AHC: Peerless Air Ministry

[steamboy]

Really the RAF's done all that can be done without striding into wanking territory.

The biggest changes are the introduction of cannons to the service pre-war with 20mm cannon armed Spits and Hurricanes, meaning they considerably outgun the BF-109's they'll be facing as they had 4 x MGs and a cannon firing through the prop hub IIRC vs 4x MG and 2 cannons in the RAF fighters and a bigger punch against the Bombers should the Blitz occur. This, combined with a far fewer number of obsolete or aged craft in service (no Battles for example) as well as doctrinal changes with the goal of supporting the troops from the air will help, probably not enough to save France if things to as per OTL but it'll make things more bloody for the Germans, and has been seen in other TL's all that's really needed is some disruption and a few nudges here and there to throw off their timetable and then things can start spinning out of control.

The other BIG thing is the advances to radar and the widespread deployment of CH 1.5 allowing for more coverage as well as a build up of an electronics industry to support it will be a great help in a longer war and protect the UK should/when the Blitz come/s.

The improvements to industry, getting Castle Bromwitch online earlier and other changes mean that the RAF is better able to absorb the losses of aircraft, if it has enough pilots is another issue but there's more trainer aircraft built and in service so this is a good thing.

The number of night fighters and the initial steps to an AI radar will also be useful, if not right away, as these are in essence defensive weapons and tied to the ground based radars that will help guide them, so not much use over France but of supreme use over the UK if France falls.

The FAA also is getting in on the act with its own modern monoplane fighter (although I'm not sure its seeing much service yet or what its production numbers are) and this will help off Norway and the like. We can assume that the Courageous will still eat torpedoes early on due to the poor (to say the least) decision to use a fleet carrier on anti-submarine patrols and that loss badly affected the FAA due to the sheer number of skilled personnel lost when she went down (which also helped with the sinking of the Ark as her Captain was very aware of the number of men lost on the Courageous and wanted to save the lives of his crew and lead to her early abandoning which probably caused her loss).

Its all very very good stuff, darn well written and done without wanking or going and relying on foresight too much too!

 

[sonofpegasus]

Thank you Steamboy for the accolade. Also a good summary of the changes in Fighter Command. The changes in Bomber command are less and more subtle. Whilst there are still plenty of Battles in front line service the expeditionary air force does have Six Squadrons of Henley Light/dive bombers plus a squadron strength OTU.
One of the Battle shadow factories is busy building Pelides engine versions of the Bristol 148 for the FAA instead. The saved Merlins going to the Henleys. The FAA Skua's are soon to become OUU training aircraft and target tugs once enough 148's are available. Having almost a 75mph speed advantage over the Skua the Naval 148 was seen a being far more viable in the duel dive bomber/fleet fighter role. earlier in 1939 the Bristol 148 was trialed against the Seversky PA-B3 which was found to be inferior.

 

[foresterab]

Really enjoying the timeline but still wonder if more can’t be done to expand training services especially in the dominions. Even increasing the number of training fields and trained pilots would go a long way to increasing the pool of personnel who can be cross trained into the modern machines.

Budgets would be any issue but even reserve pilots would help.

Also exchange of squadrons with the raf would be helpful to have more pilots brought up to speed on the big technology changes and help influence local politicians back in the dominions

But this is just random musings and shouldn’t detract from a great timeline

 

[sonofpegasus]

Now that war has been declared there will be less obstacles and more money. less you have a political POD years earlier in the prevailing economic and political climate it is difficult to see how the overseas training scheme could have been increased much quicker.

 

[foresterab]

Sonofpegasus

Agree the huge BCATP could not have been done in 1938 short of a declaration of war. I guess my experience is from the sleepy towns in Alberta that did host training units but were all developed fairly as hoc. Some sites like edmonton, high river, and Lethbridge were established airports in many cases by the RCAF. But additional sites were located in many cases where it seemed people existed and build good enough for now. This caused big delays as the scramble to find sites was not well coordinated and then once going was tough to adjust


Much good was done...my grandfather was a flight engineer in the RCAF but spent most of his time in training closing sites and then being shifted to the reserve in 1944 due to a surplus of crew to positions. For the thousands who had different experiences I think it’s an often under looked aspect of the war in Canada that often makes me wonder “what if” a couple more fields or more organized school system existed

Again
...please keep up the great writing and develop this as you wish. Just recollecting stories from grandfather and made me reply again

 

[Shanghai61]

This seemed to start as just an academic exercise, but has taken on a strong identity of its own. I'm enjoying it a lot. Can I enquire how far you're planning to take the timeline?

 

[steamboy]

There's only one bone of contention for me with this TL, calling the Mosquito the Flamingo

 

[sonofpegasus]

No No No! The Flamingo is a metal workhorse, The wooden wonder will fly!!!

 

[steamboy]

No No No! The Flamingo is a metal workhorse, The wooden wonder will fly!!!

Ahhh! My bad! I thought that you'd called the Mossie the Flamingo and got the two mixed up

Although if they want a really dangerous flying animal, just call it the Canada Goose!

Or just the Swan, regal but vicious birds!

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Really enjoying the timeline but still wonder if more can’t be done to expand training services especially in the dominions. Even increasing the number of training fields and trained pilots would go a long way to increasing the pool of personnel who can be cross trained into the modern machines.

Budgets would be any issue but even reserve pilots would help.

Also exchange of squadrons with the raf would be helpful to have more pilots brought up to speed on the big technology changes and help influence local politicians back in the dominions

But this is just random musings and shouldn’t detract from a great timeline

Now that war has been declared there will be less obstacles and more money. less you have a political POD years earlier in the prevailing economic and political climate it is difficult to see how the overseas training scheme could have been increased much quicker.

Sonofpegasus

Agree the huge BCATP could not have been done in 1938 short of a declaration of war. I guess my experience is from the sleepy towns in Alberta that did host training units but were all developed fairly as hoc. Some sites like Edmonton, High River, and Lethbridge were established airports in many cases by the RCAF. But additional sites were located in many cases where it seemed people existed and build good enough for now. This caused big delays as the scramble to find sites was not well coordinated and then once going was tough to adjust.

Much good was done...my grandfather was a flight engineer in the RCAF but spent most of his time in training closing sites and then being shifted to the reserve in 1944 due to a surplus of crew to positions. For the thousands who had different experiences I think it’s an often under looked aspect of the war in Canada that often makes me wonder “what if” a couple more fields or more organized school system existed.

Again

...please keep up the great writing and develop this as you wish. Just recollecting stories from grandfather and made me reply again.

I agree that its unlikely more could have been done to expand the training organisation, especially in the dominions prior to September 1939. However, is there any scope for more forward planning between the POD in 1935 and September 1939? Especially after the "near miss" that was the Munich Crisis?

For all I know what I'm about to suggest might have been done anyway. Could the RAF and RCAF made the setting up of a large training organisation in Canada part of the mobilisation plans that they drew up 1935-39? The result would be that when war was declared the scheme was better co-ordinated and there were fewer delays. For example the RAF and RCAF would have survey parties looking for suitable sites for the new airfields once approval was given. AFAIK the interwar RCAF spent a lot of its time conducting aerial surveys of Canada and helping to set up Canada's civil aviation infrastructure. ITTL could planning for the wartime training organisation be officially (or more likely covertly) part of that?

Unfortunately I don't have a copy of Grand Strategy Volume 2 to hand. However, IIRC from that the plan at the outbreak of war was to increase aircraft production to 3,000 a month within the next 18 months (which may have included aircraft built in the Dominions. I simply can't remember properly). That works out at 36,000 a year which IIRC required the training of 50,000 aircrew annually.

However, in the event only 1,730 aircraft were delivered in March 1941, less than 60% of the number planned 18 months earlier. The peak month wasn't until March 1944 when 2,715 aircraft were produced. See the following table from British War Production.

For the purpose of these tables bombers have been classified as follows:

Heavy: Manchester, Stirling, Lancaster and Warwick.
Medium: Wellington, Hampden, Hereford, Whitley and Albemarle.
Light: Blenheim, Battle (under Scheme L only; thereafter under 'Trainers'), Mosquito (bomber and photographic reconnaissance unit).​

If the British aircraft industry had been able to produce 3,000 aircraft in March 1941 (without reducing UK production of something else) then we alternative historians would be spending considerably less time discussing: whether some heavy bombers should have been transferred from Bomber Command to Coastal Command in 1941; whether some of Fighter Command should have been sent to the Middle and Far East in 1941; were those dastardly folks running the Air Ministry and Ministry of Aircraft Production really starving the FAA of aircraft; and if several hundred aircraft hadn't been sent to the USSR in 1941 what good would they have done in the Middle East and Far East?

 

[sonofpegasus]

Here is a very quick summary of the main changes for PAM form OTL.

From 1936 onwards more or less in chronological order.
Decision to cancel Gladiator after first contract and move Glosters to Hurricanes a year early.
Army co-operation policy and implementation changed, Henley ordered as Dive bomber not done OTL
Hispano cannon financed and ordered from the start progress about 1 year ahead of OTL.
RR Vulture, Exe and Peregrines cancelled. Development concentrated on the Merlin and the Griffon solely and getting shadow factories in volume production.
Fairey Monarch H24 engine development supported and taken into production.
1937 Alvis Pelides ordered into volume production, Armstrong Siddley deerhound development cancelled and they Shadow Pelides.
RDF 1.5 developed as an interim stage of development for AI RDF.
Blackburn Botha cancelled and Blackburn build Pelides engine De Haviland Flamingo instead, Used as MRA, training and later transport.
Pye Radio ltd and EMI co-opted into RDF development nearly two years earlier than OTL. This advances AI, ASV and the GCI by between eighteen months and one year compared to OTL.
Air Sea Rescue set up in 1938 more than a year (almost to really) than OTL.
Cancelling Peregrine engine causes cancelling of Whirlwind, Westland Build Gloster Reaper instead.
Shorts S29 ordered as original designed with the big wing. and four fairy Monarch engines. as a Heavy night bomber and LRMRA.
Avro Manchester Designed for two Fairey Monarchs instead of Vultures.
Castle Bromwich management change a year ahead of OTL and Production of Spitfires commencing one year earlier than OTL.
Availability of Hispano Cannons mean Castle Bromwich start volume production of Spitfire MkII (two 20mm cannon and four machine guns) a year ahead of OTL equivalent.
Hawkers introduce metal wings and paired cannon to Hurricanes by late 1939, 1 year ahead of OTL.
GCI RDF entering service by late Autumn 1939. 1 year ahead of OTL.
CH RDF is about as OTL, CHL is six months to a Year ahead of OTL and GCI is a full year ahead of OTL.

I m sure I have missed one or two things. IMVHO although a Rafwank every decision and changed done is actually plausible to some degree.
Even killing Professor Lindemann!!!

 

[sonofpegasus]

I did hint early in the Time line that during the recruitment drive that more instructors was a priority. encouraging civilian and retired RAF pilots beyond combat age to join up and qualify as instructors. Also you might have noticed more emphasis on training schools (especially navigation) and the Link trainer was introduced nearly 3 years earlier than OTL.
I did know an ex RFC pilot who had flown Sopwith Camels on the Western front at the age of 17 in 1917 who spent the entirety of WW2 in Canada as an instructor. I distinctly recall him saying that His WW2 was more boring than His WW1 but no les Dangerous! Oh yes to my ten year old self he was 'Biggles'.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Shorts S29 ordered as original designed with the big wing. and four fairy Monarch engines. as a Heavy night bomber and LRMRA.

Does that effectively make it the S.41 Super Stirling submitted to Specification B.1/39?

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

I agree that its unlikely more could have been done to expand the training organisation, especially in the dominions prior to September 1939. However, is there any scope for more forward planning between the POD in 1935 and September 1939? Especially after the "near miss" that was the Munich Crisis?

For all I know what I'm about to suggest might have been done anyway. Could the RAF and RCAF made the setting up of a large training organisation in Canada part of the mobilisation plans that they drew up 1935-39? The result would be that when war was declared the scheme was better co-ordinated and there were fewer delays. For example the RAF and RCAF would have survey parties looking for suitable sites for the new airfields once approval was given. AFAIK the interwar RCAF spent a lot of its time conducting aerial surveys of Canada and helping to set up Canada's civil aviation infrastructure. ITTL could planning for the wartime training organisation be officially (or more likely covertly) part of that?

Unfortunately I don't have a copy of Grand Strategy Volume 2 to hand. However, IIRC from that the plan at the outbreak of war was to increase aircraft production to 3,000 a month within the next 18 months (which may have included aircraft built in the Dominions. I simply can't remember properly). That works out at 36,000 a year which IIRC required the training of 50,000 aircrew annually.

However, in the event only 1,730 aircraft were delivered in March 1941, less than 60% of the number planned 18 months earlier. The peak month wasn't until March 1944 when 2,715 aircraft were produced. See the following table from British War Production.

View attachment 400417

For the purpose of these tables bombers have been classified as follows:

Heavy: Manchester, Stirling, Lancaster and Warwick.
Medium: Wellington, Hampden, Hereford, Whitley and Albemarle.
Light: Blenheim, Battle (under Scheme L only; thereafter under 'Trainers'), Mosquito (bomber and photographic reconnaissance unit).​

If the British aircraft industry had been able to produce 3,000 aircraft in March 1941 (without reducing UK production of something else) then we alternative historians would be spending considerably less time discussing: whether some heavy bombers should have been transferred from Bomber Command to Coastal Command in 1941; whether some of Fighter Command should have been sent to the Middle and Far East in 1941; were those dastardly folks running the Air Ministry and Ministry of Aircraft Production really starving the FAA of aircraft; and if several hundred aircraft hadn't been sent to the USSR in 1941 what good would they have done in the Middle East and Far East?

This is the same table as posted above showing the annual totals only.

For the purpose of these tables bombers have been classified as follows:

Heavy: Manchester, Stirling, Lancaster and Warwick.
Medium: Wellington, Hampden, Hereford, Whitley and Albemarle.
Light: Blenheim, Battle (under Scheme L only; thereafter under 'Trainers'), Mosquito (bomber and photographic reconnaissance unit).​

The table showed the deliveries of light bombers and fighters in 1944 as one combined figure. For the purposes of the annual production table I have shown them all as fighters for the formulas calculating the totals for 1938-44 to work.

 

[sonofpegasus]

Personally I would say that TTL Short's S29 Stirling is to the S.41 Super Stirling submitted to Specification B.1/39 OTL what OTL's Lancaster was to the Lincoln.

 

[sonofpegasus]

7. The balloon goes up but does not go Bang!


By the first of September Sir Phillip had no delusions that war would be more than days if not hours away. Now he would see if all the hard work put in by himself and the dedicated team around him would prevail. Sir Phillip and Sir Archibald issued instructions for the implementation of all contingency war plans that day. Sir Phillip then proceeded to take stock of each of RAF commands as represented in the latest returns from the CAS Sir Eric Newell. With 40 fighter squadrons active or forming, Fighter Command needed some 640 aircraft for the squadrons and for the full reserve both at squadron level and at depot a further 1600 fighters were required. Production of both Hurricanes and Spitfires had increased and was increasing significantly with all three Hurricane factories starting to produce up to three aircraft a day each and Castle Bromwich approaching two spitfires a day and Woolston maintaining the same level of production.

Boulton and Paul were starting to get into their stride with the Defiant as well and were completing one a day. Every day that passed meant that the RAF gained fourteen new fighter aircraft and at this time over half of them had cannons. That was almost a squadron worth of new fighter aircraft every day. In other words without losses the RAF could stand up seven new squadron every month with a full reserve of aircraft. As long as RR could keep the Merlins coming that would be the case. With the expansion factories starting to produce and RR improving the Merlin all the time perhaps it would be ok.

Currently stocks of Fighters held in reserve, not on squadron was low. The need to build up a reserve was obvious but this had to be balanced by the need to have operational squadrons. So the eighteen new squadrons would form and be outfitted at first with the castoff biplanes from squadron’s already converted to the new monoplanes. At least that had been accomplished before war was declared but only just. As new Fighters flowed to the squadrons so the biplanes would be discarded to other theatres and to training command.

The Luftwaffe did not try for the fabled and feared ‘Knockout Blow’ on the 3rd of September when Great Britain declared war on Germany despite the sounding of the air raid sirens. However on the sixth of September it began to look as if the Knockout blow was coming. At 6.15 in the morning the CH stations on the Thames Estuary started passing reports to the filter room at Bentley Priory of incoming hostile aircraft. On receiving the plot No 11 group head quarters scrambled two flights of Hurricanes from 56 Squadron based at North Weald to intercept. Despite only six Hurricanes from 56 Squadron being ordered to intercept no less than fourteen actually took off unbeknown to Fighter Command HQ.

As more hostiles were detected by the CH sites more, fighters were launched in response by 11 Group. The Second squadron Airborne was 151 in their hurricanes also from North Weald. Shortly followed by the Spitfires of 54, 65 and 74 squadrons at Hornchurch. By now the CH stations were reporting a veritable armada of hostile aircraft approaching the Thames near Southend. As Sir Hugh Dowding watched from the gallery of the Bentley Priory underground control centre, looking down on the map table he could see unfolding before him what appeared to be the first significant air battle of the war for Fighter Command and the first test of RDF and the ‘Dowding system’.

Suddenly just as the two opposing forces appeared to merge, on the map table there was a flurry of activity and all the hostile markers were swept to the side of the map. Seekiing answer’s Sir Hugh turned to the chief controller, who finished talking into the telephone handset he was holding before replacing it in the cradle and walking over to Sir Hugh. At that time the controller was unsure exactly what had happened, only that he had received a telephone call from Bawdsey Manor bypassing the filter room telling him there were no enemy aircraft and that the CH were reporting ghosts and Bawdsey had this confirmed by other Ch and CHL sites before calling Fighter Command HQ.

He had immediately called off all five squadrons but unfortunately 71 Squadron in their Spitfires had already mistakenly attacked Hurricanes from 151 Squadron shooting down one and damaging a second.

To Sir Hugh this was disaster and he was about to go ballistic when a couple of the resident scientists at Bentley Priory came hurrying over. They quickly explained that they had already found out how and why the false reports had occurred. Sir Hugh would still call a formal enquiry which would record the measure of the debacle. The Scientists explained that all the CH stations had been on continuous alert since the declaration of war and no maintenance or calibration adjustments had been done in that time. Somehow the blanking apparatus that prevent the static CH aerials from detecting aircraft on the landward side of the stations had failed so when they had picked up an aircraft and fighters were sent to intercept, these were seen as more hostile. To add to the confusion the signals from inland were somehow not showing the IFF signature on the CH system.

So as the Controller launched more aircraft to intercept they were seen as a bigger hostile force. Just before the phantom interception was due to occur the CHL station at Bawdsey had realised that they were only picking up the IFF identified fighters on their oscilloscopes. By the time they had confirmed this with the CH operators and had contacted the filter room at Bentley Priory the Tragic loss of two Hurricanes had already occurred. Subsequently each and every CH station was contacted to check their settings and to recalibrate as necessary to ensure only offshore targets were being detected. Other than the need for calibration and constant vigilance regarding the RDF apparatus performance two other fundamental lessons were learnt from this unfortunate incident.

One was that the single filter room at Bentley priory could be overwhelmed with information and when that happened it slowed down the decision and response time of the group and sector controllers too much. As a result of this fiasco plans were made to have filter rooms set up at each of the Group control centres to shorten the information loop.

The second lesson was from the unfortunate pilot of one of the hurricanes which had been hit. Only half a dozen rounds had hit his hurricane striking the fuel tank in front of the cockpit. Despite bailing out as quickly as possible the pilot had suffered severe burns to the hands and face. Apparently when the practicality of fitting self-sealing petrol tanks had been investigated the figures for the weight of the fuel tanks given to Dowding had been for crash proof rather than self-sealing, so fitting the tanks had been deemed impractical because of their excessive weight. Now that this error had come to light instructions were issued to design and fit self-sealing tanks as a matter of priority.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

If the tables below are accurate it looks as if IOTL priority was given to training aircraft in practice even if it had not been planned that way. However, I think the actual deliveries table counts the Fairey Battle as a trainer instead of a light bomber.

Another possible distortion in the figures might be the Blackburn Botha, which was intended to be a general reconnaissance aircraft, but ended up being used as a trainer and might be counted as trainers in the actual deliveries table.

Notes
For the purpose of these tables bombers have been classified as follows:
Heavy: Manchester, Stirling, Lancaster and Warwick.
Medium: Wellington, Hampden, Hereford, Whitley and Albemarle.
Light: Blenheim, Battle (under Scheme L only; thereafter under 'Trainers'), Mosquito (bomber and photographic reconnaissance unit).

 

[sonofpegasus]

Yes I believe Both the Battles and the Bothas transferred would be counted as training aircraft when originally ordered as Bombers of GR aircraft. Like wise OYL I believe the 200 Henleys built were also placed in the training category.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Yes I believe Both the Battles and the Bothas transferred would be counted as training aircraft when originally ordered as Bombers of GR aircraft. Like wise OYL I believe the 200 Henleys built were also placed in the training category.

From the big table I have posted twice showing the aircraft requirements for Expansion Scheme F it was intended to use the Henley as trainer as far back as October 1936 so they would be counted as trainers the chart for Scheme L and the aircraft actually delivered chart.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

To the Fairey Battle haters out there, read the following tables and weep.

Austin production of the Battle began in September 1938. The firm then produced 300 Hawker Hurricanes (I don't have the exact dates) and after that built Stirlings (I don't have the dates for Austin's Stirling production to hand either). Production of the Battle by Fairey ended in November 1940.

So 2,115 (of the 2,196 Battles built) were produced after 1st January 1939 and my guess is that the vast majority of them were delivered by 31st March 1940. If they have been counted as trainers or miscellaneous aircraft in the Actual Deliveries table then they comprise about 35% of all trainers delivered between January 1939 and March 1940.

I don't know but my guess is that the MAP cancelled 334 Battles in November 1940 to make way for the contract for 300 Hurricanes.