Had Argentina Been Anglophone, Would It Have Been More Prosperous & Populous Today? (ctd.)

Other comparably violent and tenacious places during the 19th century include the following: The North American Great Plains and especially the American West; New Zealand (e.g. Maori Wars); South Africa; Australia (both in terms of convicts and in terms of wars with Aborigines). And they all subsequently get settled by Europeans, with the original goals being much more modest than outright settlement. A century or two earlier, and even to some extent in the 19th century, eastern North America also witnessed wars with the Indians.
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In which one of them the natives had safe haven and support from a neighboring nation and in how many of them did the natives lack firearms and horses? And I'm also including the criollos among the vicious defenders. Why would the British, based in the UK, fare better in the conquest of Uruguay, than the Portuguese/Brazilians, who shared a land border with Uruguay?
Please @juanml82 be sincere, natives had safe haven and support from a neighboring nationS, in case of UK conquest of Argentina all the neighboring NationS will support Argentina, heck I could see Chile giving Weapons and Shoot to the Mapuches as long as they raid the English settlement. A thing in fact Chile did against Argentina, as the Pacificacion de la Araucania was done in equal part by Chilean troops and Allied Mapuche troops armed with European modern weapons.
 
In which one of them the natives had safe haven and support from a neighboring nation and in how many of them did the natives lack firearms and horses? And I'm also including the criollos among the vicious defenders. Why would the British, based in the UK, fare better in the conquest of Uruguay, than the Portuguese/Brazilians, who shared a land border with Uruguay?

As Lenwe said earlier, this is not the proper place to discuss this and a new thread would be required, especially with respect to the indigenous peoples.

Just as the criollos and gauchos are the vicious defenders in the Rio de la Plata, so too are the Boers, Griquas (mixed race of Dutch and Khoikhoi or black), etc. in South Africa, the bushrangers (escaped convicts) in Australia, the outlaws/desperados in the Old American West, and on it goes.
 
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As Lenwe said earlier, this is not the proper place to discuss this and a new thread would be required, especially with respect to the indigenous peoples.

Just as the criollos and gauchos are the vicious defenders in the Rio de la Plata, so too are the Boers in South Africa, the bushrangers (escaped convicts) in Australia, and on it goes.
Why do you think the British would fare better than the Portuguese/Brazilians, specially taking into account their different logistics and political objectives?
 
Why do you think the British would fare better than the Portuguese/Brazilians, specially taking into account their different logistics and political objectives?

IOTL, once the Portuguese/Brazilians annexed the Banda Oriental as Cisplatina, the 33 Orientales under Lavalleja fought those occupiers in the name of the United Provinces of La Plata, resulting in the Cisplatine War. This war, which was a continuation of the Spanish-Portuguese frontier wars in the area, ended in a stalemate. This paved the way for British intervention in the talks, and the result was the creation of an independent Uruguay, which would serve as a buffer state between Argentina and Brazil.

In this ATL, there's no state of war between the British (as occupiers of at least some parts of the Plate) and the Portuguese/Brazilians, though there are rebellions from the criollos and so forth against the British and Portuguese/Brazilians. Here, the British are a main war party (against Lavalleja and his 33), and they enlist the Portuguese/Brazilians and indigenous allies in their battles against the guerrillas.
 
IOTL, once the Portuguese/Brazilians annexed the Banda Oriental as Cisplatina, the 33 Orientales under Lavalleja fought those occupiers in the name of the United Provinces of La Plata, resulting in the Cisplatine War. This war, which was a continuation of the Spanish-Portuguese frontier wars in the area, ended in a stalemate. This paved the way for British intervention in the talks, and the result was the creation of an independent Uruguay, which would serve as a buffer state between Argentina and Brazil.

In this ATL, there's no state of war between the British (as occupiers of at least some parts of the Plate) and the Portuguese/Brazilians, though there are rebellions from the criollos and so forth against the British and Portuguese/Brazilians. Here, the British are a main war party (against Lavalleja and his 33), and they enlist the Portuguese/Brazilians and indigenous allies in their battles against the guerrillas.
Why would the Portuguese/Brazilians, who claim the area as their own, help the British and why would the British be more successful, considering that, unlike the Portuguese/Brazilians, their base of operation is in another continent?
 
Why would the Portuguese/Brazilians, who claim the area as their own, help the British and why would the British be more successful, considering that, unlike the Portuguese/Brazilians, their base of operation is in another continent?

The Portuguese and the English/British have been allies since at least the 14th century and this alliance is quite famous as such.

And I think that the British would be more successful because they have more manpower than the Portuguese/Brazilians. Even though the base of operations is thousands of miles away, they could recruit from closer areas that are part of the British Empire, like the West Indies/Guiana and parts of Africa.
 
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The Portuguese and the English/British have been allies since at least the 14th century and this alliance is quite famous as such.
Yes. That doesn't mean they'll help the UK take territory they claim as theirs
And I think that the British would be more successful because they have more manpower than the Portuguese/Brazilians. Even though the base of operations is thousands of miles away, they could recruit from closer areas that are part of the British Empire, like the West Indies/Guiana and parts of Africa.
But they also have greater commitments, specially during the period of the Napoleonic Wars. Why are those colonial troops fighting in the River Plate instead of Europe?
 
We've established already that the analogy with Quebec doesn't work terribly well.

Does the analogy of the Mexican-American War and American expansion into former Mexican territory (e.g. Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California) also not work well in this case? I mean that in that case as well as with a British Argentina TL, we're talking about an Anglo power (this time around, the Americans) encroaching into a Spanish-speaking territory that's a frontier zone, though much less inhabited at the time than Buenos Aires or the Argentine interior.

How about the analogy with Trinidad (as in Trinidad and Tobago, off Venezuela), which was a Spanish possession in the West Indies that the British captured and took over in 1797? (Although it was inhabited not so much by Spanish people as it was by French-speaking people.)
 
We've established already that the analogy with Quebec doesn't work terribly well.

Does the analogy of the Mexican-American War and American expansion into former Mexican territory (e.g. Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California) also not work well in this case?
No, the technology doesn't match up. It would be like the Argentine civil wars, but with more competent forces based on Buenos Aires or Montevideo - while on the other part, those better forces would be also facing attacks from Uruguay and Buenos Aires.
 
Yes. That doesn't mean they'll help the UK take territory they claim as theirs

As kind of I pointed out early in this thread, Portugal and Britain could agree to a common border at more or less the OTL Uruguayan-Brazilian border without fighting each other, such that Rio Grande do Sul is Brazilian just like IOTL and Uruguay is British, and Portugal could give up its own claim to Uruguay. In return, Portugal (and later Brazil) would be granted navigation rights along the Rio de la Plata along the Uruguayan shoreline.

But they also have greater commitments, specially during the period of the Napoleonic Wars. Why are those colonial troops fighting in the River Plate instead of Europe?

The Peninsular War was Britain's major commitment during the latter part of the Napoleonic Wars, from 1808 to 1814, and other commitments in Europe were not as big as the Peninsular War but generally bigger than commitments outside Europe. It's just my guess anyway, but the soldiers for the commitments in Europe (Peninsular War and otherwise) would come mainly from the UK itself, being in that same continent, and the soldiers for the commitments outside Europe could be drawn from the far-flung Empire as well as the UK.
 
As kind of I pointed out early in this thread, Portugal and Britain could agree to a common border at more or less the OTL Uruguayan-Brazilian border without fighting each other, such that Rio Grande do Sul is Brazilian just like IOTL and Uruguay is British, and Portugal could give up its own claim to Uruguay. In return, Portugal (and later Brazil) would be granted navigation rights along the Rio de la Plata along the Uruguayan shoreline.
Why would the Portuguese (let alone the Brazilians who are not in an alliance with the UK) agree with such a common border? As for navigation, they'd get that if they successfully occupy the area.

The Peninsular War was Britain's major commitment during the latter part of the Napoleonic Wars, from 1808 to 1814, and other commitments in Europe were not as big as the Peninsular War but generally bigger than commitments outside Europe. It's just my guess anyway, but the soldiers for the commitments in Europe (Peninsular War and otherwise) would come mainly from the UK itself, being in that same continent, and the soldiers for the commitments outside Europe could be drawn from the far-flung Empire as well as the UK
Yes, I understand that. But those soldiers from outside Europe could be fighting in Europe instead
 
Post No.# 2: "Argentina already was as wealthy as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the U.S... in the 1940s.
The causes that led to economic stagnation in the Post-War are complex and I don't think they can be summed up as "Because Argentines don't speak English".
In fact before 1930, along with tiny Uruguay, Argentina was the only non-English speaking settler society that managed to achieve stable democratic institutions and a thriving free market economy with high standards of living outside of Europe.
So this proves that you don't need to be English-speaking to become prosperous, even in the more prejudiced early 20th century with the UK as its major trading partner Argentina was able to do so.

Argentina happened to embrace protectionism, autarky and corporativist economy, turning away from the free market, just as the world was beginning the longest period of economic growth recorded in modern capitalism, the post-war 1950s-1970s "Golden Years".
Inflation and high political instability starting with the 1930 coup which ended an unprecedented 70 years of unbroken Constitutional succession before that did the rest of the job in stagnating the country. That was an unprecedented event, until then Argentina had faced popular uprisings, but never a military coup. Imagine the USA having a coup in the 1930s. It was on that scale of unusual."
First off, I'm glad that this particular poster acknowledged that the Southern Cone's situation cannot be summarized by the population speaking the wrong language, though Argentina and Uruguay were not new before 1930 - Chile and arguably Colombia were also in a similar boat, and in the latter case even taking into account what transpired after. Also, the whole "Argentina was already as wealthy as countries X, Y, and Z" shtick is a red herring for what's going on and distracts from talking about Argentine and Uruguayan history (the latter in particular with its own separate history, including the importance of Batlle and its history as neutral ground in Latin America) by setting up a false comparison. The reality of that wealth was actually much more like Brazil's "café com leite" approach to politics and economics but more so. As for Argentina's separate path in particular - that was also not new, as many others in the Global North - even the US and Canada - also turned to the same solutions; the only difference was that they were more successful at it and embedding it into the whole "free market" thing. At the same time, Latin America (in general and the Southern Cone in particular) was denied the chance to replicate that same trajectory, keeping them more reliant on growing cash crops and similar economies built around primary products which by the laws of the free market and comparative advantage these countries were condemned to remain. That's the root of discontent in Latin America and why Argentina went the way it did and not simplistic explanations.
Post No.# 3: "Until the 40's and 50's Argentina had a quality of life similar to Switzerland."
Which does not mean a thing (again: red herring) since that did not apply to the vast majority of people, only a select few - as it has been in colonial and post-colonial societies. Only once the benefits were spread out among the majority - which apparently populism was willing to do as long as it was "the right sort" - did things change, even if the costs of such an unsustainable extension of the Dutch disease such as inflation.
A few things. The 1862-1930 period includes the 1880 and the 1890 Revolutions. While neither was successful, they were both bloody uprisings against the Constitutional order and the 1880 was a mini-civil war. Mitre's tenure was also far from stable, although that's to be expected considering the civil wars were ending.
I also wouldn't call the period "democratic". Before 1912 elections were a farce (as they would be again after the Uriburu's coup) and, in any case, half the population was excluded from voting until 1949. I'd say Argentina wasn't a full democracy until 1983, with a the few periods between 1949 and 1976 when women could vote and Peronism wasn't proscripted as a near democracy: censorship and in the 1970s political violence was too much of the norm to speak of "full democracy" imho. But it certainly wasn't a full democracy until female suffrage was a thing.
I also don't see a relationship between political stability, military coups and economic pain, at least as the former being cause for the latter: The Onganía/Lanusse dictatorships saw large economic growth. The 1949-1975 period saw the greatest economic growth in Argentine history, and was also the most unstable one since the battle of Pavon in 1862. On the contrary, the 1976-present period is rather stable (the dictatorship was ruthless but stable and the carapintada uprisings in the 1980s and 1990 didn't hold a candle to the 1880 and 1890 revolutions) and yet has seen economic stagnation and a multitude of recessions. While economic crisis can provoke political changes (the end of De la Rua's administration and the end of the last dictatorship), the reverse doesn't seem to be truth.
And again, the economic issue isn't the abandonment of the agrarian export model for an industrial substitution one (which was in consideration since the end of WWI and started after the 1929 financial crisis. Peron emerged because of it and contributed to it. He didn't start it), which saw great economic growth, but the abandonment of the ISI model and it's replacement by god knows what, since 1975.
 
Which brings me to my final observation, this time on the rebellions in Lower Canada, which Lord Durham completely misunderstood, and in particular after the failed Rebellions of 1837-8, combined with the disastrous implications in the Durham Report that wanted to force all French-Canadians to assimilate into "civilized" (read: British/Anglo-Canadian) society. Much like the Québec Act, there are a lot of misconceptions that float around 1837 which have been used to support one side or another. Reality, as it always has a habit to do, is much more complex. The reality is that there too was a non-linguistic/non-ethnic basis to the rebellions in Québec - heck, a good portion of the leadership was actually Irish (with their own issues pertaining to British rule). Furthermore, 1837 was not an attempt to secede from the British Empire (those moves actually happened after 1837 failed and most of the leadership fled into exile in the United States to avoid capture), but as a rebellion designed to pressure the colonial government to attempt reforms to better reflect reality and grant democratic rights to the majority population - much like similar rebellions back in Europe in the same decade and concurrent with similar rebellions and sentiments in the UK itself. Unfortunately, the reality was totally ignored by Lord Durham and his Report on the Affairs of British North America, aka the Durham Report - the Report insinuated that French-Canadians had "no history and no culture" (which the intelligentsia denounced and thus tried to present their case, which probably partially explains Québec's obsession over history, though one could also assume that Lord Durham read it through a class-riddled analysis with French-Canadians collectively representing the lower classes of which he would no doubt be familiar with in England), and it was he who would over-simplify and heavily distort 1837 as being a clash of cultures between the English and the French, which he believed could only happen if the Canadiens simply did not exist and were forcibly assimilated into the English population. When the Act of Union of 1840 tried to put into practice, French-Canadians went on the defensive and became more insular, and from there changed considerably in reaction by accepting some (but not all) of the realities of being a colonized people as would be found in the Global South. Before 1837, French-Canadians had a confident nationalism which was open and welcoming, similar to liberal views elsewhere in the Anglosphere but rooted deep into French-Canadian culture as a reaction against the French colonial period. They welcomed British colonialism despite the implications (although it could be argued that "welcomed" would be too strong of a word, as I've noted already) and later on the restrictions placed on French-Canadian representation in the colonial Legislative Assembly. After 1837, things changed considerably, as if la nation was chastened by what had happened. While there were still those who preached the old liberal nationalism and the constructiveness of working with l'autre côté, the nationalist movement became more conservative, more isolationist, ultramontane, and shaped the opinions of Québec to the outside world and to a considerable segment of its own people for generations - complete with the pillars for survival. Indeed, survival - la survivance - was the watchword during this period (and arguably a continuation of the resistance to the British by acting as French-Canadians always did), which led to an informal division of power between the 'English' and the 'French' (themselves much more diverse than the nationalists were willing to let on by misusing terminology to present a simplistic worldview for a very complex reality). If you were to place French-Canadian nationalists in general into a pigeon hole of politics in the mère-patrie, then I would collectively place Québec politics as a whole on the Right, even if the Liberals had tendencies which would also place them in the Centre to moderate Left. As an over-simplification, I'd collectively place a considerable portion of French-Canadian nationalists in with the Legitimists (considering their nostalgia of the French colonial period), while both the moderates among the Right and conservatives among the Liberals would find common ground with the Orleanists. Unlike in France, though, our *Legitimists were fully in control of the historical narrative of Québec history. As one can imagine, this stasis would clearly lead it to disaster were it to remain unchecked. Canada really didn't "keep on developing" - a very Whiggish POV if there ever was one - when the same government and its lackeys still held back the development and modernization of French-Canadian society by constantly reminding them of their second-class citizenship status.

I think you're mischaracterizing the uprising to fit a narrative. There was political agitation involved with greater political rights for a decade prior, but by the time of the actual uprising occurred it was very much aimed against the English. This is why it only occured in the areas around Montreal where English settlement was the greatest and the French-Canadian farmers had the greatest interaction with the new arrivals. Papineau and co basically bilked the peasantry into blaming their woes on the English and incited rebellion when they couldn't get their way politically. The peasantry generally didn't care because none of that concerned them, their declining economic fortunes and rising land rents did, and those were quickly blamed on the English and the signeurees.
 
at best, you're going to see a neutral Portugal/Brazil. P/B claimed Uruguay as well as coveted Entre Rios. Britain's policy during the early 1800s was to separate the colonies from the motherlands (Spain/Portugal) and make as much commercial inroads as possible. Portugal hasn't forgotten that Britain hung them out to dry in both the War of Oranges and French/Spanish invasion 1806/7 until that latter invasion petered out with Spain putting up a fight against Napoleon's takeover attempt. Britain only helped the Portuguese crown relocate to Brazil in return for opening up Brazilian ports. Not to mention, Britain threatened Portuguese colonies if P didn't toe the British line in the British/French struggle, which is why France invaded in the first place. Then, at the Vienna peace conference, Britain forced Portugal to return French Guiana to France, while ignoring Portuguese claims against Spain.

Portugal isn't going to actively oppose Britain, but they aren't going to actively help them, either. Prickly relations may hasten Joao's return to Portugal, lest Britain get funny ideas about doing more than just temporarily run the mother land.
 
at best, you're going to see a neutral Portugal/Brazil. P/B claimed Uruguay as well as coveted Entre Rios. Britain's policy during the early 1800s was to separate the colonies from the motherlands (Spain/Portugal) and make as much commercial inroads as possible. Portugal hasn't forgotten that Britain hung them out to dry in both the War of Oranges and French/Spanish invasion 1806/7 until that latter invasion petered out with Spain putting up a fight against Napoleon's takeover attempt. Britain only helped the Portuguese crown relocate to Brazil in return for opening up Brazilian ports. Not to mention, Britain threatened Portuguese colonies if P didn't toe the British line in the British/French struggle, which is why France invaded in the first place. Then, at the Vienna peace conference, Britain forced Portugal to return French Guiana to France, while ignoring Portuguese claims against Spain.

Portugal isn't going to actively oppose Britain, but they aren't going to actively help them, either. Prickly relations may hasten Joao's return to Portugal, lest Britain get funny ideas about doing more than just temporarily run the mother land.

So even though in principle Britain and Portugal have this very strong alliance, all these situations on the ground make the prospect of British-Portuguese cooperation in any possibility of British troops fighting in the River Plate much more complicated and doubtful in reality? And thus the analogy of the French helping out the Americans during the American Revolution doesn't work in this particular case?!

I suppose that one could say that Portuguese troops could sometimes help the British troops in defeating guerrillas in the Banda Oriental/Entre Rios, especially after the Napoleonic War is finished, and in exchange the Portuguese/Brazilians could renounce claims to that region. (Although that might be stretching it?)
 
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So even though in principle Britain and Portugal have this very strong alliance, all these situations on the ground make the prospect of British-Portuguese cooperation in any possibility of British troops fighting in the River Plate much more complicated and doubtful in reality? And thus the analogy of the French helping out the Americans during the American Revolution doesn't work in this particular case?!

I suppose that one could say that Portuguese troops could sometimes help the British troops in defeating guerrillas in the Banda Oriental/Entre Rios, especially after the Napoleonic War is finished, and in exchange the Portuguese/Brazilians could renounce claims to that region. (Although that might be stretching it?)
why would Portugal help Britain conquer a region in return for renouncing claims on that territory? It makes no sense for Portugal to want Britain in Uruguay, where they could then encroach on Rio Grande do Sul. It makes less sense for Portugal to assist Britain gain/keep a contested territory. What would make sense is for Portugal to help Britain hold Argentina in return for Portugal getting Uruguay. But that doesn't jibe with your desire for British uber alles in the area.

Regarding the AR - Portugal was in a colonial war at the same time (76 or 77) with Spain. Britain refused to help Portugal, so Portugal refused to help Britain. It was a source of friction on both sides. The alliance wasn't really all that strong. Portugal had no other options, and Britain only really honored it when convenient.
 
why would Portugal help Britain conquer a region in return for renouncing claims on that territory? It makes no sense for Portugal to want Britain in Uruguay, where they could then encroach on Rio Grande do Sul. It makes less sense for Portugal to assist Britain gain/keep a contested territory. What would make sense is for Portugal to help Britain hold Argentina in return for Portugal getting Uruguay. But that doesn't jibe with your desire for British uber alles in the area.

When Britain takes over Montevideo (plus Maldonado and some other spots along the Uruguayan coast) and hence, at least in theory, all of the Banda Oriental in 1807, it's inheriting that area from the Spaniards. Whereas Spain and Portugal were at war with each other over the Banda Oriental, Britain and Portugal at least aren't at war over it. In a real sense, if one ignores anytime before 1807, the British are there first - taking over the naval base in Montevideo from the Spanish - and the Portuguese just covet that territory. I see the relationship between Britain and Portugal/Brazil as being kind of like between British North America (future Canada) and the United States in the early and mid-19th century minus the War of 1812. For example, just like the British and the Americans agreed on common borders like along the 45th parallel, so the British and the Portuguese agree on a common border, like more or less the OTL Brazilian-Uruguayan border. I suppose, then, that Britain and Portugal/Brazil would afterwards normally keep to themselves in their respective territories, though the Portuguese would have full navigation rights along the Rio de la Plata as that's their only viable route from Rio to Mato Grosso. So that probably goes, then, the viability of Portuguese troops helping the British in Uruguay and Entre Rios, though some indigenous troops could be enlisted on the British side (just like in North America indigenous troops were on both sides of various English-French and other conflicts). Remember, this is at the same time that Britain grants independence to Buenos Aires and/or makes it an amical protectorate or vassal state.
 
I don't think the Portuguese would do that

What I really mean to say is that in the situation I'm envisioning, the British are the heirs to the Spanish, and the Portuguese are now facing not the Spanish but rather the British in competing over the Banda Oriental. (On at least somewhat friendlier terms too.) And so, from 1807, the British and not the Spaniards have the facts on the ground in Montevideo and so forth even if the Portuguese have fantasies of possessing that area too.
 
It is worth noting that, given the predictions of extended turmoil within the British protectorates in the Banda Uruguay and possibly Buenos Aires, and the predictions of extended and interminable conflicts with the post-Spanish successor states in the OTL Argentine interior, we have a situation of protracted instability easily comparable to what Argentina experienced in the OTL early 19th century. This instability would be enough to inhibit substantial immigration to the Southern Cone from the United Kingdom.

Even if you do actually manage to get substantial British immigration to the area, this would only aggravate the region's internal conflicts, making things worse. Ethnolinguistic conflict significantly complicated the trajectories of French Canada and South Africa, and would certainly do so here.
 
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