Map Thread XVII

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Deleted member 108228

Don't look ask him for why shipgirls exist; that's the work of the devs behind Azur Lane, of which is a rival to Kancolle, which also has a similar "shipgirl" theme. Frankly I don't care for both franchises (though some of Kancolle's gals are cute and attractive, can't say the same about AL), though it wouldn't hurt to have them represented in the West (then again there was a PSV Kancolle game that wrongly had its support cut off).

I'm just confused about how humanity would allow the governments to allow humans to be cybernetically augmented and psychologically reprogrammed underage women to fight pseudo-eldritch creatures, and not using conventional weapons such as nukes, bio-bombs, or cannons. I also wonder how program would be implemented without having some backlash, an UN investigation and the group who made them executed via anti-aircraft gun.
 
I'm just confused about how humanity would allow the governments to allow humans to be cybernetically augmented and psychologically reprogrammed underage women to fight pseudo-eldritch creatures, and not using conventional weapons such as nukes, bio-bombs, or cannons. I also wonder how program would be implemented without having some backlash, an UN investigation and the group who made them executed via anti-aircraft gun.
Come to think of it, that's a good question, though I'm not familiar with the franchise; the best I can think of why they do this grey s--t is because wartime censorship I guess.
 
@Ernak to answer all of your questions, yes the symbiotes are pretty much monsters that manifests in many forms,including the human one. Also these things thrives in radiations so nuking them would essentially feeding them treats. Bioweapons don't work either because they just adapted to it the next day. Also only Early shipgirls (mostly Kancolle versions of the shipgirls) were totally augmented humans and actually people approved this because there are only two options left; sacrifice few humans for the survival of the entire species or face a total extinction, and because humans are such a stubborn fuckers, they choose the former. Later shipgirls (some KC and almost all Azur Lane shipgirls) were synthetic androids.

@KuboCaskett I find some AL girls more attractive than their KC counterpart. Honestly I like all of them shipgirls, it's just that I prefer adult-looking KC Nagato than the AL version whose for some reason the dev makes her an underaged girl (like wtf?!), same goes as that I prefer AL Bismarck (not playable yet though) more than the her stripperific KC counterpart.
 
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I did finish East Yazoo, but it's too large presently
 
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This is absolutely stunning. You've taken a lot of the premises I actually consider to be accurate (e.g. history isn't an unending upward march; our modern world may just be a brief exception rather than 'the final station'; long-established attitudes will have much more staying power than new-fangled trends) -- but you've put a completely different soin on it than I would have. Truly exceptional!
Well, in my opinion there was something of mix-up in this map between long-established attitudes and new-fangled trends--for instance, I would argue that globalization and global trade integration date back much, much farther than merely the Columbus Exchange, which was only something of a final step in the process. As long as civilization has existed, trade has spread its fingers as far as it could reach, for both non-essential and essential items; the Sumerians were dependent on trade for wood, stone, and metals, for instance, which are not found in great abundance or quality in Mesopotamia, so that in some ways they were just as dependent on trade as we are. If the trade routes of Sumeria, of Egypt, of Rome and China and Arabia and so on and so forth did not reach all the way around the globe, that was more because they were not able, rather than not willing.

So economic globalization seems to be about the most durable trend in existence, to me, and I really can't see a world which voluntarily pulls back from it. I could see a world forced to pull back from it, perhaps, as with the Bronze Age Collapse, or where technological advances shift the pattern of trade routes so dramatically that there's an intermediate period where the world seems to be withdrawing from it (which may also have been the case with the Bronze Age Collapse in part, as ironworking technology removed the need for long-distance tin trading), but the scenario as presented seems to indicate that people chose to stop trading with each other, which seems incredibly unlikely to me in light of the above.

The same with the abandonment of the idea of the Universal Empire, which also dates back far before the Johnny-come-latelies in Europe (who anyway never really embraced universalism). As early as Sargon of Akkad you had conquerers who liked to claim that they ruled the whole Earth, or at least all of it that mattered, and the idea of setting up some kind of universal system of the world that encompasses everyone to a greater or lesser extent is one that shows up again and again in a wide variety of cultures and in a wide range of times. Persia, Macedonia, Rome, Arabia, China: all have at some time or another claimed to be or at least to be trying to be a universal empire, and in many cases not wholly inaccurately. If none of them were actually able to construct a truly global dominion, that again has more to do with the limitations of their technologies, social systems, and organizations than with any unwillingness to do so.

Again, this seems to be one of the most durable trends in existence. I can see in practical terms the idea of Universal Empire being abandoned as infeasible, but I cannot really see the intellectual abandonment of the concept to any real degree. The successors of Rome didn't reject the universalism of Rome: they sought to rebuild it, and merely failed. The same goes, of course, for the successors to the Caliphate and the Empire of Cyrus and so on and so forth in many other places as well. I could certainly see the global order breaking down, but I don't think that any concepts of "Civilizationism" which explicitly deny universalism would actually become mainstream, because they go against this very long-standing grain of establishing hegemonies and empires as large as possible, which then naturally tend to assimilate local cultures into a larger whole. Far more likely, to my mind, would be squabbles over which power or powers should build the new global order, now that the old one has vanished, the way that Europeans fought over who was going to have the legacy of Rome or the Chinese over who was going to rule. But I don't see that there would be any really serious debate over whether there is or ought to be a global order in the first place, just the same way that it was taken for granted for a very long time that there ought to be a Universal Empire over Europe or an Empire of China.
 
Well, in my opinion there was something of mix-up in this map between long-established attitudes and new-fangled trends--for instance, I would argue that globalization and global trade integration date back much, much farther than merely the Columbus Exchange, which was only something of a final step in the process. As long as civilization has existed, trade has spread its fingers as far as it could reach, for both non-essential and essential items; the Sumerians were dependent on trade for wood, stone, and metals, for instance, which are not found in great abundance or quality in Mesopotamia, so that in some ways they were just as dependent on trade as we are. If the trade routes of Sumeria, of Egypt, of Rome and China and Arabia and so on and so forth did not reach all the way around the globe, that was more because they were not able, rather than not willing.

So economic globalization seems to be about the most durable trend in existence, to me, and I really can't see a world which voluntarily pulls back from it. I could see a world forced to pull back from it, perhaps, as with the Bronze Age Collapse, or where technological advances shift the pattern of trade routes so dramatically that there's an intermediate period where the world seems to be withdrawing from it (which may also have been the case with the Bronze Age Collapse in part, as ironworking technology removed the need for long-distance tin trading), but the scenario as presented seems to indicate that people chose to stop trading with each other, which seems incredibly unlikely to me in light of the above.

The same with the abandonment of the idea of the Universal Empire, which also dates back far before the Johnny-come-latelies in Europe (who anyway never really embraced universalism). As early as Sargon of Akkad you had conquerers who liked to claim that they ruled the whole Earth, or at least all of it that mattered, and the idea of setting up some kind of universal system of the world that encompasses everyone to a greater or lesser extent is one that shows up again and again in a wide variety of cultures and in a wide range of times. Persia, Macedonia, Rome, Arabia, China: all have at some time or another claimed to be or at least to be trying to be a universal empire, and in many cases not wholly inaccurately. If none of them were actually able to construct a truly global dominion, that again has more to do with the limitations of their technologies, social systems, and organizations than with any unwillingness to do so.

Again, this seems to be one of the most durable trends in existence. I can see in practical terms the idea of Universal Empire being abandoned as infeasible, but I cannot really see the intellectual abandonment of the concept to any real degree. The successors of Rome didn't reject the universalism of Rome: they sought to rebuild it, and merely failed. The same goes, of course, for the successors to the Caliphate and the Empire of Cyrus and so on and so forth in many other places as well. I could certainly see the global order breaking down, but I don't think that any concepts of "Civilizationism" which explicitly deny universalism would actually become mainstream, because they go against this very long-standing grain of establishing hegemonies and empires as large as possible, which then naturally tend to assimilate local cultures into a larger whole. Far more likely, to my mind, would be squabbles over which power or powers should build the new global order, now that the old one has vanished, the way that Europeans fought over who was going to have the legacy of Rome or the Chinese over who was going to rule. But I don't see that there would be any really serious debate over whether there is or ought to be a global order in the first place, just the same way that it was taken for granted for a very long time that there ought to be a Universal Empire over Europe or an Empire of China.

IMO, it reads like a world that has given up on "more is good, all is better" and wants to make do with what it has.
 
IMO, it reads like a world that has given up on "more is good, all is better" and wants to make do with what it has.
The thing is that the idea "more is good, all is better" is really, really, really old, as I pointed out. If the concept of the map was to examine what the future might look like if we explicitly focus on overturning recent trends and preserving older ones, then abandoning ideas which are literally as old as civilization seems to rather seriously undermine it. Now, if the purpose was instead to examine precisely what a world that does not believe "more is good, all is better" might look like, then everything is copacetic, merely unbelievable (at least for me) thanks to the problems mentioned above (and a few others related to science and technology where I know a thing or two, but that's beside the point).
 

Skallagrim

Banned
(snip)Universal Empire(snip)

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...but more seriously, I actually agree with your views here, and I do not think that the scenario presented is a refuation of what you say here. Will global trade die out here? Don't count on it! But long-term developments aren't straight lines. The, uh, well... the trend may be easily discernable, but there can (and will) still be periods where things slow down or fall back. So we may say globar trade integration is just going to keep going in the long run, but there can still be periods where such integration halts and communities are more inward-focused. The veritable collapse of the current political order would almost certainly cause such a period. One may argue that the (actually quite brief) real "dark ages" were much the same. Once new powers consolidated in post-classical Europe, the long-term trends largely resumed as one would expect.

Same goes for Universal Empire. In fact, it goes doubly so, in this case. One may well argue that the currect situation ("competing, relatively stable nation-states") is detrimental to the formation of Universal Empire. The Post-Westphalian world is ill-suited to such an endeavour, after all. Too many feasible rivals to gang up on a potential claiment! (N. Bonaparte and A. Hitler, among others, found that out soon enough.) But not to fret-- the collapse of the current order, resulting in a far more fractured amalgamation of more loosely-connected, more localised fiefs... oh, that's the perfect breeding ground for the aspirations of Empire.

A map of this world, set in 2300, may well surprise the localist denizens of 2100 by showing them a sprawling Oikoumene stretching across a very substantial part of the globe. And just as we think the current order of stable nation-states and constant growth is normal, just as the folk in 2100 think their situation of local communities and 'conserved' stagnation is normal... so will the people of 2300 find nothing strange about the simple fact that they're living in the Empire. To them, it'll be normal. (Just as you indicated in you last paragraph!)
 
...but more seriously, I actually agree with your views here, and I do not think that the scenario presented is a refuation of what you say here. Will global trade die out here? Don't count on it! But long-term developments aren't straight lines. The, uh, well... the trend may be easily discernable, but there can (and will) still be periods where things slow down or fall back. So we may say globar trade integration is just going to keep going in the long run, but there can still be periods where such integration halts and communities are more inward-focused. The veritable collapse of the current political order would almost certainly cause such a period. One may argue that the (actually quite brief) real "dark ages" were much the same. Once new powers consolidated in post-classical Europe, the long-term trends largely resumed as one would expect.
Well, I suppose my beef was more with the presentation than necessarily the idea of a breakdown in trade and the global order, etc. My complaint is that as presented the scenario requires the breakdown of rather long-standing trends, but then I go on to suggest ways that it could be presented differently that preserve the form of the world but without breaking the trends in the process: a breakdown of trade due not to the implied lower interest in trade, but instead due to shifts in technology that undermine previous trade routes (for instance, advances in robotics and automated manufacturing that make it more economical to manufacture items locally than to import them), for example, or a world of states squabbling over who gets to create the New World Order but unable to actually do it rather than rejecting the entire notion of a world order. Essentially, they might be doing the same things, but (I suspect) for different reasons.

To get back to your example of the real dark ages, even though the Roman order collapsed, and (we can now see) collapsed forever, with a concomitant end to the possibility of a Universal (European) Empire, it was not obvious at the time that the Roman order had really ended, and there were attempts to rebuild it for some time afterwards (Justinian being the obvious example). It was only in retrospect that it had clearly ended, and even then there were of course significant efforts to recreate it. I suspect that the same would be true here, where it wouldn't be obvious until a new order comes into being that the old era has really definitively ended for good.

I think the Bronze Age Collapse might be a better model for the desired scenario, and perhaps for the future in general; a combination of factors seems to have pushed the world system of that era past its breaking point, and after a period of instability a wholly new one with rather few connections to the previous formed. In particular, this did lead to a lengthy decentralization of power and the formation of smaller states than had previously tended to obtain due to the spread of technologies that undermined the former advantages of large, bureaucratic empires (viz., ironworking didn't require long-distance trade and was much cheaper than bronze, so no elaborate system was needed to manage that trade and ensure that the bronze was fairly distributed). However, this contrasts with the stated technological plateauing of the scenario as presented, at least when it comes to technologies that could benefit decentralization like automation and computer networking. In fact, the idea of a Bronze Age Collapse-type scenario tends (to me) to suggest something more out of Gibson or Stephenson, a Snow Crash or Sprawl Trilogy kind of world...

(Incidentally, that makes me curious: has anyone ever done a map trying to work up what the Sprawl Trilogy world looks like? Snow Crash is infeasible due to the overlapping of a huge number of micro states, but the Sprawl seems to have some fairly definite political boundaries in place, so it might be possible...)

Same goes for Universal Empire. In fact, it goes doubly so, in this case. One may well argue that the currect situation ("competing, relatively stable nation-states") is detrimental to the formation of Universal Empire. The Post-Westphalian world is ill-suited to such an endeavour, after all. Too many feasible rivals to gang up on a potential claiment! (N. Bonaparte and A. Hitler, among others, found that out soon enough.) But not to fret-- the collapse of the current order, resulting in a far more fractured amalgamation of more loosely-connected, more localised fiefs... oh, that's the perfect breeding ground for the aspirations of Empire.
True enough, but hegemony and cultural dominance are also forms of Empire, even if they don't look quite the same on the map. The Chinese Empire in this sense consisted not only of China, but also of Vietnam (even when it wasn't controlled by China), Korea, Japan, Tibet...the entire sphere of countries that were influenced and dominated by China and Chinese culture more so than other countries. Formally speaking, those rulers tended to accept the Emperor of China as a nominal overlord (well, except for the Japanese), even if in practice the Chinese had no real influence of that sort over them. This sort of empire is of course entirely possible in a Westphalian world, as shown by the United States among others.
 

Deleted member 67076

Crossposting from Oneshot Scenarios.
"Africa and much of the “Paupuan World” is a post-Westphalian mess of tribal and religious identities and loyalties. The concept of “nation” being restricted to European-drawn imaginary lines is ridiculous. Bush wars are still depressingly commonplace between African tribes, and a form of neo-neo-colonialism (that wasn’t a typo) is starting up as the outside world scrambles to fill in the resource gaps that austerity cannot account for. For the record, neo-neo-colonialism (there has to be a better name for this) is the hot-button geopolitical issue in the West, as it’s seen by its opponents as a gateway to destructive globalism.

Africa's post-colonial system ended in blood, and tribalism will once again be the de jure means of governance. Foreign commercial interests will buy up the port cities, and defend them, but otherwise we see the return of Darkest Africa."

I'm sorry but this doesn't make any sense. The 1980s-90s basically saw the destruction of traditional tribalism in Africa at the same level that Columbus and European plagues did with Native American civilizational complexes; you cannot go back to them not even if the world systems broke down due to a myriad of factors from far more diverse crop packages to economic incentives (such as industrialization) to differing population pressures. Furthermore if we posit to the Lindy effect than most of Central Africa should be covered by massive federations and what are essentially anarchist communes, not various tribes, many of whom were relics of the colonial structure of rule (some literally created by the colonial office to find native ruling classes as a means to save money).

A return to the 1600s era style of parasitic colonialism by outside powers on port fringes trying to influence the interior is just impossible, especially when the memories of neocolonialism and the need for ports/independence/outside contact determined by native interests is as burned into the public consciousness as the Holocaust is to Israel.
 
Of course, the bad future is really bad (make-Hitler-and-Stalin-look-like-mere-playground-bullies bad), and just writing about it can be very tiring. I'd want the far more positive scenario to be done first, just to contrast.

Reminds me of the backstory to Fitzpatrick's War, in which the horrors of the late 21st century are so vast that Hitler and Stalin are almost forgotten figures, their crimes rendered petty by comparison.
 
The POD is in 1802, which I admit is probably not far enough back to justify reorganizing all the provinces, but like..... Argentine provinces IOTL look like ass, yannow? As for Entre Ríos, I figured renaming the province after the Uruguay river (which it borders) would just be a fun kind of historical irony sort of thing, but I could certainly change it back. I feel pretty comfortable, though, with many of the other provinces keeping their names, as the majority of them are after their capital cities, which I haven't changed. Provinces that weren't around at Argentine independence I did change: note Río Negro (in OTL Uruguay, rather than Patagonia), all of the Gran Chaco provinces, and all of the Patagonian provinces save Chubut and Neuquén (which were named after rivers, themselves with etymologies in indigenous languages, so I figured keeping the names was fine). Thanks for the feedback!

Edit: Okay, went back and changed some stuff.
To be honest, with some more years of divergence, it would make sense since the capital of Entre Ríos at the time was Concepción del Uruguay. I still think it is more realistic to have it be Entre Ríos.
 
Reminds me of the backstory to Fitzpatrick's War, in which the horrors of the late 21st century are so vast that Hitler and Stalin are almost forgotten figures, their crimes rendered petty by comparison.

That book had a pretty insane premise, when you think about it. Steampunk Alexander the Great, in the Future! Some pretty interesting world building, too.
 
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