Note:
- ** - these two asterisks mean that events played out differently than they did in our timeline
- Admittedly I took some liberties with the speed of communicating news throughout the United States, so I apologize if it seems I relied too much on news spreading abnormally to make this particular event happen.
The War of Secession, 1861-1862 - The Confederacy Strikes Back: The 2nd Battle of Corinth, October 3rd - 4th
Background:
In the east, Confederate General Robert E. Lee dealt a crushing blow to Union General George McClellan on October 1st at Camp Hill, Pennsylvania, successfully defeating the Army of the Potomac and marching north toward Philadelphia. As Lee advanced, so too did General Braxton Bragg and General Edmund Kirby Smith in the west.
Earlier in 1862 the strategic situation shifted in favor the Union. With the fall of Fort Henry and Fort Donelson in February, combined with the capture of the critical rail junction at Corinth, Mississippi in May, the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers were now in firm Union control. This, along with the Union's capture of New Orleans earlier in May, severely threatened the Confederates' control of the Mississippi River. The Confederacy was in danger of being cut in two. The only obstacles standing in the way of complete control of the Mississippi River were Port Hudson and Vicksburg. The last vital stretch of the Mississippi river linking the two halves of the Confederacy had to be defended at all costs. Vicksburg was a primary target.
Something needed to be done.
Prelude:
As Confederate General Braxton Bragg moved north from Tennessee into Kentucky in September 1862, Union Maj. Gen. Don Carlos Buell pursued him from Nashville with his army. Bragg's intent was to forcibly take the state of Kentucky and draw Union attention away from Vicksburg and Chattanooga. Many residents in the state itself were pro-secessionist and the advocated for the support of the Confederacy in bringing the state onto their side. The state also produced hemp and grew cotton and tobacco and was a major slave trade center. Taking the state would severely disrupt logistics and operations in the west.
As Bragg moved north and invaded Kentucky Confederate forces under the commands of General Van Dorn and General Price moved north to support Bragg's efforts, intending to advance into Tennessee. This force, however, was also needed to prevent Union General Buell from both pursuing Bragg and being reinforced by General U.S. Grant.
Since the Siege of Corinth in May, Grant had been protecting supply lines all across western Tennessee and northern Mississippi, with a Union force garrisoned at the major supply base of Corinth. Van Dorn and Price were then committed to support Bragg by disrupting Grant's communications and supplies in this region, further tying down Union forces in the West.
General Price attempted to move north in a link up with Van Dorn, but was checked at the Battle of Iuka on September 19, allowing General Rosecrans to claim a victory. However, Rosecrans failed to prevent the Confederates under Price from escaping and did little to pursue. He later marched into Corinth after the battle. Meanwhile Price's force later linked up with General Van Dorn's army in Ripley, Mississippi on September 28th. From there the two armies merged under the command of the more senior Van Dorn, numbering a total of 22,000 men. They then marched north to Pocahontas, Tennessee and reached the town by October 1st.
** On that same day in the east, Robert E. Lee defeated George McClellan in the Battle of Camp Hill in Pennsylvania. Although news spread quickly of the defeat in the east, this was not the case for the west. It would be some time until news reached the commanders here, at best a few days. Until then the fighting went on as usual.
Grant was uncertain of Van Dorn's intentions, sending out scouting parties to ascertain and calculate where his Confederate foe would move next. When Grant received word that Van Dorn's force moved west to the town of Chewalla, Tennessee, we grew more certain that the vital rail junction of Corinth was the target. If taken, General Rosecrans would be isolated from reinforcements, allowing the Confederates to move further north into Tennessee to support Bragg from a well stocked and defended supply base. Grant could not let that happen.
He sent messages to Hurlbut ordering him to keep an eye out for the enemy and to strike if an opportunity was there to do so. Although Rosecrans received the warning from Grant, he was not convinced that Corinth was the target. He didn't think the Confederates would be brash enough to attack the fortified town, believing they would strike the Mobile-Ohio railroad and maneuver the U.S. soldiers out of their positions.
With 23,000 men positioned in good rifle pits, well-dug entrenchments, and strong earth-work batteries, Rosecrans' overall plan if attacked was to absorb the Confederate assaults upon the entrenchments, giving ground when necessary to pull the enemy in and bleed them white against even stronger defense closer to the town.
Battle: October 3rd
Van Dorn's 22,000 men began his attack at 10 AM that morning. His plan was a double envelopment of the entrenchments and rifle pits in front of him. Lovell would start the attack in an effort to make Rosecrans weaken his right to reinforce McKean, allowing Price to make the main assault against Davies on the Union right and enter the entrenchments. Lovell made a determined attack and as soon as he became engaged Maury opened the fight with Davies's left. McArthur quickly moved four regiments up to support the defense against Lovell. When Davies advanced his line to the entrenchments it left a gap between Davies and McKean. The Confederates forced their way through this gap around 1:30 PM. With Confederates pouring through the gap the whole Union line fell back to the redoubts outside of Corinth. Two pieces of artillery were captured and many dead and wounded lay on the field in the wake of the retreat.
At 3 PM Hamilton was urged to change positions and attack the Confederates pouring in through the gap on their left flank. By some grave misunderstanding of the urgent order Hamilton failed to move in time to exploit an opportunity to attack the Confederates flank and it was sunset before the division before the division finally moved, abandoning their position on the right and falling back to the redoubts and batteries outside of Corinth.
As the sun finally set on the battlefield Rosecrans' army found itself driven back on all sides, taking cover behind the redoubts and batteries. Soldiers on both sides were exhausted from the intense fighting. The weather was unbearably hot during the day and had barely cooled once night fell. Water was especially scarce as men fainted and fell from the extreme labor of fighting. Van Dorn's army slept within 600 yards of the Union entrenchments and he made an effort to reposition his men during the night for the inevitable attack tomorrow.
Rosecrans was not supremely confident in his army's performance that day and was extremely tired and bewildered from the fighting and heat. He believed he was outnumbered by his opponent and tried his best to make do with the circumstances dealt to him. He failed to put more men into the field and failed to properly coordinated them. He had to do better. By contrast Van Dorn was out for blood and was looking forward to the morning to start his attack again. Deciding to go for a more straightforward plan to rout Rosecrans, Van Dorn would rely on the bravery of his infantry and the withering fire of his artillery to break the Union lines.
** That night news of the defeat at Camp Hill was relayed via telegraph to the various commanders in the field around Corinth. The defeat completely stunned Rosecrans, but be took a measure of grim satisfaction that George McClellan, the man who had previously disagreed with him about plans for West Virginia, was licked so thoroughly by Robert E. Lee. But that feeling soon soured. The casualties were said to be enormous and General Lee was said to already be on his way Philadelphia. With Washington D.C. and Philadelphia threatened, Rosecrans grew more uncertain.
** Van Dorn was elated by the news of the Camp Hill. With the Union's capital and major cities now within striking distance of the Confederacy, the pressure on the Union now and the initiative was placed firmly in Confederate's favor in the east. Spirited and confident in the news of such success, he was surely more enthusiastic for morning to come than his counter part. Less out for blood now and more determined to press his advantage he sent word to his commanders to prepare for an attack come day break, urging them to be ready. Commander Herbert sent word before the initial bombardment that he was feeling ill and was replaced by Commander Martin Green. Green was ordered by Van Dorn to be ready for the attack at dawn, not wishing to lose momentum or shock. Green made this sentiment clear to his own subordinates and urged them to reposition in preparation. Despite the men's exhaustion there was notable change in their morale. The men waited steadfastly until morning, awoken by the sound of the guns.
Battle: October 4th
At 4:30 AM the Confederate guns opened up on the Union inner line of entrenchments. The bombardment which kept up until after sunrise, pinning down Union forces under a withering hail of cannon fire. When the guns fell silent, the U.S. troops prepared themselves to resist an attack.
** Green was immediately able to move into the attack with four brigades in echelon and his men occupying positions in the woods north of town. His men then charge on Battery Powell, while the brigades of Moore and Colbert attacked Hamilton's line. The assault on the battery was surprisingly successful, with the men coming upon the still stunned Union troops from Illinois and Iowa, scattering them in quick order as they took the guns and turned them on Hamilton's position in support of Colbert's Confederates.
**Hamilton's position was shelled and the retreating men from Battery Powell disorganized his lines and sowed panic into his men, with officers trying to get them under control. Unable to properly repulse the attack on his position from both Colbert and Green and unable to support Davies on his left, Hamilton ordered his men to fall back toward the Farmington Road just outside of Corinth, but in the ensuing confusion is men fell as far back as the town itself, hastily setting up defensive positions as quick as they could. Out-flanked and unable to hold against Green, with Colbert's men soon advancing up behind him and threatening to surround him, Davies ordered his troops to fall back toward the town, incapable of rallying them for a counter-attack against Battery Powell.
** Meanwhile, Maury's troops had been engaged while Battery Powell was being attacked. As soon as he heard the fighting on his left, he knew that Davies and Hamilton would be kept too busy to interfere with his movements. As Davies and Hamilton fell back with Colbert and Green close behind Maury pressed his momentum, giving the order for his division to move straight toward the town. His right flank however encountered stubborn resistance from Battery Robinett as it fired 20-pounder Parrot rifles into his ranks. Fierce hand-to-hand combat ensued in arguably the hottest action of the two-day battle. Reinforced with additional men from Green, Battery Robinett was eventually taken, but at high cost for the Texans that assaulted it.
** Phifer's brigade on the left met with success, driving back Davies's left flank and entering the town Combining forces with Green and Colbert the Confederates managed to fight their way in Corinth itself. Bloody street fighting erupted within the town and the streets were choked with men and lead. Sullivan's brigade was rushed in to support the disorganized remnants of Davies' and Hamilton's brigades, but determined attacks by the Confederates, who were pouring men into the town, prevented Sullivan from throwing them back, wading into the confusion in the narrow streets, unable to mount a coordinated attack. Artillery fire from Battery Madison rained down on friend and foe alike in a desperate attempt to stave of the Confederates. In face of a more coordinated bayonet charge from Colbert and Green's men the Union troops fell back once again, the captured artillery from Battery Powell and Robinett putting a few units to flight. Cabell's brigade of Maury's division was sent to reinforce the troops that had captured Battery Powell, but instead were redirected to the ensuing battle in Corinth itself.
** Lovell had been skirmishing with the Union left in the vicinity of Battery Phillips, in preparation for a general advance. When word reached him that Confederate forces has reached the town and were routing the Union forces he was soon ordered to attack to tie down the Union left.
** Unable to salvage the situation on his right Rosecrans ordered a general retreat from Corinth south along the Kossuth Road. With is army in tatters and harassed by Lovells men as they made their retreat, it was clear to Rosecrans that he could not hold out for reinforcements. By 3 PM Corinth was in Confederate hands once again.
Aftermath:
Reinforcements from Grant under the command of General James B. McPherson arrived too late to aid Rosecrans. After his scouts reported the situation and verified that the remnants of Rosecrans army retreated south, McPherson was outnumbered and unable to link up with any organized friendly forces in the immediate area. He marched back to Jackson unable to relieve Rosecrans.
From his location in Jackson, Grant was able to oversee his expanded responsibilities in the region. After losing four divisions from this expanded command Grant's forces shrank from approximately 80,000 men to less than 50,000.
This put Grant on the defensive as he deployed his remaining forces to protect his positions against several threatening Confederate forces. Grant's forces in the immediate vicinity consisted of 12,000 men at Bolivar, Rosecrans's 23,000 at Corinth, General Sherman's 7,000 at Memphis, and another 6,000 as a general reserve at Jackson.
The loss of Rosecrans's army at Corinth was a huge blow for Grant. Despite being nearby he was not directly commanding troops on the field. The reinforcement of two divisions from the Army of Tennessee failed to meet up in time and thus forced Grant to recall these divisions to draw out another plan for the area. The Confederate victory caused great worry. With his forces spread thin across Tennessee and northern Mississippi, Grant would need to find a another way to take Corinth back or to stop Van Dorn's advance to the North to assist Bragg in his invasion of Kentucky.
News of the defeat in the east reached Grant, causing him even more stress. With Philadelphia and Washington D.C. threatened by Robert E. Lee, it was uncertain to him whether or not the Union had the will to fight despite success in the west. But with Corinth back in Confederate control and with Bragg well into Kentucky his successes earlier in the year would soon go up in smoke. Either way, Grant would continue to plan for additional battles in the west to address the problem with Van Dorn in Corinth.
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