1pm Moscow The Politburo was finally getting a proper briefing on the current state of the economy. When the Economists entered the expressions on their faces were guarded. In fact, the only good news was the knowledge that Chebrikov had informed them that the desire of the Politburo was a complete and accurate explanation about what was happening to the economy. That meant they needed the Economists to tell the truth. That promise would hopefully protect them when they told the Politburo what the real economic situation was.
The Economists began their briefing and as the briefing went on the news got worse and worse. The costs of the original Mobilization had been a massive drag on the Economy. It was survivable if the crisis did not last more than a few months. But the mobilization of the additional troops had been a double whammy. The newly mobilized troops had to be paid for, while at the same time the men pulled from the factories, farms mines and all the other jobs slowed the economy down even faster. It reduced the time that disaster would arrive from months to weeks.
The simple fact was that the massive increase in the outflow of money from the Government to pay for the cost of the mobilization was draining the Government coffers. While the inflow of money was slowing down and in fact drying up. That meant that sooner or later the money flow would dry up and the Soviet Union would not be able to pay its bills. If the crisis lasted to long enough then the Soviet Union could have to make hard choices. Such as choosing between purchasing food or coal for the people of the Soviet Union. That meant the Politburo could have to decide whether the population of the Soviet Union to froze to death or starve to death. The economist where united in one thing the faster the crisis ended the better off the Soviet Union would be.
The senior economist commented that possibly engaging in massive spending cuts would allow the Soviet Union more flexibility to work its way out of the crisis. Where the spending cuts would come from the economists refused to say, they stated that was a decision for the Politburo.
The simple truth, was that the Politburo had not realized just how much money was being spent. Even worse was that the something had to be done fast to end the crisis. But even if they ended the crisis they may still run out of money unless they engaged in major spending cuts. What programs should be cut that was a discussion that no one really wanted. Once the economists had left the discussion began, the argument began.
The Politburo now had a real problem, they could insist that the demands they had Gromyko make as negotiating stances to gain concessions from the United States were now essential demands to keep the Soviet Union from running out of cash. On the other hand, they could order Gromyko to make the best agreement he could and then bring the crisis to end. Then the Politburo could demobilize the military as fast as possible. Then after that they could make the needed cuts that would possibly allow the Soviet Union to survive this unexpected crisis.
The problem would be gaining a consensus from the Politburo, that was going to be a real problem. The hardliners were not likely going to support the quick end to the crisis if it did the Soviet Union was not reimbursed for the costs of mobilization. But the soft-liners wanted the crisis ended. They knew that the United States and NATO would not agree to reparations. As for the centrists they were wondering which side to support and that would mean they would need to be convinced what approach to take.
Chernenko decided to move a move, he suggested that first one of the economists who had briefed the Politburo was to be sent to brief Gromyko on that briefing. He also suggested that until the Politburo had decided which way to go Gromyko was not to make any concessions on the initial demands made by the Soviet Union.
No one had a good argument to oppose what he had suggested so both of his suggestions were approved. The Foreign Ministry was ordered to send the latest instructions. Then the leader of the group of economists was ordered to come back into the room. When the man entered the room, he was visibly nervous. Chernenko quickly informed the man that he needed one of the economist go to New Delhi and brief Gromyko one what the Politburo had been told. The man quickly relaxed, and he volunteered to go himself. That done orders were sent out to arrange a for plane to take the man to New Delhi and also to make arrangements with the Indians for the planes arrival. With those decision made the Politburo ended the meeting with plans to meet again the next day. That would give everyone a chance to think about the new situation.
The start of the Peace Conference was the big news of the day and Gromyko’s speech was reported and dissected. It took the rest of the world by surprise, no one had expected the Soviet Union to make such harsh demands. Some in the press condemned the demands. While other pointed out that this could just be the Soviet Union’s initial negotiating position. But it did give the NATO nations something to think about.