged in Downfall so the Soviets would be attacking in late-fall/early-winter of '45, so I don't why you keep going to summer...
I like how one article is simply talking about Soviet AFV losses across the entire timespan of 1944 to all causes under all conditions and presenting it as the kill ratio solely against German AFVs while the latter only examines specific incidents and breaks the ratios down by conditions and cause. It neatly demonstrates the level of dishonesty at work here, highlighting how you massaged the numbers to be as favorable to the WAllies as possible by picking dissimilar articles with dissimilar numbers, and reaffirms Mark Twains old saw about lies and statistics. If this were a honest comparison, then what you would do is, say, take the 11,500 AFV losses the US and UK suffered during the Northwest European Campaign in June 6 1944-May 15 1945 and compare them to German AFV losses on the same front in the same timeframe. Now, I'll be frank: German AFV losses for 1945 are simply not available, at least not what I can find, so we're going to have to go for the next best thing and look at their losses throughout 1944. Don't worry, I'll subtract Eastern Front losses since I have a source for that!
Now, there are two sources I've seen that gives total German AFV losses in 1944. The first is Waffen und Geheimwaffen des Deutschen Heeres
: 1933- 1945, which gives a figure of 12,613 AFVs for 1944. The other is FMS P-059 - German Tank Strength and Loss Statistics, which gives a figure of 11,916. We'll go with the upper figure for now. It's worth keeping in mind though: the German criteria for what counts as a "loss" is much, much,
much higher then for the WAllies or Soviets. Now to subtract the Eastern Front figure from that: the only source I've ever seen is from
here. And it shows that the Germans lost 9,575 AFVs in the East in 1944*. 12,613-9,575=3,038. Now I could say that 11,500 US+UK AFVs/3,038 results in a 3.78:1 loss ratio in the Germans favor, worse then what even your T-34 article but then the obvious objection arises: but that's the losses for the Germans against in only six months of 1944 in Northwest Europe (well, not entirely but more on that at the end) compared to the 11 months of 1944-1945 for the WAllies. Why of course! How silly of me. So then what we should do is break that down to the daily loss ratio. June 6th 1944 to May 15th 1945 is 343 days, which gives the Anglo-Americans a loss rate of 33.5 AFVs a day. By comparison, June 6 1944 to December 31 1944 is 208 days, giving the Germans a loss ratio of 14.6 AFVs a day. 33.5/14.6=2.3. The kill ratio between the WAllies and the Germans is therefore 2.3:1 in the Germans favor, only marginally better for the WAllies then the Soviets. And this was with the WAllies at their prime, not the demobilizing mob present by November/December '45.
Of course, this includes German AFV losses in Italy throughout the year (that's the "more on that at the end") while excluding the WAllies losses there, so this ratio is actually
more favorable to the WAllies then might otherwise be the case.
But of course, I don't put much stock in any of these figures. Why? Because as this entire spiel is designed to expose, all trying to cite loss ratios does is wind up with the kind of chicanery you just attempted and hence I maintain that using them to prove anything means fuck all.
*I guess this would be the moment where I should observe that taking the T-34 article claims about Soviet AFV losses at face value (and how interesting it gives no figure for German AFV losses to do their own math), this gives the Germans a kill ratio about 0.5 less favorable then the article claims, making the difference between WAllies and Soviet a mere 0.2 which I recall might be below the threshold of statistical significance in difference (maybe? Memories fuzzy) but again: kill ratios, meaning, fuck all.
PS: I'll probably reply to your post over on the 1945-1950 airpower thread tomorrow. I've got a class to teach and I'm already only getting 5 hours due to telling people their wrong on the internet.