The influence of later historians as suggest per the 'Exclusion Zone' in the prologue perhaps? I wonder what that means for Canada.
"Fight and be Right"
- Thread starter EdT
- Start date
The influence of later historians as suggest per the 'Exclusion Zone' in the prologue perhaps? I wonder what that means for Canada.
Indeed. I have to say that I'm not one of Churchill's greatest fans. My own view is that if you remove him from the picture by, say, 1939, not a massive amount will change in the grand scheme of things- we've lost a lot of fantastic speeches, a national icon and a poerful symbol, but I suspect quieter, less charismatic men would have accomplished much the same overall result. Churchill was very lucky that for all that he was always almost invariably wrong on everything else (India, Gold Standard, General Strike etc) he was spot on on the one thing that mattered most at that moment. The uncharitable part of me would say 'stopped clock'...
Well, the idea is to give a bit of forshadowing without giving too much away, plus tie in Randolph with Winston in a relatively accesible fashion. The plan is to have two sections from 1936 'bookending' the work, so that Winston's fate is dealt with right at the end and everything is tied together nicely. We'll see- I think it should work ok.
Yep, shall answer them soon.
The fact that it's actually literally-American made! The Fenians brought over a surprising amount of their explosives directly from the US, and more importantly their clockwork detonators were constructed and tested there. The Fenian bombers of the 1880's were completely dependent on their US support network, both OTL and ITTL; indeed, almost all of the bombers came over from the States and many were even US citizens.
I have just finished re-reading a book published in 1934 called "It might have happened" by someone called R Egerton Swartwout. It imagines a person "Rupert Audinland" who was clearly Randoph Churchill surviving. He imagines him becoming more populist and steadily moving to the left.
It features Rupert becoming Premier in World War One, which ends in 1917. It has Gallipoli coming off in part because Bulgaria gets flipped (I am not quite sure how)
Rupert also manages to minimize the punitive elements in the Post War treaty and this prevents the Nazis taking power
It ends with Rupert leading a government with all Liberal factions linked to most of the Labour Party carrying out something that looks a lot like the Liberal yellow book
It is looking, in this view, likely that a disarmament conference will be succesful.
I have to say that I find this time line much more attactive than our own, though I do not really think it all that likely.
It features Rupert becoming Premier in World War One, which ends in 1917. It has Gallipoli coming off in part because Bulgaria gets flipped (I am not quite sure how)
Rupert also manages to minimize the punitive elements in the Post War treaty and this prevents the Nazis taking power
It ends with Rupert leading a government with all Liberal factions linked to most of the Labour Party carrying out something that looks a lot like the Liberal yellow book
It is looking, in this view, likely that a disarmament conference will be succesful.
I have to say that I find this time line much more attactive than our own, though I do not really think it all that likely.
This is another very interesting timeline, I am thoroughly enjoying it!
I must respectfully disagree with you here, without Churchill's determination to carry on the war in spite of the impossible financial situation of autumn 1940 Britain would have had to come to terms with Germany.
Financially, continuing the war in 1940 was utter madness. I do not see another figure on the British political landscape at this time with the drive, imagination, cussedness and perhaps also complete lack of understanding of financial realities to carry on the fight.
I must respectfully disagree with you here, without Churchill's determination to carry on the war in spite of the impossible financial situation of autumn 1940 Britain would have had to come to terms with Germany.
Financially, continuing the war in 1940 was utter madness. I do not see another figure on the British political landscape at this time with the drive, imagination, cussedness and perhaps also complete lack of understanding of financial realities to carry on the fight.
Eden? Attlee?
Its quite a myth Britain required only a single straw to break the camel's back in 1940. The Atlantic, the Blitz, the Greek campaign- all took place under Winnie but it certainly wasn't his speechcraft that stopped Britain throwing in the towel at that point. Churchill was certainly a rousing figure but he wasn't the sole voice of defiance in a crowd of defeatists as Faeelin just said, if so Britain would have dumped Winnie and gone for an armistice.
Churchill was a single-minded brutish hawk (I'm not saying he was stupid, mind) and Hitler's own possessed nationalism and jingoism proved the perfect ying to his yang, seeing Winnie rising to become the world famous icon of freedom he is, rather than a slightly pitiable fool as he had proven in government up until the late 1930s
So, it seems the train is slowly picking up steam....yet none has told them that the bridge is out ahead of them! Excellent!
Actually, a reference to the Tay Bridge disaster would have been quite a nice touch, although it'd be rather similar ITTL I guess coming so soon after the PoD.
As you say, we're still picking up steam at present; by my calculations, the train will hit the bridge by about Chapter 6/7 or thereabouts...
Fascinating, I haven't come across that before- I was under the impression that the only real Alternative History work from the 1930s was Squire's If It Had Happened Otherwise. Swartwout has a point with Randolph moving to the Left; even OTL it's surprising how far he had come by the mid 1890s.
I'd actually argue that he was quite a good PM. I appreciate his career was entirely overshadowed by Munich, but he also accomplished an awful lot- Anglo-Irish Trade Agreement, the Factory and Housing Acts and so on. Plus, it's not exactly a coincidence that by the summer of 1940 British Airspace was the best defended on the planet...
I can see where you're coming from, but I have to disagree. There was no real stomach for a peace deal in the Summer of 1940; not one that would be acceptable to British interests, anyway. The minimum deal Britain would accept would be the immediate withdrawal of all German troops from everywhere west of the Maginot line and as Neutralised France, and even if the German offered this, after March 1939 Hitler's word was worth precisely nothing in London.
Secondly (and probably more importantly) in political terms peace was not possible. Any PM who tried would quickly find himself deserted by Labour, the Liberals and a large proportion of the Tory benches, and would almost certainly face a motion of no confidence. Chamberlain was ousted because he was considered a ditherer, not because he was fighting the war with too much vigour. OTL, Guilty Men sold 200,000 copies in July 1940 alone, and that was just Munich- imagine the reaction if a Tory PM tried to broker a peace deal!
Please be aware that I'm praising Churchill's courage not damning his lack of financial awareness (though the two may have worked with one another to Britain's ultimate advantage) that may not have been obvious from my previous post. Churchill was Britain's spine in the summer of 1940.
Eden was too young, not by much but enough to ensure that he simply didn't have the political credibility for the job.
I'm afraid I cannot regard Attlee as anything other than a desperately mediocre individual completely out of his depth in international politics. He was naïve, credulous and a seeker of consensus. He could never have led Britain through the war and was only Deputy Prime Minister to ensure that the Labour Party remained in the national government.
Some camel, some back (no brownie points for guessing who I'm misquoting!). Seriously, Britain could not continue the war without finance.
The crucial date was 22 August 1940 when the Cabinet, meeting at noon in 10 Downing St reviewed a paper circulated by Kingsley Wood that clearly showed that Britain would be out of money by the end of 1940. Between mid-July and mid August Britain's gold and dollar reserves fell by £80 million leaving roughly £300 million in gold and dollars and £200 million in securities. Britain did not have enough money to cover the costs of the munitions already ordered in the United States and could not fulfil her military needs from her own resources. It was understood at this point that Britain had to secure American assistance or bow out of the war. This was the start point for Britain's agitation for lend lease.
It is a critical issue, no getting around it, no money no war.
One did, Lord Halifax tried to broker a peace deal through neutral Swedish channels on 17th June. A telegram was sent to Victor Mallet, the British ambassador in Stockholm requesting the Swedes find out what Germany's terms would be.
Some sources
1940: Myth and Reality by Clive Ponting
Five Days in London: May 1940 by John Lukacs
The Collapse of British Power by Correlli Barnett
The first two are the most detailed and relevant - there is also an essay by D. Reynolds entitled Churchill and the British Decision to fight on in 1940: right policy, wrong reasons which is in a book called Diplomacy and Intelligence in the Second World War edited by R. Langhorne.
It's depressing reading (for as Britons) but absolutely fascinating.
The fact is, this debate illustrates what a mess Britain was in by 1940. Appeasement had been discredited, possibly fatally, partly by it's own misjudgements and partly by Hitler's ambitions, so the chances of it being able to muster a 'final stand' were improbable. On the other, Britain was almost destitute financially and it's material ability to prosecute the war was highly doubtful. If it did, then it would undoubtedly face massive hardship, with no obvious strategic goal which could end the war favourably.
I disagree that a peace would have been totally impossible. Let us remember that the vast bulk of the Tory party (and since the Tories still had an overwhelming majority, this was the only thing that really mattered in parliamentary terms) were still entirely receptive to Chamberlain (Who remained leader of the party until his death) and Halifax. An uncomfortable truth perhaps in retrospect, but Churchill really represented no more than a clique.
On the back of Dunkirk, it would have been a misjudgement to seek peace. After a 'fightback', (this is how it would have been 'spun') though, who knows? Would people have been quite so enthusiastic in their rage against the 'guilty men' after the real prospect of a German bombing campaign, and without Churchill's rhetorical strengthening, replaced instead by a strengthening in favour of a negotiated peace?
Whether appeasement still had the energy, internal morale, and the credibility left to pull this off is an open question. Undoubtedly the doubtful nature of these factors historically were the main cause of Churchill assuming the premiership by default. But it could have been attempted.
I disagree that a peace would have been totally impossible. Let us remember that the vast bulk of the Tory party (and since the Tories still had an overwhelming majority, this was the only thing that really mattered in parliamentary terms) were still entirely receptive to Chamberlain (Who remained leader of the party until his death) and Halifax. An uncomfortable truth perhaps in retrospect, but Churchill really represented no more than a clique.
On the back of Dunkirk, it would have been a misjudgement to seek peace. After a 'fightback', (this is how it would have been 'spun') though, who knows? Would people have been quite so enthusiastic in their rage against the 'guilty men' after the real prospect of a German bombing campaign, and without Churchill's rhetorical strengthening, replaced instead by a strengthening in favour of a negotiated peace?
Whether appeasement still had the energy, internal morale, and the credibility left to pull this off is an open question. Undoubtedly the doubtful nature of these factors historically were the main cause of Churchill assuming the premiership by default. But it could have been attempted.
Last edited:
Oh, and as for Chamberlain, a lot of his instincts as a social reformer were far-sighted. But he was also arrogant; largely convinced of the merits of his own case, even when, as in the case of foreign policy, he knew little or nothing about the subject in question; and intolerant of dissent. (Churchill only narrowly avoided being de-selected as a Tory under Chamberlain, and if appeasement hadn't hit the buffers when it did, he may very well have been so.)
It's a good thing for Chamberlain that the anti-appeasers weren't actually stronger and more numerous than they were. If he had been handling a genuinely divided party, as Baldwin perhaps was at some points, then both he and the party would have been in trouble.
It's a good thing for Chamberlain that the anti-appeasers weren't actually stronger and more numerous than they were. If he had been handling a genuinely divided party, as Baldwin perhaps was at some points, then both he and the party would have been in trouble.
Last edited:
Oh, indeed- but clarifying Germany's terms is not the same as finding them remotely acceptable. As I said before, what's Britain's minimum going to be- German withdrawal from all points west and north? IIRC that's what Halifax was considering. I can't see that being too likely an offer myself, and much less is going to be difficult to sell to the public. Plus there are the aformentioned trust issues with Hitler.
None of which is not to say that negotiations take place, or even that peace is wholly impossible. However, in such a situation I suspect we'd either see;
A: Negotiations begin, and then bog down as the British use the respite as a chance to recover and re-equip themselves. Eventually they get broken off after an awkward few months of 'phoney war' and we're back to square one.
or,
B: Treaty of Amiens MK2. Britain signs an agreement through gritted teeth, uses the time to re-arm and then when the inevitable German/Soviet war begins jumps right back in.
Small world- David Reynolds was my tutor for one of my third year History Papers.
Anyway, I think we're concentrating on the wrong Churchill! I'll have to post something to tilt the balance...
Chapter 3
“Criticism may not be agreeable, but it is necessary. It fulfils the same function as pain in the human body. It calls attention to an unhealthy state of things.”
__________________________________________________
(Taken from “Tory Democracy, Churchill and the emergence of the Unionist Party” by George Farr, in the British Political Review, August 1983)
The ‘St Martin’s Lane scandal’ and the subsequent embarrassment of Lord Salisbury gave Churchill the perfect opening to resume his campaign for ‘Tory Democracy’, by which he generally meant naked self-advancement. In March 1884 he re-opened the controversy he had instigated eighteen months previously by demanding that his powerbase of the Conservative Council of National Union should be made entirely financially independent. He followed up this move by making a blistering speech in Birmingham, proclaiming that;
‘The Conservative Party will never exercise power until it has gained the confidence of the working classes; and the working classes are quite determined to govern themselves. If you want to gain the confidence of the working classes, let them have a share and a large share- a real share and not a sham share- in the Party Councils and in the Party Government!’[1]
The speech was a triumphant success, and this time, Salisbury’s weakness meant that Northcote had to stave off Churchill’s attempt at a coup d’etat largely on his own. Events moved swiftly. On March 19th the Council passed a new report defining its new duties, and the following day Lord Percy, Northcote’s ally on the Council, moved its rejection; this was defeated by 19 votes to 14. The report was then approved by a majority of twelve. By now Northcote was thoroughly alarmed, and in an unfortunate moment decided upon an ultimatum just as Churchill had decided to compromise. The result was confusion; for a time the prospect loomed of the National Union being locked out of its own offices, and a stalemate ensued throughout April and May.
In the event, the deadlock was only broken by outside events. While the veiled insults and internal chicanery had carried on throughout the late spring, in late May political events in the Commons had moved to a point when Churchill judged it best to fall back into line with his Party. Salisbury was asked to mediate once again through Balfour; the result was a generous compromise which gave the Council significant new powers, although not everything that Churchill had asked for; most notably, the Primrose League was still not recognised as an organ of the Party[2]. The rift was sealed at the annual conference of the Party Union that July, and the labyrinthine struggles of early 1884 soon gave way to the more traditional battle in the House of Commons. It was clear however that although Churchill had become a significant challenger to the leadership of Stafford Northcote, he was not yet able to confront him directly and win...”
(Taken from “Irish Terrorism; 1880-1940” by Eoghan Matthews, Republic 1982)
“At nine PM on May 30th 1884, explosions erupted across central London. Two bombs went off in St James’ Square, one outside the Junior Carlton Club and one outside the Duke of Cleveland’s house. Ten minutes later, a clockwork-fused bomb left in a urinal underneath the headquarters of Special (Irish) Branch misfired with a flash and a cloud of smoke. However, far more injurious to the pride of the nation was the bomb that went off in Trafalgar square at the same time, severely damaging one of the famous Landseer Lions that guarded Nelson’s Column[3]... “
(Taken from ‘Lord Randolph Churchill’ by Timothy James, Picador 1978)
Just before Parliament broke up for the summer recess in June 1884, Churchill scored another conspicuous success. A debate about the increasingly serious situation in the Sudan gave Lord Randolph the chance to excoriate the Government in his customarily flamboyant style. “Too late!” he shouted, pointing melodramatically at the Government Front Bench.
‘Too late! It is an awful cry. From time immemorial it has heralded the slaughter of routed armies, the flight of dethroned monarchs, the crash of falling Empires. Wherever human blood has been poured out in torrents, wherever human misery has been accumulated in mountains, there has always gone the appalling cry, ‘Too late!’ General Gordon cannot but dread the inaction of a Government whose motto is ‘Too late!’ The people of this country will undoubtedly repudiate a Government whose motto is this!’[4]
The reception the speech received from the excited Tory benches reflected the bitter feelings of the Opposition on the Sudanese crisis; more importantly, Churchill’s words caught the public mood perfectly. Amidst a storm of indignation and intensely critical leading articles in the newspapers, Lord Randolph achieved the rarest of prizes, a Governmental volte-face; in early July Gladstone decided to send a relief force to Khartoum[5]...”
(Taken from ‘Enfant Terrible: Randolph Churchill, the early years’ by James Roberts, Imperial 1978)
“The Reform Bill that was placed before Parliament in 1884 by the Government represented the height of Chamberlain’s influence over the Gladstone Ministry; it also presented the Conservatives with a monumental problem. Lord Randolph’s initial hostility to the Bill- in which he was supported by Salisbury and many of the County Members- was soon reversed by the fact that the local Party organisations in the Midlands and Lancashire were in favour of Reform, and it was on these institutions that much of his power rested[6]. The problem for the Conservatives was in the detail; Lord Salisbury was adamantly wedded to the need for a dual Bill, with seat redistribution accompanying the extension of the franchise, while many in the Party felt that this course risked constitutional crisis.
On the 15th July, Salisbury put his scheme to the Party at a meeting of the Carlton Club, proposing holding up the Franchise Bill in the Lords until the Government put a Redistribution Bill through the Commons. The unspoken threat was that Salisbury would resign if he were not supported this time; the result was a prolonged debate that was only resolved when Northcote came out in favour, albeit grudgingly...”
(Taken from ‘Lord Salisbury: A Biography’ by Ian Jenkins, Star 1987)
By early September, Salisbury was concerned, as he told the Tory Chief Whip Rowland Winn, that some senior Conservatives, such as Churchill or Cross, might try to break ranks and ‘attempt compromises, bridges, open doors and the rest’. He admitted that this was what he was most afraid of, ‘some cunning half measure which surrenders everything’, and he was proved right. In mid-September, the Duke of Argyll offered a compromise whereby the Lords would pass the Franchise Bill after a Seats Bill had been laid on the Commons table. Salisbury’s fragile coalition immediately began to fracture. On September 20th – a day that Salisbury would later laconically describe as ‘an rather unfortunate date’ – his long-time rival the Earl Cairns endorsed the compromise, quickly followed by the Duke of Richmond and Lord Jersey.
After this, Salisbury’s hard-line position quickly collapsed. At a meeting of Conservative leaders the following day, Northcote too admitted that he was in favour of coming to terms if good ones were to be had[7]. On October 29th, Richmond arranged a meeting between Salisbury and the Queen, who advised Salisbury to compromise; by then, his gamble had clearly failed. Salisbury told the Queen then and there that he could not be privy to a deal and would immediately resign to allow his successor to handle the negotiations; this he did that afternoon, to nobody’s great surprise. In his resignation speech, Salisbury noted that;
‘I am still of the mind that the Prime Minister does not wish to negotiate; indeed, that there is only the desire to have the credit of negotiation...Politics stand alone among human pursuits in that no one is conscious of liking them- and no one is able to leave them. But whatever attraction politics may have had for me is fading.’
Salisbury intended this speech to be his valedictory performance; a final bow before leaving politics forever for his laboratory at Hatfield. It was the commonly accepted view that his career had reached its conclusion, if a sadly inglorious one[8]. Few, let alone Salisbury himself, could imagine his Cincinnatus-like return to politics in a decade’s time...”
(Taken from “Irish Terrorism; 1880-1940” by Eoghan Matthews, Republic 1982)
“A new bombing campaign was coming. Shortly before 6PM on December 10th 1884, three men set off in a rowing boat from the Surrey side of the River Thames. They paddled under the brooding granite of London Bridge, and fixed a charge to a newly-fixed grating just above the waterline of one of its arches before retreating. Three hours later, the charge exploded, forcing the bridge’s closure for several days while repairs were carried out[9]. More Clan-na-Gael bombers were on their way. On 2nd January 1885 a device detonated in the tunnel between King’s Cross and Farringdon St Stations on the Metropolitan Line. There were minor casualties...
On Saturday 24th January, at around 2 PM, a bomb detonated beneath a stand of muskets at the armoury of the Tower of London. Four young sightseers were injured. A few minutes later, a parcel caught fire in Westminster Hall; when a policeman picked it up to move it away from the crowds of tourists it exploded, killing him instantly. The bomb was clearly intended as a diversion, for as guards rushed towards the commotion a second bomb exploded in the Chamber of the Commons itself, detonating with great force next to the Commons Table. Nobody was killed, but significant damage was caused. The press called it ‘Dynamite Saturday’[10]...”
(Taken from ‘The Equatorian wars, 1884-1899’ by Arnold Stephens, Garnholm 1978)
“...During the abortive attack on Metemma, Colonel Wilson was told that several paddle-steamers flying the large red flag of the Kehdive were coming down-river. They proved to be the expected steamers; one, the Bordein, had only left Khartoum on December 14th, carrying Gordon’s latest letters and the sixth volume of his journals. Wilson read these carefully; the journals concluded with the words; “NOW MARK THIS- if the Expeditionary Force, and I ask for no more than 200 men, does not come in ten days, the town may fall; and I have done my best for the honour of the country. Good bye.” From his letters it was clear that Gordon expected the worst. The town would fall soon after the food ran out in mid-December. It was now January 11th.[11] After a day’s delay, the Bordein and the Talahawiyeh began to steam southwards towards Khartoum with twenty soldiers, all that could be spared from the Sussex Regiment. Wilson was merely to make a reconnaissance, while his red-coated troops frightened the Mahdi. He knew his unpleasant task was to tell Gordon that it would take two months before rescue could reach him.
What happened was rather different to what had been planned. Wilson’s force arrived on the 23rd; the two paddle-steamers had to run the gauntlet of half-a-dozen field guns and of thousands of rifles fired by tribesmen from the riverbank. The British found Khartoum in a shocking state. Food had run out the previous week; the pith of palm trees was handed out instead of rations, and many of the soldiers were too weak to stand at their posts. Realising the city was about to fall Wilson vainly tried to convince Gordon to leave with his ships, but the General refused; if the townspeople were to die, he would die with them. Two hours before dawn on the 26th, tens of thousands of the Mahdi’s wild tribesmen splashed across the low water of the White Nile and fell on the south-west corner of the defences[12]. The result was a massacre. The starved defenders of Khartoum could offer no meaningful resistance, and soon the Dervishes were running through the streets of the city. An hour before dawn, Wilson realised that all was lost and he and his men fought their way back to their steamers. Along the way, they passed the steps of the palace; General Gordon was lying unconscious on top of a dead Dervish, his white uniform stained with blood and a spear lodged in his shoulder[13]. Wilson ordered his men to carry the injured General; the British were able to fight their way back to the Talahawiyeh, and then endure a tempest of bullets as they escaped the environs of the city. Later, the steamer was wrecked at the cataracts and some of the few remaining Sudanese crew defected to the Mahdi. When Wilson and the survivors- including a still unconscious Gordon- staggered into the British camp near Metemma on February 1st, Wilson was grey with exhaustion and shock. Against all of the odds, he had rescued the Queen’s favourite general, elevating himself to hero status in the process...”
(Taken from ‘Britain, from Churchill to Chamberlain’ by Peter Moorcroft, Star 1983)
“In truth, the loss of Khartoum was a severe setback for British interests in the region. When the news reached London on February 15th however, the casual observer would have been forgiven for thinking a great victory had taken place. The phrase “GORDON’S ALIVE!” shouted from every newspaper; across the country patriotic songs were sung at the tops of voices, and the verb ‘to gordon’ briefly entered the vocabulary, to mean public rejoicing. For Gladstone’s Government, the explosion of popular rejoicing served extremely well to cover what had in fact been a humiliating withdrawal from a position that should never had been entered into. The successful rescue of Gordon provided the Prime Minister with the perfect pretext not to continue the war in Sudan; so long as Egypt was not threatened by the Dervishes Gladstone did not much care what they did in their own country.
The rejoicing proved so beneficial to the Government’s popularity that Gladstone eventually decided to bring forward the date of the proposed General Election from the summer to the spring, as soon as the Redistribution Bill had been made into law; accordingly on March 12th the Prime Minister went to the Palace and requested a dissolution of Parliament[14]. The new franchise would elect the House of Commons for the first time on April 10th...”
__________________________________________________
[1] OTL Churchill said this in October 1883.
[2] The Primrose League exists ITTL as in OTL, but was accepted thanks to a compromise by Salisbury. More on this later.
[3] These attacks also occurred OTL; the bomb in Trafalgar Square failed to go off, while the bomb in the Urinal exploded successfully.
[4] OTL, Churchill made a similar speech in February 1884; it caught the mood of Parliament but was otherwise forgotten. Here, by making it in different circumstances he gets a lot more publicity and attracts the interest of the press.
[5] In fact, Churchill does not cause a complete reverse in policy; OTL, the Government decided to send a relief force to Khartoum in August rather than July. The earlier commitment will have important consequences down the line however...
[6] This was the case OTL as well.
[7] OTL, Lord Salisbury remained firm and forced the Gladstone Government to concede on the redistribution issue; ITTL his diminished standing in the Conservative Party is enough to allow his rivals to bring him down by compromising.
[8] Salisbury intended to retire permanently if he lost the Reform controversy; ITTL he gets his chance.
[9] OTL the charge exploded prematurely, killing the expert bomber William Lomasney. ITTL he remains alive to plan further attacks.
[10] All of this is OTL, save that the policeman was not killed but merely severely injured.
[11] Thanks to various butterflies and Churchill’s embarrassment of the Government, ITTL the relief expedition is just over a week ahead of their OTL counterparts. Considering that in OTL the expedition arrived only two days after the fall of Khartoum, this is quite significant.
[12] This happened OTL too; the only difference is that Wilson’s force has arrived a week earlier, and so is there to see the fall of the city.
[13] OTL Gordon was killed around this time; ITTL he has a means of escape, although it is likely he would rather have died in Khartoum.
[14] This is very different to OTL, where the Tories had won a major victory over redistribution and Gordon was killed; ITTL there is no temptation for Gladstone to resign and allow to Tories for form a minority Government.
“Criticism may not be agreeable, but it is necessary. It fulfils the same function as pain in the human body. It calls attention to an unhealthy state of things.”
__________________________________________________
(Taken from “Tory Democracy, Churchill and the emergence of the Unionist Party” by George Farr, in the British Political Review, August 1983)
The ‘St Martin’s Lane scandal’ and the subsequent embarrassment of Lord Salisbury gave Churchill the perfect opening to resume his campaign for ‘Tory Democracy’, by which he generally meant naked self-advancement. In March 1884 he re-opened the controversy he had instigated eighteen months previously by demanding that his powerbase of the Conservative Council of National Union should be made entirely financially independent. He followed up this move by making a blistering speech in Birmingham, proclaiming that;
‘The Conservative Party will never exercise power until it has gained the confidence of the working classes; and the working classes are quite determined to govern themselves. If you want to gain the confidence of the working classes, let them have a share and a large share- a real share and not a sham share- in the Party Councils and in the Party Government!’[1]
The speech was a triumphant success, and this time, Salisbury’s weakness meant that Northcote had to stave off Churchill’s attempt at a coup d’etat largely on his own. Events moved swiftly. On March 19th the Council passed a new report defining its new duties, and the following day Lord Percy, Northcote’s ally on the Council, moved its rejection; this was defeated by 19 votes to 14. The report was then approved by a majority of twelve. By now Northcote was thoroughly alarmed, and in an unfortunate moment decided upon an ultimatum just as Churchill had decided to compromise. The result was confusion; for a time the prospect loomed of the National Union being locked out of its own offices, and a stalemate ensued throughout April and May.
In the event, the deadlock was only broken by outside events. While the veiled insults and internal chicanery had carried on throughout the late spring, in late May political events in the Commons had moved to a point when Churchill judged it best to fall back into line with his Party. Salisbury was asked to mediate once again through Balfour; the result was a generous compromise which gave the Council significant new powers, although not everything that Churchill had asked for; most notably, the Primrose League was still not recognised as an organ of the Party[2]. The rift was sealed at the annual conference of the Party Union that July, and the labyrinthine struggles of early 1884 soon gave way to the more traditional battle in the House of Commons. It was clear however that although Churchill had become a significant challenger to the leadership of Stafford Northcote, he was not yet able to confront him directly and win...”
(Taken from “Irish Terrorism; 1880-1940” by Eoghan Matthews, Republic 1982)
“At nine PM on May 30th 1884, explosions erupted across central London. Two bombs went off in St James’ Square, one outside the Junior Carlton Club and one outside the Duke of Cleveland’s house. Ten minutes later, a clockwork-fused bomb left in a urinal underneath the headquarters of Special (Irish) Branch misfired with a flash and a cloud of smoke. However, far more injurious to the pride of the nation was the bomb that went off in Trafalgar square at the same time, severely damaging one of the famous Landseer Lions that guarded Nelson’s Column[3]... “
(Taken from ‘Lord Randolph Churchill’ by Timothy James, Picador 1978)
Just before Parliament broke up for the summer recess in June 1884, Churchill scored another conspicuous success. A debate about the increasingly serious situation in the Sudan gave Lord Randolph the chance to excoriate the Government in his customarily flamboyant style. “Too late!” he shouted, pointing melodramatically at the Government Front Bench.
‘Too late! It is an awful cry. From time immemorial it has heralded the slaughter of routed armies, the flight of dethroned monarchs, the crash of falling Empires. Wherever human blood has been poured out in torrents, wherever human misery has been accumulated in mountains, there has always gone the appalling cry, ‘Too late!’ General Gordon cannot but dread the inaction of a Government whose motto is ‘Too late!’ The people of this country will undoubtedly repudiate a Government whose motto is this!’[4]
The reception the speech received from the excited Tory benches reflected the bitter feelings of the Opposition on the Sudanese crisis; more importantly, Churchill’s words caught the public mood perfectly. Amidst a storm of indignation and intensely critical leading articles in the newspapers, Lord Randolph achieved the rarest of prizes, a Governmental volte-face; in early July Gladstone decided to send a relief force to Khartoum[5]...”
(Taken from ‘Enfant Terrible: Randolph Churchill, the early years’ by James Roberts, Imperial 1978)
“The Reform Bill that was placed before Parliament in 1884 by the Government represented the height of Chamberlain’s influence over the Gladstone Ministry; it also presented the Conservatives with a monumental problem. Lord Randolph’s initial hostility to the Bill- in which he was supported by Salisbury and many of the County Members- was soon reversed by the fact that the local Party organisations in the Midlands and Lancashire were in favour of Reform, and it was on these institutions that much of his power rested[6]. The problem for the Conservatives was in the detail; Lord Salisbury was adamantly wedded to the need for a dual Bill, with seat redistribution accompanying the extension of the franchise, while many in the Party felt that this course risked constitutional crisis.
On the 15th July, Salisbury put his scheme to the Party at a meeting of the Carlton Club, proposing holding up the Franchise Bill in the Lords until the Government put a Redistribution Bill through the Commons. The unspoken threat was that Salisbury would resign if he were not supported this time; the result was a prolonged debate that was only resolved when Northcote came out in favour, albeit grudgingly...”
(Taken from ‘Lord Salisbury: A Biography’ by Ian Jenkins, Star 1987)
By early September, Salisbury was concerned, as he told the Tory Chief Whip Rowland Winn, that some senior Conservatives, such as Churchill or Cross, might try to break ranks and ‘attempt compromises, bridges, open doors and the rest’. He admitted that this was what he was most afraid of, ‘some cunning half measure which surrenders everything’, and he was proved right. In mid-September, the Duke of Argyll offered a compromise whereby the Lords would pass the Franchise Bill after a Seats Bill had been laid on the Commons table. Salisbury’s fragile coalition immediately began to fracture. On September 20th – a day that Salisbury would later laconically describe as ‘an rather unfortunate date’ – his long-time rival the Earl Cairns endorsed the compromise, quickly followed by the Duke of Richmond and Lord Jersey.
After this, Salisbury’s hard-line position quickly collapsed. At a meeting of Conservative leaders the following day, Northcote too admitted that he was in favour of coming to terms if good ones were to be had[7]. On October 29th, Richmond arranged a meeting between Salisbury and the Queen, who advised Salisbury to compromise; by then, his gamble had clearly failed. Salisbury told the Queen then and there that he could not be privy to a deal and would immediately resign to allow his successor to handle the negotiations; this he did that afternoon, to nobody’s great surprise. In his resignation speech, Salisbury noted that;
‘I am still of the mind that the Prime Minister does not wish to negotiate; indeed, that there is only the desire to have the credit of negotiation...Politics stand alone among human pursuits in that no one is conscious of liking them- and no one is able to leave them. But whatever attraction politics may have had for me is fading.’
Salisbury intended this speech to be his valedictory performance; a final bow before leaving politics forever for his laboratory at Hatfield. It was the commonly accepted view that his career had reached its conclusion, if a sadly inglorious one[8]. Few, let alone Salisbury himself, could imagine his Cincinnatus-like return to politics in a decade’s time...”
(Taken from “Irish Terrorism; 1880-1940” by Eoghan Matthews, Republic 1982)
“A new bombing campaign was coming. Shortly before 6PM on December 10th 1884, three men set off in a rowing boat from the Surrey side of the River Thames. They paddled under the brooding granite of London Bridge, and fixed a charge to a newly-fixed grating just above the waterline of one of its arches before retreating. Three hours later, the charge exploded, forcing the bridge’s closure for several days while repairs were carried out[9]. More Clan-na-Gael bombers were on their way. On 2nd January 1885 a device detonated in the tunnel between King’s Cross and Farringdon St Stations on the Metropolitan Line. There were minor casualties...
On Saturday 24th January, at around 2 PM, a bomb detonated beneath a stand of muskets at the armoury of the Tower of London. Four young sightseers were injured. A few minutes later, a parcel caught fire in Westminster Hall; when a policeman picked it up to move it away from the crowds of tourists it exploded, killing him instantly. The bomb was clearly intended as a diversion, for as guards rushed towards the commotion a second bomb exploded in the Chamber of the Commons itself, detonating with great force next to the Commons Table. Nobody was killed, but significant damage was caused. The press called it ‘Dynamite Saturday’[10]...”
(Taken from ‘The Equatorian wars, 1884-1899’ by Arnold Stephens, Garnholm 1978)
“...During the abortive attack on Metemma, Colonel Wilson was told that several paddle-steamers flying the large red flag of the Kehdive were coming down-river. They proved to be the expected steamers; one, the Bordein, had only left Khartoum on December 14th, carrying Gordon’s latest letters and the sixth volume of his journals. Wilson read these carefully; the journals concluded with the words; “NOW MARK THIS- if the Expeditionary Force, and I ask for no more than 200 men, does not come in ten days, the town may fall; and I have done my best for the honour of the country. Good bye.” From his letters it was clear that Gordon expected the worst. The town would fall soon after the food ran out in mid-December. It was now January 11th.[11] After a day’s delay, the Bordein and the Talahawiyeh began to steam southwards towards Khartoum with twenty soldiers, all that could be spared from the Sussex Regiment. Wilson was merely to make a reconnaissance, while his red-coated troops frightened the Mahdi. He knew his unpleasant task was to tell Gordon that it would take two months before rescue could reach him.
What happened was rather different to what had been planned. Wilson’s force arrived on the 23rd; the two paddle-steamers had to run the gauntlet of half-a-dozen field guns and of thousands of rifles fired by tribesmen from the riverbank. The British found Khartoum in a shocking state. Food had run out the previous week; the pith of palm trees was handed out instead of rations, and many of the soldiers were too weak to stand at their posts. Realising the city was about to fall Wilson vainly tried to convince Gordon to leave with his ships, but the General refused; if the townspeople were to die, he would die with them. Two hours before dawn on the 26th, tens of thousands of the Mahdi’s wild tribesmen splashed across the low water of the White Nile and fell on the south-west corner of the defences[12]. The result was a massacre. The starved defenders of Khartoum could offer no meaningful resistance, and soon the Dervishes were running through the streets of the city. An hour before dawn, Wilson realised that all was lost and he and his men fought their way back to their steamers. Along the way, they passed the steps of the palace; General Gordon was lying unconscious on top of a dead Dervish, his white uniform stained with blood and a spear lodged in his shoulder[13]. Wilson ordered his men to carry the injured General; the British were able to fight their way back to the Talahawiyeh, and then endure a tempest of bullets as they escaped the environs of the city. Later, the steamer was wrecked at the cataracts and some of the few remaining Sudanese crew defected to the Mahdi. When Wilson and the survivors- including a still unconscious Gordon- staggered into the British camp near Metemma on February 1st, Wilson was grey with exhaustion and shock. Against all of the odds, he had rescued the Queen’s favourite general, elevating himself to hero status in the process...”
(Taken from ‘Britain, from Churchill to Chamberlain’ by Peter Moorcroft, Star 1983)
“In truth, the loss of Khartoum was a severe setback for British interests in the region. When the news reached London on February 15th however, the casual observer would have been forgiven for thinking a great victory had taken place. The phrase “GORDON’S ALIVE!” shouted from every newspaper; across the country patriotic songs were sung at the tops of voices, and the verb ‘to gordon’ briefly entered the vocabulary, to mean public rejoicing. For Gladstone’s Government, the explosion of popular rejoicing served extremely well to cover what had in fact been a humiliating withdrawal from a position that should never had been entered into. The successful rescue of Gordon provided the Prime Minister with the perfect pretext not to continue the war in Sudan; so long as Egypt was not threatened by the Dervishes Gladstone did not much care what they did in their own country.
The rejoicing proved so beneficial to the Government’s popularity that Gladstone eventually decided to bring forward the date of the proposed General Election from the summer to the spring, as soon as the Redistribution Bill had been made into law; accordingly on March 12th the Prime Minister went to the Palace and requested a dissolution of Parliament[14]. The new franchise would elect the House of Commons for the first time on April 10th...”
__________________________________________________
[1] OTL Churchill said this in October 1883.
[2] The Primrose League exists ITTL as in OTL, but was accepted thanks to a compromise by Salisbury. More on this later.
[3] These attacks also occurred OTL; the bomb in Trafalgar Square failed to go off, while the bomb in the Urinal exploded successfully.
[4] OTL, Churchill made a similar speech in February 1884; it caught the mood of Parliament but was otherwise forgotten. Here, by making it in different circumstances he gets a lot more publicity and attracts the interest of the press.
[5] In fact, Churchill does not cause a complete reverse in policy; OTL, the Government decided to send a relief force to Khartoum in August rather than July. The earlier commitment will have important consequences down the line however...
[6] This was the case OTL as well.
[7] OTL, Lord Salisbury remained firm and forced the Gladstone Government to concede on the redistribution issue; ITTL his diminished standing in the Conservative Party is enough to allow his rivals to bring him down by compromising.
[8] Salisbury intended to retire permanently if he lost the Reform controversy; ITTL he gets his chance.
[9] OTL the charge exploded prematurely, killing the expert bomber William Lomasney. ITTL he remains alive to plan further attacks.
[10] All of this is OTL, save that the policeman was not killed but merely severely injured.
[11] Thanks to various butterflies and Churchill’s embarrassment of the Government, ITTL the relief expedition is just over a week ahead of their OTL counterparts. Considering that in OTL the expedition arrived only two days after the fall of Khartoum, this is quite significant.
[12] This happened OTL too; the only difference is that Wilson’s force has arrived a week earlier, and so is there to see the fall of the city.
[13] OTL Gordon was killed around this time; ITTL he has a means of escape, although it is likely he would rather have died in Khartoum.
[14] This is very different to OTL, where the Tories had won a major victory over redistribution and Gordon was killed; ITTL there is no temptation for Gladstone to resign and allow to Tories for form a minority Government.
No British Sudan, and i take it the situation in Ireland is going to keep escalating?
1. How far in advance you have to plan if you want to plan a bomb? IMHO as those plans were made some time after the POD the butterfly effect gives you more liberty in choosing the targets different than IOTL.
2. “Irish Terrorism; 1880-1940” - this title spells trouble.
2. “Irish Terrorism; 1880-1940” - this title spells trouble.