If offered with such caveats the US would advised as to where they might put their aid and an offer to lend them a lamp as the sun does not shine there. Then carry on without it.
HMS EAGLE in the Falklands
- Thread starter flasheart
- Start date
How? The US supplied massive quantities of fuel for the task force, in Ascencion Island. Provided extra stocks of Sidewinders, airfield mating, Shrike anti-radar missiles... the fuel alone made it possible for the task force to sail south and for air ops from Ascencion to happen.
The fuel made life easier & 'sped things up' somewhat - ultimately, nothing we couldn't (and did) provide for ourselves.
The 'Winders came from NATO war stocks & were additionally already 'on order' (and, in the case of the Wattisham wing, already here) for both RAF & RN anyway. Furthermore, almost all the AIM-9 shots taken OTL were well inside the engagement envelope (and under suitable ECM conditions) of the AIM-9G.
Shrike won't be missed - had they not been available, a 'lash up' for Martel carriage by FRS.1 would have been attempted (they'd already been flown on the FRS.1 to assist in asymmetric load configurations for the Sea Eagle programme, so they're flight cleared - only the wiring is missing). Martel was also trial fitted to a Victor K.2, which had the range low down (which the Vulcan didn't) to keep them within temp parameters.
*Edit* Forgot the AM 2 - we used our own during the conflict (and lost a bunch more on Atlantic Conveyor). Additional was supplied only after the cessation of hostilities to lengthen Stanley's r/w to enable operation of the FGR.2, with first deliveries around 18 - 19th July.
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In my view once the UK decided to use military force to reclaim the Falklands the difference in risk borne by the UK between attacking the mainland or not is minor in the big scheme of things.
If the Junta backed themselves into a corner and may not be able to back down, well to bad for them. That sort of consideration shouldn't preclude a democracy from taking prudent and propotional military action if the circumstances require it so long as a reasonable effort has been made to settle things peacefully (which I believe was done in the case of the Falklands.)
I recall a lot of unhappiness directed towards the UK during the war. I'm doubtful any additional unhappiness resulting from proportional and militarily necessary attacks on the mainland so long as they were part of an effort to liberate the islands would have made any real difference.
Regards
Blue cat
Yeah, but note the following: afaik, in OTL the UK didn't bomb the mainland due to a combination of military/technical facts and the political situation; and the fight was a lot harder and closer than this scenario. In this scenario, Argentina is being utterly crushed: the navy is gone, the air force is on it's knees and the forces in the Falklands are under siege and under bombardment. So a chancy, dangerous attack on the mainland is simply not necessary. Moreover, the RN is now busy covering the landings; to carry out an attack would mean stopping that, getting closer to Argentina (which would help what's left of Arg air force to get to them, as well as any survicing sub (?) ) and launch a massed raid with the small pool of planes it has. The chances of doing that with no losses are very slim. I'd like someone to run numbers, but I'm pretty sure a Vulcan raid would involve even more air refueling to happen, with all the possibilities for problems that means...
And imagine this (admitedly unlikely) scenario: while the RN sails on to carry out the attack, at the same time the Arg AF is launching their massed strike on the landing areas. Where most of the air cover and ship SAMs are gone...
Sure.. I have no issues with the UK coming to the conclusion that an attack on the mainland didn't make military sense. I do have an issue with the notion that foreign political pressure would have persuaded the UK not to attack the mainland if such an attack was deemed militarily necessary by the UK.
Edit to add:
In the context of the time line of this thread I believe there likely would be some political consequences for the UK if they didn't strike Air bases on the mainland when they apparently have the means to do so if there was a reasonable military need to do so. I believe in our time line the ability of the UK to credibly strike the mainland was a bit "iffy." In this time line the UK has a much more credible ability to attack the mainland. In the alternate time line of this thread allowing the Argentine airforce to get a "free pass" to operate from un attacked air bases on the the mainland would in my view send the wrong messages to other potential enemies including the Soviet Union.
If the UK didn't mount at least a token series of attacks against the mainland air bases I expect they would be going to some lengths to explain why they didn't and how they would reserve the right to do so in the future in another conflict.
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Yes, I understand what you are saying. And I get it. But if the US backed the UK, who can say much of anything? I'm just saying, if the US could get away with, hypothetically, curb stomping Cuba in my example, why shouldn't the UK be able to conduct limited airstrikes on Argentinean air bases designed to remove the only threat to their liberation of the Falklands?
What leads you to believe this is a 'chancy, dangerous' option? There is no need to, nor rhyme or reason in 'getting closer to Argentina'. Perhaps you could tell me exactly where you think Eagle is likely to be when launching a strike package which out-ranges any opposition she might conceivably face (clue: it's not going to be off the coast of Comodoro, at anchor...). Bear in mind too, that even with her air group 'occupied', the task force still has 'Vince & Hermes with, presumably, a similar number of Harriers at their disposal as per OTL. There is, in other words, no need to 'stop' or postpone the landings.
An attack of this nature may be launched by the RN at a time of their choosing - they have full all - weather capabilities, and Argentina doesn't. If the FAA are going to launch against the landings, the attack will come at dawn or sometime shortly thereafter. Any such attack will proceed via a limited choice of approach corridors - there will not be sufficient fuel to allow wiggle room here, which all makes prediction and / or interception of such an action rather straightforward - particularly with the aid of AEW assets. I said early on that I believe a 'four + four' package would be more than sufficient for airfield attack - that doesn't impede the standing CAP at all.
Any combat operation carries risk, but I rather fancy that the odds of 'doing that with no losses' are pretty good, actually. Argentine airfield defences at the time (and now, for that matter) were, frankly, a bit shit. And anything either already in the air, or launched to greet the raid gets a very warm 'hello' from Mr. Skyflash from forty to fifty odd miles out. Even if there are losses, it's much preferable - by ANY standards - to lose an aircraft with two crew, rather than a ship with hundreds. Indeed, it's the whole raison d'etre behind attacking the airfield in the first place...
SsgtC
Banned
I'm not sure if the aircraft used compatible refueling systems, but even if they do, I'm sure they couldn't top up a V-bomber. Maybe enough to give them an extra hour or two? Pure speculation here.
It was an exercise in theory possibly just a quick top off before a run in to the target with the balls to the wall.
SsgtC
Banned
Maybe. But again, a Bucc just doesn't carry the fuel load needed to top up a Vulcan or Victor. They could probably give em enough for an extra hour or two at cruise, or maybe 10-15 minutes at high speed
Fair enough the thought just popped into my head with the discussions on mainland strikes.
Given that we have a CATOBAR carrier in this scenario, I don't get the Vulcan fixation at all.
Surely, a Buccaneer at, if you'll forgive the expression, 'fuck all feet' & 600 knots is a far, far better proposition than a Vulcan at several hundred ft & 350 - 400 knots. Smaller physical target, too.
Refuelling it from a Bucc merely adds an extra layer of crazy to the whole enterpise...
BTW, that TriStar shot is a 'dry prod' but yeah, it's possible.
Surely, a Buccaneer at, if you'll forgive the expression, 'fuck all feet' & 600 knots is a far, far better proposition than a Vulcan at several hundred ft & 350 - 400 knots. Smaller physical target, too.
Refuelling it from a Bucc merely adds an extra layer of crazy to the whole enterpise...
BTW, that TriStar shot is a 'dry prod' but yeah, it's possible.
I would imagine the RAF are very keen, probably considerably keener than OTL, to get involved somehow. As has been mentioned keeping carrier strike post-war is going to be politically desirable but the defence budget is unlikely to increase much, if at all.
With BAOR and Trident being sacrosanct for various reasons the RAF is the obvious source of funds if you are looking to give the RN a funding boost and the RAF will have worked that out. A Vulcan strike may not make much military sense, but from an inter-service/Treasury-wars perspective it is going to be a priority for the RAF. They have to show they have done something in the conflict, if not they will be first on the chopping block when cuts are made.
Of course, this also means that if they do it and something goes wrong then they've guaranteed that they'll be on the block. Black Buck was incredibly risky - if they'd run out of fuel, the Vulcan crews would have had no rescue at all. Can you imagine if a Vulcan strike goes ahead ITTL, but they end up getting lost somewhere between Ascension and Argentina? The RAF would be so screwed...
The RAF was very involved they were placing at least 1 Nimrod sortie a day into the AOE. Also they were conducting a fairly large airhead to wideawake