There have been a few posts that the Germans didn't bring winter clothing, although technically correct, it doesn't tell the whole story. It's not that the winterclothing wasn't available, but that logistics prevented them getting at the front, because there was more rush to supply the troops with ammo, food and fuel in a desperate attempt to get Moscow. Meanwhile the winterclothing was sitting in supplydumps in Poland. This would probably still a problem. German logistics lacked, they still would.
Apart from that it's a difference between getting to Moscow and actually capturing it. In OTL they didn't even get to it, let alone capture it.
I'll give you that Hitler will still be foolish enough to think that Barbarossa will be quick and not bring winter clothing, but I think ITTl Barbarossa has a much higher chance of success than 33%; I'd place it at 80-90%. The Russian Winter will not be as disastrous to the Germans as in OTL because Barbarossa will start earlier, at its initial start date, as Germany will not have to invade Yugoslavia and Italy will not invade Greece. This leads to the Battle of Moscow occuring earlier than in OTL and in all likelihood a German Victory. Leningrad will also likely fall in this TL. Germany would likely take both Moscow and Leningrad and be able to try and reconstruct Soviet railways. Add on to the fact that Japan is far more likely to invade Siberia due to the greater German successes, and I'd place the chances of a successful Barbarossa higher.
When this question comes up there is always a difference of opinion on the result. Some write about when the UK rejoins the fight, or supplies Russia with L-L. No, don't see that at all in the context of accepting German leadership in Europe - that's what a 'peace treaty' would be about; you are more likely to see the RN supporting the Germans in the Baltic!!
With a defeated UK, I wonder who the American public favour the Germans or the Russians!? We can't assume it will be the Russians.
IIRC that was through October not July or August, as the Soviets did lose over 1 million men in October just in front of Moscow.It's hard to imagine the Soviets doing worse at the opening stages of the war than they did in the original timeline; They lost 4 million men killed or captured in the first couple of months
IIRC that was through October not July or August, as the Soviets did lose over 1 million men in October just in front of Moscow.
The Soviet pre-invasion army was over 5 million men. Perhaps 4 million was what was in European Russia.From June 22nd to the end the Vyzama encirclements (Oct 15th); The Russians lost roughly 4 million men, which equated to 100 percent of their pre war army and about half of their total losses from the first world war.
Perhaps my use of the term "couple of months" was too broad; in 114 days they captured or killed 4 million Russians; or 35k men per day
I would still stand by the broad stroke of my statement that the initial stages of Barbarossa went as poorly for the Russians as one could imagine; outside of 2 armies that where able to run away on the Dvina river and eventually bottle themselves up in Leningrad, the Germans ultimately destroyed or captured everything in front of them (the Smolensk survivors eventually being lost in the Vyzama battles)
In situation in which the UK has made peace in 1940 I find it hard to fathom that the Russians could similarly be caught so flat footed and ill prepared; that is unless Stalin engages in exactly the same behavior he did in the original timeline, and makes the same poorly thought out command decisions at the beginning of the campaign as well
The Soviet pre-invasion army was over 5 million men. Perhaps 4 million was what was in European Russia.
Thing is my comment you quoted was right, losing 4 million men officially (per Krivosheev) took until October, though there are other Russian historians who challenge his numbers and alledge that the Soviets took significantly more losses in 1941 than the currently recognized Russian official numbers due to reporting problems due to units collapsing and the general chaos during the invasion, which broke down the reporting mechanism around mobilization. That and challenges about who and what organizations qualified as combatants (like whether police and firefighters really counted as civilian losses other whether being a government personnel and becoming casualties in a combat zone made them really combatants). Also in the period in question there were also substantial numbers of deserters who weren't captured or became casualties, they just became missing and probably went home if possible.
That said yes 1941 was pretty bad, but not as bad as it could have gone due to a number of operational/strategic mistakes the Germans made and some reasonable choices the Soviets made. Perhaps the Soviets wouldn't be caught nearly as flat footed, but going by Glantz's "Stumbling Colossus" the Soviets were in a really bad way in terms of actual defensive planning and had only the broad strokes of a mobilization plan that largely broke down IOTL and was a major part of the continuing Soviet collapse throughout 1941. If anything Stalin would be even more scared about invasion and would do everything he could to placate Hitler so as not to provoke him, as it was clear even going full out the USSR was not ready to fight in 1941.
Given how much Stalin low balled the war losses (claiming only 7 million dead) there wasn't really much inflation that they did about their losses from 1941, if anything they were lowballing them. Post-Soviet Russia has put them at 26-27 million total people of which about 8.6 million soldiers were counted as war dead. That is generally considered the lowest possible losses, with a lot of military adjacent forces counted as civilians (like partisans and police); David Glantz estimates Soviet military dead as at least 11 million with much of the discrepancy in official Russian/Soviet numbers in 1941-42. There are some Russian scholars that estimate more based on a variety of esoteric arguments that may or may not hold water (demography/census issues, problems with archives, etc.).And yes Russian casualties in 1941 and generally throughout the war are a matter of academic debate particularly as it became trendy to inflate losses in the 50's and 60's as a way to discredit Stalin; for example Nikita Kruschev (who may have had access to source material that nobody else had) stated that Russian losses in the winter war exceeded 1 million; whereas the Soviet stated losses and general post war count comes in 250-350k
Also anyone in a uniform (the Soviets did that in 1945 too), which meant any government official, even if technically a non-combatant. There is enough debate about the issue of who was drafted and when during the collapse that it is worth considering that the vast majority of the people rounded up as PoWs were combatants (whether or not they were willing) or aiding the Red Army in some way.The other problem was that the Germans (for example in the Kiev pocket) tended to detain every male over the age of 12 which arguably inflated their prisoner counts (although considering that the Soviets conscripted every male over the age of 12 in some of the darker periods in 1941, one might argue the counts where accurate)
Well, command issues were probably the least of their issues given the insane orders Stalin was issuing. Surprise and standing orders not to respond to attacks were much more an issue as well of course the border being the point of maximum Axis combat power without logistics issues, casualties, or having to travel deeper into Russia via poor roads. Given the rate of German losses they certainly weren't unchallenged, its just that the Soviets were unable to effectively fight back for a variety of reasons that aren't limited to communication disruptions or surprise/lack of mobilization.The Germans inflicted massive losses at the border because the Soviets experienced a near complete command collapse the first two weeks of the campaign; major Soviet forces up to the corps level went days in a position of no orders, conflicting orders or insane/impossible orders allowing German troops to flow around them unchallenged, cut off their supply lines and compel their surrender. Admittedly it was stunning after what happened to France for the Russians in the original timeline to not have taken better precautions to protect themselves, but with no other German efforts elsewhere in Africa, the Balkans etc; I believe the Russians would more seriously realize the Germans were coming for them and take more adequate defensive measures
Given how much Stalin low balled the war losses (claiming only 7 million dead) there wasn't really much inflation that they did about their losses from 1941, if anything they were lowballing them. Post-Soviet Russia has put them at 26-27 million total people of which about 8.6 million soldiers were counted as war dead. That is generally considered the lowest possible losses, with a lot of military adjacent forces counted as civilians (like partisans and police); David Glantz estimates Soviet military dead as at least 11 million with much of the discrepancy in official Russian/Soviet numbers in 1941-42. There are some Russian scholars that estimate more based on a variety of esoteric arguments that may or may not hold water (demography/census issues, problems with archives, etc.).
Also anyone in a uniform (the Soviets did that in 1945 too), which meant any government official, even if technically a non-combatant. There is enough debate about the issue of who was drafted and when during the collapse that it is worth considering that the vast majority of the people rounded up as PoWs were combatants (whether or not they were willing) or aiding the Red Army in some way.
Well, command issues were probably the least of their issues given the insane orders Stalin was issuing. Surprise and standing orders not to respond to attacks were much more an issue as well of course the border being the point of maximum Axis combat power without logistics issues, casualties, or having to travel deeper into Russia via poor roads. Given the rate of German losses they certainly weren't unchallenged, its just that the Soviets were unable to effectively fight back for a variety of reasons that aren't limited to communication disruptions or surprise/lack of mobilization.
'More adequate' is relative, especially given the increased Axis combat power that would come from not being blockaded or having other fronts. Of the 8 million men of the Wehrmacht in 1941 less than half participated in Barbarossa (note Wehrmacht means the entire German armed forces, not just the army). One of the biggest issues both in terms of surprise and for the Axis to even be able to invade the USSR is how Hitler is going to sell the build up to and war with the USSR ITTL without an already ongoing war with Britain. Going from peace to war without some sort of political build up I think would be impossible and Hitler himself lamented that after defeating the British he wouldn't be able to get the German people to go to war again. The Soviets assumed that there would be some sort of build up to war and border incidents first before invasion over the period of a week to allow for mobilization IOTL and might be right ITTL (it fit Hitler's pattern up to and through Poland). So perhaps the question is how much better could the Soviets do with a week's notice of war given all their horrible deficiencies IOTL?
I highly doubt Japan will attack the US, as they will have sufficient resources ITTL, even with the US embargo, to continue the war in China, which is what they wanted.Assuming that Japan stills attacks the US, does Hitler declare war on the US? If the oil embargo is only partial does Japan still have the incentive to attack the US?