OTL it was called the Tizard Mission. Beaverbrook was busy running riot as the Minister at MAP. ITTL MAP is joined at the hip with the AM. SIR Archibald Sinclair as head pf MAP is defacto Sir Phillips second at the AM.
AHC: Peerless Air Ministry
- Thread starter perfectgeneral
- Start date
Glyndwr01
Banned
The Beaufighter with 4 40mm Vickers S guns would be a better tank/maritime/ground attack aircraft than the Hurricanes use OTL, with twin radials it can take more damage than a single water cooled engined aircraft. It would still have 4 mg's for self defense.
Conversely, a Beaufighter in the low level ground attack role presents a larger less agile target to light AAA and is not so capable of self defence against first rate single engine fighters. all becomes a matter of 'horses for courses'. The most suitable aircraft you use in this role is decided by many tactical factors and sometimes strategic ones. All to often in OTL it was simply a case of what was available and not requires for more important tasks. Ground attack for much of the first years of WW2 very low on the RAF's Totem Pole.
8.7 The Other Side Of The Hill
8.7 The other side of the hill
As to the Germans next move, the broad outline was fairly easy to discern, take control of occupied France, Then when ready commence the destruction of the UK’s ability to resist. This would mean attacking and neutralising all aspects of Britain’s air defence and aircraft production. The difficulty the RAF had in “seeing the other side of the hill” was that there was no way that currently the actual targets for raids could be predicted in advance, therefore the initiative would invariably lay with the attacker. Signals intelligence and aerial photography could and did provide information as to where the Luftwaffe were based and roughly their state of readiness but that was about the current limit.
One thing that the phoney war and the subsequent continental campaign had driven home was just how unsuitable the Battle and the Blenheim were as reconnaissance aircraft. As a consequence of this the Photographic Development Unit which Winterbottom had sponsored with the unorthodox and somewhat cavalier F.S.Cotton had developed it’s special high altitude and long range Spitfire PR aircraft and these had become the preeminent aerial reconnaissance asset. Such a unit could not be left in the control of a loose cannon like Cotton so in early May 1940 the unit was taken under direct RAF control and command of it given to a regular RAF officer, Wing Commander G.W. Tuttle and renamed the Photographic Reconnaissance Unit.
For administration purposes this unit came under Maritime Command but it received its instructions directly form the High Command of the RAF and the Air Ministry. With the fall of France the work of the PRU became even more vital. Just as the interception of the German reconnaissance aircraft became a vital task for Fighter Command. One early task suggested was the regular or even daily photographing of Luftwaffe basis that could be used for the coming assault of Britain. The sponsor of this program was somewhat taken aback when he was quietly informed that there were now some four hundred known Luftwaffe airfields within range and capable of launching attacks on Britain and photographing them all just once was a major task even if they were prioritised regular updates would still soak up resources.
There was another source of intelligence that the AM was exploiting and once more Winterbottom’s influence was present via the committee for scientific intelligence. R.V. Jones was looking for and analysing German radio transmitions but these were not communications but radar and directional guidance beams. For this purpose the radio investigation flight of specially equipped De Havilland Flamingos was based at the RAEE at Farnborough. Every day these aircraft with their special aerials and multitude of radio receivers sampled the air waves and searched out the enemies transmissions.
Late in June a new German radar was detected transmitting from near cape Wissant, it was classified as a Freyer gun laying and sea search radar. Informed of it’s location the RN came to the conclusion that the attacks on the coastal convoys were likely to intensify. The German radar was however a side show as far as R.V. Jones was concerned. His primary aim was to find the German guidance signals that could and would be used by the German night bombers. Finding these beams would give warning that an attack was imminent and an indication of the target. Further counter measures could then be instigated to negate the effectiveness of the guidance system.
When and where the air assault would come was of course a prime consideration of all the forces and intelligence services and at this juncture all they could do was watch and listen hoping that the respite was long enough for them to remedy the immediate deficiencies.
The counter to this was of course the German reconnaissance efforts each one of which whether intercepted or not was tracked as closely as possible by electronic and visual means to help build up the picture of the enemies intentions. One aspect of these flights was to help to inform the placement of decoys and the camouflage and deception activities as an on going part of the build up to the battle. It would seem hard to hide an airfield with concrete runways and huge hangers or a factory with equally prominent buildings but the effort was made. With paint canvas, hessian and other materials fake hedges and field patterns broke up the hard shapes of runways and buildings in an attempted to deceive whist the same materials produced dummy aircraft, hangers and sheds to provide alternatives to the real thing. Major aircraft plants like the De Havilland factory at Hatfield were both camouflaged as well as possible and given their own decoy site. The Q site, as it was known, for Hatfield was located some three miles to the east of the plant in open countryside.
At the beging of May the RAF had been given a gift of extraordinary value when No1 squadron had somehow acquired an ME 109E-3 that had been forced down near Amiens. Restored to flying condition and given RAF markings including the serial number AE479 the aircraft was sent to the RAE at Boscombe Down for flying trials and evaluation. These trials included mock combat against all the current RAF and FAA fighter types to establish the strengths and weakness of the aircraft and their best tactical use in both defence and offence.
By the end of the first week of July the AM/RAF had arrived at the following order of battle for the Luftwaffe, this was based mostly on radio traffic analysis and some message intercepts. An additional source of information was German propaganda procured through contacts in neutral countries. Here the British intelligence services were much helped by the Nazi’s love of propaganda pictures. Herr Goering in particular liked to have pictures of himself with his Luftwaffe high command in the field published. By this and other means the commanding officers of the Luftwaffe formations were identified.
Luftflotte 2, Commanded by Kesselring was based in Holland.
Luftflotte 3, Commanded by Sperrle was in north and north-west France.
Luftflotte 5, Commanded by Stumpff was in Norway and Denmark.
Identify the individual units and their strengths within each Luftflotte was much more difficult and often the estimates were more of guesstimate than the intelligence officers would have liked. The best the AM /RAF could come up with at this time was total strength of around 3500 aircraft between the three fleets, taking that no more than 75% of this total would be available for operations at any one time still meant that the RAF was facing around 250 dive bombers, 1,000 long range bombers and a 1,000 fighters.
In late June and early July the Luftwaffe was only using about 10% of this strength on a daily basis as they reorganised and relocated after the intensity of the recent campaigns.
So the preparations, move and counter move went on though the heat of mid-summer and whilst the enemy was not quiescent the probes and tactical taunts slowly intensified.
As to the Germans next move, the broad outline was fairly easy to discern, take control of occupied France, Then when ready commence the destruction of the UK’s ability to resist. This would mean attacking and neutralising all aspects of Britain’s air defence and aircraft production. The difficulty the RAF had in “seeing the other side of the hill” was that there was no way that currently the actual targets for raids could be predicted in advance, therefore the initiative would invariably lay with the attacker. Signals intelligence and aerial photography could and did provide information as to where the Luftwaffe were based and roughly their state of readiness but that was about the current limit.
One thing that the phoney war and the subsequent continental campaign had driven home was just how unsuitable the Battle and the Blenheim were as reconnaissance aircraft. As a consequence of this the Photographic Development Unit which Winterbottom had sponsored with the unorthodox and somewhat cavalier F.S.Cotton had developed it’s special high altitude and long range Spitfire PR aircraft and these had become the preeminent aerial reconnaissance asset. Such a unit could not be left in the control of a loose cannon like Cotton so in early May 1940 the unit was taken under direct RAF control and command of it given to a regular RAF officer, Wing Commander G.W. Tuttle and renamed the Photographic Reconnaissance Unit.
For administration purposes this unit came under Maritime Command but it received its instructions directly form the High Command of the RAF and the Air Ministry. With the fall of France the work of the PRU became even more vital. Just as the interception of the German reconnaissance aircraft became a vital task for Fighter Command. One early task suggested was the regular or even daily photographing of Luftwaffe basis that could be used for the coming assault of Britain. The sponsor of this program was somewhat taken aback when he was quietly informed that there were now some four hundred known Luftwaffe airfields within range and capable of launching attacks on Britain and photographing them all just once was a major task even if they were prioritised regular updates would still soak up resources.
There was another source of intelligence that the AM was exploiting and once more Winterbottom’s influence was present via the committee for scientific intelligence. R.V. Jones was looking for and analysing German radio transmitions but these were not communications but radar and directional guidance beams. For this purpose the radio investigation flight of specially equipped De Havilland Flamingos was based at the RAEE at Farnborough. Every day these aircraft with their special aerials and multitude of radio receivers sampled the air waves and searched out the enemies transmissions.
Late in June a new German radar was detected transmitting from near cape Wissant, it was classified as a Freyer gun laying and sea search radar. Informed of it’s location the RN came to the conclusion that the attacks on the coastal convoys were likely to intensify. The German radar was however a side show as far as R.V. Jones was concerned. His primary aim was to find the German guidance signals that could and would be used by the German night bombers. Finding these beams would give warning that an attack was imminent and an indication of the target. Further counter measures could then be instigated to negate the effectiveness of the guidance system.
When and where the air assault would come was of course a prime consideration of all the forces and intelligence services and at this juncture all they could do was watch and listen hoping that the respite was long enough for them to remedy the immediate deficiencies.
The counter to this was of course the German reconnaissance efforts each one of which whether intercepted or not was tracked as closely as possible by electronic and visual means to help build up the picture of the enemies intentions. One aspect of these flights was to help to inform the placement of decoys and the camouflage and deception activities as an on going part of the build up to the battle. It would seem hard to hide an airfield with concrete runways and huge hangers or a factory with equally prominent buildings but the effort was made. With paint canvas, hessian and other materials fake hedges and field patterns broke up the hard shapes of runways and buildings in an attempted to deceive whist the same materials produced dummy aircraft, hangers and sheds to provide alternatives to the real thing. Major aircraft plants like the De Havilland factory at Hatfield were both camouflaged as well as possible and given their own decoy site. The Q site, as it was known, for Hatfield was located some three miles to the east of the plant in open countryside.
At the beging of May the RAF had been given a gift of extraordinary value when No1 squadron had somehow acquired an ME 109E-3 that had been forced down near Amiens. Restored to flying condition and given RAF markings including the serial number AE479 the aircraft was sent to the RAE at Boscombe Down for flying trials and evaluation. These trials included mock combat against all the current RAF and FAA fighter types to establish the strengths and weakness of the aircraft and their best tactical use in both defence and offence.
By the end of the first week of July the AM/RAF had arrived at the following order of battle for the Luftwaffe, this was based mostly on radio traffic analysis and some message intercepts. An additional source of information was German propaganda procured through contacts in neutral countries. Here the British intelligence services were much helped by the Nazi’s love of propaganda pictures. Herr Goering in particular liked to have pictures of himself with his Luftwaffe high command in the field published. By this and other means the commanding officers of the Luftwaffe formations were identified.
Luftflotte 2, Commanded by Kesselring was based in Holland.
Luftflotte 3, Commanded by Sperrle was in north and north-west France.
Luftflotte 5, Commanded by Stumpff was in Norway and Denmark.
Identify the individual units and their strengths within each Luftflotte was much more difficult and often the estimates were more of guesstimate than the intelligence officers would have liked. The best the AM /RAF could come up with at this time was total strength of around 3500 aircraft between the three fleets, taking that no more than 75% of this total would be available for operations at any one time still meant that the RAF was facing around 250 dive bombers, 1,000 long range bombers and a 1,000 fighters.
In late June and early July the Luftwaffe was only using about 10% of this strength on a daily basis as they reorganised and relocated after the intensity of the recent campaigns.
So the preparations, move and counter move went on though the heat of mid-summer and whilst the enemy was not quiescent the probes and tactical taunts slowly intensified.
All true.
I'll add another thing, that being Beaufighter was about twice the size of Hurricane, and perhaps thrice the size of Bf 109. Thus giving the AA gunners opportunity to spot it early, and hit more easily than it would've been the case for a typical ww2 fighter-bomber.
Want a slightly less vulnerable Hurricane? Stick the Hercules in the nose.
Given its record, the Beaufighter would be the Heavy Tactical ground attack aircraft supplementing the Hurricane. Bigger bomb load ( 2000lb max vs 500lb ), more rugged and far better pilot protection ( engines are so far forward they basically acted as shields ) so better at hitting fixed defended targets like bridges. Hurricane would be better at mobile targets where it has to loiter more and so more chance of fighters being vectored on to them.
Glyndwr01
Banned
Beaufighter Whispering Death— in the Beaufighter's case, supposedly because attacking aircraft often were not heard (or seen) until it was too late.[34][2] The Beaufighter's Hercules engines used sleeve valves, which lacked the noisy valve gear common to poppet valve engines. This was most apparent in a reduced noise level at the front of the engine. Mark X Beaufighters were also flown on long range daylight intruder missions over Burma. The high-speed, low-level attacks were very effective, despite often atrocious weather conditions, and makeshift repair and maintenance facilities.
Just reread the Beaverbrook/Tizard Mission intro. You say Beaverbrook's also Minister for Ship Production, so without an aircraft production crisis, they can spare man and brain power for other systemic problems in the British war effort.
Modernising production and labour practice in an industry as prominent as shipbuilding could lead to bigger imports of machine tools etc instead or on top of finished goods. IOTL Britain had a production crisis due to worn out plants wearing themselves out further, here the crisis could come from the fact that Britain is trying to modernise its industries during wartime.
Modernising production and labour practice in an industry as prominent as shipbuilding could lead to bigger imports of machine tools etc instead or on top of finished goods. IOTL Britain had a production crisis due to worn out plants wearing themselves out further, here the crisis could come from the fact that Britain is trying to modernise its industries during wartime.
I've read in several books that the Whispering Death thing existed more in the minds of the allied propaganda specialists. Both engines where noisy as hell. Although the Beau was an excellent intruder/tactical strike plane. I think that the Beau would do a good job of disrupting German airfields during this TTL's BoB going in low and fast and then running away, although it might the German ideas!
The biggest butterflies of this would be post war. Britain might even retain its ship building industry to the modern day!
Some of the biggest problems Beaverbrook will have in this ITTL as in OTL within the ship building industry is the Unions! For many and Diverse reasons, couple that with a complacent and intransient management does not bode well.
8.8 Joisting And Jostling In June
8.8 Joisting and Jostling in June.
Even before the French call for an armistice on the 17th of June the Luftwaffe had carried out a series of probing attacks commencing on the night of the 5/6th June. The first of these attacks was primarily on the coastal towns, ports, industry and airfields of the English east coast as far south as northern Kent. This nightime incursion would be the biggest of the war so far with some 30 Luftwaffe bomber aircraft taking part. As such it would be the first major test of Fighter Commands night fighting system and capabilities. Fortunately for the RAF the east coast had been the first area to be given the new PPI RDF system and the areas operatives were the most experienced. There was an opinion expressed by the O.R Teams at both Fighter Command at Bentley Priory and at the AM that these probing attacks on the night of the 5/6Th June and on the following night were in effect a ‘reconnaissance in force’ to test and establish the effectiveness of Britain’s night air defences.
Despite the ability of the CH system to detect the attacking aircraft some miles out to sea, due to the selection of primarily coastal targets the night fighters had a very short engagement window. The PPI sets would often, because of their generally more inland location only get a contact at less than 40 miles from the coast. Thereby giving the operators less than ten minutes to establish a track and to direct a fighter onto the intruder before they reached their target. Here one of the advantages of the RDF 1.5 system became apparent, in that using its RDF 1.5 the night fighter could head out towards the attacking aircraft and be turning onto its track even as the target aircraft entered the range of the PPI RDF station. This manoeuvre took a level of skill and three dimensional awareness that few crew had stablished so early in their careers.
For the first time in the war the night of the 5/6th of June saw some PPI stations reach saturation point as they attempted to guide as many as four separate night fighters simultaneously on to multiple intruders showing as ‘magots’ on the glowing cathode ray tubes of their PPI sets. With four operators clustered round a single twelve inch diameter PPI set trying to concentrate on their ‘magot’ and fighter, to vector the fighter into a stern chase position close enough for a firm contact proved extraordinarily difficult. And in most cases impossible. Often the plot on the twelve inch diameter screen would descend into a confusing muddle of chino graph lines and symbols. sometimes however the operators, especially when less pressed, did succeed in vectoring their client fighter onto the ‘magot’ and aerial engagements occurred all over the eastern skies throughout that short summer night.
One particular incident on that night was studied by OR with particular interest, this happened whilst Colchester PPI was tracking no less than six intruders and trying to vector their four fighters on to four of these intruders. Into this already cluttered and confusing picture came a ‘magot’ hotly pursued by a Reaper under the control of Debden PPI which was fast approaching the limit of their range. Needless to say Colchester PPI was unable to assist quickly enough to enable a successful conclusion to that pursuit, let alone their own, much to the frustration of all concerned.
Despite this there were some notable success. Two night Reapers from Martlesham each scored a ‘magot’ in separate interceptions, as did a Bisley from Coltishall. When the intelligence staff had completed their debriefings the success, failures and problems could be assessed and analysed. During that night a total of forty eight sorties had been flown against thirty known intruders, of the forty eight less than half had successfully been assigned an intercept. In fact twenty three fighters had been vectored, of these only six had resulted in acquisition of the target by the fighters airborne RDF system. Of these six only four resulted in engagements where guns were fired. Two of these resulted in kills overland where they could be confirmed. Another resulted in the Luftwaffe bomber plunging into the see some miles off the coast at Orefordness where it was reported by staff manning a post at the range and experimental station there. This was later confirmed by the recovery of a body and debris from the sea by a fishing boat which enabled the aircrafts type and unit to be identified. One further aircraft was claimed damaged and as a probable but this could bot be confirmed.
One Reaper was damaged by defensive fire and had to abort it’s attack and return to base. The pilot had misjudged the rate of closing speed and had undershot his ‘magot’, presenting the bombers ventral gunner with a relatively easy target. A burst of machinegun fire had damaged the fighters port engine enabling the bomber to make good it’s escape.
Examination of the remains of the two crashed bombers had shown how devastating the fire was from four closely grouped 20mm cannon spitting out a total of some forty rounds a second. Despite the evident problems, that were being urgently investigated by the OR teams, especially with multiple targets and fighters within the same PPI zone there was overall satisfaction with the effectiveness of the system. It was noted that weather condition over the UK at the time were advantageous to the defenders with little cloud and good starlight, still an interception rate of 20% and a kill ratio of 50% of interceptions made, resulting in 10% loss to the enemy was getting close to a viable defence. Tactically there was much to learn and the system needed a lot of refining but Sir Hugh Dowding felt some gentle satisfaction as he was briefed on the nights results the following day. On the whole the report could be summed up as ‘good but could do better’.
The following night there were slightly fewer intruders but they were more concentrated and had more cloud cover to use. Despite this, two bombers were shot down by night fighters one of them as far inland as Bedford. This set the pattern for the night campaign until the start of the main assault some weeks later. Sporadic attacks on nights when the moon and weather conditions were advantageous with a maximum of around sixty bombers but often less. Over the course of the eight weeks or so from the end of the Dunkirk evacuation to the start of the campaign to destroy the RAF the losses inflicted on the Luftwaffe night force was estimated at around 5%, to a combination of AA and Fighters. How many other operational losses were suffered was an unknown quantity. Whilst many in the RAF Higher echelons considered a loss rate of 5% sustainable by the Luftwaffe, Sir Phillip thought that it must still be very damaging to both material and men in a sustained campaign. The consensus of opinion at the AM was that inflicting a sustained loss rate of 10% would eventual prove more than the Luftwaffe could bear.
Even before the French call for an armistice on the 17th of June the Luftwaffe had carried out a series of probing attacks commencing on the night of the 5/6th June. The first of these attacks was primarily on the coastal towns, ports, industry and airfields of the English east coast as far south as northern Kent. This nightime incursion would be the biggest of the war so far with some 30 Luftwaffe bomber aircraft taking part. As such it would be the first major test of Fighter Commands night fighting system and capabilities. Fortunately for the RAF the east coast had been the first area to be given the new PPI RDF system and the areas operatives were the most experienced. There was an opinion expressed by the O.R Teams at both Fighter Command at Bentley Priory and at the AM that these probing attacks on the night of the 5/6Th June and on the following night were in effect a ‘reconnaissance in force’ to test and establish the effectiveness of Britain’s night air defences.
Despite the ability of the CH system to detect the attacking aircraft some miles out to sea, due to the selection of primarily coastal targets the night fighters had a very short engagement window. The PPI sets would often, because of their generally more inland location only get a contact at less than 40 miles from the coast. Thereby giving the operators less than ten minutes to establish a track and to direct a fighter onto the intruder before they reached their target. Here one of the advantages of the RDF 1.5 system became apparent, in that using its RDF 1.5 the night fighter could head out towards the attacking aircraft and be turning onto its track even as the target aircraft entered the range of the PPI RDF station. This manoeuvre took a level of skill and three dimensional awareness that few crew had stablished so early in their careers.
For the first time in the war the night of the 5/6th of June saw some PPI stations reach saturation point as they attempted to guide as many as four separate night fighters simultaneously on to multiple intruders showing as ‘magots’ on the glowing cathode ray tubes of their PPI sets. With four operators clustered round a single twelve inch diameter PPI set trying to concentrate on their ‘magot’ and fighter, to vector the fighter into a stern chase position close enough for a firm contact proved extraordinarily difficult. And in most cases impossible. Often the plot on the twelve inch diameter screen would descend into a confusing muddle of chino graph lines and symbols. sometimes however the operators, especially when less pressed, did succeed in vectoring their client fighter onto the ‘magot’ and aerial engagements occurred all over the eastern skies throughout that short summer night.
One particular incident on that night was studied by OR with particular interest, this happened whilst Colchester PPI was tracking no less than six intruders and trying to vector their four fighters on to four of these intruders. Into this already cluttered and confusing picture came a ‘magot’ hotly pursued by a Reaper under the control of Debden PPI which was fast approaching the limit of their range. Needless to say Colchester PPI was unable to assist quickly enough to enable a successful conclusion to that pursuit, let alone their own, much to the frustration of all concerned.
Despite this there were some notable success. Two night Reapers from Martlesham each scored a ‘magot’ in separate interceptions, as did a Bisley from Coltishall. When the intelligence staff had completed their debriefings the success, failures and problems could be assessed and analysed. During that night a total of forty eight sorties had been flown against thirty known intruders, of the forty eight less than half had successfully been assigned an intercept. In fact twenty three fighters had been vectored, of these only six had resulted in acquisition of the target by the fighters airborne RDF system. Of these six only four resulted in engagements where guns were fired. Two of these resulted in kills overland where they could be confirmed. Another resulted in the Luftwaffe bomber plunging into the see some miles off the coast at Orefordness where it was reported by staff manning a post at the range and experimental station there. This was later confirmed by the recovery of a body and debris from the sea by a fishing boat which enabled the aircrafts type and unit to be identified. One further aircraft was claimed damaged and as a probable but this could bot be confirmed.
One Reaper was damaged by defensive fire and had to abort it’s attack and return to base. The pilot had misjudged the rate of closing speed and had undershot his ‘magot’, presenting the bombers ventral gunner with a relatively easy target. A burst of machinegun fire had damaged the fighters port engine enabling the bomber to make good it’s escape.
Examination of the remains of the two crashed bombers had shown how devastating the fire was from four closely grouped 20mm cannon spitting out a total of some forty rounds a second. Despite the evident problems, that were being urgently investigated by the OR teams, especially with multiple targets and fighters within the same PPI zone there was overall satisfaction with the effectiveness of the system. It was noted that weather condition over the UK at the time were advantageous to the defenders with little cloud and good starlight, still an interception rate of 20% and a kill ratio of 50% of interceptions made, resulting in 10% loss to the enemy was getting close to a viable defence. Tactically there was much to learn and the system needed a lot of refining but Sir Hugh Dowding felt some gentle satisfaction as he was briefed on the nights results the following day. On the whole the report could be summed up as ‘good but could do better’.
The following night there were slightly fewer intruders but they were more concentrated and had more cloud cover to use. Despite this, two bombers were shot down by night fighters one of them as far inland as Bedford. This set the pattern for the night campaign until the start of the main assault some weeks later. Sporadic attacks on nights when the moon and weather conditions were advantageous with a maximum of around sixty bombers but often less. Over the course of the eight weeks or so from the end of the Dunkirk evacuation to the start of the campaign to destroy the RAF the losses inflicted on the Luftwaffe night force was estimated at around 5%, to a combination of AA and Fighters. How many other operational losses were suffered was an unknown quantity. Whilst many in the RAF Higher echelons considered a loss rate of 5% sustainable by the Luftwaffe, Sir Phillip thought that it must still be very damaging to both material and men in a sustained campaign. The consensus of opinion at the AM was that inflicting a sustained loss rate of 10% would eventual prove more than the Luftwaffe could bear.
Well that does depend on how accurate the loss figures are that the rate is calculated from. OTL Bomber Command knew they were losing when they hit 3% loses per mission.
I am not sure what loss rate the US 8th suffered at times in it's daylight operations but I am sure it was well above 3%. I am n ot an expert on this aspect of air warfare so any advice and guidance would be appreciated.
They took something like 16% casualties on their first raid on Schweinfurt.
http://www.taphilo.com/history/8thaf/8aflosses.shtml
http://www.taphilo.com/history/8thaf/8aflosses.shtml
8.9 New Chicks Hatching and Guarding The Nests
8.9, New chicks hatching and guarding the nests
Despite the insipient invasion panic Sir Phillip was gratified that no less than three projects he had advocated had not been hindered in any way and in early June two of those bore palatable fruit. Under great secrecy a little aircraft was dismantled and transported from the ‘Weasel Works at Hucclecote to the airfield at Cranwell where it was reassembled under heavy guard. Early in the morning of the 3rd of June the RAF had entered the jet age as the little Gloster E.28 lifted off from the long concrete runway at Cranwell. Some had had their doubts but others were always confident that ‘Whittles Wonder’ would work. Now serious testing could commence and hopefully rapid development of a practical fighter could be pursued.
Another red letter as far as Sir Phillip was concerned came less than a week later when the first Mosquito protype flew from De Havilland’s airfield at Hatfield. Initial reports were that it not only handled well but was every bit as fast as had been predicted. Production was to proceed as quickly as possible with the first fifty being fighter bombers and the second protype was to be completed as a PRU aircraft. The third of this hat trick of good things was the signing off of the final production design drawings of the four engine Manchester and the issuing of instructions for the construction of a protype using a modified Manchester fuselage. The reasoning behind this development was two fold. Vickers had raised concerns about the availability of the Monarch engine and Roy Chadwick had done some quick calculations that showed that Manchester derivative with four merlins and a lagers wingspan could carry the same bomb load as a Manchester twice as far at a higher cruising speed or a bigger bomb load for a shorter range. Vickers also suggested that such an aircraft could be built at a shadow factory without loss of current Manchester production.
Both the AM and the RAF had already concluded that both the Hurricane and the Defiant would be outclassed by the newer variants and types of German fighters. Replacement designs had been commissioned and the prototypes completed to the F18/37 specification. Now the problems were of getting them into production. To lose capacity now whilst the RAF and Fighter Command was scrambling for every available fighter to rebuild numbers was unthinkable but to not get them into production would possibly cause a capability gap later that could be just as damaging. So with Austin’s shadow factory that had been building Fairey Battles now temporarily building components and sub assembles for fighters the decision was taken to commence setting up the factory for production of the Hawker Tornado. The Hawker Typhoon would have to wait until Napier had sorted out the Sabre, if and when that ever happened. The production numbers for the Tornado would be determined by the availability of the Fairey Monarch engine. Despite the expansion of the Fairey engineering works the demand for the Monarch was still rising faster than the increase in supply. Both the MAP and AM were burning the midnight oil working on solutions to this problem. Currently with both the Centaurus and the Sabre having a disturbing tendency to reducing themselves to scrap the only available aircraft engine in the 2000hp class currently available was the Monarch.
With the successful first flight of a British jet engine thoughts turned more seriously to producing a viable fighter design. Though the Gloster E28 had been designed to include provision for armament the current consensus of opinion within the AM was that it was currently lacking both the range and power to be a practical fighter. Hence Glosters were working on no less than three new jet fighter designs, two were single engine developments of the E28 including all the lessons learnt in its construction and flight trials based on the next series of more powerful engines. The third one was a clean sheet twin engine design. In parallel W.E.W Petter at Westlands had been working on a jet engine project based on his Whirlwind and a second bomber dedicated bomber design. Unfortunately for the Whirlwind project this was not as simple a just swapping engines but required several major design changes, including an all new undercarriage system, new Fowler flaps, new inboard wing section and other detailed modifications. The final Jet version of the Whirlwind simple known Whirlwind J had a tricycle type landing gear and two jets underslung in front of the wings main spar. The one piece Fowler flap stretched from just inboard of the ailerons, with u sections under the jet pipes to complete a single structural element. The flap actuators and main guide rails were housed within the rear part of the engine nacelles under the jet engine tail pipes. All in all the end result was very neat aircraft that promised much. As part of this project Petter had done a quick sketch design for a twin merlin Whirlwind but had come to the conclusion that it would not offer anything not already available in another in service aircraft and certainly would not be as useful as two spitfires.
Regarding Spitfire development the one thing that was already apparent and an obvious area for development was for a greater fuel capacity and longer range. This was certainly a priority for the PRU versions but the ability to increase the range/loiter time of the Spitfire as a fighter would be an operational bonus. Hence the design team at Supermarime were investigating means by which the tankage on later marks could be increased particularly with the likelihood of a Griffon engine version being required.
Sometimes simple or obvious ideas can be overlooked and one such was the case with an earlier suggestion that every airfield whatever its function, within 11 group at least, should be given revetments at it’s dispersals to shelter fighters. The original concept suggested in the autumn of 1939 was to give the largest number of available airfields for fighter operations and it had been initially kyboshed on the grounds that it would take too much time and divert resources from more urgent defensive works. However as the fall of France became inevitable the suggestion came up that by building such revetments at diverse airfields could well help confuse the Luftwaffe as to which airfields were actually fighter bases and could also act to divert their attack from critical airfields, in a way turning them into Q sites. So as May progressed various airfields such as the No 13 EFTS at Maidenhead had sprouted revetments arounds it’s perimeter that aroused some wry comments from both instructor and pupil alike. All that levity ended on the third of July when a Dornier dived out of the clouds strafing and bombing the airfield. One airman was killed and two Tiger moths destroyed and several damaged. None of those in the revetments were damaged just those neatly lined up outside the flight instructors shed. It was noted by the AM that strait after this attack there was a clamour for more light AA guns from virtually every airfield in southern Britain. The supply of such weapons was at the time in very short supply and many expedients were resorted to, all sorts of machine guns were acquired from various sources by any means possible and fitted on make shift mounts.
Despite the insipient invasion panic Sir Phillip was gratified that no less than three projects he had advocated had not been hindered in any way and in early June two of those bore palatable fruit. Under great secrecy a little aircraft was dismantled and transported from the ‘Weasel Works at Hucclecote to the airfield at Cranwell where it was reassembled under heavy guard. Early in the morning of the 3rd of June the RAF had entered the jet age as the little Gloster E.28 lifted off from the long concrete runway at Cranwell. Some had had their doubts but others were always confident that ‘Whittles Wonder’ would work. Now serious testing could commence and hopefully rapid development of a practical fighter could be pursued.
Another red letter as far as Sir Phillip was concerned came less than a week later when the first Mosquito protype flew from De Havilland’s airfield at Hatfield. Initial reports were that it not only handled well but was every bit as fast as had been predicted. Production was to proceed as quickly as possible with the first fifty being fighter bombers and the second protype was to be completed as a PRU aircraft. The third of this hat trick of good things was the signing off of the final production design drawings of the four engine Manchester and the issuing of instructions for the construction of a protype using a modified Manchester fuselage. The reasoning behind this development was two fold. Vickers had raised concerns about the availability of the Monarch engine and Roy Chadwick had done some quick calculations that showed that Manchester derivative with four merlins and a lagers wingspan could carry the same bomb load as a Manchester twice as far at a higher cruising speed or a bigger bomb load for a shorter range. Vickers also suggested that such an aircraft could be built at a shadow factory without loss of current Manchester production.
Both the AM and the RAF had already concluded that both the Hurricane and the Defiant would be outclassed by the newer variants and types of German fighters. Replacement designs had been commissioned and the prototypes completed to the F18/37 specification. Now the problems were of getting them into production. To lose capacity now whilst the RAF and Fighter Command was scrambling for every available fighter to rebuild numbers was unthinkable but to not get them into production would possibly cause a capability gap later that could be just as damaging. So with Austin’s shadow factory that had been building Fairey Battles now temporarily building components and sub assembles for fighters the decision was taken to commence setting up the factory for production of the Hawker Tornado. The Hawker Typhoon would have to wait until Napier had sorted out the Sabre, if and when that ever happened. The production numbers for the Tornado would be determined by the availability of the Fairey Monarch engine. Despite the expansion of the Fairey engineering works the demand for the Monarch was still rising faster than the increase in supply. Both the MAP and AM were burning the midnight oil working on solutions to this problem. Currently with both the Centaurus and the Sabre having a disturbing tendency to reducing themselves to scrap the only available aircraft engine in the 2000hp class currently available was the Monarch.
With the successful first flight of a British jet engine thoughts turned more seriously to producing a viable fighter design. Though the Gloster E28 had been designed to include provision for armament the current consensus of opinion within the AM was that it was currently lacking both the range and power to be a practical fighter. Hence Glosters were working on no less than three new jet fighter designs, two were single engine developments of the E28 including all the lessons learnt in its construction and flight trials based on the next series of more powerful engines. The third one was a clean sheet twin engine design. In parallel W.E.W Petter at Westlands had been working on a jet engine project based on his Whirlwind and a second bomber dedicated bomber design. Unfortunately for the Whirlwind project this was not as simple a just swapping engines but required several major design changes, including an all new undercarriage system, new Fowler flaps, new inboard wing section and other detailed modifications. The final Jet version of the Whirlwind simple known Whirlwind J had a tricycle type landing gear and two jets underslung in front of the wings main spar. The one piece Fowler flap stretched from just inboard of the ailerons, with u sections under the jet pipes to complete a single structural element. The flap actuators and main guide rails were housed within the rear part of the engine nacelles under the jet engine tail pipes. All in all the end result was very neat aircraft that promised much. As part of this project Petter had done a quick sketch design for a twin merlin Whirlwind but had come to the conclusion that it would not offer anything not already available in another in service aircraft and certainly would not be as useful as two spitfires.
Regarding Spitfire development the one thing that was already apparent and an obvious area for development was for a greater fuel capacity and longer range. This was certainly a priority for the PRU versions but the ability to increase the range/loiter time of the Spitfire as a fighter would be an operational bonus. Hence the design team at Supermarime were investigating means by which the tankage on later marks could be increased particularly with the likelihood of a Griffon engine version being required.
Sometimes simple or obvious ideas can be overlooked and one such was the case with an earlier suggestion that every airfield whatever its function, within 11 group at least, should be given revetments at it’s dispersals to shelter fighters. The original concept suggested in the autumn of 1939 was to give the largest number of available airfields for fighter operations and it had been initially kyboshed on the grounds that it would take too much time and divert resources from more urgent defensive works. However as the fall of France became inevitable the suggestion came up that by building such revetments at diverse airfields could well help confuse the Luftwaffe as to which airfields were actually fighter bases and could also act to divert their attack from critical airfields, in a way turning them into Q sites. So as May progressed various airfields such as the No 13 EFTS at Maidenhead had sprouted revetments arounds it’s perimeter that aroused some wry comments from both instructor and pupil alike. All that levity ended on the third of July when a Dornier dived out of the clouds strafing and bombing the airfield. One airman was killed and two Tiger moths destroyed and several damaged. None of those in the revetments were damaged just those neatly lined up outside the flight instructors shed. It was noted by the AM that strait after this attack there was a clamour for more light AA guns from virtually every airfield in southern Britain. The supply of such weapons was at the time in very short supply and many expedients were resorted to, all sorts of machine guns were acquired from various sources by any means possible and fitted on make shift mounts.
Again darn good stuff that does not happily go into wankage territory. The Hurricane and Defiant's early downgrading does come as a bit of a surprise though as the Hurricane was going to be good until at least 42 and with the changes here in this TL, it should be easily equal to a 109 and there's not any 190's to worry about either. The Defiant's basically the UK's version of a heavy fighter or the BF-110 equivalent. Not that great in a dogfight but if it catches you with its quad 20mm, wish you was somewhere else. But it can still serve as a ground attack aircraft as light vehicles and Panzer III's and this era's Panzer IV's would not want to be tickled with 20mm rounds in any way, shape or form.
Its good to see that the Lancaster is coming along along with the jet engine. What's the Hawker Tornado though? OTL it was what the Typhoon evolved from, but here the Typhoon is regarded as something else so I assume its a different fighter? Also the use of the Whirlwind as the basis for a jet is interesting, was this the OTL starting point for the Meteor or was that made whole cloth?
The hurried construction of revetments sounds like its something that should have been prioritized over pouring concrete into bunkers on the south and south east coast. Even earth and sand ones will suffice and could be built quickly, and the ground defences could use the Vickers 303's I mentioned a good while back
Its good to see that the Lancaster is coming along along with the jet engine. What's the Hawker Tornado though? OTL it was what the Typhoon evolved from, but here the Typhoon is regarded as something else so I assume its a different fighter? Also the use of the Whirlwind as the basis for a jet is interesting, was this the OTL starting point for the Meteor or was that made whole cloth?
The hurried construction of revetments sounds like its something that should have been prioritized over pouring concrete into bunkers on the south and south east coast. Even earth and sand ones will suffice and could be built quickly, and the ground defences could use the Vickers 303's I mentioned a good while back