the most realistic timeframe for German Soviet armistice in WW2

There are some good reasons for Germany not to have taken a Soviet armistice request in most of 1941 (it looked good for Germany for most of that year). But what about in the time period between Stalingrad and Kursk. I remember reading somewhere that Stalin was so impressed that after Stalingrad the Germans were still strongly resisting that he felt final victory was going to come only at a huge cost. So, maybe sometime in the spring of 1943 might have been that most realistic time for an armistice.
Not saying that this was ever a very likely scenario, but if it was going to have happened, maybe that was the time.
 
There's a story from a Bulgarian diplomat that Stalin sent a proposal to Germany in the autum of 1943. Hitler dismissed it apparently.

This was at the point of Stalin lowest confidence in Britain & the US. This was a month before the Terhan conference. If the story is true Stalin may have been fishing for a alternative had the Brits refused a 1944 invasion in NW Europe.

Note that earlier in 1943 a delegation of Red Army generals had been sent to Italy to see if the Brits and Yanks were really fighting. Their report was 'Yes', but not very well.
 
I wonder what the demarcation line for a 1943 armistice would be.
I would guess that the Germans would take all of Belarus, the Baltics, alongside most of Ukraine (except for the easternmost portion of it and Crimea), while the Soviets would be left with a line extending from Leningrad and sticking east of the Dniepr.
Hitler would be left with good forces to bear upon the Wallies in Sicily, but i'd expect that dislodging them would be hard, as Italy's will and capability to fight was crumbling by that point.
 
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Hitler would be left with good forces to bear upon the Wallies in Sicily, but i'd expect that dislodging them would be hard, as Italy's will and capability to fight was crumbling by that point.

Be ok in ground forces. In the air it was looking pretty bad for the nazi AF. Through 1943 they managed to keep the average operating strength between 5,000 & 6,000 aircraft. The US & RAF went from under 5,000 to over 10,000 front line strength during the year. At that point the GAF was deep into it's quality crisis, undertrained pilots flying deficient aircraft. Conversely the allied training had matured, turning out a well prepared air crew, and efficient maintinance.

Even if the entire front line strength of 2500 aircraft are moved from the east it's weak vs the 3000+ stood up in operational units in the UK and MTO first quarter of 1944. OTL some 600 fighters were moved from the east to reinforce the Reichs air defense in the autum of 1943. By the end of the big week in Jan 44 most of those pilots were dead or maimed.

Whatever the capability of the ground forces they will still be operating with negligable aircover.
 

Ian_W

Banned
I wonder what the demarcation line for a 1943 armistice would be.
I would guess that the Germans would take all of Belarus, the Baltics, alongside most of Ukraine (except for the easternmost portion of it and Crimea), while the Soviets would be left with a line extending from Leningrad and sticking east of the Dniepr.
Hitler would be left with good forces to bear upon the Wallies in Sicily, but i'd expect that dislodging them would be hard, as Italy's will and capability to fight was crumbling by that point.

Nahh, in 1943 it'd be the 1940 border, as by that point the Germans are losing.
 

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
I think Gerhard Weinberg details peace proposals in his "world at arms" and possibly in his "visions of victory". For the 1943 talks, I distinctly remember Stalin demanding considerable territory beyond the front line, like the first Soviet proposal in '43 was the pre-war border, and the second proposal was pre-war border, plus central Poland.
 

Deleted member 1487

Whatever the capability of the ground forces they will still be operating with negligable aircover.
Would the preponderance of AAA with frontline and potentially also logistics units have made a difference given Allied air supremacy?
 

thaddeus

Donor
my view early or not at all, but their campaign was not run to destroy industry and infrastructure (which until a ridiculously late date they schemed to exploit)

what if Tunisia was evacuated along with German victory in Third Battle of Kharkov? those would both be in that March timeframe? and might convince Stalin the German side could be further reinforced.
 

RousseauX

Donor
There's a story from a Bulgarian diplomat that Stalin sent a proposal to Germany in the autum of 1943. Hitler dismissed it apparently.

This was at the point of Stalin lowest confidence in Britain & the US. This was a month before the Terhan conference. If the story is true Stalin may have been fishing for a alternative had the Brits refused a 1944 invasion in NW Europe.

Note that earlier in 1943 a delegation of Red Army generals had been sent to Italy to see if the Brits and Yanks were really fighting. Their report was 'Yes', but not very well.
it was actually in 1941, not 43
 

thaddeus

Donor
one can imagine that IF the Soviets offered an armistice in 1941 it would have been rejected out of hand?
 
As I understand it, the Germans expected to roll all the way to the Urals, taking Moscow etc en passant. They would not have accepted an armistice. Then the tide slowly, slowly turned, destroying several German armies (!) and much materiel. After that, to put it kindly, the Russians would not have accepted an armistice...
 
Note that earlier in 1943 a delegation of Red Army generals had been sent to Italy to see if the Brits and Yanks were really fighting. Their report was 'Yes', but not very well.

A different report (that it was not serious combat) could have had dramatic differences. At that point, it’s hard to not see a 3-way Cold War develop. An invasion of a non-Eastern front distraction Europe borders on somewhere between insane and batshit crazy, and it’s hard to see the political will to do it if Stalin says “buh-bye.”
 
one can imagine that IF the Soviets offered an armistice in 1941 it would have been rejected out of hand?

That makes sense. That's the same end to the 1943 version. No response via the Bulgarians. Either way it would be out of character for Hitler to propose terms, as he thought total victory was possible.

One would think that after 80 years some mention of this might have emerged from the German side. Hitler ran off at the mouth about many other things. Why not such a message as this?
 
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