Si vis pacem, para bellum: The Asquith Reforms, 1908-09
Edmund Allenby - The Lightning General
With the radical wing of the party in charge of domestic reforms, the final remaining province of the Liberals’ Gladstonians came in the War Office. When the Liberals returned to power in 1905, Henry Campbell-Bannerman was installed as Secretary for War. While this was initially thought to be a prestigious appointment for the department – Campbell-Bannerman was respected on a cross-party basis and had the additional cachet of having served in every Liberal government since the 1860s – and was widely held to have expertise in military affairs (he had been a parliamentary assistant to William Cardwell in carrying out the Cardwell Reforms). However, it rapidly became clear that Campbell-Bannerman had been cut out of the inner workings of the Liberal government and he was more or less ineffective in his role up to his death in April 1908.
Perhaps the only lasting effect of Campbell-Bannerman’s tenure at the War Office was his ordering of the creation of the Land-Ship Committee in February 1905 under the chairmanship of R.E.B. Crompton, to look into the possibilities of developing armoured vehicles for use in the military. The existence of this committee was kept secret from the rest of the cabinet until July 1905, when the first prototype tracked vehicle (codenamed ‘the tank’ in order to conceal its nature, a word which soon came to stand in for the entire concept) was unveiled. The original Mark I tank proved to have too high a centre of gravity to negotiate the broken ground and trechlines that was anticipated on future battlefields but the subsequent Mark II demonstrated the rhomboidal shape and sponson weapons that would become iconic. After a demonstration in January 1906 to members of the cabinet (in utmost secrecy), the War Office placed an order for 150.
By the time H.H. Asquith took over from Campbell-Bannerman as Secretary of War in April 1908, the ordered tanks had been delivered but the extreme secrecy under which they were held meant that the infantry, cavalry and artillery had not had the chance to train with these new vehicles (and, it was alleged, some brigade commanders were even unaware of their existence). Furthermore, the Second Boer War and the Anglo-Tibet War, along with supply difficulties during the Anglo-Egyptian War, had revealed the bad communication between the different armed forces of the empire and the problems inherent in trying to coordinate the tactics and a number of different organisations each with different histories and combat doctrines.
With an analytical mind that enjoyed working with numbers and chairing committees, Asquith was the ideal person for the job and set himself the task of reorganizing the different military forces of the empire in conjunction with the CID (although one of the first of these ‘Asquith Reforms’ was renaming the CID the Imperial Chiefs of Staff or “ICS”). Although the Dominions continued to raise their own land armies (and coast guards, where relevant), the budding Australian and Canadian navies and the longer-established Royal Indian Navy were scrapped and control was centralised with the Royal Navy under the command of the ICS. The secrecy around tanks was lifted (albeit only to an extent – they remained unknown to most of the public) and the active home army was reorganized into an active force of three cavalry divisions and three mixed infantry and mechanized divisions. This reorganization allowed a number of surplus infantry and artillery brigades to be disbanded, meaning that the government actually saved money. To support the active army, the various Yeomanry and Reserve forces were reorganized into the 28-division Territorial Force. In October 1908, the 11th Hussars became the first cavalry regiment to ‘mechanise’ permanently (i.e. get rid of their horses and replace them with tanks and armoured cars).
Asquith was not able to get agreement in the ICS to amalgamate all British and Dominion forces into a single army. However, he was able to get agreement as to the preparation of a single manual in 1907 that would be distributed to the armies and practiced at the combined empire military exercises. The man chosen to draft the manual was Edmund Allenby, a major-general who had served with distinction in the Second Boer War. Allenby was not known for being the most cerebral military mind in the world but he was experienced, tactically and strategically astute, open to new ideas and technology and had experience of commanding Australian and Canadian troops during the Second Boer War. Furthermore, he was well liked by the other staff officers both in Camberley and on the ICS, something which was regarded as vital considering that the writing process consisted of widespread consultation with other commanders in order to create a synthesis of the best ideas.
When it was published in 1909, the manual (nicknamed ‘Plan 1914’ for the date of anticipated implementation of all of its provisions) proposed a big break with previous orthodoxy, which had stressed good defensive preparations combined with maneuverable cavalry formations in order to destroy the opposing forces. Instead, Plan 1914 called for rapid strikes lead by mechanized infantry to punch holes through the opposing front line and make advances to the enemy’s rear, destroying lines of supply and communication. In the ensuing confusion, the enemy’s command could be eliminated. Allenby memorably described this kind of assault as “a shot to the brain.”
The manual was controversial amongst an older breed of commander but was generally accepted thanks to rapid advances in technology. In 1908, 2,000 of the heavier Mark IV tanks had been ordered, alongside the smaller Mark III tanks (of which there were 4,500 in service), creating the conditions for heavy tanks to punch holes in the opposition line, with lighter tanks and cavalry exploiting the breakthroughs. Research was also put into the potential use of planes, not only for reconnaissance but also for strafing runs on enemy infantry and bombing attacks on supply lines and artillery. Artillery doctrine was also changed to place emphasis on smaller, mobile guns which were capable to providing a rolling barrage ahead of the advancing tanks and infantry. Through the deployment of this fast-moving, combined-arms attack, the enemy would, in theory, be continually off-balance and unable to respond. The doctrine soon came to be known as ‘Lightning Warfare’ and Allenby himself as ‘The Lightning General.’