Gorbachev dies pre 1985?

[GI Jim]

Add a dramatic drop in political/military spending.



It was the only significant bright spark in the USSR economy but many other raw materials were available in Russia. The USSR could have tried to get overseas companies to help mine them.

I think again the "military spending leads to the fall of the USSR" argument is somewhat over-used. Sure military spending ate up a large chunk of the budget, but the issues surrounding the wider economy were not military related at all. Soviet manufacturing since the 1960s had seen an incredible fall in quality if not quantity, meaning that by 1985 it was pretty much solely oil that was a net gain for Moscow.

Andropov's methods of a huge crackdown on absenteeism, enforced standards in factories and a beefed up KGB could have proved useful for turning around the USSR's economy. We will never know of course, because Gorby's chaos destroyed the whole system.

 

[Belarus-Chan]

The thing is, stagnation caused the decline of the USSR, but it was the botched reforms that carry the majority of the blame for it's collapse. So therefore, with no Gorbachev, a reformer is still needed. Depending on who is chosen the county could collapse sooner, at the same time OTL, or successfully reform and survive.
Finding an effective way to reform the Warsaw Pact states while preventing their governments from being replaced by pro-NATO opposition is possible, and so is reforming the economy to ostensibly remain a socialist system (through abolishing collectivised farming and planned economy). A chinese style approach to political reforms may be optimal at this stage, although it would be possible to loosen that aspect as well by the mid-90s.

 

[RousseauX]

I think the truth lies somewhere inbetween inevitable collapse that you quite rightly say is commonly accepted nowadays, and the integral strength of the Soviet system. The Soviet economic model I don't believe was totally doomed to fail, with some reform to central planning, removing layers of bureaucracy and allowing regional individuals to formulate economic strategy rather than the centre aiding overall growth. The Soviet's also suffered from the "dutch disease" which Russia still does today, a heavy over-reliance on oil exports.

Were Saddam to invade Kuwait and not be kicked out of it, you could see high oil prices sustain the Soviet regime for many more years. They simply would have to attempt to diversify their economy however, and if that process was began by a conservative reformist in 1985 rather than "radical" Gorbachev it may have been possible.

failure by what standards?

Soviet per capita income in 1989 is on par with Brazil's today

If you mean failure as in "reaching US level of economic development/living standards" then it's not gonna get there, but otherwise the Soviet standard of living was well above global average in 1989

 

[fasquardon]

This point is very important - I can still see the Iran-Iraq war ending on schedule but the USSR could probably veto a war against Saddam. An expanded Iraq would control about 20% of the world's oil - and would likely be facing an embargo from the West.

This is very beneficial to the Soviet economy. I think Virtual History had a scenario that argued that the USSR could have used this and later détente (alongside a continued willingness to shoot whoever needs to be) to essentially hold together into the 21st century. There would still be long term issues with matching the West, but I would think they exist on an even grander scale today.....

Like I said before. I don't think the Soviets would do this. It's violating borders, which weakens them to any American demands to cough up an SSR or two, they don't like Saddam much, they had a defensive alliance with Iraq, not an aggressive alliance (they didn't even help Iraq against Iran at first) and Saddam completely borked up his diplomacy and there's no reason why he wouldn't do so in an ALT without Gorbachev, and offend the Soviets with his presumption.

Afghanistan was sustainable Imo, the otl Kabul government fought off several major Mujahadeen offensives in the late 80s without direct Soviet combat unit intervention. Had aid continued from the USSR the Kabul government might have survived without the Soviets themselves needing to bleed too much to keep it afloat. What killed the PDPA was the fall of the USSR and end of aid to Kabul.

Poland OTOH, without Gorbachev why couldn't the PUWP kept a lid on solidarity? It successfully repressed Solidarity in 1981 even though it had a membership of what 1/3 of the country? It seems to me hardline-Communism had a way of dealing with that sort of dissent as long as the Soviet Union is willing to even -sort- of back Jaruzelski

+1 to this.

Solidarity was completely crushed and had joined a long list of similar failed movements - it was only revived by the instability of the Polish regime that was caused directly by changes Gorbachev initiated.

And I can't add to what you've said about Afghanistan.

I do not understand your response if fracking cannot come in time, which I agree with the oil prices would depend on political developments which could go anywhere.

I have no idea what you are saying either. What exactly don't you understand?

The Soviet's also suffered from the "dutch disease" which Russia still does today, a heavy over-reliance on oil exports.

Technically, the Soviet system could not suffer dutch disease, since their currency was not freely floating in a market system.

What the Soviets were suffering from was mal-investment stimulated by a short term advantage in oil prices.

Part of the problem was that hardly any of the Soviet leadership itself had any clear idea of just how much they were spending.

The Soviets did make good use of stolen CIA reports on their own economy...

But here's the other problem: By the 1980's, the Soviets cannot just factor in the United States. In reality there were now five major economic loci in the world, and four of them were hostile to the Soviets (U.S., the EC, Japan, and China), a point Paul Kennedy was making even back in 1987. If the U.S. alone was a grave challenge for the Soviets, the prospect of competing with three more as well was even more daunting.

This is true. To be honest, I do wonder if the Soviets, had they survived the Cold War with the US until today, could survive the rise of China.

On the other hand, the recovery of Europe and the rise of Japan and China also offered opportunities to break out of the isolation imposed by the stronger superpower.

fasquardon

 

[bernardz]

The fundamental issue is, however, I believe the appeal of communism was declining even in the top of the society. Few wanted to keep spending the *money and freedom costs* required to keep the USSR politically, secret police and military costs. People of different nationalities were upset that they were being kept together in a society dominated by Russians, and everyone wanted more freedom. As such Gorbachev's program did represent a moderate view of what the country wanted.

I think again the "military spending leads to the fall of the USSR" argument is somewhat over-used. Sure military spending ate up a large chunk of the budget,

Indeed depending on who you look at the figure military spending was somewhere between 10% to 20% of the total economy. Now in the late 1980s, what was becoming clear is that to continue its military power the USSR would have to spend a lot more money to update this military just to keep it at this level.

On top of that was massive political and police spending required to keep the USSR superpower status.

failure by what standards?

Soviet per capita income in 1989 is on par with Brazil's today

If you mean failure as in "reaching US level of economic development/living standards" then it's not gonna get there, but otherwise the Soviet standard of living was well above global average in 1989

I am not sure how useful per capita income as a measure dealing with a state dominated economy where much of the money is going off to the state first and the consumer is getting the leftovers.

Having said that the Russian people were not measuring themselves on a global average but on Eastern and Western Europe. They saw their standard of living was much lower and they complained of shortages, food rationing and the long lines in queues in the shops. They certainly did not see themselves as economically successful.

Solidarity was completely crushed and had joined a long list of similar failed movements - it was only revived by the instability of the Polish regime that was caused directly by changes Gorbachev initiated.

And I can't add to what you've said about Afghanistan.

Afghanistan was dragging out but the cost was not high in terms of GDP. It was seen as a political disaster internally.

This is true. To be honest, I do wonder if the Soviets, had they survived the Cold War with the US until today, could survive the rise of China

..

One big plus the Chinese had over the USSR in modernising is that China has only a minor nationality problem. The USSR had a major problem here. Once the screws of oppression were lifted the nationalities were falling apart.

I agree with you too about China, no way would the USSR be able to match Chinese economic growth, with China greater population and the Chinese antagonism to the USSR, there are major long terms problems here for the USSR. There now a problem although less intense.

Europe, if the USSR would have continued, would have kept its military spending up.

 

[Chris S]

The fundamental issue is, however, I believe the appeal of communism was declining even in the top of the society. Few wanted to keep spending the *money and freedom costs* required to keep the USSR politically, secret police and military costs. People of different nationalities were upset that they were being kept together in a society dominated by Russians, and everyone wanted more freedom. As such Gorbachev's program did represent a moderate view of what the country wanted.

That's over-generalizing quite a bit I think. Up until mid to late 1991 that could only really have been said about some nationalities (like the Baltic nationalities obviously and some of the Caucasus nationalities). In March 1991, a referendum was held on maintaining the USSR as a federation (not even a communist federation at that) and 80% of the voters in all the republics save the 3 baltic ones, Armenia, Moldova and Georgia took part and 77% of them voted in favour (in no republic that participated was the overall vote in favour less than 70%). All told that meant at least 60% of the total registered voters wanted to retain that kind of society. Many were in favour of more local autonomy, but to say they were upset at being kept together in a society dominated by Russians seems to be over-simplifying.

 

[RousseauX]

I am not sure how useful per capita income as a measure dealing with a state dominated economy where much of the money is going off to the state first and the consumer is getting the leftovers.

But money going to the state doesn't go down a blackhole either, in the USSR the state provided you with vacations/medical treatment/housing etc in form of vouchers/guarantees. The consumer economy is not nessessarily a good indicator of overall living standards.

Having said that the Russian people were not measuring themselves on a global average but on Eastern and Western Europe. They saw their standard of living was much lower and they complained of shortages, food rationing and the long lines in queues in the shops. They certainly did not see themselves as economically successful.

The American people today don't see themselves as economically successful either, that's not necessarily indicative of anything

 

[RousseauX]

One big plus the Chinese had over the USSR in modernising is that China has only a minor nationality problem. The USSR had a major problem here. Once the screws of oppression were lifted the nationalities were falling apart.

A lie put together after the USSR collapsed to legitimize the collapse and to give the new governments legitimacy, ethnic separatism was not a problem outside the Baltics and Georgia and a few other places which are a tiny % of overall soviet population

the Soviet people overwhelmingly voted to keep the Union together in 1991:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_Union_referendum,_1991

Indeed depending on who you look at the figure military spending was somewhere between 10% to 20% of the total economy.

what's the source for this?

 

[Athelstane]

Or Andropov could have lives longer than he did otl

Health wise, he was a basket case, and he was getting the best care the Soviet Union could provide. It just seems...unlikely.

Or Andrei Gromyko who hands it off to a younger moderate reformer like Yegor Legachev a couple of years later

Less likely, but not impossible. I was working from a 1984/85 point of departure, admittedly.

Afghanistan was sustainable Imo, the otl Kabul government fought off several major Mujahadeen offensives in the late 80s without direct Soviet combat unit intervention. Had aid continued from the USSR the Kabul government might have survived without the Soviets themselves needing to bleed too much to keep it afloat. What killed the PDPA was the fall of the USSR and end of aid to Kabul.

I have in mind less here what happens to the Kabul regime than the status of the Soviet ground forces. And it's quite clear, I think, that by the mid-80's there was broad consensus on finding an exit strategy for them in the Kremlin.

Poland OTOH, without Gorbachev why couldn't the PUWP kept a lid on solidarity? It successfully repressed Solidarity in 1981 even though it had a membership of what 1/3 of the country? It seems to me hardline-Communism had a way of dealing with that sort of dissent as long as the Soviet Union is willing to even -sort- of back Jaruzelski

As an observation about the East Bloc generally, it's a fair statement. But as for Poland, the strategy was reaching its limits.

 

[Athelstane]

the Soviet people overwhelmingly voted to keep the Union together in 1991:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_Union_referendum,_1991

Is any popular vote held in the Soviet Union worth the paper it's written on?

 

[GI Jim]

failure by what standards?

Soviet per capita income in 1989 is on par with Brazil's today

If you mean failure as in "reaching US level of economic development/living standards" then it's not gonna get there, but otherwise the Soviet standard of living was well above global average in 1989

As raw economic fact per capita income was as you say not a major issue. However I don't need to remind you of the growing issue surrounding food production and the lack of availabilty of motor vehicles, microwaves and other consumer goods. I am by no means saying that the USSR was a backwater, and I think by re-focusing some of the aforementioned economic tools they possessed, by the mid 90s from a 1985 POD the economy could have been improved.

The fundamental issue is, however, I believe the appeal of communism was declining even in the top of the society. Few wanted to keep spending the *money and freedom costs* required to keep the USSR politically, secret police and military costs. People of different nationalities were upset that they were being kept together in a society dominated by Russians, and everyone wanted more freedom. As such Gorbachev's program did represent a moderate view of what the country wanted.



Indeed depending on who you look at the figure military spending was somewhere between 10% to 20% of the total economy. Now in the late 1980s, what was becoming clear is that to continue its military power the USSR would have to spend a lot more money to update this military just to keep it at this level.

On top of that was massive political and police spending required to keep the USSR superpower status.

I believe the issue was not the rate of military spending the USSR employed, but the fact that economic growth had stalled by the mid 80s and that meant increasing arms spending meant an ever increasing chunk of the same pie. If the USSR maintained a healthy 4-5% annual growth (Which it had done previously) it could keep up its superpower military aspirations.

In terms of the nationality question, I totally concur with RousseauX. There was no nationality problem prior to 1985 even worth mentioning. Gorbachev's reforms added nationality to a litany of issues, real or otherwise, that individuals with gripes against the Soviet system shouted about towards the end of the 80s and early 90s. Were the Soviet system not to undergo Glasnost, the baltic republics would have kept reasonably quiet and the rest of the USSR would have remained as it was for the past 60 years, unquestionably loyal.

 

[Athelstane]

No it wasn't, this is a complete myth made up by a triumphalist western narrative about the historical inevitability of western liberalism

The DPRK is still here today, as the PRC, as is Cuba: all three illustrates very different ways Communist parties have survived under arguably worse circumstances than the USSR.

I'm not without sympathy for the argument about liberal determinism.

But the PRC is hardly "communist" by any practical definition today; and the DPRK and Cuba are isolated irrelevancies. They are not the Soviet Union. Different cultures, different circumstances.

As I have said, there was nothing inevitable about the collapse of the Soviet empire as it unfolded in 1989-91. It happened as it did most proximately because of Gorbachev's failed reform project (and his general unwillingness to sanction the widespread use of force to maintain that power). The USSR *could* have lasted longer than it did (and thank God it did not). But the grave flaws in the system were not phantoms.

 

[Chris S]

Is any popular vote held in the Soviet Union worth the paper it's written on?

By that time it was yes.

As was noted about an election held almost exactly two years prior:

Only one Congress was elected, in March 1989. The fundamental difference from previous elections in Soviet Union was that elections were actually competitive. Instead of one Communist Party-approved candidate for each seat, multiple candidates were allowed. A variety of different political positions, from Communist to pro-Western, were represented in the Congress, and lively debates took place with different viewpoints expressed.

By 1989 popular votes in the USSR actually had meaning as they were actually allowed to reflect what people actually thought. It's why folks like Andrei Sakharov got elected into the Congress of People's Deputies and why Yeltsin won over the CPSU's own endorsed candidate (with 89% of the vote). Had it been a case of the old system of voting neither of these events could ever have happened. It was this same Congress of People's Deputies (of which two-thirds of the deputies had been voted in under the democratic system) which then later voted to hold the referendum in question and to approve the structure of the referendum.

 

[Chris S]

I'm not without sympathy for the argument about liberal determinism.

But the PRC is hardly "communist" by any practical definition today; and the DPRK and Cuba are isolated irrelevancies. They are not the Soviet Union. Different cultures, different circumstances.

Given that a lot of consensus on the thread is that some reformer of some sort is likely to have come into power in the Soviet Union in 1985 and made changes to the system, how is the PRC not a relevant example given that most everyone agrees that the reforms that say Romanov would have instituted (or some other reformer) would likely have shifted the USSR away from what you described as "any practical definition" of "communist"?

Also, how are the DPRK and Cuba isolated irrelevancies given the same context? They are not the Soviet Union, quite true. But they are also not each other. The "different cultures, different circumstances" quote applies to any comparison of the DPRK and Cuba with each other as to the USSR, yet in both (as in the PRC, Laos and Vietnam) there continues to be a single party system with the single party at it's core calling itself communist. What was said about the PRC, DPRK and Cuba was that if they could all do it (and do it clearly despite vastly and wildly differing cultures and differing circumstances between them) then there isn't any reason why (given a different set of choices made by the leaders of the USSR in the 1980s) that the USSR could not experience a similar outcome: remaining governed by a single party system with the CPSU as that single, allowed party (even if the CPSU by now would seem not very communist in practice, or even if communist in internal party practice it was not truly communist in how it organized the state economy).

 

[bernardz]

That's over-generalizing quite a bit I think. Up until mid to late 1991 that could only really have been said about some nationalities (like the Baltic nationalities obviously and some of the Caucasus nationalities). In March 1991, a referendum was held on maintaining the USSR as a federation (not even a communist federation at that) and 80% of the voters in all the republics save the 3 baltic ones, Armenia, Moldova and Georgia took part and 77% of them voted in favour (in no republic that participated was the overall vote in favour less than 70%). All told that meant at least 60% of the total registered voters wanted to retain that kind of society. Many were in favour of more local autonomy, but to say they were upset at being kept together in a society dominated by Russians seems to be over-simplifying.

A lie put together after the USSR collapsed to legitimize the collapse and to give the new governments legitimacy, ethnic separatism was not a problem outside the Baltics and Georgia and a few other places which are a tiny % of overall soviet population

the Soviet people overwhelmingly voted to keep the Union together in 1991:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_Union_referendum,_1991

what's the source for this?

In terms of the nationality question, I totally concur with RousseauX. There was no nationality problem prior to 1985 even worth mentioning. Gorbachev's reforms added nationality to a litany of issues, real or otherwise, that individuals with gripes against the Soviet system shouted about towards the end of the 80s and early 90s. Were the Soviet system not to undergo Glasnost, the baltic republics would have kept reasonably quiet and the rest of the USSR would have remained as it was for the past 60 years, unquestionably loyal.

As a person who was raised by a Russian and knows many Russians, I can assure you that nationality is the significant dividing line in the society. A person in an area will describe themselves by nationality. Most of these nationalities speak their own languages, have their own history and culture. When these people go overseas and live in different countries, you will see that they separate by these nationalities. There will be a Georgian, Azerbaijanis, Ukrainian, etc clubs. The Russian club will be filled with people who consider themselves Russian by nationality.

The protest movements under the communists also were divided by nationality.

Once communism was removed as an ideology, the union came down. Note this we also saw in the Russian Civil War. Many places tried to leave but except for Poland and Finland they all failed.

I believe the issue was not the rate of military spending the USSR employed, but the fact that economic growth had stalled by the mid 80s and that meant increasing arms spending meant an ever increasing chunk of the same pie. If the USSR maintained a healthy 4-5% annual growth (Which it had done previously) it could keep up its superpower military aspirations.

I agree but for such a growth rate to occur one would need a fundamental shift in the USSR. In an attempt to make such a change in the USSR, Gorbachev brought the whole system down.

 

[GI Jim]

Given that a lot of consensus on the thread is that some reformer of some sort is likely to have come into power in the Soviet Union in 1985 and made changes to the system, how is the PRC not a relevant example given that most everyone agrees that the reforms that say Romanov would have instituted (or some other reformer) would likely have shifted the USSR away from what you described as "any practical definition" of "communist"?

Also, how are the DPRK and Cuba isolated irrelevancies given the same context? They are not the Soviet Union, quite true. But they are also not each other. The "different cultures, different circumstances" quote applies to any comparison of the DPRK and Cuba with each other as to the USSR, yet in both (as in the PRC, Laos and Vietnam) there continues to be a single party system with the single party at it's core calling itself communist. What was said about the PRC, DPRK and Cuba was that if they could all do it (and do it clearly despite vastly and wildly differing cultures and differing circumstances between them) then there isn't any reason why (given a different set of choices made by the leaders of the USSR in the 1980s) that the USSR could not experience a similar outcome: remaining governed by a single party system with the CPSU as that single, allowed party (even if the CPSU by now would seem not very communist in practice, or even if communist in internal party practice it was not truly communist in how it organized the state economy).

I actually would disagree that "any reformer" would have moved the USSR away from "any practical definition of communist". Romanov or some other Kosygin like character could have reformed the Soviet Union in a way that didn't drastically alter its communist origins. I.E. a version of the 1965 failed reform that Kosygin himself promoted could have helped the economy greatly. In short, a move away from economic planning all being based in Moscow and out to the regions, with planners allocated their own individual budgets. A key factor in why the Soviet economy underperformed was the simple fact that Moscow could not handle the sheer volume of planning required for a nation that covered two whole continents.

A reformist that kept the political structure intact, cracked down on absenteeism and re-focused at least part of the economy on consumer goods could have certainly improved the USSR's outlook post 1985. The notion that the USSR was economically destined to fail, and all the other falsehoods commonly accepted in public parlance such as nationality are seriously flawed.

As a person who was raised by a Russian and knows many Russians, I can assure you that nationality is the significant dividing line in the society. A person in an area will describe themselves by nationality. Most of these nationalities speak their own languages, have their own history and culture. When these people go overseas and live in different countries, you will see that they separate by these nationalities. There will be a Georgian, Azerbaijanis, Ukrainian, etc clubs. The Russian club will be filled with people who consider themselves Russian by nationality.

The protest movements under the communists also were divided by nationality.

Once communism was removed as an ideology, the union came down. Note this we also saw in the Russian Civil War. Many places tried to leave but except for Poland and Finland they all failed.

I don't doubt at all the fact of nationality being significant within society at the time. What I am stating is that the concept of nationality did not and would not have put any pressure on the Soviet state were its political structure to remain intact. This to be fair is what I believe you were stating yourself.

In essence, the main and absolute reason the Soviet union collapsed was the political deconstruction of the Communist party and its power structures.

 

[Chris S]

As a person who was raised by a Russian and knows many Russians, I can assure you that nationality is the significant dividing line in the society. A person in an area will describe themselves by nationality. Most of these nationalities speak their own languages, have their own history and culture. When these people go overseas and live in different countries, you will see that they separate by these nationalities. There will be a Georgian, Azerbaijanis, Ukrainian, etc clubs. The Russian club will be filled with people who consider themselves Russian by nationality.

Okay that's fine, but not seeing where it negates anything that was mentioned in the posts you quoted. When they go overseas and live in different countries and separate themselves by nationality doesn't seem to suggest that the referendum itself was invalid. After all Puerto Ricans tend to cluster together even when they move elsewhere in the USA, but Puerto Ricans are all American citizens and a significant number of Puerto Ricans do not want outright independence (many want more local autonomy). Even from countries and regions where you have a single ethnic group, settlement patterns for persons who migrated overseas tended to show that people from one particular area tended to settle together anyway:

This generation of Sicilian immigrants tended to cluster together in groups according to the regions from which they had emigrated. In New York City those emigrating from the village of Cinisi huddled together on East 69th Street, while larger sections like Elizabeth Street contained emigrants from several different areas including Sciacca and Palermo. Sicilians from fishing villages settled in Boston on the North Street, while others settled in San Francisco's North Beach. Many of the districts were soon regarded as "Little Italys." Sicilians in Chicago congregated in an area known as "Little Sicily," and those in New Orleans lived in a district dubbed "Little Palermo."

When African-Americans migrated away from the South, they often tended to settle in areas together (for historical, legal (Jim Crow), cultural and other reasons). Even now these patterns still occur.

And it isn't as if say the majority of Georgians didn't live in Georgia to start out with - in essence, while the Georgian SSR and RSFSR were in the same country (USSR), most Georgians lived in the Georgian SSR, not the RSFSR so they wouldn't have been any less separate from these other nationalities than their compatriots who migrated to New York and settled in a predominantly Georgian area versus a predominantly Russian area (in fact given that both groups were in the same city they were in some ways more closely co-located than the average Georgian and the average Russian in the USSR). Couple that with the fact that up until the 1990s the USSR had an internal passport and propiska system and it meant that the chances that many Azerbaijanis, Georgians, Russians, etc could even have neighbours from different nationalities was smaller than it would have been in a system of completely free internal movement. Thus when such persons migrated away to the USA or other western countries, it would only be expected that their circle of contacts would likely include more persons from their own ethnic group than persons from without. And once you are moving from Baku to Boston, are you more likely to move to an area with people you don't know or to one with people whom you do know, if the choice was available to you?

What we have been saying is that up until 1991 most persons from other nationalities did not have a problem with living in a state that included the RSFSR. However, most persons from other nationalities definitely wanted more local autonomy and democracy. That was not incompatible with remaining in a union with the RSFSR or a democratic successor republic to the RSFSR. Even after 1991 polls from some western organizations showed that between 20-40% of persons in many of these republics would be in favour of some form of renewed union that included Russia and this is at least a decade after the dissolution.

The protest movements under the communists also were divided by nationality.

Given that many protests movements were localized, some were spontaneous and many were often directed at the republic's governing communist party, this doesn't seem surprising.
The USSR was a massive country. Without a history of nationwide freedom of movement or freedom of speech. In such circumstances it would seem surprising if most protests movements actually were coordinated across the length and breadth of the Union at first.

 

[Chris S]

I actually would disagree that "any reformer" would have moved the USSR away from "any practical definition of communist". Romanov or some other Kosygin like character could have reformed the Soviet Union in a way that didn't drastically alter its communist origins. I.E. a version of the 1965 failed reform that Kosygin himself promoted could have helped the economy greatly. In short, a move away from economic planning all being based in Moscow and out to the regions, with planners allocated their own individual budgets. A key factor in why the Soviet economy underperformed was the simple fact that Moscow could not handle the sheer volume of planning required for a nation that covered two whole continents.

Well to be honest this all depends on how Athelstane properly and precisely describes "any practical definition" of "communism". It could easily be argued that anything other than a centrally planned economy is not, by any practical definition, "communism". Kosygin's reforms to move away from all planning based in Moscow (central planning) to planning in the regions (distributed planning) could arguably fall outside of that definition.

The potential problem here is that the practical definition, if provided, can be defined in such a way as to exclude anything that would mean the PRC actually has to be defined as being communist, while including things that describe the USSR as communist despite such aspects probably being closer to the PRC's economic/social/political model than to the model defined by Marx and Engels and later Lenin (and even then Lenin's NEP almost certainly can't be considered as communist if the PRC's current system is).

A reformist that kept the political structure intact, cracked down on absenteeism and re-focused at least part of the economy on consumer goods could have certainly improved the USSR's outlook post 1985. The notion that the USSR was economically destined to fail, and all the other falsehoods commonly accepted in public parlance such as nationality are seriously flawed.

Definitely agreed.

 

[RousseauX]

Is any popular vote held in the Soviet Union worth the paper it's written on?

1991 had the freest election in russian history, much more free than what yeltsin

For the first and only time the opposition was allowed to win a russian election

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_presidential_election,_1991

So yes, it wasnt a fake election, late gorbachev was the only point when russia had free elections

 

[fraa Jad]

I think you're correct that Gorbachev can't be replaced. The man was a huge optimist.

You are aware he's still alive, right? I think I watched an interview with him on an American late night show relatively recently and he seemed in good health. Or do you mean he's no longer an optimist? That would seem to be true.